Search results for 'Intentional objects' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
See also:
  1. Uriah Kriegel (2008). The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.
    The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  2. Michael Gorman (2006). Talking About Intentional Objects. Dialectica 60 (2):135-144.
    Discusses the old problem of how to characterize apparently intentional states that appear to lack objects. In tandem with critically discussing a recent proposal by Tim Crane, I develop the line of reasoning according to which talking about intentional objects is really a way of talking about intentional states—in particular, it’s a way of talking about their satisfaction-conditions.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Tim Crane (2001). Intentional Objects. Ratio 14 (4):298-317.
    Is there, or should there be, any place in contemporary philosophy of mind for the concept of an intentional object? Many philosophers would make short work of this question. In a discussion of what intentional objects are supposed to be, John Searle.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  4. Ilaria Canavotto (2013). The problem of intentionality and intentional objects critical analysis of the proposal by Searle and Crane. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 105 (1):17-40.
    Intentionality is traditionally defined as the property of a mental state to be directed at something presented in a particular way. The fact that we can think about objects which do not exist makes this definition problematic: what kind of things are those objects? The aim of this paper is to analyse the definition of intentionality as a relation in theories which do not admit non-existent special entities. In particular, I consider John R. Searle and Tim Crane’s theories (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Katalin Farkas (2010). Independent Intentional Objects. In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications
    Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is based on the idea (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6.  77
    Dagfinn Føllesdal (1978). Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception. Grazer Philosophische Studien 5:83-94.
    The article is a comparative critical discussion of the views of Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and on perception. Brentano's views on intentional objects are first discussed, with special attention to the problems connected with the status of the intentional objects. It is then argued that Husserl overcomes these problems by help of his notion of noema. Similarly, in the case of perception, Brentano's notion of physical phenomena is argued to be less satisfactory (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7.  53
    Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2013). Varieties of Intentional Objects. Semiotica 194 (194):189–206.
    In this paper I propose a certain classification of entities which are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label ‘intentional objects’. Franz Brentano’s immanent objects, Alexius Meinong’s entities ‘beyond being and non-being’, or Roman Ingarden’s purely intentional objects can serve as examples of such entities. What they all have in common is that they have been introduced in order to extensionalise the so called ‘intentional contexts’ (‘intentional’ with ‘t’). But not all (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Dale Jacquette (1991). The Origins of Gegenstandstheorie: Immanent and Transcendent Intentional Objects in Brentano, Twardowski, and Meinong. Brentano Studien 3:177-202.
    The origins of object theory in the philosophical psychology and semantics of Alexius Meinong and the Graz school can be traced both to the insight and failure of Franz Brentano's immanent objectivity or intentional in-existence thesis. The immanence thesis is documented, together with its critical reception in Alois Höfler's Logik, Twardowski's Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, and Meinong's mature Gegenstandstheorie, in which immanent thought content and transcendent intentional object are distinguished, and Brentano's thesis of immanent (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  9.  28
    Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2008). Varieties of Intentional Objects. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17 (194):23-32.
    I propose a certain classification of entities which are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label ‘intentional objects’. Franz Brentano’s immanent objects, Alexius Meinong’s entities ‘beyond being and non-being’, or Roman Ingarden’s purely intentional objects can serve as examples of suchentities. What they all have in common is that they have been introduced in order to extensionalise the so called ‘intentional contexts’ (‘intentional’ with ‘t’). But not all entities which function this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  4
    Jairo José da Silva (1991). Intentional objects and objective existence. Trans/Form/Ação 14:155-164.
    In this paper I show the possibility of an ontology of mathematics that keeps some points in common with platonism and constructivism while diverging from them in other essencial ones. I understand that mathematical objects are simply the referential focus of mathematical discourse, I also understand that their existence is merely intentional but none the less objective, in the sense of being shared by all those who are engaged in the mathematical activity. However, the objective existence of mathematical (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  11
    Hans-Ulrich Hoche & Michael Knoop (2013). Ascriptions of Propositional Attitudes. An Analysis in Terms of Intentional Objects. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):747-768.
