Search results for 'Intentional generalization' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (2001). Are Frege Cases Exceptions to Intentional Generalizations? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.score: 132.0
    This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples.
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  2. D. Arjo (1996). Sticking Up for Oedipus: Fodor on Intentional Generalizations and Broad Content. Mind and Language 11 (3):231-45.score: 82.0
  3. Rhebe Cramer (1970). Semantic Generalization: IAR Locus and Instructions. Journal of Experimental Psychology 83 (2p1):266.score: 78.0
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  4. Phebe Cramer (1972). Semantic * Associative Relationships * Conditions of CRS Presentation in Semantic Generalization. Journal of Experimental Psychology 92 (2):246.score: 78.0
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  5. David K. Henderson (1991). On the Testability of Psychological Generalizations (Psychological Testability). Philosophy of Science (December) 586 (December):586-606.score: 72.0
    Rosenberg argues that intentional generalizations in the human sciences cannot be law-like because they are not amenable to significant empirical refinement. This irrefinability is said to result from the principle that supposedly controls in intentional explanation also serving as the standard for successful interpretation. The only credible evidence bearing on such a principle would then need conform to it. I argue that psychological generalizations are refinable and can be nomic. I show how empirical refinement of psychological generalizations is (...)
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  6. Anders Rydvall, Niklas Juth, Mikael Sandlund, Magnus Domellöf & Niels Lynøe (forthcoming). To Treat or Not to Treat a Newborn Child with Severe Brain Damage? A Cross-Sectional Study of Physicians' and the General Population's Perceptions of Intentions. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy:1-8.score: 52.0
    Ethical dilemmas are common in the neonatal intensive care setting. The aim of the present study was to investigate the opinions of Swedish physicians and the general public on treatment decisions regarding a newborn with severe brain damage. We used a vignette-based questionnaire which was sent to a random sample of physicians (n = 628) and the general population (n = 585). Respondents were asked to provide answers as to whether it is acceptable to discontinue ventilator treatment, and when it (...)
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  7. Jeffrey C. King (1993). Intentional Identity Generalized. Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (1):61 - 93.score: 50.0
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  8. J. K. Swindler (1996). Social Intentions: Aggregate, Collective, and General. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26 (1):61-76.score: 48.0
    The literature on collective action largely ignores the constraints that moral principle places on action-prompting intentions. Here I suggest that neither individualism nor holism can account for the generality of intentional contents demanded by universalizability principles, respect for persons, or proactive altruism. Utilitarian and communitarian ethics are criticized for nominalism with respect to social intentions. The failure of individualism and holism as grounds for moral theory is confirmed by comparing Tuomela's reductivist analysis of we-intentions with Gilbert's analysis of social (...)
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  9. Barbara Crossette (2007). The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations, Paul Kennedy (New York: Random House, 2006), 384 Pp., $26.95 Cloth, $15.95 Paper. Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics, Simon Chesterman, Ed.(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 296 Pp., $85 Cloth, $29.99 Paper. The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power, James Traub (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 464 Pp., $26 Cloth, $15 Paper. [REVIEW] Ethics and International Affairs 21 (3):381-385.score: 40.0
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  10. Barbara Crossette (2007). The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations - by Paul Kennedy, Secretary or General?: The UN Secretary-General in World Politics - Edited by Simon Chesterman and the Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power - by James Traub. Ethics and International Affairs 21 (3):381–385.score: 40.0
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  11. Jens Timmerman, John Skorupski & Simon Robertson (2009). 1. General Constraints on a Cognitivist Account of Intentions. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Four. Oup Oxford. 4--243.score: 40.0
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  12. Mark Alfano (2010). The Tenacity of the Intentional Prior to the Genealogy. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 40:29-46.score: 38.0
    I have argued elsewhere that the psychological aspects of Nietzsche’s later works are best understood from a psychodynamic point of view. Nietzsche holds a view I dubbed the tenacity of the intentional (T): when an intentional state loses its object, a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely. In this essay I amend and clarify (T) to (T``): When an intentional state with a sub-propositional object loses its object, the affective component of the (...)
