Search results for 'Indispensability' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. A. Personal, Corporate Indispensability, B. Personal, Corporate Infallibility, A. God—Humanism, C. Family—Career, D. Work—Leisure, E. Interdependence—Independence, I. Thrift—Debt & J. Absolute—Relative (forthcoming). Chapter Outline. Moral Management: Business Ethics.score: 30.0
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  2. Sam Baron (2013). A Truthmaker Indispensability Argument. Synthese 190 (12):2413-2427.score: 24.0
    Recently, nominalists have made a case against the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism by taking issue with Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. In this paper I propose and defend an indispensability argument founded on an alternative criterion of ontological commitment: that advocated by David Armstrong. By defending such an argument I place the burden back onto the nominalist to defend her favourite criterion of ontological commitment and, furthermore, show that criterion cannot be used to formulate a plausible (...)
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  3. Anne Newstead & James Franklin (2012). Indispensability Without Platonism. In Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard Sankey (eds.), Properties, Powers and Structures. Routledge.score: 24.0
    According to Quine’s indispensability argument, we ought to believe in just those mathematical entities that we quantify over in our best scientific theories. Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment is part of the standard indispensability argument. However, we suggest that a new indispensability argument can be run using Armstrong’s criterion of ontological commitment rather than Quine’s. According to Armstrong’s criterion, ‘to be is to be a truthmaker (or part of one)’. We supplement this criterion with our own brand (...)
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  4. Richard Pettigrew (2012). Indispensability Arguments and Instrumental Nominalism. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):687-709.score: 24.0
    In the philosophy of mathematics, indispensability arguments aim to show that we are justified in believing that abstract mathematical objects exist. I wish to defend a particular objection to such arguments that has become increasingly popular recently. It is called instrumental nominalism. I consider the recent versions of this view and conclude that it has yet to be given an adequate formulation. I provide such a formulation and show that it can be used to answer the indispensability arguments. (...)
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  5. Patrick S. Dieveney (2007). Dispensability in the Indispensability Argument. Synthese 157 (1):105 - 128.score: 24.0
    One of the most influential arguments for realism about mathematical objects is the indispensability argument. Simply put, this is the argument that insofar as we are committed to the existence of the physical objects existentially quantified over in our best scientific theories, we are also committed to the mathematical objects existentially quantified over in these theories. Following the Quine–Putnam formulation of the indispensability argument, some proponents of the indispensability argument have made the mistake of taking confirmational holism (...)
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  6. Jacob Busch (2011). Is the Indispensability Argument Dispensable? Theoria 77 (2):139-158.score: 24.0
    When the indispensability argument for mathematical entities (IA) is spelled out, it would appear confirmational holism is needed for the argument to work. It has been argued that confirmational holism is a dispensable premise in the argument if a construal of naturalism, according to which it is denied that we can take different epistemic attitudes towards different parts of our scientific theories, is adopted. I argue that the suggested variety of naturalism will only appeal to a limited number of (...)
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  7. Jacob Busch (2011). Indispensability and Holism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (1):47-59.score: 24.0
    It is claimed that the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical entities (IA) works in a way that allows a proponent of mathematical realism to remain agnostic with regard to how we establish that mathematical entities exist. This is supposed to be possible by virtue of the appeal to confirmational holism that enters into the formulation of IA. Holism about confirmation is supposed to be motivated in analogy with holism about falsification. I present an account of how holism (...)
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  8. Lieven Decock (2002). Quine's Weak and Strong Indispensability Argument. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33 (2):231-250.score: 24.0
    Quine's views on indispensability arguments in mathematics are scrutinised. A weak indispensability argument is distinguished from a strong indispensability thesis. The weak argument is the combination of the criterion of ontological commitment, holism and a mild naturalism. It is used to refute nominalism. Quine's strong indispensability thesis claims that one should consider all and only the mathematical entities that are really indispensable. Quine has little support for this thesis. This is even clearer if one takes into (...)
