Search results for 'Intentionalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Angela Mendelovici (2014). Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge 135-157.
    Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which emotions and some moods represent intentional objects as having (...)
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  2. Elmar Unnsteinsson (2016). Wittgenstein as a Gricean Intentionalist. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1):155-172.
    According to the dominant view, the later Wittgenstein identified the meaning of an expression with its use in the language and vehemently rejected any kind of mentalism or intentionalism about linguistic meaning. I argue that the dominant view is wrong. The textual evidence, which has either been misunderstood or overlooked, indicates that at least since the Blue Book Wittgenstein thought speaker’s intentions determine the contents of linguistic utterances. His remarks on use are only intended to emphasize the heterogeneity of (...)
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  3. Angela Mendelovici (2013). Intentionalism About Moods. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.
    According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same kinds of ways (...)
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  4. Jeff Speaks (2010). Attention and Intentionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):325-342.
    Many alleged counter-examples to intentionalism, the thesis that the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of a given sense modality supervenes on the contents of experiences of that modality, can be avoided by adopting a liberal view of the sorts of properties that can be represented in perceptual experience. I argue that there is a class of counter-examples to intentionalism, based on shifts in attention, which avoids this response. A necessary connection between the contents and phenomenal characters of perceptual experiences (...)
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  5. Jeff Speaks (2009). Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.
    I argue that the transparency of experience provides the basis of arguments both for intentionalism -- understood as the view that there is a necessary connection between perceptual content and perceptual phenomenology -- and for the view that the contents of perceptual experiences are Russellian propositions. While each of these views is popular, there are apparent tensions between them, and some have thought that their combination is unstable. In the second half of the paper, I respond to these worries (...)
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  6. David Bain (2003). Intentionalism and Pain. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523.
    The pain case can appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory, I argue. After categorising versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an “objectivist” and “non-mentalist” version is the most promising, provided it can withstand two objections: concerning what we say when in pain, and the distinctiveness of the pain case. I rebut these objections, in a way that’s (...)
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  7.  37
    Kathrin Glüer (2016). Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification. Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1007-1030.
    According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard (...) with further plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasible justification for empirical belief, and that such justification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call “phenomenal intentionalism”. Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having “phenomenal” or “looks contents”: contents of the form Lp. (shrink)
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  8.  6
    Timothy Burns (2015). On Being a ‘We’: Edith Stein’s Contribution to the Intentionalism Debate. Human Studies 38 (4):529-547.
    It is commonplace to speak of social groups as if they were capable of the same sorts of activities as individuals. We say, “Germany won the World Cup”; “The United States invaded Iraq”; and “The world mourned the passing of Nelson Mandela”. In so doing, we attribute agency, belief, and emotional states to groups themselves. In recent years, much literature devoted to analyzing such statements and their implications has emerged. Within this literature, the issue of “intentionalism,” whether individuals must (...)
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  9. Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
  10.  92
    Eric Marcus (2006). Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.
    There has been much written in recent years about whether a pair of subjects could have visual experiences that represented the colors of objects in their environment in precisely the same way, despite differing significantly in what it was like to undergo them, differing that is, in their qualitative character. The possibility of spectrum inversion has been so much debated1 in large part because of the threat that it would pose to the more general doctrine of Intentionalism, according to (...)
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  11.  87
    Max Deutsch (2005). Intentionalism and Intransitivity. Synthese 144 (1):1-22.
    I argue in this paper that the existence of sorites series of color patches – series of color patches arranged so that the patches on each end look different in color though no two adjacent patches do – shows that the relation of same phenomenal charac­ter as is not a transitive relation. I then argue that the intransitivity of same phenomenal character as conflicts with certain versions of intentionalism, the view that an experiences phenomenal character is exhausted, or fully (...)
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  12.  92
    John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2004). Some Arguments Against Intentionalism. Acta Analytica 19 (32):107-141.
    According to a popular doctrine known as "intentionalism," two experiences must have different representational contents if they have different phenomenological contents, in other words, what they represent must differ if what they feel like differs. Were this position correct, the representational significance of a given affect (or 'quale'---plural 'qualia'--to use the preferred term), e.g. a tickle, would be fixed: what it represented would not be a function of the subject's beliefs, past experiences, or other facts about his past or (...)