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  13. Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs. In Alessandro Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, Quantifiers. Springer.score: 38.0
    The question whether natural language permits quantification over intentional objects as the ‘nonexistent’ objects of thought is the topic of a major philosophical controversy, as is the status of intentional objects as such. This paper will argue that natural language does reflect a particular notion of intentional object and in particular that certain types of natural language constructions (generally disregarded in the philosophical literature) cannot be analysed without positing intentional objects. At the same time, those (...) objects do not come for free; rather they are strictly dependent on intentional acts that generally need to have a presence, in one way or another, in the semantic structure of the sentence. (shrink)
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  14. William Lanier (2014). Intentional Identity and Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):289-302.score: 38.0
    What is the semantic contribution of anaphoric links in sentences like, ‘A physicist was late to the party. He brought some bongos’? A natural first thought is that the passage entails a wide-scope existential claim that there is something that both (i) was late to the party and (ii) brought some bongos. Intentional identity sentences are counter-examples to this natural thought applied to anaphora in general. Some have tried to rescue the thought and accommodate the counter-examples by positing mythical (...)
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  15. Ian Phillips (2005). Experience and Intentional Content. Dissertation, Oxford Universityscore: 30.0
    Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its Intentional content. Strong or Pure Anti-Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its non-Intentional properties. In Chapters One and Two, I consider how best to delineate the opposition between these positions. I reject various characterizations of the distinction, in particular, that it (...)
     
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  16. Ryan Wasserman (2011). Intentional Action and the Unintentional Fallacy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):524-534.score: 30.0
    Much of the recent work in action theory can be organized around a set of objections facing the Simple View and other intention-based accounts of intentional action. In this paper, I review three of the most popular objections to the Simple View and argue that all three objections commit a common fallacy. I then draw some more general conclusions about the relationship between intentional action and moral responsibility.
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  17. Andrew D. Spear, Husserl on Intentionality and Intentional Content.score: 30.0
    Edmund Husserl (1859—1938) was an influential thinker of the first half of the twentieth century. His philosophy was heavily influenced by the works of Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, and was also influenced in various ways by interaction with contemporaries such as Alexius Meinong, Kasimir Twardowski, and Gottlob Frege. In his own right, Husserl is considered the founder of twentieth century Phenomenology with influence extending to thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and to contemporary continental philosophy generally. (...)
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  18. Marcel Weber, Behavioral Traits, the Intentional Stance, and Biological Functions.score: 30.0
    It has been claimed that the intentional stance is necessary to individuate behavioral traits. This thesis, while clearly false, points to two interesting sets of problems concerning biological explanations of behavior: The first is a general in the philosophy of science: the theory-ladenness of observation. The second problem concerns the principles of trait individuation, which is a general problem in philosophy of biology. After discussing some alternatives, I show that one way of individuating the behavioral traits of an organism (...)
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  19. Andrea Onofri (2013). On Non-Pragmatic Millianism. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):305-327.score: 30.0
    Speakers often judge the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Superman flies” to be true and the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies” to be false. If Millianism is true, however, these sentences express the very same proposition and must therefore have same truth value. “Pragmatic” Millians like Salmon and Soames have tried to explain speakers’ “anti-substitution intuitions” by claiming that the two sentences are routinely used to pragmatically convey different propositions which do have different truth values. “Non-Pragmatic” Millians (...)
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  20. Panos Theodorou (2006). Perception and Action: On the Praxial Structure of Intentional Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):303-320.score: 30.0
    Progressively Husserl started referring to the whole sphere of the life of intentional acts in terms of praxis. Perception, imagination, judgement, scientific consciousness, etc., are all seen as practices. What is the meaning of this move? A seemingly self-evident possibility is that intentionality is praxial, because even perception is not completely free from empty intending moments that demand fulfilment; and all fulfilment is attained by means of bodily activities that enable our senses to acquire the relevant contents. I reject (...)