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  9. Mitchell O. Stokes (2007). Van Inwagen and the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument. Erkenntnis 67 (3):439 - 453.score: 24.0
    In this paper I do two things: (1) I support the claim that there is still some confusion about just what the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument is and the way it employs Quinean meta-ontology and (2) I try to dispel some of this confusion by presenting the argument in a way which reveals its important meta-ontological features, and include these features explicitly as premises. As a means to these ends, I compare Peter van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of properties (...)
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  10. Jacob Busch (2012). The Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism and Scientific Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43 (1):3-9.score: 24.0
    Confirmational holism is central to a traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for mathematical realism (IA). I argue that recent strategies for defending scientific realism are incompatible with confirmational holism. Thus a traditional formulation of IA is incompatible with recent strategies for defending scientific realism. As a consequence a traditional formulation of IA will only have limited appeal.
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  11. Pieranna Garavaso (2005). On Frege's Alleged Indispensability Argument. Philosophia Mathematica 13 (2):160-173.score: 24.0
    The expression ‘indispensability argument’ denotes a family of arguments for mathematical realism supported among others by Quine and Putnam. More and more often, Gottlob Frege is credited with being the first to state this argument in section 91 of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Frege's alleged indispensability argument is the subject of this essay. On the basis of three significant differences between Mark Colyvan's indispensability arguments and Frege's applicability argument, I deny that Frege presents an indispensability argument (...)
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  12. Eduardo Castro (2013). Defending the Indispensability Argument: Atoms, Infinity and the Continuum. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 44 (1):41-61.score: 24.0
    This paper defends the Quine-Putnam mathematical indispensability argument against two objections raised by Penelope Maddy. The objections concern scientific practices regarding the development of the atomic theory and the role of applied mathematics in the continuum and infinity. I present two alternative accounts by Stephen Brush and Alan Chalmers on the atomic theory. I argue that these two theories are consistent with Quine’s theory of scientific confirmation. I advance some novel versions of the indispensability argument. I argue that (...)
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  13. Feng Ye (2007). Indispensability Argument and Anti-Realism in Philosophy of Mathematics. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):614-628.score: 24.0
    The indispensability argument for abstract mathematical entities has been an important issue in the philosophy of mathematics. The argument relies on several assumptions. Some objections have been made against these assumptions, but there are several serious defects in these objections. Ameliorating these defects leads to a new anti-realistic philosophy of mathematics, mainly: first, in mathematical applications, what really exist and can be used as tools are not abstract mathematical entities, but our inner representations that we create in imagining abstract (...)
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  14. Russell Marcus (2014). The Holistic Presumptions of the Indispensability Argument. Synthese 191 (15):3575-3594.score: 24.0
    The indispensability argument is sometimes seen as weakened by its reliance on a controversial premise of confirmation holism. Recently, some philosophers working on the indispensability argument have developed versions of the argument which, they claim, do not rely on holism. Some of these writers even claim to have strengthened the argument by eliminating the controversial premise. I argue that the apparent removal of holism leaves a lacuna in the argument. Without the holistic premise, or some other premise which (...)
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  15. Sam Baron (2013). Can Indispensability‐Driven Platonists Be (Serious) Presentists? Theoria 79 (3):153-173.score: 24.0
    In this article I consider what it would take to combine a certain kind of mathematical Platonism with serious presentism. I argue that a Platonist moved to accept the existence of mathematical objects on the basis of an indispensability argument faces a significant challenge if she wishes to accept presentism. This is because, on the one hand, the indispensability argument can be reformulated as a new argument for the existence of past entities and, on the other hand, if (...)
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  16. Russell Marcus (2007). Structuralism, Indispensability, and the Access Problem. Facta Philosophica 9 (1):203-211.score: 24.0
    The access problem for mathematics arises from the supposition that the referents of mathematical terms inhabit a realm separate from us. Quine’s approach in the philosophy of mathematics dissolves the access problem, though his solution sometimes goes unrecognized, even by those who rely on his framework. This paper highlights both Quine’s position and its neglect. I argue that Michael Resnik’s structuralist, for example, has no access problem for the so-called mathematical objects he posits, despite recent criticism, since he relies on (...)
