Search results for 'Intentional' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2010). The Deep Self Model and Asymmetries in Folk Judgments About Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):159-176.score: 18.0
    Recent studies by experimental philosophers demonstrate puzzling asymmetries in people’s judgments about intentional action, leading many philosophers to propose that normative factors are inappropriately influencing intentionality judgments. In this paper, I present and defend the Deep Self Model of judgments about intentional action that provides a quite different explanation for these judgment asymmetries. The Deep Self Model is based on the idea that people make an intuitive distinction between two parts of an agent’s psychology, an Acting Self that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Mark Alfano (2010). The Tenacity of the Intentional Prior to the Genealogy. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 40:29-46.score: 18.0
    I have argued elsewhere that the psychological aspects of Nietzsche’s later works are best understood from a psychodynamic point of view. Nietzsche holds a view I dubbed the tenacity of the intentional (T): when an intentional state loses its object, a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely. In this essay I amend and clarify (T) to (T``): When an intentional state with a sub-propositional object loses its object, the affective component of the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Joshua Shepherd (2014). Causalism and Intentional Omission. American Philosophical Quarterly 51:15-26.score: 18.0
    It is natural to think that at root, agents are beings that act. Agents do more than this, however – agents omit to act. Sometimes agents do so intentionally. How should we understand intentional omission? Recent accounts of intentional omission have given causation a central theoretical role. The move is well-motivated. If some form of causalism about intentional omission can successfully exploit similarities between action and omission, it might inherit the broad support causalism about intentional action (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Joshua Knobe (2003). Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325.score: 18.0
    Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not _evaluative _considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by (...)
    Direct download (15 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Uriah Kriegel (2008). The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.score: 18.0
    The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Michael Gorman (2006). Talking About Intentional Objects. Dialectica 60 (2):135-144.score: 18.0
    Discusses the old problem of how to characterize apparently intentional states that appear to lack objects. In tandem with critically discussing a recent proposal by Tim Crane, I develop the line of reasoning according to which talking about intentional objects is really a way of talking about intentional states—in particular, it’s a way of talking about their satisfaction-conditions.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Danny Frederick (2010). Unmotivated Intentional Action. Philosophical Frontiers 5 (1):21-30.score: 18.0
    In opposition to the tenet of contemporary action theory that an intentional action must be done for a reason, I argue that some intentional actions are unmotivated. I provide examples of arbitrary and habitual actions that are done for no reason at all. I consider and rebut an objection to the examples of unmotivated habitual action. I explain how my contention differs from recent challenges to the tenet by Hursthouse, Stocker and Pollard.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Julien A. Deonna & Klaus R. Scherer (2010). The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion. Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.score: 18.0
    Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Mark Phelan (2010). The Intentional Action Factory. The Philosophers' Magazine 52.score: 18.0
    This short paper, forthcoming as part of a symposium on experimental philosophy to appear in the popular publication, The Philosophers’ Magazine (including contributions by Papineau, Stich, Machery, Sommers, and Knobe), offers an accessible summary of seven years of experimental-philosophical research into intentional action attributions.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Patrick Haggard & S. Clark (2003). Intentional Action: Conscious Experience and Neural Prediction. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):695-707.score: 18.0
    Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that ''I'' am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a movement against its (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Berit Brogaard (2010). Stupid People Deserve What They Get: The Effects of Personality Assessment on Judgments of Intentional Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):332-334.score: 18.0
    Knobe argues that people’s judgments of the moral status of a side-effect of action influence their assessment of whether the side-effect is intentional. We tested this hypothesis using vignettes akin to Knobe’s but involving economically or eudaimonistically (wellness-related) negative side-effects. Our results show that it is people’s sense of what agents deserve and not the moral status of side-effects that drives intuition.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Eric Wiland (2007). Intentional Action and "in Order To". Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):113-118.score: 18.0
    I. Thanks largely to Joshua Knobe, philosophers now frequently empirically investigate the folk psychological concept of intentional action. Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b) argues that application of this concept is often surprisingly sensitive to one’s moral views. In particular, it seems that people are much more willing to regard a bit of behavior as intentional, if they think that the action in question is bad or wrong. There is much controversy about both the design and the interpretation of the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Yair Levy (2013). Intentional Action First. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.score: 18.0
    The paper motivates a novel research programme in the philosophy of action parallel to the ‘Knowledge First’ programme in epistemology. It is argued that much of the grounds for abandoning the quest for a reductive analysis of knowledge in favour of the Knowledge First alternative is mirrored in the case of intentional action, inviting the hypothesis that intentional action is also, like knowledge, metaphysically basic. The paper goes on to demonstrate the sort of explanatory contribution that intentional (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs. In Alessandro Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, Quantifiers. Springer.score: 18.0
    The question whether natural language permits quantification over intentional objects as the ‘nonexistent’ objects of thought is the topic of a major philosophical controversy, as is the status of intentional objects as such. This paper will argue that natural language does reflect a particular notion of intentional object and in particular that certain types of natural language constructions (generally disregarded in the philosophical literature) cannot be analysed without positing intentional objects. At the same time, those (...) objects do not come for free; rather they are strictly dependent on intentional acts that generally need to have a presence, in one way or another, in the semantic structure of the sentence. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. L. S. Carrier (1986). Free Will and Intentional Action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364.score: 18.0
    I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Jonathan Knowles (2001). Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science? Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.score: 18.0
    I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical arguments (...)
