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  1. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (forthcoming). Summary of Unfit for the Future. Journal of Medical Ethics.
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  2. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2015). The Art of Misunderstanding Moral Bioenhancement. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24 (1):48-57.
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  3. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2014). Against Fetishism About Egalitarianism and in Defense of Cautious Moral Bioenhancement. American Journal of Bioethics 14 (4):39-42.
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  4. Ingmar Persson (2013). From Morality to the End of Reason: An Essay on Rights, Reasons and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    Many philosophers think that if you're morally responsible for a state of affairs, you must be a cause of it. Ingmar Persson argues that this strand of common sense morality is asymmetrical, in that it features the act-omission doctrine, according to which there are stronger reasons against performing some harmful actions than in favour of performing any beneficial actions. He analyses the act-omission doctrine as consisting in a theory of negative rights, according to which there are rights not to have (...)
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  5. Ingmar Persson (2013). Is Agar Biased Against 'Post-Persons'? Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):77-78.
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  6. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2013). Getting Moral Enhancement Right: The Desirability of Moral Bioenhancement. Bioethics 27 (3):124-131.
    We respond to a number of objections raised by John Harris in this journal to our argument that we should pursue genetic and other biological means of morally enhancing human beings (moral bioenhancement). We claim that human beings now have at their disposal means of wiping out life on Earth and that traditional methods of moral education are probably insufficient to achieve the moral enhancement required to ensure that this will not happen. Hence, we argue, moral bioenhancement should be sought (...)
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  7. Ingmar Persson (2012). Could It Be Permissible to Prevent the Existence of Morally Enhanced People? Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (11):692-693.
    This paper discusses Nicholas Agar's argument in Humanity's End, that it can be morally permissible for human beings to prevent the coming into existence of morally enhanced people because this can harm the interests of the unenhanced humans. It contends that Agar's argument fails because it overlooks the distinction between morally permissible and morally impermissible harm. It is only if the harm to them would be of the morally impermissible kind that humans are provided with a reason to prevent the (...)
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  8. Ingmar Persson (2012). Prioritarianism and Welfare Reductions. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (3):289-301.
    Derek Parfit has argued that egalitarianism is exposed to a levelling down objection because it implies, implausibly, that a change, which consists only in the better-off sinking to the level of the worse-off, is in one respect better, though it is better for nobody. He claims that, in contrast, the prioritarian view that benefits to the worse-off have greater moral weight escapes this objection. This article contends, first, that prioritarianism is equally affected by the levelling down objection as is egalitarianism, (...)
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  9. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2012). Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine. The Monist 95 (3):399-421.
  10. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2012). Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement. Oxford University Press.
    Unfit for the Future argues that the future of our species depends on our urgently finding ways to bring about radical enhancement of the moral aspects of our own human nature. We have rewritten our own moral agenda by the drastic changes we have made to the conditions of life on earth. Advances in technology enable us to exercise an influence that extends all over the world and far into the future. But our moral psychology lags behind and leaves us (...)
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  11. Julian Savulescu & Ingmar Persson (2012). Moral Enhancement. Philosophy Now 91:6-8.
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  12. Ingmar Persson (2011). Prioritarianism, Levelling Down and Welfare Diffusion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):307-311.
    I have earlier argued that, like egalitarianism, prioritarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection—which I do not find serious—but also that it faces related, more serious objections that egalitarianism avoids. In this paper I reply to Thomas Porter’s attempt to rebut this argument. I also trace the more serious objections to prioritarianism to the fact that it implies the desirability of welfare diffusion, i.e. that it is better all things considered if a quantity of welfare is distributed over as (...)
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  13. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2011). The Turn for Ultimate Harm: A Reply to Fenton. Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (7):441-444.
    Elizabeth Fenton has criticised an earlier article by the authors in which the claim was made that, by providing humankind with means of causing its destruction, the advance of science and technology has put it in a perilous condition that might take the development of genetic or biomedical techniques of moral enhancement to get out of. The development of these techniques would, however, require further scientific advances, thus forcing humanity deeper into the danger zone created by modern science. Fenton argues (...)
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  14. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2011). Unfit for the Future? Human Nature, Scientific Progress, and the Need for Moral Enhancement. In Guy Kahane, Julian Savulescu & Ruud Ter Meulen (eds.), Enhancing Human Capacities. 486--500.
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  15. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2010). Moral Transhumanism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (6):656-669.