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  17. Matteo Plebani (forthcoming). Nominalistic Content, Grounding, and Covering Generalizations: Reply to 'Grounding and the Indispensability Argument'. Synthese:1-10.score: 24.0
    ‘Grounding and the indispensability argument’ presents a number of ways in which nominalists can use the notion of grounding to rebut the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects. I will begin by considering the strategy that puts grounding to the service of easy-road nominalists (“Nominalistic content meets grounding” section). I will give some support to this strategy by addressing a worry some may have about it (“A misguided worry about the grounding strategy” section). I will then (...)
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  18. Andrea Sereni (forthcoming). Equivalent Explanations and Mathematical Realism. Reply to “Evidence, Explanation, and Enhanced Indispensability”. Synthese:1-12.score: 24.0
    The author of “Evidence, Explanation, Enhanced Indispensability” advances a criticism to the Enhanced Indispensability Argument and the use of Inference to the Best Explanation in order to draw ontological conclusions from mathematical explanations in science. His argument relies on the availability of equivalent though competing explanations, and a pluralist stance on explanation. I discuss whether pluralism emerges as a stable position, and focus here on two main points: whether cases of equivalent explanations have been actually offered, and which (...)
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  19. Mark Colyvan, Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 21.0
    One of the most intriguing features of mathematics is its applicability to empirical science. Every branch of science draws upon large and often diverse portions of mathematics, from the use of Hilbert spaces in quantum mechanics to the use of differential geometry in general relativity. It's not just the physical sciences that avail themselves of the services of mathematics either. Biology, for instance, makes extensive use of difference equations and statistics. The roles mathematics plays in these theories is also varied. (...)
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  20. Jacob Busch & Andrea Sereni (2012). Indispensability Arguments and Their Quinean Heritage. Indispensability Arguments and Their Quinean Heritage 4 (32):343 - 360.score: 21.0
    Indispensability arguments (IA) for mathematical realism are commonly traced back to Quine. We identify two different Quinean strands in the interpretation of IA, what we label the �logical point of view� and the �theory-contribution� point of view. Focusing on each of the latter, we offer two minimal versions of IA. These both dispense with a number of theoretical assumptions commonly thought to be relevant to IA (most notably confirmational holism and naturalism). We then show that the attribution of both (...)
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  21. Y. E. Feng (2007). Indispensability Argument and Anti-Realism in Philosophy of Mathematics. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):614-628.score: 21.0
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  22. David Liggins (2008). Quine, Putnam, and the 'Quine-Putnam' Indispensability Argument. Erkenntnis 68 (1):113 - 127.score: 18.0
    Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument—an argument which aims to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that this attribution is mistaken. Quine's argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. (...)
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  23. Otávio Bueno (2003). Quine's Double Standard: Undermining the Indispensability Argument Via the Indeterminacy of Reference. Principia 7 (1-2):17-39.score: 18.0
    Quine has famously put forward the indispensability argument to force belief in the existence of mathematical objects (such as classes) due to their indispensability to our best theories of the world (Quine 1960). Quine has also advocated the indeterminacy of reference argument, according to which reference is dramatically indeterminate: given a language, there’s no unique reference relation for that language (see Quine 1969a). In this paper, I argue that these two arguments are in conflict with each other. Whereas (...)
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  24. Jacob Busch (2011). Scientific Realism and the Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism: A Marriage Made in Hell. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):307-325.score: 18.0
    An emphasis on explanatory contribution is central to a recent formulation of the indispensability argument (IA) for mathematical realism. Because scientific realism is argued for by means of inference to the best explanation (IBE), it has been further argued that being a scientific realist entails a commitment to IA and thus to mathematical realism. It has, however, gone largely unnoticed that the way that IBE is argued to be truth conducive involves citing successful applications of IBE and tracing this (...)
