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  1.  32
    Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2012). Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement. Oxford University Press.
    Unfit for the Future argues that the future of our species depends on our urgently finding ways to bring about radical enhancement of the moral aspects of our own human nature. We have rewritten our own moral agenda by the drastic changes we have made to the conditions of life on earth. Advances in technology enable us to exercise an influence that extends all over the world and far into the future. But our moral psychology lags behind and leaves us (...)
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  2. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2008). The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (3):162-177.
    abstract As history shows, some human beings are capable of acting very immorally. 1 Technological advance and consequent exponential growth in cognitive power means that even rare evil individuals can act with catastrophic effect. The advance of science makes biological, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction easier and easier to fabricate and, thus, increases the probability that they will come into the hands of small terrorist groups and deranged individuals. Cognitive enhancement by means of drugs, implants and biological (including (...)
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  3. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2013). Getting Moral Enhancement Right: The Desirability of Moral Bioenhancement. Bioethics 27 (3):124-131.
    We respond to a number of objections raised by John Harris in this journal to our argument that we should pursue genetic and other biological means of morally enhancing human beings (moral bioenhancement). We claim that human beings now have at their disposal means of wiping out life on Earth and that traditional methods of moral education are probably insufficient to achieve the moral enhancement required to ensure that this will not happen. Hence, we argue, moral bioenhancement should be sought (...)
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  4. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2014). Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Unfit for the Future argues that the future of our species depends on radical enhancement of the moral aspects of our nature. Population growth and technological advances are threatening to undermine the conditions of worthwhile life on earth forever. We need to modify the biological bases of human motivation to deal with this challenge.
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  5.  77
    Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2012). Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine. The Monist 95 (3):399-421.
  6. Ingmar Persson (2009). Rights and the Asymmetry Between Creating Good and Bad Lives. In David Wasserman & Melinda Roberts (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer 29--47.
  7.  19
    Ingmar Persson (2016). Parfit on Personal Identity: Its Analysis and Importance. Theoria 82 (2):148-165.
    This article examines Derek Parfit's claim in Reasons and Persons that personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity with the right kind of cause. It argues that such psychological accounts of our identity fail, but that their main rivals, biological or animalist accounts do not fare better. Instead it proposes an error-theory to the effect that common sense takes us to be identical to our bodies on the erroneous assumption that our minds belong non-derivatively to them, whereas (...)
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  8.  59
    Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2010). Moral Transhumanism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (6):656-669.
    In its basic sense, the term "human" is a term of biological classification: an individual is human just in case it is a member of the species Homo sapiens . Its opposite is "nonhuman": nonhuman animals being animals that belong to other species than H. sapiens . In another sense of human, its opposite is "inhuman," that is cruel and heartless (cf. "humane" and "inhumane"); being human in this sense is having morally good qualities. This paper argues that biomedical research (...)
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  9.  4
    Julian Savulescu & Ingmar Persson (2016). Conjoined Twins: Philosophical Problems and Ethical Challenges. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (1):41-55.
    We examine the philosophical and ethical issues associated with conjoined twins and their surgical separation. In cases in which there is an extensive sharing of organs, but nevertheless two distinguishable functioning brains, there are a number of philosophical and ethical challenges. This is because such conjoined twins: 1. give rise to puzzles concerning our identity, about whether we are identical to something psychological or biological;2. force us to decide whether what matters from an ethical point of view is the biological (...)
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  10. Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2011). Unfit for the Future? Human Nature, Scientific Progress, and the Need for Moral Enhancement. In Guy Kahane, Julian Savulescu & Ruud Ter Meulen (eds.), Enhancing Human Capacities. 486--500.
     
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  11.  20
    Ingmar Persson (2005). The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy of Life. Oxford University Press.
    The Retreat of Reason brings back to philosophy the ambition of offering a broad vision of the human condition. One of the main original aims of philosophy was to give people guidance about how to live their lives. Ingmar Persson resumes this practical project, which has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy, but his conclusions are very different from those of the ancient Greeks. They typically argued that a life led in accordance with reason, a rational life, would also be (...)