    Direct download (19 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Wei Zhang (2009). The Foundation of Phenomenological Ethics: Intentional Feelings. [REVIEW] Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (1):130-142.score: 18.0
    E. Husserl’s reflections in Logical Investigations on “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings” are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler’s thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler’s phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl’s first orientation.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. R. Takenaga (2002). Inverting Intentional Content. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):197-229.score: 18.0
    Critics of wide functionalism have traditionally sought to attack the theory by exposing weaknesses in its account of the qualitative content of experience. Wide functionalist theories of intentional content, however, were spared philosophical scrutiny. I propose that wide functionalist accounts of the intentional content are equally susceptible to attack. I will attempt to demonstrate this by enlisting the functionalist's old foe from the qualia wars - the inverted spectrum hypothesis - in a new way. If the argument is (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki (2012). Unlikely Allies: Embodied Social Cognition and the Intentional Stance. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):487-506.score: 18.0
    I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett’s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target’s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the intentional (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Zhu Xu (2010). Laws, Causality and the Intentional Explanation of Action. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):280-293.score: 18.0
    Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper-Hempel Thesis , which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three characteristic arguments for (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Elisabeth Pacherie (2011). Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control. Social Psychology 42 (1):67-73.score: 18.0
    In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relation- ships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of these (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Bjørn Jespersen (2011). An Intensional Solution to the Bike Puzzle of Intentional Identity. Philosophia 39 (2):297-307.score: 18.0
    In a 2005 paper Ólafur Páll Jónsson presents a puzzle that turns on intentional identity and definite descriptions. He considers eight solutions and rejects them all, thus leaving the puzzle unsolved. In this paper I put forward a solution. The puzzle is this. Little Lotta wants most of all a bicycle for her birthday, but she gets none. Distracted by the gifts she does receive, she at first does not think about the bike. But when seeing her tricycle, she (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Liezl van Zyl (2002). Intentional Parenthood: Responsibilities in Surrogate Motherhood. [REVIEW] Health Care Analysis 10 (2):165-175.score: 18.0
    In recent years, a number of writers dealingwith questions over parenthood that arisein the context of reproductive technologies andsurrogate motherhood, have appealed to thenotion of ``intentional parenthood''. Basingtheir argument on liberal values such asindividual autonomy, the freedom to entercontracts, the right to privacy, and individualself-fulfilment, they argue that contractuallystated intentions, rather than genetic orgestational relationships, should form thebasis of parental rights. Against this I arguethat parental rights do not derive fromcontractual agreements, but are based in theirobligations towards the child. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. William Lanier (2014). Intentional Identity and Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):289-302.score: 18.0
    What is the semantic contribution of anaphoric links in sentences like, ‘A physicist was late to the party. He brought some bongos’? A natural first thought is that the passage entails a wide-scope existential claim that there is something that both (i) was late to the party and (ii) brought some bongos. Intentional identity sentences are counter-examples to this natural thought applied to anaphora in general. Some have tried to rescue the thought and accommodate the counter-examples by positing mythical (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Liezl van Zyl (2002). Intentional Parenthood and the Nuclear Family. Journal of Medical Humanities 23 (2):107-118.score: 18.0
    Reproductive techniques and practices, ranging from ordinary birth-control measures and artificial insemination to embryo transfer and surrogate motherhood, have greatly enhanced our range of reproductive choices. As a consequence, they pose a number of difficult moral and legal questions with regard to the formation of a family and our conception of parenthood. A view that is becoming increasingly common is that parental rights and responsibilities should not be based on genetic relationships but should instead be seen as arising from agreements (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Zhang Wei & Yu Xin (2009). The Foundation of Phenomenological Ethics: Intentional Feelings. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (1):130 - 142.score: 18.0