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  21. Gyula Klima, Intentional Transfer in Averroes, Indifference of Nature in Avicenna, and the Issue of the Representationalism of Aquinas.score: 30.0
    Is Aquinas a representationalist or a direct realist? Max Herrera’s (and, for that matter, Claude Panaccio’s) qualified answers to each alternative show that the real significance of the question is not that if we answer it, then we can finally learn under which classification Aquinas should fall, but rather that upon considering it we can learn something about the intricacies of the question itself. In these comments I will first argue that the Averroistic notion of “intentional transfer”, combined with (...)
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  22. Berent Enç (2004). Causal Theories of Intentional Behavior and Wayward Causal Chains. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):149 - 166.score: 30.0
    On a causal theory of rational behavior, behavior is just a causal consequence of the reasons an actor has. One of the difficulties with this theory has been the possibility of the "wayward causal chains," according to which reasons can cause the expected output, but in such an unusual way that the output is clearly not intentional. The inability to find a general way of excluding these wayward chains without implicitly appealing to elements incompatible with a pure causal account (...)
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  23. Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Precis of the Intentional Stance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (3):13-25.score: 30.0
    The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other states to systems and predicts future behavior from what it would be rational for an agent to do, given those beliefs and desires. Any system whose performance can be thus predicted and explained is an intentional system, whatever its innards. The strategy of treating parts of the world as intentional systems is the foundation of but is also exploited (and is virtually (...)
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  24. Gordon R. Foxall (2007). Intentional Behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy 35:1 - 55.score: 30.0
    Two of the leading contenders to explain behavior are radical behaviorism and intentionality: an account that seeks to confine itself to descriptions of response–environment correlations and one that employs the language of beliefs and desires to explicate its subject matter. While each claims an exclusive right to undertake this task, this paper argues that neither can be eliminated from a complete explanatory account of human behavior. The behavior analysis derived from radical behaviorism is generally sufficient for the prediction and control (...)
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  25. Samuli Pöyhönen (2013). Intentional Concepts in Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophical Explorations (1):1-17.score: 30.0
    In this article, I develop an account of the use of intentional predicates in cognitive neuroscience explanations. As pointed out by Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker, intentional language abounds in neuroscience theories. According to Bennett and Hacker, the subpersonal use of intentional predicates results in conceptual confusion. I argue against this overly strong conclusion by evaluating the contested language use in light of its explanatory function. By employing conceptual resources from the contemporary philosophy of science, I show (...)
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  26. Péter Lautner (2012). Aristotle on the Intentional Nature of Emotions. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):221-237.score: 30.0
    Emotions are characteristic activities/states in hylemorphic structure of the Aristotelian soul. Emotional activities/states are physiological processes/states as well, as it is particularly clear in anger. It raises the question about the origin of their intentionality. Sometimes sheer bodily processes can lead to emotions, which implies that intentionality in emotions might also originate in bodily processes. But Aristotle does not generalize this point in saying that all emotions are due to bodily processes. Moreover, since they are complex phenomena, involving opinion, representation, (...)
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  27. Robert K. Shope (1996). Nondeviant Chains in Intentional Action. Journal of Philosophical Research 21:15-49.score: 30.0
    When employing causal terminology in analyzing intentional action, and sometimes in analyzing additional phenomena, philosophers have required that relevant causal chains be free of what they call causal deviance or waywardness. But there is a wider type of deviance that needs to be excluded, of which causal deviance is only a species. Carl Ginet’s On Action considers examples of both types of deviance. A criticism of his treatment of such examples leads to a more satisfactory general analysis of nondeviant (...)
