Search results for 'Intentional' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Joshua Knobe (2003). Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325.
    Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not _evaluative _considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by (...)
    Direct download (17 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   71 citations  
  2. Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2010). The Deep Self Model and Asymmetries in Folk Judgments About Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):159-176.
    Recent studies by experimental philosophers demonstrate puzzling asymmetries in people’s judgments about intentional action, leading many philosophers to propose that normative factors are inappropriately influencing intentionality judgments. In this paper, I present and defend the Deep Self Model of judgments about intentional action that provides a quite different explanation for these judgment asymmetries. The Deep Self Model is based on the idea that people make an intuitive distinction between two parts of an agent’s psychology, an Acting Self that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  3.  66
    Eric Hochstein (2012). Minds, Models and Mechanisms: A New Perspective on Intentional Psychology. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 24 (4):547-557.
    In this article, I argue that intentional psychology (i.e. the interpretation of human behaviour in terms of intentional states and propositional attitudes) plays an essential role in the sciences of the mind. However, this role is not one of identifying scientifically respectable states of the world. Rather, I argue that intentional psychology acts as a type of phenomenological model, as opposed to a mechanistic one. I demonstrate that, like other phenomenological models in science, intentional psychology is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  75
    Patrick Haggard & S. Clark (2003). Intentional Action: Conscious Experience and Neural Prediction. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):695-707.
    Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that ''I'' am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a movement against its (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   31 citations  
  5. Danny Frederick (2010). Unmotivated Intentional Action. Philosophical Frontiers 5 (1):21-30.
    In opposition to the tenet of contemporary action theory that an intentional action must be done for a reason, I argue that some intentional actions are unmotivated. I provide examples of arbitrary and habitual actions that are done for no reason at all. I consider and rebut an objection to the examples of unmotivated habitual action. I explain how my contention differs from recent challenges to the tenet by Hursthouse, Stocker and Pollard.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. Yair Levy (2013). Intentional Action First. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.
    The paper motivates a novel research programme in the philosophy of action parallel to the ‘Knowledge First’ programme in epistemology. It is argued that much of the grounds for abandoning the quest for a reductive analysis of knowledge in favour of the Knowledge First alternative is mirrored in the case of intentional action, inviting the hypothesis that intentional action is also, like knowledge, metaphysically basic. The paper goes on to demonstrate the sort of explanatory contribution that intentional (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7.  16
    A. Feltz, M. Harris & A. Perez (2010). Actor-Observer Differences in Intentional Action Intuitions. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society
    Empirically minded researchers (e.g., experimental philosophers) have begun exploring the “folk” notion of intentional action, often with surprising results. In this paper, we extend these lines of research and present new evidence from a radically new paradigm in experimental philosophy. Our results suggest that in some circumstances people make strikingly different judgments about intentions and intentionality as a function of whether the person brings about or observes an event. Implications for traditional action theory and the experimental study of folk (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Berit Brogaard (2010). Stupid People Deserve What They Get: The Effects of Personality Assessment on Judgments of Intentional Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):332-334.
    Knobe argues that people’s judgments of the moral status of a side-effect of action influence their assessment of whether the side-effect is intentional. We tested this hypothesis using vignettes akin to Knobe’s but involving economically or eudaimonistically (wellness-related) negative side-effects. Our results show that it is people’s sense of what agents deserve and not the moral status of side-effects that drives intuition.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9. Florian Cova (2013). Unconsidered Intentional Actions: An Assessment of Scaife and Webber's 'Consideration Hypothesis'. Journal of Moral Philosophy (1):1-22.
    The ‘Knobe effect’ is the name given to the empirical finding that judgments about whether an action is intentional or not seems to depend on the moral valence of this action. To account for this phenomenon, Scaife and Webber have recently advanced the ‘Consideration Hypothesis’, according to which people’s ascriptions of intentionality are driven by whether they think the agent took the outcome in consideration when taking his decision. In this paper, I examine Scaife and Webber’s hypothesis (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  10. Joshua Shepherd (2014). Causalism and Intentional Omission. American Philosophical Quarterly 51:15-26.
    It is natural to think that at root, agents are beings that act. Agents do more than this, however – agents omit to act. Sometimes agents do so intentionally. How should we understand intentional omission? Recent accounts of intentional omission have given causation a central theoretical role. The move is well-motivated. If some form of causalism about intentional omission can successfully exploit similarities between action and omission, it might inherit the broad support causalism about intentional action (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Uriah Kriegel (2008). The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.
    The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  12. Julien A. Deonna & Klaus R. Scherer (2010). The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion. Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.
    Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  13. Mark Alfano (2010). The Tenacity of the Intentional Prior to the Genealogy. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 40:29-46.
    I have argued elsewhere that the psychological aspects of Nietzsche’s later works are best understood from a psychodynamic point of view. Nietzsche holds a view I dubbed the tenacity of the intentional (T): when an intentional state loses its object, a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely. In this essay I amend and clarify (T) to (T``): When an intentional state with a sub-propositional object loses its object, the affective component of the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14.  39
    William Lanier (2014). Intentional Identity and Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):289-302.
    What is the semantic contribution of anaphoric links in sentences like, ‘A physicist was late to the party. He brought some bongos’? A natural first thought is that the passage entails a wide-scope existential claim that there is something that both (i) was late to the party and (ii) brought some bongos. Intentional identity sentences are counter-examples to this natural thought applied to anaphora in general. Some have tried to rescue the thought and accommodate the counter-examples by positing mythical (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15.  3
    David J. Stevens, Joanne Arciuli & David I. Anderson (2015). Concurrent Movement Impairs Incidental But Not Intentional Statistical Learning. Cognitive Science 39 (5):1081-1098.
    The effect of concurrent movement on incidental versus intentional statistical learning was examined in two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants learned the statistical regularities embedded within familiarization stimuli implicitly, whereas in Experiment 2 they were made aware of the embedded regularities and were instructed explicitly to learn these regularities. Experiment 1 demonstrated that while the control group were able to learn the statistical regularities, the resistance-free cycling group and the exercise group did not demonstrate learning. This is in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  49
    Elisabeth Pacherie (2011). Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control. Social Psychology 42 (1):67-73.
    In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relation- ships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of these (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17.  69
    Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs. In Alessandro Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, Quantifiers. Springer
    The question whether natural language permits quantification over intentional objects as the ‘nonexistent’ objects of thought is the topic of a major philosophical controversy, as is the status of intentional objects as such. This paper will argue that natural language does reflect a particular notion of intentional object and in particular that certain types of natural language constructions (generally disregarded in the philosophical literature) cannot be analysed without positing intentional objects. At the same time, those (...) objects do not come for free; rather they are strictly dependent on intentional acts that generally need to have a presence, in one way or another, in the semantic structure of the sentence. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  74
    Wei Zhang (2009). The Foundation of Phenomenological Ethics: Intentional Feelings. [REVIEW] Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (1):130-142.
    E. Husserl’s reflections in Logical Investigations on “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings” are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler’s thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler’s phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl’s first orientation.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  19.  71
    Eric Wiland (2007). Intentional Action and "in Order To". Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):113-118.
    I. Thanks largely to Joshua Knobe, philosophers now frequently empirically investigate the folk psychological concept of intentional action. Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b) argues that application of this concept is often surprisingly sensitive to one’s moral views. In particular, it seems that people are much more willing to regard a bit of behavior as intentional, if they think that the action in question is bad or wrong. There is much controversy about both the design and the interpretation of the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20.  91
    Mark Phelan (2010). The Intentional Action Factory. The Philosophers' Magazine 52.
    This short paper, forthcoming as part of a symposium on experimental philosophy to appear in the popular publication, The Philosophers’ Magazine (including contributions by Papineau, Stich, Machery, Sommers, and Knobe), offers an accessible summary of seven years of experimental-philosophical research into intentional action attributions.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Michael Gorman (2006). Talking About Intentional Objects. Dialectica 60 (2):135-144.
    Discusses the old problem of how to characterize apparently intentional states that appear to lack objects. In tandem with critically discussing a recent proposal by Tim Crane, I develop the line of reasoning according to which talking about intentional objects is really a way of talking about intentional states—in particular, it’s a way of talking about their satisfaction-conditions.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  44
    Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki (2012). Unlikely Allies: Embodied Social Cognition and the Intentional Stance. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):487-506.
    I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett’s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target’s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the intentional (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  66
    R. Takenaga (2002). Inverting Intentional Content. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):197-229.
    Critics of wide functionalism have traditionally sought to attack the theory by exposing weaknesses in its account of the qualitative content of experience. Wide functionalist theories of intentional content, however, were spared philosophical scrutiny. I propose that wide functionalist accounts of the intentional content are equally susceptible to attack. I will attempt to demonstrate this by enlisting the functionalist's old foe from the qualia wars - the inverted spectrum hypothesis - in a new (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  61
    Jonathan Knowles (2001). Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science? Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.
    I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical arguments (...)
