Search results for 'Intentional objects' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Uriah Kriegel (2008). The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.score: 90.0
    The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
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  2. Michael Gorman (2006). Talking About Intentional Objects. Dialectica 60 (2):135-144.score: 72.0
    Discusses the old problem of how to characterize apparently intentional states that appear to lack objects. In tandem with critically discussing a recent proposal by Tim Crane, I develop the line of reasoning according to which talking about intentional objects is really a way of talking about intentional states—in particular, it’s a way of talking about their satisfaction-conditions.
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  3. Ilaria Canavotto (2013). The problem of intentionality and intentional objects critical analysis of the proposal by Searle and Crane. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 105 (1):17-40.score: 72.0
    Intentionality is traditionally defined as the property of a mental state to be directed at something presented in a particular way. The fact that we can think about objects which do not exist makes this definition problematic: what kind of things are those objects? The aim of this paper is to analyse the definition of intentionality as a relation in theories which do not admit non-existent special entities. In particular, I consider John R. Searle and Tim Crane’s theories (...)
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  4. Hans-Ulrich Hoche & Michael Knoop (2013). Ascriptions of Propositional Attitudes. An Analysis in Terms of Intentional Objects. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):747-768.score: 66.0
    Having briefly sketched the aims of our paper, namely, to logically analyse the ascription of propositional attitudes to somebody else in terms, not of Fregean senses or of intensions-with-s, but of the intentional object of the person spoken about, say, the believer or intender (Section 1), we try to introduce the concept of an intentional object as simply as possible, to wit, as coming into view whenever two (or more) subjective belief-worlds strikingly diverge (Section 2). Then, we assess (...)
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  5. Tim Crane (2001). Intentional Objects. Ratio 14 (4):298-317.score: 62.0
    Is there, or should there be, any place in contemporary philosophy of mind for the concept of an intentional object? Many philosophers would make short work of this question. In a discussion of what intentional objects are supposed to be, John Searle.
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  6. Katalin Farkas (2010). Independent Intentional Objects. In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.score: 60.0
    Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is based on the idea (...)
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  7. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2013). Varieties of Intentional Objects. Semiotica 194 (194):189–206.score: 60.0
    In this paper I propose a certain classification of entities which are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label ‘intentional objects’. Franz Brentano’s immanent objects, Alexius Meinong’s entities ‘beyond being and non-being’, or Roman Ingarden’s purely intentional objects can serve as examples of such entities. What they all have in common is that they have been introduced in order to extensionalise the so called ‘intentional contexts’ (‘intentional’ with ‘t’). But not all (...)
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  8. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2008). Varieties of Intentional Objects. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17 (194):23-32.score: 60.0
    I propose a certain classification of entities which are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label ‘intentional objects’. Franz Brentano’s immanent objects, Alexius Meinong’s entities ‘beyond being and non-being’, or Roman Ingarden’s purely intentional objects can serve as examples of suchentities. What they all have in common is that they have been introduced in order to extensionalise the so called ‘intentional contexts’ (‘intentional’ with ‘t’). But not all entities which function this (...)
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  9. Dagfinn Føllesdal (1978). Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception. Grazer Philosophische Studien 5:83-94.score: 60.0
    The article is a comparative critical discussion of the views of Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and on perception. Brentano's views on intentional objects are first discussed, with special attention to the problems connected with the status of the intentional objects. It is then argued that Husserl overcomes these problems by help of his notion of noema. Similarly, in the case of perception, Brentano's notion of physical phenomena is argued to be less satisfactory (...)
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  10. Dale Jacquette (1991). The Origins of Gegenstandstheorie: Immanent and Transcendent Intentional Objects in Brentano, Twardowski, and Meinong. Brentano Studien 3:177-202.score: 60.0
    The origins of object theory in the philosophical psychology and semantics of Alexius Meinong and the Graz school can be traced both to the insight and failure of Franz Brentano's immanent objectivity or intentional in-existence thesis. The immanence thesis is documented, together with its critical reception in Alois Höfler's Logik, Twardowski's Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, and Meinong's mature Gegenstandstheorie, in which immanent thought content and transcendent intentional object are distinguished, and Brentano's thesis of immanent (...)
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  11. Douglas Odegard (1972). Anscombe, Sensation and Intentional Objects. Dialogue 11 (March):69-77.score: 55.0
  12. Julien A. Deonna & Klaus R. Scherer (2010). The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion. Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.score: 48.0
    Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have (...)