    In its basic sense, the term "human" is a term of biological classification: an individual is human just in case it is a member of the species Homo sapiens . Its opposite is "nonhuman": nonhuman animals being animals that belong to other species than H. sapiens . In another sense of human, its opposite is "inhuman," that is cruel and heartless (cf. "humane" and "inhumane"); being human in this sense is having morally good qualities. This paper argues that biomedical research (...)
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  16. Ingmar Persson (2009). Rights and the Asymmetry Between Creating Good and Bad Lives. In David Wasserman & Melinda Roberts (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer. 29--47.
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  17. Ingmar Persson (2009). The Origination of a Human Being: A Reply to Oderberg. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (4):371-378.
    Recently David S. Oderberg has tried to refute three arguments that have been advanced in favour of the view that a human being does not begin to exist at fertilization. These arguments turn on the absence of differentiation between the embryoblast and trophoblast, the possibility of monozygotic twinning, and the totipotency of the cells during the first days after fertilization. It is here contended that Oderberg fails to rebut these arguments, though it is conceded that the first two arguments are (...)
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  18. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2009). Actualizable Potential, Reproduction, and Embryo Research: Bringing Embryos Into Existence for Different Purposes or Not at All. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19 (01):51-.
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  19. Ingmar Persson (2008). A Consequentialist Distinction Between What We Ought to Do and Ought to Try. Utilitas 20 (3):348-355.
    G. E. Moore raised the question of whether consequentialists ought to maximize actual rather than expected value, and came down in favour of the former alternative. But rather recently Frank Jackson has presented an example which has been widely thought to clinch the case in favour of the alternative view. This article argues for a sort of compromise between these rival views, namely that while we ought to do what maximizes actual value, we ought to try to do what maximizes (...)
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  20. Ingmar Persson (2008). Why Levelling Down Could Be Worse for Prioritarianism Than for Egalitarianism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):295 - 303.
    Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that (1) there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute form of prioritarianism, (...)
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  21. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2008). The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (3):162-177.
    abstract As history shows, some human beings are capable of acting very immorally. 1 Technological advance and consequent exponential growth in cognitive power means that even rare evil individuals can act with catastrophic effect. The advance of science makes biological, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction easier and easier to fabricate and, thus, increases the probability that they will come into the hands of small terrorist groups and deranged individuals. Cognitive enhancement by means of drugs, implants and biological (including (...)
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  22. Ingmar Persson (2007). A Defence of Extreme Egalitarianism. In Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Clarendon Press. 83--98.
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  23. Ingmar Persson (2007). The Act—Omission Doctrine and Negative Rights. Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (1):15-29.
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  24. Ingmar Persson (2006). Consciousness as Existence as a Form of Neutral Monism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):128-146.
    I shall here raise and attempt to answer -- given the constraints of space, rather dogmatically -- some fundamental questions as regards the fertile and far-reaching doctrine Ted Honderich has in the past called Consciousness as Existence.
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  25. Ingmar Persson (2006). Why There Cannot Be Transitivity With Respect to Supervenient Properties. In Björn Haglund & Helge Malmgren (eds.), Kvantifikator För En Dag. Essays Dedicated to Dag Westerståhl on His Sixtieth Birthday.
    This paper presents an argument to the effect that the relation of exact similarity with respect to properties that are supervenient cannot be transitive. The point of departure is that, while a difference in respect of supervenient properties entails a difference in respect of subvenient properties, exact similiarity in respect of supervenient properties is compatible with differences in respect of subvenient properties. It is logically possible that two such sets of differences that each individually is insufficient for a difference as (...)
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  26. Krister Bykvist, Garrett Cullity, Åsa Carlson, Johan Brännmark, Klemens Kappel, Ulrik Kihlbom, Ian Law, Hans Mathlein, Derek Parfit & Ingmar Persson (2005). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake1. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. 115.
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  27. Ingmar Persson (2005). Double Effect Troubles. In Felix Larsson (ed.), Kapten Mnemos Kolumbarium. Philosophical Communications.
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  28. Ingmar Persson (2005). The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy of Life. Oxford University Press.
    The Retreat of Reason brings back to philosophy the ambition of offering a broad vision of the human condition. One of the main original aims of philosophy was to give people guidance about how to live their lives. Ingmar Persson resumes this practical project, which has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy, but his conclusions are very different from those of the ancient Greeks. They typically argued that a life led in accordance with reason, a rational life, would also (...)
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  29. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2005). McMahan on the Withdrawal of Life‐Prolonging Aid. Philosophical Books 46 (1):11-22.