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  13.  18
    Karsten Stueber (2009). Intentionalism, Intentional Realism, and Empathy. Journal of the Philosophy of History 3 (3):290-307.
    Contemporary philosophers of history and interpretation theorists very often deny the thesis of intentional realism, because they reject intentionalism or the thesis that an agent's or author's intentions are relevant for the interpretive practice of the human sciences. I will defend intentional realism by showing why it is wrong to whole-heartedly reject intentionalism and by clarifying the logical relation between intentionalism and intentional realism. I will do so by discussing the two central arguments against intentionalism; the (...)
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  14.  72
    Greg Janzen (2008). Intentionalism and Change Blindness. Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.
    According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. The goal of this article is to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. It is argued, in particular, that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which (...)
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  15.  53
    Vivienne Brown (2007). Historical Interpretation, Intentionalism and Philosophy of Mind. Journal of the Philosophy of History 1 (1):25-62.
    Historiographic debates keep returning to issues of authorial intention in the interpretation of texts. This paper offers a response to these debates by differentiating between two versions of intentionalism, termed 'substantive intentionalism' and 'formal intentionalism', according to two different senses of 'identity' in the thesis that assigned meaning is identified with authorial intention, such that these two versions of intentionalism imply different ontological commitments to what are construed as the relevant authorial intentions. These distinctions and arguments (...)
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  16.  36
    Georges Rey (2004). A Deflated Intentionalist Alternative to Clark's Unexplanatory Metaphysics. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):519-540.
    Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionalism, but I see no (...)
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  17.  8
    Alan Zaitchik (1980). Intentionalism and Computational Psychology. Grazer Philosophische Studien 10:149-166.
    Intentionalism must be distinguished from computational psychology. The former is a mentalist-realist metatheoretical stance vis-a-vis the latter, which is a research programme devoted to the construction of informationally-characterized simulation models for human behavior, perception, cognition, etc. Intentionalism has its attractive aspects, but unfortunately it is plagued by severe conceptual difficulties. Recent attempts to justify the intentionalist interpretation of computational models, by J.A. Fodor and by C. Graves, J.J. Katz et al., fail to secure a conceptually adequate and genuinely (...)
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  18.  8
    Nenad Miscevic (2004). Response-Intentionalism About Color: A Sketch. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):179-191.
    Building on Crane’s intentionalism, the paper proposes a variant of response-dependentist view of colors. To be of a color C is to have a disposition to cause in normal observers a response, namely, intentional phenomenal C-experience. The view is dubbed “response-intentionalism”. It follows from the following considerations, with the red of a tomato surface taken as an example of color C. Full phenomenal red is being visaged as being on the surface of the tomato. Science tells us that (...)
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  19.  20
    Kenneth P. Winkler (2009). Early Modern Intentionalism: Replies to LoLordo's Comments. Philosophia 37 (3):507-509.
    I clarify Locke’s intentionalism and explain what we might gain by paying more attention to the role of linguistic intentions in the work of the British empiricists.
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  20.  4
    Branko Mitrović (2009). Intentionalism, Intentionality, and Reporting Beliefs1. History and Theory 48 (3):180-198.
    The dominant view of twentieth-century analytic philosophy has been that all thinking is always in a language, that languages are vehicles of thought. The same view has been widespread in continental philosophy as well. In recent decades, however, the opposite view—that languages serve merely to express language-independent thought-contents or propositions—has been more widely accepted. The debate has a direct equivalent in the philosophy of history: when historians report the beliefs of historical figures, do they report the sentences or propositions that (...)
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  21. Adam Pautz (2006). Sensory Awareness is Not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism. Noûs 40 (2):205-240.
  22.  82
    Robert A. Stecker (2006). Moderate Actual Intentionalism Defended. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (4):429-438.
  23.  21
    Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (2003). Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 105-111.
    Emotions are Janus-faced: their focus may switch from how a person is feeling deep inside her, to the busy world of actions, words, or gestures whose perception currently affects her. The intimate relation between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ seems to call for a redrawing of the traditional distinction of mental states between those that can look out to the world, and those that are, supposedly, irredeemably blind.