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  13. Eric Dowling (1970). Intentional Objects, Old and New. Ratio 12 (December):95-107.score: 47.0
     
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  14. Michael Clark (1965). Intentional Objects. Analysis 25 (January):123-128.score: 45.0
  15. Alberto Voltolini (2009). Consequences of Schematism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.score: 45.0
    In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. (...)
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  16. Dominik Perler (1994). What Am I Thinking About? John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureol on Intentional Objects. Vivarium 32 (1):72-89.score: 45.0
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  17. Friederike Moltmann (2008). Intensional Verbs and Their Intentional Objects. Natural Language Semantics 16 (3):239-270.score: 45.0
    The complement of intensional transitive verbs, like any nonreferential complement, can be replaced by a ‘special quantifier’ or ‘special pronoun’ such as 'something', 'the same thing', or 'what'. In this paper, I will defend the ‘Nominalization Theory’ of special quantifiers against a range of apparent counterexamples involving intensional transitive verbs.
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  18. Roger Scruton (1970). Intensional and Intentional Objects. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71:187 - 207.score: 45.0
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  19. Guido Küng (1973). Husserl on Pictures and Intentional Objects. Review of Metaphysics 26 (4):670 - 680.score: 45.0
  20. Richard E. Aquila (1981). Intentional Objects and Kantian Appearances. Philosophical Topics 12 (2):9-37.score: 45.0
  21. William Lanier (2013). Intentional Identity and Descriptions. Philosophical Studies:1-14.score: 45.0
    What is the semantic contribution of anaphoric links in sentences like, ‘A physicist was late to the party. He brought some bongos’? A natural first thought is that the passage entails a wide-scope existential claim that there is something that both (i) was late to the party and (ii) brought some bongos. Intentional identity sentences are counter-examples to this natural thought applied to anaphora in general. Some have tried to rescue the thought and accommodate the counter-examples by positing mythical (...)
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  22. Richard E. Aquila (1971). The Status of Intentional Objects. New Scholasticism 45 (3):427-456.score: 45.0
  23. Frederick Kroon (2013). Intentional Objects, Pretence, and the Quasi-Relational Nature of Mental Phenomena: A New Look at Brentano on Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):377-393.score: 45.0
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  24. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2004). Roman Ingarden. Ontology From a Phenomenological Point of View. Reports on Philosophy 22:121-142.score: 45.0
    Ontology is doubtless the most important part of Roman Ingarden’s (1893-1970) philosophy. Contrary to Husserl, Ingarden always believed that any serious philosophical investigation must involve an ontological basis and he tried to formulate a solid ontological framework for his philosophy. There are several reasons why this ontology deserves our attention. For those who are interested in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, Ingarden’s ontology could be treated as an ingenious attempt to analyse the conceptual structure and hidden ontological assumptions of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. (...)
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  25. Frederick Kroon (2013). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional Objects. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oup Usa. 137.score: 45.0
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  26. A. Chrudzimski (2008). Intentional Objects and Causal Semantics. Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 36 (2):25-35.score: 45.0
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  27. Dale Jacquette (1999). Review: Jacek Pasniczek, The Logic of Intentional Objects. A Meinongian Version of Classical Logic. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (4):1847-1849.score: 45.0
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  28. Dominic O'Meara (2001). Intentional Objects in Later Neoplatonism. In Dominik Perler (ed.), Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality. Brill. 115--125.score: 45.0
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  29. Hoke Robinson (1996). Kantian Appearances and Intentional Objects. Kant-Studien 87 (4):448-454.score: 45.0
     
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  30. A. Controversy Among Early Scotists (2001). What Are Intentional Objects? A Controversy Among Early Scotists Dominik Perler (Universitat Basel). In Dominik Perler (ed.), Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality. Brill. 203.score: 45.0
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  31. Richard Sorabji (2001). Why the Neoplatonists Did Not Have Intentional Objects of Intellection”. In Dominik Perler (ed.), Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality. Brill.score: 45.0
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  32. Alberto Voltolini (1991). Objects as Intentional and as Real. Grazer Philosophische Studien 41:1-32.score: 42.0
    A theory of intentionality is outlined, in which the desideratum that the intentional be the same as the real object is argued for in terms of an anti-realist ontology. According to such an ontology, an ordinary object is in itself an object of discourse taken as intentional when posited phenomenologically and as possible when posited naturalistically, i.e. as not existing in some possible worlds but as existing in others. If the actual world is included among the latter, the (...)