    Having briefly sketched the aims of our paper, namely, to logically analyse the ascription of propositional attitudes to somebody else in terms, not of Fregean senses or of intensions-with-s, but of the intentional object of the person spoken about, say, the believer or intender (Section 1), we try to introduce the concept of an intentional object as simply as possible, to wit, as coming into view whenever two (or more) subjective belief-worlds strikingly diverge (Section 2). Then, we assess (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  23
    Guido Küng (1973). Husserl on Pictures and Intentional Objects. Review of Metaphysics 26 (4):670 - 680.
    The DIALOG between Husserlian Phenomnnology and Analytic Philosophy is severely hampered by the fact that much of the secondary literrature on phenomenology fails to pay attention to certain subtile semantical distinctions which are basic for a clear understanding of epistemological issures. Some European Phenomenologists even take pride in their neglect of what they consider to be shallow scholastic quibbling. I hope to remedy this short-coming by outlining in this paper what I believe to be the keypoints of Husserl's theory of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  13.  2
    Maria Gyemant (2015). Objects or Intentional Objects?: Twardowski and Husserl on Non-Existent Entities. In Denis Seron, Sebastien Richard & Bruno Leclercq (eds.), Objects and Pseudo-Objects: Ontological Deserts and Jungles From Brentano to Carnap. De Gruyter 85-100.
  14.  39
    Friederike Moltmann (2008). Intensional Verbs and Their Intentional Objects. Natural Language Semantics 16 (3):239-270.
    The complement of intensional transitive verbs, like any nonreferential complement, can be replaced by a ‘special quantifier’ or ‘special pronoun’ such as 'something', 'the same thing', or 'what'. In this paper, I will defend the ‘Nominalization Theory’ of special quantifiers against a range of apparent counterexamples involving intensional transitive verbs.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  15. M. Ayers (unknown). Are Locke's 'Ideas' Images, Intentional Objects or Natural Signs? Locke Studies 25:3.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  9
    Frederick Kroon (2013). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional Objects. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. OUP Usa 137.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17.  1
    Jacek Paśniczek (2000). The Logic of Intentional Objects. A Meinongian Version of Classical Logic. Studia Logica 65 (3):429-432.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  18.  30
    Richard E. Aquila (1981). Intentional Objects and Kantian Appearances. Philosophical Topics 12 (2):9-37.
  19.  66
    Michael Clark (1965). Intentional Objects. Analysis 25 (January):123-128.
  20.  54
    Dominik Perler (1994). What Am I Thinking About? John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureol on Intentional Objects. Vivarium 32 (1):72-89.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  18
    Frederick Kroon (2013). Intentional Objects, Pretence, and the Quasi-Relational Nature of Mental Phenomena: A New Look at Brentano on Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):377-393.
    Brentano famously changed his mind about intentionality between the 1874 and 1911 editions of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (PES). The 1911 edition repudiates the 1874 view that to think about something is to stand in a relation to something that is within in the mind, and holds instead that intentionality is only like a relation (it is ‘quasi-relational’). Despite this, Brentano still insists that mental activity involves ‘the reference to something as an object’, much as he did in the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  3
    Dominic O'Meara (2001). Intentional Objects in Later Neoplatonism. In Dominik Perler (ed.), Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality. Brill 115--125.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23.  2
    Richard Sorabji (2001). Why the Neoplatonists Did Not Have Intentional Objects of Intellection”. In Dominik Perler (ed.), Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality. Brill
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24.  26
    Douglas Odegard (1972). Anscombe, Sensation and Intentional Objects. Dialogue 11 (March):69-77.
  25.  19
    Roger Scruton (1970). Intensional and Intentional Objects. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71:187 - 207.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  16
    Richard E. Aquila (1971). The Status of Intentional Objects. New Scholasticism 45 (3):427-456.