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  24.  49
    John Bricke (1985). Consciousness and Dennett's Intentionalist Net. Philosophical Studies 48 (September):249-56.
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  25.  16
    Alan Zaitchik (1981). Intentionalism and Physical Reductionism in Computational Psychology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (September):23-41.
  26. Bernhard Nickel (2006). Against Intentionalism. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279 - 304.
    Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper presents a counterexample to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping phenomenology. I argue that this example is superior to super?cially similar examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke (1983), because the standard intentionalist responses to Peacocke.
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  27. Benj Hellie (2007). Higher-Order Intentionalism and Higher-Order Acquaintance. Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.
    I argue against such "Relation Intentionalist" theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the grounds that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than "direct", like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness, based on views expressed by Russell and Price, takes the relation of awareness to be (...)
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  28. Jerrold Levinson (2010). Defending Hypothetical Intentionalism. British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (2):139-150.
    I here defend hypothetical intentionalism, the view of literary and cinematic interpretation that I endorse, from some recent criticisms, and then illustrate the appeal of the view in connection with a recent film of enigmatic cast.
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  29.  54
    Kevin Lynch (2009). Prospects for an Intentionalist Theory of Self-Deception. Abstracta 5 (2):126-138.
    A distinction can be made between those who think that self-deception is frequently intentional and those who don’t. I argue that the idea that self-deception has to be intentional can be partly traced to a particular invalid method for analyzing reflexive expressions of the form ‘Ving oneself’ (where V stands for a verb). However, I take the question of whether intentional self-deception is possible to be intrinsically interesting, and investigate the prospects for such an alleged possibility. Various potential strategies of (...)
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  30. A. Huddleston (2012). The Conversation Argument for Actual Intentionalism. British Journal of Aesthetics 52 (3):241-256.
    Proponents of actual intentionalism hold that an author’s actual intentions should constrain the proper interpretation of his or her works. If, for example, we have good reason to think Proust intends his character Marcel to set out to write a different novel from In Search of Lost Time itself, then that is how we should interpret the text. After decades of being denigrated as the ‘intentional fallacy’, actual intentionalism has enjoyed a renaissance in philosophical aesthetics in recent years, (...)
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  31. Daniel Stoljar (2007). Consequences of Intentionalism. Erkenntnis (Special Issue) 66 (1-2):247--70.
    Most of the recent discussion in philosophy of mind concerning intentionalism.
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  32.  83
    Derek H. Brown (2010). Locating Projectivism in Intentionalism Debates. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):69-78.
    Intentionalism debates seek to uncover the relationship between the qualitative aspects of experience—phenomenal character—and the intentionality of the mind. They have been at or near center stage in the philosophy of mind for more than two decades, and in my view need to be reexamined. There are two core distinct intentionalism debates that are rarely distinguished (Sect. 1). Additionally, the characterization of spectrum inversion as involving inverted qualities and constant intentional content is mistaken (Sect. 3). These confusions can (...)
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  33.  66
    Pierre Le Morvan (2008). Sensory Experience and Intentionalism. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.
    Increasingly prominent in the recent literature on the philosophy of perception, Intentionalism holds that sensory experience is inherently intentional, where to be intentional is to be about, or directed on, something. This article explores Intentionalism's prospects as a viable ontological and epistemological alternative to the traditional trinity of theories of sensory experience: the Sense-Datum Theory, the Adverbial Theory, and the Theory of Appearing.
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  34.  63
    Richard E. Aquila (2003). Hans Vaihinger and Some Recent Intentionalist Readings of Kant. Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2):231-250.
    BRENTANO'S APPROPRIATION OF THE Scholastic notion of intentionality, and of what Brentano called "the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object," was early on exploited in a reading of Kant's theory of objects and appearances. Apparently the first systematic attempt was undertaken by Hans Vaihinger. However, Vaihinger's is radically different from more recent intentionalist readings of Kant. Albeit not in every respect, I propose that a return to this aspect of Vaihinger's approach supports a rewarding advance on such readings. After (...)
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  35.  16
    William Irwin (2015). Authorial Declaration and Extreme Actual Intentionalism: Is Dumbledore Gay? Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (2):141-147.
