Search results for 'Internalism about Practical Reason' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. David O. Brink, Handout #5: Anti-Rationalism and Internalism About Practical Reason.
    Given these worries about strategic ethical egoism, we might conclude that morality and rationality are two independent points of view. We might agree that morality is impartial but insist that practical reason is instrumental or prudential. If so, we can see how there might be conflicts between practical reason and other-regarding morality, because other-regarding duties need not always advance the agent's own aims and interests. If there can be such conflicts, then immoral action is not (...)
     
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    Practical Reason (2012). Coming to Terms with Contingency: Humean Constructivism About. In Jimmy Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press 40.
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    Errol Lord (forthcoming). The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism About Practical Reason. In Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Practical and Epistemic.
    Cognitivists about practical reason hold that we can explain why certain wide-scope requirements of practical rationality are true by appealing to certain epistemic requirements. Extant discussions of cognitivism focus solely on two claims. The first is the claim that intentions involve beliefs. The second is that whenever your intentions are incoherent in certain ways, you will be epistemically irrational (given that intentions involve beliefs). Even if the cognitivist successfully defends these claims, she still needs to (...)
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    Oded Na'aman (2015). Reasons of Love: A Case Against Universalism About Practical Reason. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3 pt 3):315-322.
    The paper presents an argument from love against universalism about practical reason, that is, the view that an agent's practical reasons normatively supervene on the agent's circumstances. Universalism explains the different reasons you and I have by citing differences in our properties, circumstances, relationships, etc. It thus rejects the possibility that the normative differences between us are basic. But love seems to make such basic distinctions, for it gives us special reasons with regard to particular individuals (...)
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  5. Christine M. Korsgaard (1986). Skepticism About Practical Reason. Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
    Content skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice. Motivational skepticism is doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. Some people think that motivational considerations alone provide grounds for skepticism about the project of founding ethics on practical reason. I will argue, against this view, that motivational skepticism must always be based on content skepticism. I will not address (...)
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  6. David Enoch (2011). Can There Be a Global, Interesting, Coherent Constructivism About Practical Reason? Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):319-339.
    More and more people seem to think that constructivism - in political philosophy, in moral philosophy, and perhaps in practical reasoning most generally - is the way to go. And yet it is surprisingly hard to even characterize the view. In this paper, I go to some lengths trying to capture the essence of a constructivist position - mostly in the realm of practical reason - and to pinpoint its theoretical attractions. I then give some reason (...)
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  7. Howard Nye (2009). Ethics, Fitting Attitudes, and Practical Reason: A Theory of Normative Facts. Dissertation, University of Michigan
    I present and defend (1) an account of ethical judgments as judgments about our reasons to feel specific motivationally laden attitudes, (2) an account of what an agent should do in terms of what would achieve ends that she has reason to be motivated to pursue, and (3) an account of an agent’s reasons for motivation (and thus action) in terms of the prescriptions of the most fundamental principles that guide her deliberations. Using these accounts, I explain (...)
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  8. R. Jay Wallace (1990). How to Argue About Practical Reason. Mind 99 (395):355-385.
    What are the comparative roles of reason and the passions in explaining human motivation and behaviour? Accounts of practical reason divide on this central question, with proponents of different views falling into rationalist and Humean camps. By 'rationalist' accounts of practical reason, I mean accounts which make the characteristically Kantian claim that pure reason can be practical in its issue. To reject this view is to take the Humean position that reasoning or ratiocination (...)
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  9. Guy Kahane (2010). Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):20-49.
    In this paper I present a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason. My argument is inpired by Frank Jackson's celebrated Knowledge Argument. I ask what will happen when an agent experiences pain for the first time. Such an agent, I argue, will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot explain. This argument presents a similar difficulty for other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value. I end by suggesting that some debates (...)
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  10.  4
    Thomas Schmidt (2016). Instrumentalism About Practical Reason: Not by Default. Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):17-27.
    Instrumentalism is the view that all requirements of practical reason can be derived from the instrumental principle, that is, from the claim that one ought to take the suitable means to one's ends. Rationalists, by contrast, hold that there are requirements of practical reason that concern the normative acceptability of ends. To the extent that rationalists put forward these requirements in addition to the instrumental principle, rationalism might seem to go beyond instrumentalism in its normative commitments. (...)
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    James Skidmore (2002). Skepticism About Practical Reason: Transcendental Arguments and Their Limits. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):121-141.