    E. Husserl's reflections in Logical Investigations on "Intentional Feelings" and "non-intentional feelings" are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler's thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler's phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl's first orientation. /// 胡塞尔在 "逻辑研究" 中对 "意向感受" (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Hans-Ulrich Hoche & Michael Knoop (2013). Ascriptions of Propositional Attitudes. An Analysis in Terms of Intentional Objects. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):747-768.score: 18.0
    Having briefly sketched the aims of our paper, namely, to logically analyse the ascription of propositional attitudes to somebody else in terms, not of Fregean senses or of intensions-with-s, but of the intentional object of the person spoken about, say, the believer or intender (Section 1), we try to introduce the concept of an intentional object as simply as possible, to wit, as coming into view whenever two (or more) subjective belief-worlds strikingly diverge (Section 2). Then, we assess (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. X. U. Zhu (2010). Laws, Causality and the Intentional Explanation of Action. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):280-293.score: 18.0
    Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper–Hempel Thesis, which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three characteristic arguments for the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. R. Kadosh, N. Bien & A. T. Sack (2011). Automatic and Intentional Number Processing Both Rely on Intact Right Parietal Cortex: A Combined FMRI and Neuronavigated TMS Study. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6:2-2.score: 18.0
    Practice and training usually lead to performance increase in a given task. In addition, a shift from intentional towards more automatic processing mechanisms is often observed. It is currently debated whether automatic and intentional processing is subserved by the same or by different mechanism(s), and whether the same or different regions in the brain are recruited. Previous correlational evidence provided by behavioural, neuroimaging, modelling, and neuropsychological studies addressing this question yielded conflicting results. Here we used transcranial magnetic stimulation (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Granville King Iii (2001). Perceptions of Intentional Wrongdoing and Peer Reporting Behavior Among Registered Nurses. Journal of Business Ethics 34 (1):1-13.score: 18.0
    How a person perceives a wrongdoing being committed by a coworker will affect whether the incident is reported within the organization. A significant factor that may influence the decision to report a wrongdoing is the perceived intentionality of the wrongdoer. This study sought to examine if differences in perceptions of a wrongdoing could affect the disclosure of unethical behavior. Three hundred seventy-two registered nurses (N = 372) responded to a survey consisting of both intentional and unintentional wrongdoings that could (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Ilaria Canavotto (2013). The problem of intentionality and intentional objects critical analysis of the proposal by Searle and Crane. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 105 (1):17-40.score: 18.0
    Intentionality is traditionally defined as the property of a mental state to be directed at something presented in a particular way. The fact that we can think about objects which do not exist makes this definition problematic: what kind of things are those objects? The aim of this paper is to analyse the definition of intentionality as a relation in theories which do not admit non-existent special entities. In particular, I consider John R. Searle and Tim Crane’s theories of intentionality (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Ihor Karivets (2010). Is the Phenomenon of Non-Intentional "Self-Other" Relation Possible? In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana. The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research. Volume CV. Springer. 209-220.score: 18.0
    This article is dedicated to possibility of overcoming the subject-object ontoligy, which is based on intentionality.The author proves that such dualism is rooted into the transcendental level. The transcendental level makes possible our empirical experience on the basis of subject-object relations. The author considers Parmenides' famous sentence "For it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be" and Husserl's well-known claim "Back to things themselves!" as essential for possibility of discovering non-intentional relation between Self and (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Veronika Krieghoff, Marcel Brass, Wolfgang Prinz & Florian Waszak (2009). Dissociating What and When of Intentional Actions. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 3:3.score: 18.0
    Recent brain imaging research revealed that internally guided actions involve the fronto-median wall, in particular the preSMA and the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ). However, a systematic decomposition of different components of intentional action is still lacking. We propose a new paradigm to dissociate two components of internally guided behaviour: Which action to perform (selection component) and when to perform the action (timing component). Our results suggest a neuro-functional dissociation of intentional action timing and intentional action selection. While (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Hugh J. McCann (2005). Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):737-748.score: 16.0