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  25. Juha Saatsi (2011). The Enhanced Indispensability Argument: Representational Versus Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):143-154.score: 18.0
    The Enhanced Indispensability Argument (Baker [ 2009 ]) exemplifies the new wave of the indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism. The new wave capitalizes on mathematics' role in scientific explanations. I will criticize some analyses of mathematics' explanatory function. In turn, I will emphasize the representational role of mathematics, and argue that the debate would significantly benefit from acknowledging this alternative viewpoint to mathematics' contribution to scientific explanations and knowledge.
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  26. Michael Resnik (1995). Scientific Vs. Mathematical Realism: The Indispensability Argument. Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2):166-174.score: 18.0
    Penelope Maddy and Elliott Sober recently attacked the confirmational indispensability argument for mathematical realism. We cannot count on science to provide evidence for the truth of mathematics, they say, because either scientific testing fails to confirm mathematics (Sober) or too much mathematics occurs in false scientific theories (Maddy). I present a pragmatic indispensability argument immune to these objections, and show that this argument supports mathematical realism independently of scientific realism. Mathematical realism, it turns out, may be even more (...)
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  27. Mark Colyvan (2003). The Indispensability of Mathematics. Oxford University Press on Demand.score: 18.0
    This book not only outlines the indispensability argument in considerable detail but also defends it against various challenges.
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  28. Mark Colyvan (1998). In Defence of Indispensability. Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):39-62.score: 18.0
    Indispensability arguments for realism about mathematical entities have come under serious attack in recent years. To my mind the most profound attack has come from Penelope Maddy, who argues that scientific/mathematical practice doesn't support the key premise of the indispensability argument, that is, that we ought to have ontological commitment to those entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories. In this paper I defend the Quine/Putnam indispensability argument against Maddy's objections.
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  29. J. Melia (2000). Weaseling Away the Indispensability Argument. Mind 109 (435):455-480.score: 18.0
    According to the indispensability argument, the fact that we quantify over numbers, sets and functions in our best scientific theories gives us reason for believing that such objects exist. I examine a strategy to dispense with such quantification by simply replacing any given platonistic theory by the set of sentences in the nominalist vocabulary it logically entails. I argue that, as a strategy, this response fails: for there is no guarantee that the nominalist world that go beyond the set (...)
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  30. Mary Leng (2002). What's Wrong with Indispensability? Synthese 131 (3):395 - 417.score: 18.0
    For many philosophers not automatically inclined to Platonism, the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objectshas provided the best (and perhaps only) evidence for mathematicalrealism. Recently, however, this argument has been subject to attack, most notably by Penelope Maddy (1992, 1997),on the grounds that its conclusions do not sit well with mathematical practice. I offer a diagnosis of what has gone wrong with the indispensability argument (I claim that mathematics is indispensable in the wrong way), and, taking (...)
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  31. Christopher Pincock (2004). A Revealing Flaw in Colyvan's Indispensability Argument. Philosophy of Science 71 (1):61-79.score: 18.0
    Mark Colyvan uses applications of mathematics to argue that mathematical entities exist. I claim that his argument is invalid based on the assumption that a certain way of thinking about applications, called `the mapping account,' is correct. My main contention is that successful applications depend only on there being appropriate structural relations between physical situations and the mathematical domain. As a variety of non-realist interpretations of mathematics deliver these structural relations, indispensability arguments are invalid.
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  32. Susan Vineberg (1996). Confirmation and the Indispensability of Mathematics to Science. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):263.score: 18.0
    Quine and Putnam argued for mathematical realism on the basis of the indispensability of mathematics to science. They claimed that the mathematics that is used in physical theories is confirmed along with those theories and that scientific realism entails mathematical realism. I argue here that current theories of confirmation suggest that mathematics does not receive empirical support simply in virtue of being a part of well confirmed scientific theories and that the reasons for adopting a realist view of scientific (...)
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  33. Mark Colyvan (1999). Confirmation Theory and Indispensability. Philosophical Studies 96 (1):1-19.score: 18.0
    In this paper I examine Quine''s indispensability argument, with particular emphasis on what is meant by ''indispensable''. I show that confirmation theory plays a crucial role in answering this question and that once indispensability is understood in this light, Quine''s argument is seen to be a serious stumbling block for any scientific realist wishing to maintain an anti-realist position with regard to mathematical entities.