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  28. Martin Kurthen (1994). Ahistorical Intentional Content. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 25 (2):241 - 259.score: 26.0
    One of the main problems of current theory of intentionality concerns the possibility of ahistorical intentional content, that is, content in the absence of any developmental history of the respective item. Biosemanticists like Millikan (1984) argue that content is essentially historical, while computationalists like Cummins (1989) hold that a system's current ahistorical state alone determines content. In the present paper, this problem is discussed in terms of some popular 'cosmic accident' thought experiments, and the conceptual framework of these experiments (...)
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  29. Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2010). The Deep Self Model and Asymmetries in Folk Judgments About Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):159-176.score: 24.0
    Recent studies by experimental philosophers demonstrate puzzling asymmetries in people’s judgments about intentional action, leading many philosophers to propose that normative factors are inappropriately influencing intentionality judgments. In this paper, I present and defend the Deep Self Model of judgments about intentional action that provides a quite different explanation for these judgment asymmetries. The Deep Self Model is based on the idea that people make an intuitive distinction between two parts of an agent’s psychology, an Acting Self that (...)
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  30. Joshua Knobe (2003). Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325.score: 24.0
    Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not _evaluative _considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by (...)
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  31. Uriah Kriegel (2008). The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.score: 24.0
    The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
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  32. Joshua Shepherd (2014). Causalism and Intentional Omission. American Philosophical Quarterly 51:15-26.score: 24.0
    It is natural to think that at root, agents are beings that act. Agents do more than this, however – agents omit to act. Sometimes agents do so intentionally. How should we understand intentional omission? Recent accounts of intentional omission have given causation a central theoretical role. The move is well-motivated. If some form of causalism about intentional omission can successfully exploit similarities between action and omission, it might inherit the broad support causalism about intentional action (...)
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  33. Danny Frederick (2010). Unmotivated Intentional Action. Philosophical Frontiers 5 (1):21-30.score: 24.0
    In opposition to the tenet of contemporary action theory that an intentional action must be done for a reason, I argue that some intentional actions are unmotivated. I provide examples of arbitrary and habitual actions that are done for no reason at all. I consider and rebut an objection to the examples of unmotivated habitual action. I explain how my contention differs from recent challenges to the tenet by Hursthouse, Stocker and Pollard.
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  34. Michael Gorman (2006). Talking About Intentional Objects. Dialectica 60 (2):135-144.score: 24.0
    Discusses the old problem of how to characterize apparently intentional states that appear to lack objects. In tandem with critically discussing a recent proposal by Tim Crane, I develop the line of reasoning according to which talking about intentional objects is really a way of talking about intentional states—in particular, it’s a way of talking about their satisfaction-conditions.
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  35. Julien A. Deonna & Klaus R. Scherer (2010). The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion. Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.score: 24.0
    Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in (...)
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  36. Mark Phelan (2010). The Intentional Action Factory. The Philosophers' Magazine 52.score: 24.0
    This short paper, forthcoming as part of a symposium on experimental philosophy to appear in the popular publication, The Philosophers’ Magazine (including contributions by Papineau, Stich, Machery, Sommers, and Knobe), offers an accessible summary of seven years of experimental-philosophical research into intentional action attributions.
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  37. Patrick Haggard & S. Clark (2003). Intentional Action: Conscious Experience and Neural Prediction. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):695-707.score: 24.0
    Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that ''I'' am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a movement against its (...)
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  38. Berit Brogaard (2010). Stupid People Deserve What They Get: The Effects of Personality Assessment on Judgments of Intentional Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):332-334.score: 24.0
    Knobe argues that people’s judgments of the moral status of a side-effect of action influence their assessment of whether the side-effect is intentional. We tested this hypothesis using vignettes akin to Knobe’s but involving economically or eudaimonistically (wellness-related) negative side-effects. Our results show that it is people’s sense of what agents deserve and not the moral status of side-effects that drives intuition.