  27.  1
    A. Chrudzimski (2008). Intentional Objects and Causal Semantics. Kwartalnik Filozoficzny 36 (2):25-35.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  2
    A. Controversy Among Early Scotists (2001). What Are Intentional Objects? A Controversy Among Early Scotists Dominik Perler (Universitat Basel). In Dominik Perler (ed.), Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality. Brill 203.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Eric Dowling (1970). Intentional Objects, Old and New. Ratio 12 (December):95-107.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Dale Jacquette (1999). Review: Jacek Pasniczek, The Logic of Intentional Objects. A Meinongian Version of Classical Logic. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (4):1847-1849.
  31. Hoke Robinson (1996). Kantian Appearances and Intentional Objects. Kant-Studien 87 (4):448-454.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  35
    Alberto Voltolini (1991). Objects as Intentional and as Real. Grazer Philosophische Studien 41:1-32.
    A theory of intentionality is outlined, in which the desideratum that the intentional be the same as the real object is argued for in terms of an anti-realist ontology. According to such an ontology, an ordinary object is in itself an object of discourse taken as intentional when posited phenomenologically and as possible when posited naturalistically, i.e. as not existing in some possible worlds but as existing in others. If the actual world is included among the latter, the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  33.  28
    Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2010). Composed Objects, Internal Relations, and Purely Intentional Negativity. Ingarden's Theory of States of Affairs. Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):63-80.
    Ingarden’s official ontology of states of affairs is by no means reductionist. According to him there are states of affairs, but they are ontologically dependent onother entities. There are certain classical arguments for the introduction of states of affairs as extra entities over and above the nominal objects, that can be labelled “the problem of composition,” “the problem of relation” and “the problem of negation.” To the first two Ingarden proposes rather traditional solutions, while his treatment of negation proves (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  41
    Casey O’Callaghan (2016). Objects for Multisensory Perception. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1269-1289.
    Object perception deploys a suite of perceptual capacities that constrains attention, guides reidentification, subserves recognition, and anchors demonstrative thought. Objects for perception—perceptual objects—are the targets of such capacities. Characterizing perceptual objects for multisensory perception faces two puzzles. First is the diversity of objects across sensory modalities. Second is the unity of multisensory perceptual objects. This paper resolves the puzzles. Objects for perception are structured mereologically complex individuals. Perceptual objects are items that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  75
    Friederike Moltmann (2015). Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs. In Alessandro Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers. Springer
    The question whether natural language permits quantification over intentional objects as the ‘nonexistent’ objects of thought is the topic of a major philosophical controversy, as is the status of intentional objects as such. This paper will argue that natural language does reflect a particular notion of intentional object and in particular that certain types of natural language constructions (generally disregarded in the philosophical literature) cannot be analysed without positing intentional (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  42
    William Lanier (2014). Intentional Identity and Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):289-302.
    What is the semantic contribution of anaphoric links in sentences like, ‘A physicist was late to the party. He brought some bongos’? A natural first thought is that the passage entails a wide-scope existential claim that there is something that both (i) was late to the party and (ii) brought some bongos. Intentional identity sentences are counter-examples to this natural thought applied to anaphora in general. Some have tried to rescue the thought and accommodate the counter-examples by positing (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37.  52
    Alberto Voltolini (2009). Consequences of Schematism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.
    In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  38.  36
    Raamy Majeed (2014). The Objects of Thought, by Tim Crane. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):182-184.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2004). Roman Ingarden. Ontology From a Phenomenological Point of View. Reports on Philosophy 22:121-142.
    Ontology is doubtless the most important part of Roman Ingarden’s (1893-1970) philosophy. Contrary to Husserl, Ingarden always believed that any serious philosophical investigation must involve an ontological basis and he tried to formulate a solid ontological framework for his philosophy. There are several reasons why this ontology deserves our attention. For those who are interested in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, Ingarden’s ontology could be treated as an ingenious attempt to analyse the conceptual structure and hidden ontological assumptions of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. (...)
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  21
    Robert Brisart (2012). True Objects and Fulfilments Under Assumption in the Young Husserl. Axiomathes 22 (1):75-89.