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  33. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2010). Composed Objects, Internal Relations, and Purely Intentional Negativity. Ingarden's Theory of States of Affairs. Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):63-80.score: 39.0
    Ingarden’s official ontology of states of affairs is by no means reductionist. According to him there are states of affairs, but they are ontologically dependent onother entities. There are certain classical arguments for the introduction of states of affairs as extra entities over and above the nominal objects, that can be labelled “the problem of composition,” “the problem of relation” and “the problem of negation.” To the first two Ingarden proposes rather traditional solutions, while his treatment of negation proves (...)
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  34. David Miguel Gray (forthcoming). HOT: Keeping Up Appearances? Southern Philosophical Review.score: 37.0
    David Rosenthal and Josh Weisberg have recently provided a counter argument to Ned Block’s argument that a Higher Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness cannot accommodate the existence of hallucinatory conscious states (i.e. a conscious episode consisting of a HOT without the presence of a relevant lower order thought). Their counter argument invokes the idea of mental appearances: a non-existent intentional object which is to aid in an account of subjective conscious awareness. I argue that if mental appearances are (...)
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  35. Jenefer Robinson (2008). Do All Musical Emotions Have the Music Itself as Their Intentional Object? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (5):592-593.score: 36.0
    Juslin & Vll (J&V) think that all emotions aroused by music have the music itself as their Some of the mechanisms they discuss almost certainly involve both cognitive appraisals and intentional objects. But some of the mechanisms are non-cognitive: they involve neither cognitive appraisals nor intentional objects. Partly for this reason they may produce moods rather than emotions proper.
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  36. Robert Brisart (2012). True Objects and Fulfilments Under Assumption in the Young Husserl. Axiomathes 22 (1):75-89.score: 36.0
    In the year 1894, Husserl had not been already contaminated by Bolzano’s realism. It was then that he conceived a theory of assumptions in order to “save an existence” for mathematical objects. Here we would like to explore this theory and show in what way it represented a convincing alternative to realistic ontology and its counterpart: the correspondence theory of truth. However, as soon as he designed it, Husserl shoved away all the implications for his theory of assumptions, and (...)
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  37. R. M. Sainsbury (2010). Intentionality Without Exotica. In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought.score: 30.0
    The paper argues that intensional phenomena can be explained without appealing to "exotic" entities: one that don't exist, are merely possible, or are essentially abstract.
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  38. Friederike Moltmann, Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs.score: 30.0
    The question whether natural language permits quantification over intentional objects as the ‘nonexistent’ objects of thought is the topic of major philosophical controversy, as is the status of intentional objects as such. This paper will argue that natural language does reflect a particular notion of intentional object and in particular that certain types of natural language constructions (generally disregarded in philosophical literature) cannot be analysed without positing intentional objects. At the same time, (...)
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  39. Catherine Legg (2008). Catnesses. In Stephen D. Hales (ed.), What Philosophy Can Tell you About your Cat. Carus.score: 30.0
    An introduction to cat metaphysics..........
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  40. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski & Barry Smith (2004). Brentano’s Ontology: From Conceptualism to Reism. In Dale Jacquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Cambridge University Press. 197--220.score: 30.0
    It is often claimed that the beginnings of Brentano’s ontology were Aristotelian in nature; but this claim is only partially true. Certainly the young Brentano adopted many elements of Aristotle’s metaphysics, and he was deeply influenced by the Aristotelian way of doing philosophy. But he always interpreted Aristotle’s ideas in his own fashion. He accepted them selectively, and he used them in the service of ends that would not have been welcomed by Aristotle himself. The present paper is an exposition (...)
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  41. Alberto Voltolini (2006). Are There Non-Existent Intentionalia? Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):436-441.score: 27.0
    In his recent book on the philosophy of mind,1 Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are to be conceived as schematic entities, having no particular intrinsic nature. I take this metaphysical thesis as fundamentally correct. Yet in this paper I want to cast some doubts on whether this thesis prevents intentionalia, especially nonexistent ones, from belonging to the general inventory of what there is, as Crane seems to think. If my doubts are grounded, Crane’s treatment of intentionalia (...)