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  12.  22
    Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2011). The Turn for Ultimate Harm: A Reply to Fenton. Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (7):441-444.
    Elizabeth Fenton has criticised an earlier article by the authors in which the claim was made that, by providing humankind with means of causing its destruction, the advance of science and technology has put it in a perilous condition that might take the development of genetic or biomedical techniques of moral enhancement to get out of. The development of these techniques would, however, require further scientific advances, thus forcing humanity deeper into the danger zone created by modern science. Fenton argues (...)
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  13. Ingmar Persson (2008). Why Levelling Down Could Be Worse for Prioritarianism Than for Egalitarianism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):295-303.
    Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute form of prioritarianism, and (...)
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  14.  12
    Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2015). The Art of Misunderstanding Moral Bioenhancement. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24 (1):48-57.
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  15.  67
    Ingmar Persson (2001). Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (1):23-39.
    Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be construed as (...)
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  16.  17
    Ingmar Persson (2013). From Morality to the End of Reason: An Essay on Rights, Reasons and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    Many philosophers think that if you're morally responsible for a state of affairs, you must be a cause of it. Ingmar Persson argues that this strand of common sense morality is asymmetrical, in that it features the act-omission doctrine, according to which there are stronger reasons against performing some harmful actions than in favour of performing any beneficial actions. He analyses the act-omission doctrine as consisting in a theory of negative rights, according to which there are rights not to (...)
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  17.  33
    Ingmar Persson (1999). Our Identity and the Separability of Persons and Organisms. Dialogue 38 (03):519-.
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  18.  7
    Ingmar Persson (2013). Is Agar Biased Against 'Post-Persons'? Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):77-78.
    I shall discuss only one of Nicholas Agar's main claims,1 namely ‘that the bad consequences/of moral status enhancement/are, in moral terms, so bad that a moderate probability of their occurrence makes it wrong not to seek to prevent them’. His other main claim, which I grant, is that moral status enhancement to the effect of creating beings with a moral status higher than that of persons—post-persons—is possible. My chief objection to Agar's argument is that it is biased in favour of (...)
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  19.  24
    Ingmar Persson (2012). Could It Be Permissible to Prevent the Existence of Morally Enhanced People? Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (11):692-693.
    This paper discusses Nicholas Agar's argument in Humanity's End, that it can be morally permissible for human beings to prevent the coming into existence of morally enhanced people because this can harm the interests of the unenhanced humans. It contends that Agar's argument fails because it overlooks the distinction between morally permissible and morally impermissible harm. It is only if the harm to them would be of the morally impermissible kind that humans are provided with a reason to prevent the (...)
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  20. Ingmar Persson (2007). A Defence of Extreme Egalitarianism. In Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Clarendon Press 83--98.
     
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  21.  20
    Ingmar Persson (2012). Prioritarianism and Welfare Reductions. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (3):289-301.
    Derek Parfit has argued that egalitarianism is exposed to a levelling down objection because it implies, implausibly, that a change, which consists only in the better-off sinking to the level of the worse-off, is in one respect better, though it is better for nobody. He claims that, in contrast, the prioritarian view that benefits to the worse-off have greater moral weight escapes this objection. This article contends, first, that prioritarianism is equally affected by the levelling down objection as is egalitarianism, (...)
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  22.  33
    Ingmar Persson (2008). A Consequentialist Distinction Between What We Ought to Do and Ought to Try. Utilitas 20 (3):348-355.
    G. E. Moore raised the question of whether consequentialists ought to maximize actual rather than expected value, and came down in favour of the former alternative. But rather recently Frank Jackson has presented an example which has been widely thought to clinch the case in favour of the alternative view. This article argues for a sort of compromise between these rival views, namely that while we ought to do what maximizes actual value, we ought to try to do what maximizes (...)