    Direct download (18 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  23
    Liezl van Zyl (2002). Intentional Parenthood and the Nuclear Family. Journal of Medical Humanities 23 (2):107-118.
    Reproductive techniques and practices, ranging from ordinary birth-control measures and artificial insemination to embryo transfer and surrogate motherhood, have greatly enhanced our range of reproductive choices. As a consequence, they pose a number of difficult moral and legal questions with regard to the formation of a family and our conception of parenthood. A view that is becoming increasingly common is that parental rights and responsibilities should not be based on genetic relationships but should instead be seen as arising from agreements (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26.  20
    Liezl van Zyl (2002). Intentional Parenthood: Responsibilities in Surrogate Motherhood. [REVIEW] Health Care Analysis 10 (2):165-175.
    In recent years, a number of writers dealingwith questions over parenthood that arisein the context of reproductive technologies andsurrogate motherhood, have appealed to thenotion of ``intentional parenthood''. Basingtheir argument on liberal values such asindividual autonomy, the freedom to entercontracts, the right to privacy, and individualself-fulfilment, they argue that contractuallystated intentions, rather than genetic orgestational relationships, should form thebasis of parental rights. Against this I arguethat parental rights do not derive fromcontractual agreements, but are based in theirobligations towards the child. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27.  52
    L. S. Carrier (1986). Free Will and Intentional Action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364.
    I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  43
    Zhu Xu (2010). Laws, Causality and the Intentional Explanation of Action. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):280-293.
    Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper-Hempel Thesis , which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three characteristic arguments for (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  32
    Bjørn Jespersen (2011). An Intensional Solution to the Bike Puzzle of Intentional Identity. Philosophia 39 (2):297-307.
    In a 2005 paper Ólafur Páll Jónsson presents a puzzle that turns on intentional identity and definite descriptions. He considers eight solutions and rejects them all, thus leaving the puzzle unsolved. In this paper I put forward a solution. The puzzle is this. Little Lotta wants most of all a bicycle for her birthday, but she gets none. Distracted by the gifts she does receive, she at first does not think about the bike. But when seeing her tricycle, she (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  8
    Ihor Karivets (2010). Is the Phenomenon of Non-Intentional "Self-Other" Relation Possible? In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana. The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research. Volume Cv. Springer 209-220.
    This article is dedicated to possibility of overcoming the subject-object ontoligy, which is based on intentionality.The author proves that such dualism is rooted into the transcendental level. The transcendental level makes possible our empirical experience on the basis of subject-object relations. The author considers Parmenides' famous sentence "For it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be" and Husserl's well-known claim "Back to things themselves!" as essential for possibility of discovering non-intentional relation between Self and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  8
    X. U. Zhu (2010). Laws, Causality and the Intentional Explanation of Action. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):280-293.
    Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper–Hempel Thesis, which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three characteristic arguments for the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  16
    Zhang Wei & Yu Xin (2009). The Foundation of Phenomenological Ethics: Intentional Feelings. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (1):130 - 142.
    E. Husserl's reflections in Logical Investigations on "Intentional Feelings" and "non-intentional feelings" are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler's thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler's phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl's first orientation. /// 胡塞尔在 "逻辑研究" 中对 "意向感受" (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  11
    Hans-Ulrich Hoche & Michael Knoop (2013). Ascriptions of Propositional Attitudes. An Analysis in Terms of Intentional Objects. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):747-768.
    Having briefly sketched the aims of our paper, namely, to logically analyse the ascription of propositional attitudes to somebody else in terms, not of Fregean senses or of intensions-with-s, but of the intentional object of the person spoken about, say, the believer or intender (Section 1), we try to introduce the concept of an intentional object as simply as possible, to wit, as coming into view whenever two (or more) subjective belief-worlds strikingly diverge (Section 2). Then, we assess (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  3
    Granville King Iii (2001). Perceptions of Intentional Wrongdoing and Peer Reporting Behavior Among Registered Nurses. Journal of Business Ethics 34 (1):1-13.
    How a person perceives a wrongdoing being committed by a coworker will affect whether the incident is reported within the organization. A significant factor that may influence the decision to report a wrongdoing is the perceived intentionality of the wrongdoer. This study sought to examine if differences in perceptions of a wrongdoing could affect the disclosure of unethical behavior. Three hundred seventy-two registered nurses (N = 372) responded to a survey consisting of both intentional and unintentional wrongdoings that could (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Ilaria Canavotto (2013). The problem of intentionality and intentional objects critical analysis of the proposal by Searle and Crane. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 105 (1):17-40.