    Authorial and artistic declarations would seem to be a boon to interpreters who favor actual intentionalism. However, because they believe there are limits on the power of authors and artists to embody their intentions in their works, moderate actual intentionalists hold that some intentions are irrelevant. Looking closely at authorial declaration about the sexuality of Albus Dumbledore in the Harry Potter novels, I argue in favor of the extreme actual intentionalist position that genuine authorial declarations should not be ignored (...)
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  36.  41
    Jose Luis Bermudez (1997). Defending Intentionalist Accounts of Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):107-108.
    This commentary defends intentionalist accounts of self-deception against Mele by arguing that: (1) viewing self-deception on the model of other-deception is not as paradoxical as Mele makes out; (2) the paradoxes are not entailed by the view that self-deception is intentional; and (3) there are two problems for Mele's theory that only an intentionalist theory can solve.
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  37.  32
    Daniel O. Nathan (2005). A Paradox in Intentionalism. British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (1):32-48.
    I argue that intentionalism in aesthetics and in legal interpretation is vulnerable to a different sort of criticism than is found in the voluminous literature on the topic. Specifically, a kind of paradox arises for the intentionalist out of recognition of a second-order intention embedded in the social practices that characterize both art and law. The paper shows how this second-order intention manifests itself in each of the two enterprises, and argues that its presence entails the overriding centrality of (...)
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  38.  19
    Alon Chasid (2014). Pictorial Experience and Intentionalism. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (4):405-416.
    This article examines the compatibility of intentionalism (also called ‘representationalism’) in the philosophy of perception with the thesis that we can visually experience an object by looking at a picture of that object (the pictorial experience thesis, or PET). I begin by presenting three theses associated with intentionalism and various accounts of depiction that uphold PET. Next, I show that pictures sometimes depict an object indeterminately, thereby rendering the alleged visual experience of the depicted object partly nonintentional. I (...)
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  39.  55
    Denis Dutton, Why Intentionalism Won't Go Away.
    Considering the philosophic intelligence that has set out to discredit it, intentionalism in critical interpretation has shown an uncanny resilience. Beginning perhaps most explicitly with the New Criticism, continuing through the analytic tradition in philosophy, and culminating most recently in deconstructionism, philosophers and literary theorists have kept under sustained attack the notion that authorial intention can provide a guide to interpretation, a criterion of textual meaning, or a standard for the validation of criticism. Yet intentionalist criticism still has avid (...)
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  40.  1
    Karla Chediak (2016). Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of Perception. Trans/Form/Ação 39 (2):87-100.
    ABSTRACT: In this paper, I intend to review the intentionalist account of perceptual experience in order to deal with some difficulties that it faces in adequately specifying the nature and object of perceptual experience. My aim is to show that it is possible for the intentionalists to incorporate the disjunctivist thesis that the object of perception is part of perceptual experiences, without renouncing the common factor principle. I argue that, in order to do this, it is necessary to engage with (...)
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  41.  25
    Mark Bevir (2002). How to Be an Intentionalist. History and Theory 41 (2):209–217.
    The general aim of this paper is to establish the plausibility of a postfoundational intentionalism. Its specific aim is to respond to criticisms of my work made by Vivienne Brown in a paper "On Some Problems with Weak Intentionalism for Intellectual History." Postfoundationalism is often associated with a new textualism according to which there is no outside to the text. In contrast, I suggest that postfoundationalists can legitimate our postulating intentions, actions, and other historical objects outside of the (...)
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  42.  30
    Michael Watkins (2008). Intentionalism and the Inverted Spectrum. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):299-313.
    Intentionalism holds that two experiences differ in their representational content if and only if they differ in phenomenal character. It is generally held that Intentionalism cannot allow for the possibility of spectrum inversion without systematic error, unless it abandons the idea that, for example, the qualitative character of color experience is inherited from the qualitative character of colors. The paper argues that the conjunction of all three -- the possibility of spectrum inversion, Intentionalism, and the inheritance thesis (...)
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  43.  41
    James A. E. Macpherson (2010). Legislative Intentionalism and Proxy Agency. Law and Philosophy 29 (1):1-29.