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  23.  8
    Ingmar Persson, Internal or External Grounds for the Nontransitivity of “Better/Worse Than”.
    In his book Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of PracticalReasoning Larry Temkin contrasts two views of ideals for evaluating outcomes:the Internal Aspects View and the Essentially Comparative View. He claimsthat the latter view can make the relation of being better/worse than all thingsconsidered nontransitive, while the former can’t. This paper argues that theInternal Aspects View can also be a source of nontransitivity. The gist of theargument is that perfect similarity as regards supervenient properties, likevalue, is compatible (...)
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  24.  40
    Ingmar Persson (2004). Two Act-Omission Paradoxes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):147–162.
    There are two ways in which the act-omission doctrine, which implies that it may be permissible to let people die or be killed when it is wrong to kill them, gives rise to a paradox. First, it may be that when you let a victim be killed, you let yourself kill this victim. On the assumption that, if it would be wrong of you to act in a certain fashion, it would be wrong of you let yourself act in this (...)
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  25.  8
    Ingmar Persson (2003). Two Claims About Potential Human Beings. Bioethics 17 (5-6):503-517.
    It seems that at conception something is formed which, due to its genetic make-up, has the potentiality to develop into a full-blown human being. Many believe that in virtue of this potentiality, this organism, the human zygote or early embryo, has an intrinsic value which makes it wrong to use or produce it merely as a means to some end, e.g., some scientific end such as to produce embryonic stem cells. Against this it is here argued, first, that it does (...)
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  26.  78
    Ingmar Persson (2011). Prioritarianism, Levelling Down and Welfare Diffusion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):307-311.
    I have earlier argued that, like egalitarianism, prioritarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection—which I do not find serious—but also that it faces related, more serious objections that egalitarianism avoids. In this paper I reply to Thomas Porter’s attempt to rebut this argument. I also trace the more serious objections to prioritarianism to the fact that it implies the desirability of welfare diffusion, i.e. that it is better all things considered if a quantity of welfare is distributed over as (...)
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  27.  55
    Ingmar Persson (1983). Hare on Universal Prescriptivism and Utilitarianism. Analysis 43 (1):43 - 49.
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  28.  91
    Ingmar Persson (2004). Self-Doubt: Why We Are Not Identical to Things of Any Kind. Ratio 17 (4):390-408.
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  29.  10
    Ingmar Persson (1995). Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person-Regarding Reasons. Bioethics 9 (1):16–31.
    It has been argued that there can be no person‐regarding reasons for practising genetic therapy, since it affects identity and causes to exist an individual who would not otherwise have existed. And there can be no such reasons for causing somebody to exist because existing cannot be better for an individual than never existing. In the present paper, both of these claims are denied. It is contended, first, that in practically all significant cases genetic therapy will not affect the identity (...)
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  30.  18
    Ingmar Persson (1997). Hume - Not a "Humean" About Motivation. History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (2):189-206.
  31.  23
    Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2014). Against Fetishism About Egalitarianism and in Defense of Cautious Moral Bioenhancement. American Journal of Bioethics 14 (4):39-42.
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  32.  21
    Ingmar Persson (1988). Rationality and Maximization of Satisfaction. Noûs 22 (4):537-554.
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  33.  34
    Ingmar Persson (1995). Critical Notice of Michael Smith: The Moral Problem. Theoria 61 (2):143-158.
  34.  26
    Ingmar Persson (1997). Ambiguities in Feldman's Desert-Adjusted Values. Utilitas 9 (3):319.
    Fred Feldman has argued that consequentialists can answer the well-known by replacing the utilitarian axiology with one that makes the value of receiving pleasures and pains depend on how deserved it is. It is shown that this proposal is open to three interpretations: the Fit-idea, which operates with the degree of fit between what recipients get and what they deserve; the Merit-idea, which operates with the magnitude of the recipients' desert or merit; and the Fit-Merit idea which is a combination (...)