    Transcendental arguments offer a particularlypowerful strategy for combating skepticism. Such arguments, after all, attempt to show thata particular skepticism is not simply mistakenbut inconsistent or self-refuting. Whilethus tempting to philosophers struggling withskepticism of various sorts, the boldconclusions of these arguments have longrendered them suspicious in the eyes of many. In fact, in a famous paper from 1968 BarryStroud develops what is often taken to be adecisive case against transcendental argumentsin general.Recent work in the area of practical reason,however, suggests (...)
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  12.  88
    Ralph Wedgwood (2002). Practical Reason and Desire. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):345 – 358.
    Many philosophres have attempted to argue from the "Humean Theory of Motivation" (HTM) and the "Internalism Requirement" (IR) to the "Humean Theory of Practical Reason" (HTPR). This argument is familiar, but it has rarely been stated with sufficient precision. In this paper, I shall give a precise statement of this argument. I shall then rely on this statement to show two things. First, the HTPR is false: it is incompatible with some extremely plausible assumptions about weakness (...)
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  13. Matthew S. Bedke (2008). Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):85 - 111.
    There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new (...)
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    Deborah Roberts (2005). Does the Explanatory Constraint on Practical Reasons Favour Naturalism About Practical Reasons? South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):97-108.
    There is an explanatory constraint on practical reasons: practical reasons have to be the kinds of things that we can act for. Some philosophers, notably Bernard Williams, have argued that the explanatory constraint favours internalism about reasons: for an agent to have a reason to x, it is at least a necessary condition that she would, after ideal deliberation, be motivated to x. Internalism suggests that naturalism about reasons is more plausible for, in (...)
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    Joshua Gert (2012). Internalism and Hyperexternalism About Reasons. Journal of Ethics 16 (1):15-34.
    Alan Goldman’s Reasons from Within is one of the most thorough recent defenses of what might be called ‘orthodox internalismabout practical reasons. Goldman’s main target is an opposing view that includes a commitment to the following two theses: (O) that there are such things as objective values, and (E) that these values give rise to external reasons. One version of this view, which we can call ‘orthodox externalism’, also includes a commitment to the thesis (I) that (...)
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  16.  82
    Sharon Street (2012). Coming to Terms with Contingency : Humean Constructivism About Practical Reason. In Jimmy Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press
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  17. Jacob Ross (2009). How to Be a Cognitivist About Practical Reason. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:243-281.
  18.  12
    R. Jay Wallace (1990). How to Argue About Practical Reason. Mind 99 (395):355-385.
    How to Argue about . Bibliographic Info. Citation. How to Argue about ; Author(s): R. Jay Wallace; Source: Mind , New Series, Vol.
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  19.  80
    G. F. Schueler (1995). Why "Oughts" Are Not Facts (or What the Tortoise and Achilles Taught Mrs. Ganderhoot and Me About Practical Reason). Mind 104 (416):713-723.
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  20.  83
    Robert C. Roberts (2012). Paraplegic in a Car Accident, the Horror and Shame I Feel at Feeling Such Joy Set Going a Dialectic of Reflection That Seeks Equilibrium in a More or Less Stable Moral Outlook. De Sousa Seeks No Foundation of the Usual Kind for Ethics—No Theology, No Appeal to Tradition, No Story About Practical Reason or Univocal Human. Mind 121:483.
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  21.  99
    David Velleman (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
    Suppose that we want to frame a conception of reasons that isn't relativized to the inclinations of particular agents. That is, we want to identify particular things that count as reasons for acting simpliciter and not merely as reasons for some agents rather than others, depending on their inclinations. One way to frame such a conception is to name some features that an action can have and to say that they count as reasons for someone whether or not he is (...)
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  22.  84
    Michael E. Bratman (1991). Cognitivism About Practical Reason (Review of Practical Reflection, by J. David Velleman). [REVIEW] Ethics 102 (1):117-.
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  23.  13
    Michael E. Bratman (1991). Review: Cognitivism About Practical Reason. [REVIEW] Ethics 102 (1):117 - 128.
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  24. J. R. Wallace (1990). How to Argue About Practical Reason. Mind 99:355.
     
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  25. Jacob Ross (2009). Reflections on Cognitivism About Practical Reason. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Four. OUP Oxford
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  26.  8
    John Robertson (2001). Internalism, Practical Reason, and Motivation. In Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning. MIT Press 127--150.
  27.  26
    Joshua Gert (2001). Skepticism About Practical Reasons Internalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):59-77.
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    John J. Tilley (1992). Moral Relativism, Internalism, and the "Humean" View of Practical Reason. Modern Schoolman 69 (2):81-109.