    In the year 1894, Husserl had not been already contaminated by Bolzano’s realism. It was then that he conceived a theory of assumptions in order to “save an existence” for mathematical objects. Here we would like to explore this theory and show in what way it represented a convincing alternative to realistic ontology and its counterpart: the correspondence theory of truth. However, as soon as he designed it, Husserl shoved away all the implications for his theory of assumptions, and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  23
    Daniel Shargel (2015). Emotions Without Objects. Biology and Philosophy 30 (6):831-844.
    It is widely assumed that emotions have particular intentional objects. This assumption is consistent with the way that we talk: when we attribute states of anger, we often attribute anger at someone, or at something. It is also consistent with leading theories of emotion among philosophers and psychologists, according to which emotions are like judgments or appraisals. However, there is evidence from the social psychology literature suggesting that this assumption is actually false. I will begin by presenting a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Julien A. Deonna & Klaus R. Scherer (2010). The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion. Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.
    Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  43.  17
    David Miguel Gray (2012). HOT: Keeping Up Appearances? Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):155-163.
    David Rosenthal and Josh Weisberg have recently provided a counter argument to Ned Block’s argument that a Higher Order Thought theory of consciousness cannot accommodate the existence of hallucinatory conscious states . Their counter argument invokes the idea of mental appearances: a non-existent intentional object which is to aid in an account of subjective conscious awareness. I argue that if mental appearances are to do the work they are supposed to, we cannot draw a mental appearance/reality distinction. I provide (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. R. M. Sainsbury (2010). Intentionality Without Exotica. In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought.
    The paper argues that intensional phenomena can be explained without appealing to "exotic" entities: one that don't exist, are merely possible, or are essentially abstract.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45. Alberto Voltolini (2013). There Are Intentionalia of Which It Is True That Such Objects Do Not Exist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):394-414.
    According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will point out, ST has the ontological consequence that the intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good metaphysical kind, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  21
    Itay Shani (2011). Aim That Bow! An Interactivist Gaze at the Problem of Intentional Tracking. Axiomathes 21 (1):67-97.
    In this essay I offer a theory of the outward directedness of intentional states, namely, an account of what makes intentional states directed at their respective intentional objects. The theory is meant to be complementary to the canonical interactivist account of mental content in that the latter emphasizes the predicative, intensional, and internal aspects of representation whereas here I shall focus on its denotative, extensional, and external aspects. Thus, the aim is to establish that the two (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  47.  68
    Graham Harman (2011). The Road to Objects. Continent 3 (1):171-179.
    continent. 1.3 (2011): 171-179. Since 2007 there has been a great deal of interest in speculative realism, launched in the spring of that year at a well-attended workshop in London. It was always a loose arrangement of people who shared few explicit doctrines and no intellectual heroes except the horror writer H.P. Lovecraft, an improbable patron saint for a school of metaphysics. Lovecraft serves as a sort of mascot for the “speculative” part of speculative realism, since his grotesque semi-Euclidean monsters (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48.  23
    Arkadiusz Chrudzimski & Barry Smith (2004). Brentano’s Ontology: From Conceptualism to Reism. In Dale Jacquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Cambridge University Press 197--220.
    It is often claimed that the beginnings of Brentano’s ontology were Aristotelian in nature; but this claim is only partially true. Certainly the young Brentano adopted many elements of Aristotle’s metaphysics, and he was deeply influenced by the Aristotelian way of doing philosophy. But he always interpreted Aristotle’s ideas in his own fashion. He accepted them selectively, and he used them in the service of ends that would not have been welcomed by Aristotle himself. The present paper is an exposition (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  49.  74
    Catherine Legg (2008). Catnesses. In Stephen D. Hales (ed.), What Philosophy Can Tell you About your Cat. Carus
    An introduction to cat metaphysics..........
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Liliana Albertazzi (2007). At the Roots of Consciousness: Intentional Presentations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):94-114.
    The Author argues for a non-semantic theory of intentionality, i.e. a theory of intentional reference rooted in the perceptive world. Specifically, the paper concerns two aspects of the original theory of intentionality: the structure of intentional objects as appearance (an unfolding spatio-temporal structure endowed with a direction), and the cognitive processes involved in a psychic act at the primary level of cognition. Examples are given from the experimental psychology of vision, with a particular emphasis on the relation (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000