    Recent empirical work calls into question the so-called Simple View that an agent who A’s intentionally intends to A. In experimental studies, ordinary speakers frequently assent to claims that, in certain cases, agents who knowingly behave wrongly intentionally bring about the harm they do; yet the speakers tend to deny that it was the intention of those agents to cause the harm. This paper reports two additional studies that at first appear to support the original ones, but argues that in (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Xiaoqing Hu, Hao Chen & Genyue Fu (2012). A Repeated Lie Becomes a Truth? The Effect of Intentional Control and Training on Deception. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 16.0
    Deception has been demonstrated as a task that involves execution control such as conflict monitoring and response inhibition. In the present study, we investigated whether or not the controlled processes associated with deception could be trained to be more efficient. Forty-eight participants finished a reaction times (RTs)-based differentiation of deception paradigm (DDP) task using self- and other-referential information on two occasions. After the first baseline DDP task, participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a control group in which (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Genyue Fu Xiaoqing Hu, Hao Chen (2012). A Repeated Lie Becomes a Truth? The Effect of Intentional Control and Training on Deception. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 16.0
    Deception has been demonstrated as a task that involves execution control such as conflict monitoring and response inhibition. In the present study, we investigated whether or not the controlled processes associated with deception could be trained to be more efficient. Forty-eight participants finished a reaction times (RTs)-based differentiation of deception paradigm (DDP) task using self- and other-referential information on two occasions. After the first baseline DDP task, participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a control group in which (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. John R. Searle (1979). What is an Intentional State? Mind 88 (January):74-92.score: 15.0
  38. Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (2001). Are Frege Cases Exceptions to Intentional Generalizations? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.score: 15.0
    This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Florian Cova (2013). Unconsidered Intentional Actions: An Assessment of Scaife and Webber's 'Consideration Hypothesis'. Journal of Moral Philosophy (1):1-22.score: 15.0
  40. Kirk Ludwig (2007). Foundations of Social Reality in Collective Intentional Behavior. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology.score: 15.0
    This paper clarifies Searle's account of we-intentions and then argues that it is subject to counterexamples, some of which are derived from examples Searle uses against other accounts. It then offers an alternative reductive account that is not subject to the counterexamples.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Mark B. Okrent (1990). Individuation and Intentional Ascriptions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):461-480.score: 15.0
  42. Alfred R. Mele (2004). The Illusion of Conscious Will and the Causation of Intentional Actions. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):193-213.score: 15.0
  43. Samuel Cumming (2014). Indefinites and Intentional Identity. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):371-395.score: 15.0
    This paper investigates the truth conditions of sentences containing indefinite noun phrases, focusing on occurrences in attitude reports, and, in particular, a puzzle case due to Walter Edelberg. It is argued that indefinites semantically contribute the (thought-)object they denote, in a manner analogous to attributive definite descriptions. While there is an existential reading of attitude reports containing indefinites, it is argued that the existential quantifier is contributed by the de re interpretation of the indefinite (as the de re reading adds (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. David Davies (1992). Perspectives on Intentional Realism. Mind and Language 7 (3):264-285.score: 15.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Daniel Seymour (1993). Some of the Difference in the World: Crane on Intentional Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (170):83-89.score: 15.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Philip Nochlin (1953). Reducibility and Intentional Words. Journal of Philosophy 50 (October):625-637.score: 15.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Morris Eagle & Eli Leiter (1964). Recall and Recognition in Intentional and Incidental Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 68 (1):58.score: 15.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Marilyn E. Miller & Virginia Lakso (1964). Effect of Constant Versus Varied Pairing of Simultaneous Intentional- and Incidental-Learning Materials with Different Rates and Numbers of Exposures. Journal of Experimental Psychology 67 (3):256.score: 15.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Michael Dale (1990). Intentional Explanations and Radical Theories of Education. Studies in Philosophy and Education 10 (3):179-194.score: 15.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Dennis Greenwood (2007). Relational Care: Learning to Look Beyond Intentionality to the ?Non-Intentional? In a Caring Relationship. Nursing Philosophy 8 (4):223-232.score: 15.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000