    Intentionality is traditionally defined as the property of a mental state to be directed at something presented in a particular way. The fact that we can think about objects which do not exist makes this definition problematic: what kind of things are those objects? The aim of this paper is to analyse the definition of intentionality as a relation in theories which do not admit non-existent special entities. In particular, I consider John R. Searle and Tim Crane’s theories of intentionality (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Marc Slors (2015). Two Improvements to the Intentional Stance Theory. Philosophia 43 (3):579-591.
    In this paper I assess the extent to which Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Stance Theory fits into the overall proposal for a programme on naturalizing mental content outlined by Daniel Hutto and Glenda Satne in this issue. I argue that in order to fit the proposal, two changes need to be made: the reality of intentional states should not be grounded in the reality of behavioral patterns but in the ascription-independent status of Ur-intentionality that is the at the root (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Hugh J. McCann (2005). Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):737-748.
    Recent empirical work calls into question the so-called Simple View that an agent who A’s intentionally intends to A. In experimental studies, ordinary speakers frequently assent to claims that, in certain cases, agents who knowingly behave wrongly intentionally bring about the harm they do; yet the speakers tend to deny that it was the intention of those agents to cause the harm. This paper reports two additional studies that at first appear to support the original ones, but argues that in (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   36 citations  
  38.  91
    Florian Cova (forthcoming). The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Empirical Approaches. In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy.
    This paper provides a comprehensive review of the experimental philosophy of action, focusing on the various different accounts of the Knobe Effect.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Joshua Knobe (2003). Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language. Analysis 63 (3):190–194.
    There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases. g.
    Direct download (15 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   158 citations  
  40.  14
    Daniel C. Dennett (1983). Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The 'Panglossian Paradigm' Defended. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.
    Ethologists and others studying animal behavior in a spirit are in need of a descriptive language and method that are neither anachronistically bound by behaviorist scruples nor prematurely committed to particular Just such an interim descriptive method can be found in intentional system theory. The use of intentional system theory is illustrated with the case of the apparently communicative behavior of vervet monkeys. A way of using the theory to generate data - including usable, testable data - is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   493 citations  
  41. John R. Searle (1979). What is an Intentional State? Mind 88 (January):74-92.
  42. Alexander Rosenberg (1986). Intentional Psychology and Evolutionary Biology, Part II: The Crucial Disanalogy. Behaviorism 14 (2):125-138.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   27 citations  
  43. Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (2001). Are Frege Cases Exceptions to Intentional Generalizations? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.
    This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  44.  42
    Alfred R. Mele (1992). Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior. Oxford University Press.
    Tackling some central problems in the philosophy of action, Mele constructs an explanatory model for intentional behavior, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reason, and intentions in the etiology of intentional action. Part One comprises a comprehensive examination of the standard treatments of the relations between desires, beliefs, and actions. In Part Two, Mele goes on to develop a subtle and well-defended view that the motivational role of intentions is of a different (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   118 citations  
  45.  42
    Alfred R. Mele (2004). The Illusion of Conscious Will and the Causation of Intentional Actions. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):193-213.
  46.  41
    Samuel Cumming (2014). Indefinites and Intentional Identity. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):371-395.
    This paper investigates the truth conditions of sentences containing indefinite noun phrases, focusing on occurrences in attitude reports, and, in particular, a puzzle case due to Walter Edelberg. It is argued that indefinites semantically contribute the (thought-)object they denote, in a manner analogous to attributive definite descriptions. While there is an existential reading of attitude reports containing indefinites, it is argued that the existential quantifier is contributed by the de re interpretation of the indefinite (as the de re reading adds (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  18
    Guido Küng (1973). Husserl on Pictures and Intentional Objects. Review of Metaphysics 26 (4):670 - 680.
    The DIALOG between Husserlian Phenomnnology and Analytic Philosophy is severely hampered by the fact that much of the secondary literrature on phenomenology fails to pay attention to certain subtile semantical distinctions which are basic for a clear understanding of epistemological issures. Some European Phenomenologists even take pride in their neglect of what they consider to be shallow scholastic quibbling. I hope to remedy this short-coming by outlining in this paper what I believe to be the keypoints of Husserl's theory of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  48.  62
    Philip Nochlin (1953). Reducibility and Intentional Words. Journal of Philosophy 50 (October):625-637.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  5
    F. Michael Rabinowitz & Susan R. Andrews (1973). Intentional and Incidental Learning in Children and the von Restorff Effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology 100 (2):315.
  50.  13
    David Davies (1992). Perspectives on Intentional Realism. Mind and Language 7 (3):264-285.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 1000