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  34. Joe Morrison (2012). Evidential Holism and Indispensability Arguments. Erkenntnis 76 (2):263-278.score: 18.0
    The indispensability argument is a method for showing that abstract mathematical objects exist (call this mathematical Platonism). Various versions of this argument have been proposed (§1). Lately, commentators seem to have agreed that a holistic indispensability argument (§2) will not work, and that an explanatory indispensability argument is the best candidate. In this paper I argue that the dominant reasons for rejecting the holistic indispensability argument are mistaken. This is largely due to an overestimation of the (...)
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  35. S. Bangu (2013). Indispensability and Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):255-277.score: 18.0
    The question as to whether there are mathematical explanations of physical phenomena has recently received a great deal of attention in the literature. The answer is potentially relevant for the ontology of mathematics; if affirmative, it would support a new version of the indispensability argument for mathematical realism. In this article, I first review critically a few examples of such explanations and advance a general analysis of the desiderata to be satisfied by them. Second, in an attempt to strengthen (...)
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  36. Cheryl Misak (2011). 2011 Presidential Address: American Pragmatism and Indispensability Arguments. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (3):261-273.score: 18.0
    In the early- to mid- 1870s, William James started to argue that if one needs to believe something, then one ought to believe it, even if there is no evidence in its favor. It is not easy to unwind the various things that James said about what he called the will to believe, but one thing is clear. He was initially tempted to put forward a very strong point and despite the refinements he was eventually to make, his is the (...)
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  37. Mark Colyvan (1999). Contrastive Empiricism and Indispensability. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):323-332.score: 18.0
    The Quine-Putnam indispensability argument urges us to place mathematical entities on the same ontological footing as (other) theoretical entities of empirical science. Recently this argument has attracted much criticism, and in this paper I address one criticism due to Elliott Sober. Sober argues that mathematical theories cannot share the empirical support accrued by our best scientific theories, since mathematical propositions are not being tested in the same way as the clearly empirical propositions of science. In this paper I defend (...)
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  38. Wai-Hung Wong (2005). The Skeptical Paradox and the Indispensability of Knowledge-Beliefs. Synthese 143 (3):273-290.score: 18.0
    Some philosophers understand epistemological skepticism as merely presenting a paradox to be solved, a paradox given rise to by some apparently forceful arguments. I argue that such a view needs to be justified, and that the best way to do so is to show that we cannot help seeing skepticism as obviously false. The obviousness (to us) of the falsity of skepticism is, I suggest, explained by the fact that we cannot live without knowledge-beliefs (a knowledge-belief about the world is (...)
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  39. Tomasz Bigaj (2003). The Indispensability Argument – a New Chance for Empiricism in Mathematics? Foundations of Science 8 (2):173-200.score: 18.0
    In recent years, the so-calledindispensability argument has been given a lotof attention by philosophers of mathematics.This argument for the existence of mathematicalobjects makes use of the fact, neglected inclassical schools of philosophy of mathematics,that mathematics is part of our best scientifictheories, and therefore should receive similarsupport to these theories. However, thisobservation raises the question about the exactnature of the alleged connection betweenexperience and mathematics (for example: is itpossible to falsify empirically anymathematical theorems?). In my paper I wouldlike to address this (...)
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  40. David Liggins (forthcoming). Grounding and the Indispensability Argument. Synthese:1-18.score: 18.0
    There has been much discussion of the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects. In this paper I reconsider the debate by using the notion of grounding, or non-causal dependence. First of all, I investigate what proponents of the indispensability argument should say about the grounding of relations between physical objects and mathematical ones. This reveals some resources which nominalists are entitled to use. Making use of these resources, I present a neglected but promising response to the (...)
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  41. Jeroen van Bouwel, Erik Weber & Leen de Vreese (2011). Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (1):33-46.score: 18.0
    Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to (...)
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  42. C. Cheyne (2002). The Indispensability of Mathematics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):378 – 379.score: 18.0
    Book Information The Indispensability of Mathematics. By Mark Colyvan. Oxford University Press. New York. 2001. Pp. 172. Hardback, £30.00.