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  42. David Friedell (2013). Salmon on Hob and Nob. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):213-220.score: 27.0
    Nathan Salmon appeals to his theory of mythical objects as part of an attempt to solve Geach’s Hob–Nob puzzle. In this paper I argue that, even if Salmon’s theory of mythical objects is correct, his attempt to solve the puzzle is unsuccessful. I also refute an original variant of his proposal. The discussion indicates that it is difficult (if not impossible) to devise a genuine solution to the puzzle that relies on mythical objects.
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  43. Luke Manning (forthcoming). No Identity Without an Entity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.score: 27.0
    Peter Geach's puzzle of intentional identity is to explain how the claim 'Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow' is compatible with there being no such witch. I clarify the puzzle and reduce it to the familiar problem of negative existentials. That problem is a paradox, of representations that seem to include denials of commitment (implicitly, here), to carry commitment to what they deny commitment to, and to (...)
     
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  44. Liliana Albertazzi (2007). At the Roots of Consciousness: Intentional Presentations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):94-114.score: 26.0
    The Author argues for a non-semantic theory of intentionality, i.e. a theory of intentional reference rooted in the perceptive world. Specifically, the paper concerns two aspects of the original theory of intentionality: the structure of intentional objects as appearance (an unfolding spatio-temporal structure endowed with a direction), and the cognitive processes involved in a psychic act at the primary level of cognition. Examples are given from the experimental psychology of vision, with a particular emphasis on the relation (...)
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  45. Austen Clark (2011). Vicissitudes of Non-Visual Objects: Comments on Macpherson, O'Callaghan, and Batty. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):175 - 181.score: 26.0
    The papers by Macpherson, O'Callaghan, and Batty reveal some startling differences in the objects and properties represented by different modalities. They also reveal some tensions between different ways of understanding what it is for any one modality to represent objects and properties.
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  46. Claudia Bianchi (2003). How to Refer: Objective Context Vs. Intentional Context. In P. Blackburn, C. Ghidini, R. Turner & F. Giunchiglia (eds.), Proceedings of the Fourth International and Interdisciplinary Conference on Modeling and Using Context (CONTEXT'03), Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2680. Springer.score: 24.0
    In "Demonstratives" Kaplan claims that the occurrence of a demonstrative must be supplemented by an act of demonstration, like a pointing (a feature of the objective context). Conversely in "After-thoughts" Kaplan argues that the occurrence of a demonstrative must be supplemented by a directing intention (a feature of the intentional con-text). I present the two theories in competition and try to identify the constraints an intention must satisfy in order to have semantic rele-vance. My claim is that the analysis (...)
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  47. Olivier Massin (2011). Le Mutisme des Sens. In S. Laugier & C. Al-Saleh (eds.), J.L. Austin et la philosophie du langage ordinaire. Olms.score: 24.0
    The thesis defended is that ordinary perception does not present us with the existential independence of its objects from itself. The phenomenology of ordinary perception is mute with respect to the subject-object distinction. I call this view "phenomenal neutral monism" : though neutral monists are wrong about the metaphysics of perception (in every perceptual episode, there is a distinction between the perceptual act and its perceptual objet), they are right about its phenomenology. I first argue that this view is (...)
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  48. George H. Miller (1999). How Phenomenological Content Determines the Intentional Object. Husserl Studies 16 (1):1-24.score: 24.0
    This essay argues for internalism in maintaining that there is a sense of “determination” – namely “a selection of one” – according to which phenomenological content determines the object of an experience. The subject may not be able to describe the object in a way which distinguishes it from all other objects, but the object is nevertheless determined by the unity of sense, or noema, which presents it.
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  49. Raul Corazzon, Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects.score: 24.0
    "Nowadays, a need for formal tools is strongly felt in the treatment of two special areas of ontological inquiry. One area is concerned with intentional objects, an area which seems to contain difficulties on the level of things, but also on the level of states of affairs, facts and other "propositional" entities. An intentional relation holds between either persons (more generally experiencing subjects) or acts of consciousness on the one hand, and the intentional objects on (...)
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  50. Graham Harman (2011). The Road to Objects. Continent 3 (1):171-179.score: 24.0
    continent. 1.3 (2011): 171-179. Since 2007 there has been a great deal of interest in speculative realism, launched in the spring of that year at a well-attended workshop in London. It was always a loose arrangement of people who shared few explicit doctrines and no intellectual heroes except the horror writer H.P. Lovecraft, an improbable patron saint for a school of metaphysics. Lovecraft serves as a sort of mascot for the “speculative” part of speculative realism, since his grotesque semi-Euclidean monsters (...)
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