  29.  89
    Kate Manne (2014). Internalism About Reasons: Sad but True? Philosophical Studies 167 (1):89-117.
    Internalists about reasons following Bernard Williams claim that an agent’s normative reasons for action are constrained in some interesting way by her desires or motivations. In this paper, I offer a new argument for such a position—although one that resonates, I believe, with certain key elements of Williams’ original view. I initially draw on P.F. Strawson’s famous distinction between the interpersonal and the objective stances that we can take to other people, from the second-person point of view. I suggest (...)
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    Kirsten B. Endres & Practical Reasons (2003). O Ne Main Topic in Practical Philosophy is the Question of When Someone has a Reason for a Certain Action. Most Philosophers Agree on the Necessity of a Motivational and a Justificatory Condition, but They Still Disagree About How These Conditions Can Be Fulfilled. Though These Conditions Are Important in Forming Convincing Concepts of Practical. [REVIEW] In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik. 1--67.
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  31. Paula Gottlieb (2006). Aristotle Makes the Controversial Claim That It is Impossible to Have All the Ethical Virtues–Bravery, Temperance, Generosity, Magnificence, Magna-Nimity, the Virtue Concerned with Honor on a Small Scale, Mildness, Truth-Fulness, Wit, Friendliness, and Justice–Fully Without Having Practical Wisdom (Phronesis), and That It is Impossible to Have Practical Wisdom Without Having All of the Aristotelian Ethical Virtues Fully (NE VI. 13.1144 B30–1145a1). This Raises a Puzzle About What Sort of Reason is ... [REVIEW] In Richard Kraut (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Blackwell Pub. 218.
     
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  32.  36
    Houston Smit (2003). Internalism and the Origin of Rational Motivation. Journal of Ethics 7 (2):183-231.
    What makes a subject''s motivationrational is its originating in her practicalreasoning. I explain the appeal of this thesisabout rational motivation, and explore itsrelation to recent discussions of internalismabout reasons for action. I do so in theservice of clarifying an important meta-ethicaldebate between Humean motivational skeptics andtheir Kantian opponents. This debate is oneover whether, as this skeptic contends andKantians deny, considerations about ourmotivational capacities, together withinternalism, restrict genuine reasons foraction to merely instrumental ones. I arguethat properly adjudicating this debate requiresidentifying (...)
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  33.  43
    Melissa McBay Merritt (forthcoming). Practical Reason and Respect for Persons. Kantian Review.
    My project is to reconsider the Kantian conception of practical reason. Some Kantians think that practical reasoning must be more active than theoretical reasoning, on the putative grounds that such reasoning need not contend with what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. Behind that claim stands the thesis that practical reason is essentially efficacious. I accept the efficacy principle, but deny that it underwrites this inference about practical reason. My inquiry takes (...)
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    R. Jay Wallace (ed.) (2006). Normativity and the Will: Selected Papers on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
    Normativity and the Will collects fourteen important papers on moral psychology and practical reason by R. Jay Wallace, one of the leading philosophers currently working in these areas. The papers explore the interpenetration of normative and psychological issues in a series of debates that lie at the heart of moral philosophy. Themes that are addressed include reason, desire, and the will; responsibility, identification, and emotion; and the relation between morality and other normative domains. Wallace's treatments of these (...)
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  35. Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). Constitutivism About Practical Reasons. In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford
    This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim, principle, or standard – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the (...)
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  36.  85
    Hallvard Lillehammer (1999). Analytical Dispositionalism and Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (2):117-133.
    The paper examines the plausibility of analytical dispositionalism about practical reason, according to which the following claims are conceptual truths about common sense ethical discourse: i) Ethics: agents have reasons to act in some ways rather than others, and ii) Metaphysical Modesty: there is no such thing as a response independent normative reality. By elucidating two uncontroversial assumptions which are fundamental to the common sense commitment to ethics, I argue that common sense ethical discourse is most (...)
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  37. Lorraine Besser-Jones (2012). The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):203-220.
    Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. This paper explores how it is that an empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological naturalism, ought to respond to the skeptical challenge presented by this research. While many think taking this challenge seriously requires revising, sometimes dramatically, how we think about moral agency, this (...)
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  38.  43
    Michelle Mason (2005). Hume and Humeans on Practical Reason. Hume Studies 31 (2):347-378.
    I introduce a distinction between two divergent trends in the literature on Hume and practical reason. One trend, action-theoretic Humeanism, primarily concerns itself with defending a general account of reasons for acting. The other trend, virtue-theoretic Humeanism, concentrates on defending the case for being an agent of a particular practical character, one whose enduring dispositions of practical thought are virtuous. I discuss work exemplifying these two trends and warn against decoupling thought about Hume's and a (...)