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  43. C. Juhl (2012). On the Indispensability of the Distinctively Mathematical. Philosophia Mathematica 20 (3):324-338.score: 18.0
    Indispensability arguments purport to show that empirical data provide evidence for the existence of mathematical entities. In this paper we argue that indispensability arguments fail to show that empirical data bears on the mathematical. In order to show this we attempt to clarify what it is to be mathematical , and separate the question whether abstracta in general exist from whether distinctively mathematical abstracta exist. We introduce the notion of an ‘agnostified’ empirical theory as a heuristic device for (...)
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  44. Anthony Peressini (1997). Troubles with Indispensability: Applying Pure Mathematics in Physical Theoryt. Philosophia Mathematica 5 (3):210-227.score: 18.0
    Much of the current thought concerning mathematical ontology in volves in some way the Quine/Putnam indispensability argument. The indispensability approach needs to be more thoroughly specified, however, before substantive progress can be made in assessing it. To this end I examine in some detail the ways in which pure mathematics is applied to physical theory; such considerations give rise to three specific issues with which the indispensability approach must come to grips.
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  45. Jacob Busch (2012). Can the New Indispensability Argument Be Saved From Euclidean Rescues? Synthese 187 (2):489-508.score: 18.0
    The traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical entities (IA) has been criticised due to its reliance on confirmational holism. Recently a formulation of IA that works without appeal to confirmational holism has been defended. This recent formulation is meant to be superior to the traditional formulation in virtue of it not being subject to the kind of criticism that pertains to confirmational holism. I shall argue that a proponent of the version of IA that (...)
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  46. Russell Marcus (forthcoming). How Not to Enhance the Indispensability Argument. Philosophia Mathematica:nku004.score: 18.0
    The new explanatory or enhanced indispensability argument alleges that our mathematical beliefs are justified by their indispensable appearances in scientific explanations. This argument differs from the standard indispensability argument which focuses on the uses of mathematics in scientific theories. I argue that the new argument depends for its plausibility on an equivocation between two senses of explanation. On one sense the new argument is an oblique restatement of the standard argument. On the other sense, it is vulnerable to (...)
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  47. Andrea Sereni (forthcoming). Frege, Indispensability, and the Compatibilist Heresy. Philosophia Mathematica:nkt046.score: 18.0
    In Grundgesetze, Vol. II, §91, Frege argues that ‘it is applicability alone which elevates arithmetic from a game to the rank of a science’. Many view this as an in nuce statement of the indispensability argument (ia) later championed by Quine. Garavaso has questioned this attribution. I argue that even though Frege's applicability argument is not a version of ia, it facilitates acceptance of suitable formulations of ia. The prospects for making the empiricist ia compatible with a rationalist Fregean (...)
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  48. Jörgen Sjögren (2011). Indispensability, the Testing of Mathematical Theories, and Provisional Realism. Polish Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):99-116.score: 18.0
    Mathematical concepts are explications, in Carnap's sense, of vague or otherwise non-clear concepts; mathematical theories have an empirical and a deductive component. From this perspective, I argue that the empirical component of a mathematical theory may be tested together with the fruitfulness of its explications. Using these ideas, I furthermore give an argument for mathematical realism, based on the indispensability argument combined with a weakened version of confirmational holism.
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  49. Jeroen Van Bouwel, Erik Weber & Leen De Vreese (2011). Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):33 - 46.score: 18.0
    Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to (...)
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  50. Geoffrey Hellman (1992). On the Scope and Force of Indispensability Arguments. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:456 - 464.score: 18.0
    Three questions are highlighted concerning the scope and force of indispensability arguments supporting classical, infinitistic mathematics. The first concerns the need for non-constructive reasoning for scientifically applicable mathematics; the second concerns the need for impredicative set existence principles for finitistic and scientifically applicable mathematics, respectively; and the third concerns the general status of such arguments in light of recent work in mathematical logic, especially that of Friedman et al. and Feferman et al. Some recent results (of Pour-El and Richards (...)
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