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  39. Yair Levy (2013). Intentional Action First. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.score: 24.0
    The paper motivates a novel research programme in the philosophy of action parallel to the ‘Knowledge First’ programme in epistemology. It is argued that much of the grounds for abandoning the quest for a reductive analysis of knowledge in favour of the Knowledge First alternative is mirrored in the case of intentional action, inviting the hypothesis that intentional action is also, like knowledge, metaphysically basic. The paper goes on to demonstrate the sort of explanatory contribution that intentional (...)
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  40. Eric Wiland (2007). Intentional Action and "in Order To". Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):113-118.score: 24.0
    I. Thanks largely to Joshua Knobe, philosophers now frequently empirically investigate the folk psychological concept of intentional action. Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b) argues that application of this concept is often surprisingly sensitive to one’s moral views. In particular, it seems that people are much more willing to regard a bit of behavior as intentional, if they think that the action in question is bad or wrong. There is much controversy about both the design and the interpretation of the (...)
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  41. Jonathan Knowles (2001). Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science? Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.score: 24.0
    I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical arguments (...)
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  42. R. Takenaga (2002). Inverting Intentional Content. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):197-229.score: 24.0
    Critics of wide functionalism have traditionally sought to attack the theory by exposing weaknesses in its account of the qualitative content of experience. Wide functionalist theories of intentional content, however, were spared philosophical scrutiny. I propose that wide functionalist accounts of the intentional content are equally susceptible to attack. I will attempt to demonstrate this by enlisting the functionalist's old foe from the qualia wars - the inverted spectrum hypothesis - in a new way. If the argument is (...)
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  43. Jurgen Schroder (2002). The Supervenience Argument and the Generalization Problem. Erkenntnis 56 (3):319-28.score: 24.0
    This paper tries to show that Kims strategy of preventing the problem of generalization of mental causation is not successful and that his original supervenience argument can be applied to cases of nonmental macrolevel causation, with the effect that nonmental macroproperties which only supervene on, but are not identical with, configurations of microproperties turn out to be epiphenomenal after all.
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  44. L. S. Carrier (1986). Free Will and Intentional Action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364.score: 24.0
    I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.
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  45. Elisabeth Pacherie & Patrick Haggard (2010). What Are Intentions? In L. Nadel & W. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. A tribute to Benjamin Libet. Oxford University Press. 70--84.score: 24.0
    The concept of intention can do useful work in psychological theory. Many authors have insisted on a qualitative difference between prospective and intentions regarding their type of content, with prospective intentions generally being more abstract than immediate intentions. However, we suggest that the main basis of this distinction is temporal: prospective intentions necessarily occur before immediate intention and before action itself, and often long before them. In contrast, immediate intentions occur in the specific context of the action itself. Yet both (...)
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  46. Gyula Klima (2013). Three Myths of Intentionality Versus Some Medieval Philosophers. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21:359-376.score: 24.0
    After Brentano, intentionality is often characterized as “the mark of the mental”. In Brentano‟s view, intentionality “is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything like it”. 2 After Meinong, it is also generally believed that intentionality, as this characteristic mental phenomenon, concerns a specific type of objects, namely, intentional objects, having intentional inexistence, as opposed to ordinary physical objects, having real existence. Thus, intentional objects are supposed to constitute a mysterious ontological realm, the dwelling (...)
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  47. Elisabeth Pacherie (2011). Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control. Social Psychology 42 (1):67-73.score: 24.0
    In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relation- ships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of these (...)
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  48. Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki (2012). Unlikely Allies: Embodied Social Cognition and the Intentional Stance. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):487-506.score: 24.0
    I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett’s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target’s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the intentional (...)
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  49. Wei Zhang (2009). The Foundation of Phenomenological Ethics: Intentional Feelings. [REVIEW] Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (1):130-142.score: 24.0
    E. Husserl’s reflections in Logical Investigations on “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings” are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler’s thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler’s phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl’s first orientation.
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  50. Zhu Xu (2010). Laws, Causality and the Intentional Explanation of Action. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):280-293.score: 24.0
    Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper-Hempel Thesis , which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three characteristic arguments for (...)
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