    Intentionalism is the view that statutes should be interpreted in accordance with the intentions of the legislatures that produce them. As a theory of legislative interpretation, intentionalism has been very influential, but it has also been subject to much critical attention. It is claimed that legislatures will seldom have any relevant intentions, and that even if they did, we could not come to know them. I propose a modification of intentionalism that significantly mitigates the severity of these (...)
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  44.  35
    Daniel Stoljar (2003). Physicalism Plus Intentionalism Equals Error Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):790-791.
    Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) combine physicalism about color with intentionalism about color experience. I argue that this combination leads to an “error theory” about color experience, that is, the doctrine that color experience is systematically illusory. But this conflicts with another aspect of B&H's position, namely, the denial of error theory.
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  45.  25
    Raymond W. Gibbs Jr (1993). The Intentionalist Controversy and Cognitive Science. Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):181 – 205.
    What role do speakers'/authors' communicative intentions play in language interpretation? Cognitive scientists generally assume that listeners'/readers' recognitions of speakers'/authors' intentions is a crucial aspect of utterance interpretation. Various philosophers, literary theorists and anthropologists criticize this intentional view and assert that speakers'/authors' intentions do not provide either the starting point for linguistic interpretation or constrain how texts should be understood. Until now, cognitive scientists have not seriously responded to the current challenges regarding intentions in communication. My purpose in this article is (...)
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  46.  18
    Nenad Miščević (2004). Response-Intentionalism About Color. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):179-191.
    Building on Crane’s intentionalism, the paper proposes a variant of response-dependentist view of colors. To be of a color C is to have a disposition to cause in normal observers a response, namely, intentional phenomenal C-experience. The view is dubbed “response-intentionalism”. It follows from the following considerations, with the red of a tomato surface taken as an example of color C. Full phenomenal red is being visaged (intentionally experienced) as being on the surface of the tomato. Science tells (...)
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  47.  24
    Stephen Davies (2010). The Hypothetical Intentionalist's Dilemma: A Reply to Levinson. British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (3):307-312.
    In a recent essay, Jerrold Levinson defends his version of hypothetical intentionalism (HI), which is a theory of literary interpretation, from two criticisms. The first, argued by Stephen Davies, is that it is equivalent to the value-maximizing view. The second, argued by Robert Stecker, is that there are straightforward counterexamples to HI. We will argue that Levinson does not successfully fend off either criticism, and further, that in the process of attempting to do so, creates another dilemma for his (...)
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  48.  8
    Antoni Gomila Benejam (1998). Tras la Pragmática Intencionalista (After the Intentionalist Pragmatics). Theoria 13 (1):33-49.
    Se trata de una consideraeión de la ultima propuesta teórica de Víctor Sánchez de Zavala para la Pragmatica, desde la perspectiva de sus fundamentos conceptuales, de la filosofia de la mente subyacente. Se repasan sus argumentos para sentirse insatisfecho con el enfoque intencionalista estándar de la Pragmática y se intenta reconstruir su coneepeión alternativa a este respecto, implícita en su nuevo marco teórieo. Lo que aparece, al final es una concepeión dinámica de las relaciones reciprocas entre pensamiento y lenguaje.The aim (...)
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  49.  20
    R. Stecker & S. Davies (2010). The Hypothetical Intentionalist's Dilemma: A Reply to Levinson. British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (3):307-312.
    In a recent essay, Jerrold Levinson defends his version of hypothetical intentionalism (HI), which is a theory of literary interpretation, from two criticisms. The first, argued by Stephen Davies, is that it is equivalent to the value-maximizing view. The second, argued by Robert Stecker, is that there are straightforward counterexamples to HI. We will argue that Levinson does not successfully fend off either criticism, and further, that in the process of attempting to do so, creates another dilemma for his (...)
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  50.  18
    Anthony J. Cascardi & Denis Dutton, Why Intentionalism Won't Go Away.
    Considering the philosophic intelligence that has set out to discredit it, intentionalism in critical interpretation has shown an uncanny resilience. Beginning perhaps most explicitly with the New Criticism, continuing through the analytic tradition in philosophy, and culminating most recently in deconstructionism, philosophers and literary theorists have kept under sustained attack the notion that authorial intention can provide a guide to interpretation, a criterion of textual meaning, or a standard for the validation of criticism. Yet intentionalist criticism still has avid (...)
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