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  35.  12
    Ingmar Persson (1985). The Universal Basis of Egoism. Theoria 51 (3):137-158.
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  36.  11
    Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2005). McMahan on the Withdrawal of Life‐Prolonging Aid. Philosophical Books 46 (1):11-22.
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  37.  53
    Ingmar Persson (2006). Consciousness as Existence as a Form of Neutral Monism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):128-146.
    I shall here raise and attempt to answer -- given the constraints of space, rather dogmatically -- some fundamental questions as regards the fertile and far-reaching doctrine Ted Honderich has in the past called Consciousness as Existence.
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  38.  51
    Ingmar Persson (1985). Phenomenal Realism. Erkenntnis 23 (May):59-78.
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  39.  47
    Ingmar Persson (2007). The Act—Omission Doctrine and Negative Rights. Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (1):15-29.
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  40.  33
    Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu (2010). Actualizable Potential, Reproduction, and Embryo Research: Bringing Embryos Into Existence for Different Purposes or Not at All. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19 (1):51.
    i) it is morally permissible to engage in reproduction, whether natural or artificial, despite knowledge that a large number of embryos will fail to implant and quickly die, then ii) it is morally permissible to produce embryos for other purposes that involve killing them, for instance, to harvest stem cells that may be used to save lives.
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  41.  37
    Ingmar Persson (1992). The Indeterminacy and Insignificance of Personal Identity. Inquiry 35 (2):271 – 283.
  42. Ingmar Persson (1993). A Basis (Interspecies) Equality. In Peter Singer & Paola Cavalieri (eds.), The Great Ape Project. St. Martin's Griffin 183--193.
     
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  43. Ingmar Persson (1988). Review of Thomas Nagel: The view from nowhere. [REVIEW] Theoria 54 (1):55.
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  44.  12
    Ingmar Persson (1989). Universalizability and the Summing of Desires. Theoria 55 (3):159-170.
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  45.  17
    Julian Savulescu & Ingmar Persson (2012). Moral Enhancement. Philosophy Now 91:6-8.
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  46.  14
    Ingmar Persson (1993). Hallden on the Unity of the Mind and the Self. Theoria 59 (1-3):113-123.
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  47.  31
    Ingmar Persson (1994). The Groundlessness of Natural Rights. Utilitas 6 (1):9.
    Today talk of rights is very much in vogue both in philosophical and popular ethics; so much so that it is common to find even philosophers unabashedly going straight to discussing what rights we have without touching on what their foundation might be. This is so in spite of there being a time-honoured tradition of scepticism about rights, conceived as ‘natural’ ones, going back at least to Jeremy Bentham. The present paper is intended as a contribution to this sceptical tradition (...)
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  48.  32
    Ingmar Persson (1995). Peter Singer on Why Persons Are Irreplaceable. Utilitas 7 (1):55.
    In the preface to the second edition of his deservedly popular Practical Ethics, Peter Singer notes that one of the ‘two significant changes” of his ‘underlying ethical views” consists in dropping the tentative suggestion that ‘one might try to combine both the “total” and the “prior existence” versions of utilitarianism, applying the former to sentient beings who are not self-conscious and the latter to those who are”. On the total view our aim is ‘to increase the total amount of pleasure (...)
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  49.  10
    Krister Bykvist, Garrett Cullity, Åsa Carlson, Johan Brännmark, Klemens Kappel, Ulrik Kihlbom, Ian Law, Hans Mathlein, Derek Parfit & Ingmar Persson (2005). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake1. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer 115.
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  50.  37
    Ingmar Persson (1999). Awareness of One's Body as Subject and Object. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):70-76.
    This paper rejects Hume's famous claim that we never perceive our selves, by arguing that, under conditions specified, our perception of our bodies is perception of our selves. It takes as its point of departure Quassim Cassam's defence of a position to a similar effect but puts a different interpretation on the distinction between perceiving the body as an object, having spatial attributes, and perceiving it as a self or subject of experiences.
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