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  1. Carlos Bazan, Rudiger Bittner, Irving Block, Luc Brisson, John Clendinnen, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Johnann Götschl, Ingemund Gullvag, Rom Harre & Bernard Harrison (forthcoming). Visiting Professors From Abroad, 1983-84. Social Research.
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  2. Ingemund Gullvåg (1988). Remarks on Wittgenstein's Über Gewissheit and a Norwegian Discussion. Inquiry 31 (3):371 – 385.
    In the late forties and in the fifties, what was then known as the Oslo School of Philosophy, that is, Arne Naess and his students, received some fame, or notoriety, for its empirical investigations of lay uses of various epistemological terms, such as 'true', 'certain', 'probable'. It is less known that Arne Naess, in 1953, opened up a series of investigations into conceptual frameworks, the comparability of conceptual frameworks, and the senses, if any, in which a conceptual framework can be (...)
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  3. Ingemund Gullvåg (1987). The Logic of Conditions. In Jan T. J. Srzednicki (ed.), Initiatives in Logic. M. Nijhoff. 52--69.
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  4. Helge Hoibraaten & Ingemund Gullvåg (eds.) (1985). Essays in Pragmatic Philosophy. Distributed World-Wide Excluding Scandinavia by Oxford University Press.
    This is the second of two voumes designed to document a trend in Norwegian philosophy away from the empirical semantics represented by Arne Naess towards a more pragmatic and transcendental perspective. A number of the contributed essays examine the controversy between Wittgenstein and the philosophies of Habermas and Apel.
     
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  5. Ingemund Gullvåg (1983). Depth of Intention. Inquiry 26 (1):31 – 83.
    The paper attempts to reconstruct some notions of Naess's semantics, and at the same time to relate them to more recent developments. On Naess's view, there is no such thing as a language in the sense of a shared structure which determines clear-cut literal meanings like Fregean Gedanken or propositions. We use words, and try to interpret each other; but there is no a priori or intuitive basis for secure and precise knowledge about language. Interpretation or understanding, as well as (...)
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  6. Ingemund Gullvåg (1978). The Logic of Assertion. Theoria 44 (2):75-116.
    The aim is to fashion intuitive conditions of pragmatic consistency for the speech act of assertion into a formal theory, so as to exclude "pragmatically absurd" utterances (contradictory statements, versions of the liar, moore's paradox, etc.). a core theory i for a concept of pragmatic implication (tentatively identified with overt or covert assertion) and an added theory ib for implied belief are constructed on the pattern of a weak modal system, whose specific axiom is taken to explicate what it means (...)
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  7. Ingemund Gullvåg (1975). Naess's Pluralistic Metaphilosophy1. Inquiry 18 (4):391-408.
    The article begins by outlining Naess's pluralistic theory of philosophical systems and indicating its connection with Naess's semantics, i.e. his account of interpretation, preciseness, definiteness of intention, and level of discrimination. Reference is also made to the indeterminacy relation which Naess claims holds between, on the one hand, philosophically relevant preciseness, definite?ness of intention, and level of discrimination, and, on the other, comparability and philosophical neutrality of standpoints. Naess claims philosophical neutrality for his theory of systems, on the basis of (...)
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  8. Ingemund Gullvåg (1964). Scepticism and Absurdity. Inquiry 7 (1-4):163-190.
    Analytic rejections of extreme traditional views, especially scepticism, as ?absurd? in some sense of violating ?rules? of discourse, arc considered. References to linguistic and pragmatic rules are discussed and found inadequate as bases for rejecting scepticism. References to logical principles alone are found to lead into scepticism. The claim that epistemology and scepticism take for granted an inadequate theory of words like ?know?, or ?knowledge?, as descriptive predicates, is considered. Alternatives, construing such words as appraisive or performative, are discussed, but (...)
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  9. Ingemund Gullvåg (1955). Criteria of Meaning and Analysis of Usage. Synthese 9 (1):341 - 361.
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