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  30. Ingmar Persson (2004). Self-Doubt: Why We Are Not Identical to Things of Any Kind. Ratio 17 (4):390-408.
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  31. Ingmar Persson (2004). Two Act-Omission Paradoxes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):147–162.
    There are two ways in which the act-omission doctrine, which implies that it may be permissible to let people die or be killed when it is wrong to kill them, gives rise to a paradox. First, it may be that when you let a victim be killed, you let yourself kill this victim. On the assumption that, if it would be wrong of you to act in a certain fashion, it would be wrong of you let yourself act in this (...)
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  32. Ingmar Persson (2003). The Badness of Unjust Inequality. Theoria 69 (1-2):109-124.
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  33. Ingmar Persson (2003). Two Claims About Potential Human Beings. Bioethics 17 (5-6):503-517.
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  34. Ingmar Persson (2002). Human Death – a View From the Beginning of Life. Bioethics 16 (1):20–32.
    This paper presents a simple argument against definitions of the death of a human being in terms of death, or the cessation of functioning, of its brain: a human being is alive, and is capable of dying, before it acquires a brain. Although a more accurate definition is sketched, it is stressed that it should not be taken for granted that it is ethically urgent to work out such a definition. What morally matters more than the death of a human (...)
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  35. Ingmar Persson (2001). Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (1):23-39.
    Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be construed as (...)
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  36. Ingmar Persson (2000). Mill's Derivation of the Intrinsic Desirability of Pleasure. History of Philosophy Quarterly 17 (3):297 - 310.
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  37. Ingmar Persson (1999). Awareness of One's Body as Subject and Object. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):70-76.
    This paper rejects Hume's famous claim that we never perceive our selves, by arguing that, under conditions specified, our perception of our bodies is perception of our selves. It takes as its point of departure Quassim Cassam's defence of a position to a similar effect but puts a different interpretation on the distinction between perceiving the body as an object, having spatial attributes, and perceiving it as a self or subject of experiences.
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  38. Ingmar Persson (1999). Dancy on Desire and Internalism of Reasons. Theoria 65 (2-3):156-170.
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  39. Ingmar Persson (1999). Equality and Selection for Existence. Journal of Medical Ethics 25 (2):130-136.
    It is argued that the policy of excluding from further life some human gametes and pre-embryos as "unfit" for existence is not at odds with a defensible idea of human equality. Such an idea must be compatible with the obvious fact that the "functional" value of humans differs, that their "use" to themselves and others differs. A defensible idea of human equality is instead grounded in the fact that as this functional difference is genetically determined, it is nothing which makes (...)
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  40. Ingmar Persson (1999). Harming the Non-Conscious. Bioethics 13 (3-4):294-305.
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  41. Ingmar Persson (1999). Our Identity and the Separability of Persons and Organisms. Dialogue 38 (03):519-.
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  42. Ingmar Persson (1997). Ambiguities in Feldman's Desert-Adjusted Values. Utilitas 9 (03):319-.
    Fred Feldman has argued that consequentialists can answer the well-known by replacing the utilitarian axiology with one that makes the value of receiving pleasures and pains depend on how deserved it is. It is shown that this proposal is open to three interpretations: (1) the Fit-idea, which operates with the degree of fit between what recipients get and what they deserve; (2) the Merit-idea, which operates with the magnitude of the recipients' desert or merit; and (3) the Fit-Merit idea which (...)
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  43. Ingmar Persson (1997). Genetic Therapy, Person-Regarding Reasons and the Determination of Identity — a Reply to Robert Elliot. Bioethics 11 (2):161–169.
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  44. Ingmar Persson (1997). Hume - Not a "Humean" About Motivation. History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (2):189 - 206.
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  45. Ingmar Persson (1997). The Involvement of Our Identity in Experiential Memory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):447 - 465.
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  46. Ingmar Persson (1996). Feldman's Justicized Act Utilitarianism. Ratio 9 (1):39-46.
  47. Ingmar Persson (1995). Peter Singer on Why Persons Are Irreplaceable. Utilitas 7 (01):55-.
  48. Ingmar Persson (1995). Critical Notice of Michael Smith: The Moral Problem. Theoria 61 (2):143-158.
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  49. Ingmar Persson (1995). Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person-Regarding Reasons. Bioethics 9 (1):16–31.
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  50. Ingmar Persson (1995). What is Mysterious About Death? Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):499-508.
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