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  39.  36
    Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.) (2010). Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford University Press.
    Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis (...)
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  40. Ariela Tubert (2011). Korsgaard's Constitutive Arguments and the Principles of Practical Reason. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):343-362.
    Constitutive arguments for the principles of practical reason attempt to justify normative requirements by claiming that we already accept them in so far as we are believers or agents. In two constitutive arguments for the requirement that we must will universally, Korsgaard attempts first to arrive at the requirement that we will universally from observations about the causality of the will, and secondly to establish that willing universally is constitutive of having a self. Some rational requirements may (...)
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  41. Carla Bagnoli (2013). Constructivism About Practical Knowledge. In Constructivism in Ethics. Cambridge University Press 153-182.
    It is largely agreed that if constructivism contributes anything to meta-ethics it is by proposing that we understand ethical objectivity “in terms of a suitably constructed point of view that all can accept” (Rawls 1980/1999: 307). Constructivists defend this “practical” conception of objectivity in contrast to the realist or “ontological” conception of objectivity, understood as an accurate representation of an independent metaphysical order. Because of their objectivist but not realist commitments, Kantian constructivists place their theory “somewhere (...)
     
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  42.  23
    Alessandro Giordani & Paolo Gomarasca (2012). Trust as the End of Practical Reason. Justification Procedures. In Botturi Francesco (ed.), Understanding Human Experience. Peter Lang
    This paper is about the epistemology of practical reason and, in particular, the function of trust as an end to be pursued rationally in praxis. Our purpose is threefold: first, to present an outline of the structure of practical reason; secondly, to compare practical reason and scientific reason in order to determine the main differences between these two basic manifestations of human reason; finally, to argue in favour of a non-utilitarian model (...)
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  43.  11
    Joe Saunders (2014). Kant, Rational Psychology and Practical Reason. Kant Yearbook 6 (1).
    In his pre-critical lectures on rational psychology, Kant employs an argument from the I to the transcendental freedom of the soul. In the (A-edition of the) first Critique, he distances himself from rational psychology, and instead offers four paralogisms of this doctrine, insisting that ‘I think’ no longer licenses any inferences about a soul. Kant also comes alive to the possibility that we could be thinking mechanisms – rational beings, but not agents. These developments rob him of his pre-critical (...)
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    Valerie Tiberius (2002). Practical Reason and the Stability Standard. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):339-354.
    Practical reasoning, reasoning about what to do, is a very familiar activity. When we think about whether to cook or to go out for dinner, to buy a house or rent, or to study law or business, we are engaged in practical reasoning. If the kind of reasoning we engage in is truly a rational process, there must be some norms or standards that govern it; the process cannot be arbitrary or random. In this paper I (...)
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  45. E. Sonny Elizondo (2013). Reason in its Practical Application. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (21):1-17.
    Is practical reason a cognitive faculty? Do practical judgments make claims about a subject matter that are appropriately assessed in terms of their agreement with that subject matter? According to Kantians like Christine Korsgaard, the answer is no. To think otherwise is to conflate the theoretical and the practical, the epistemic and the ethical. I am not convinced. In this paper, I motivate my skepticism through examination of the very figure who inspires Korsgaard’s rejection of (...)
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  46. Paul Russell (2006). Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism. In Heiner F. Klemme Dieter Schönecker & Manfred Kuehn (eds.), “Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism”, in Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kuehn, Dieter Schönecker, eds., Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen. Kant-Forschungen. Felix Meiner Verlag
    In her influential and challenging paper “Skepticism about Practical Reason” Christine Korsgaard sets out to refute an important strand of Humean scepticism as it concerns a Kantian understanding of practical reason.1 Korsgaard distinguishes two components of scepticism about practical reason. The first, which she refers to as content scepticism, argues that reason cannot of itself provide any “substantive guidance to choice and action” (SPR, 311). In its classical formulation, as stated by (...)
     
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  47.  1
    Yogi Berra (2004). Involvement and Detachment: A Paradox of Practical Reason Peter Baumann. In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. Cambridge 244.
    For each of the many goals of an agent it is true that the agent wants its realization. Given further very plausible assumptions, one can show that there is no good reason for an agent not to want the realization of all of his goals. However, it seems also true that reaching all of one’s goals would be extremely boring; most human beings would consider such a life not worth living. In this respect, leading a life is like playing (...)
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  48.  56
    Michael Byron (ed.) (2004). Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays explores two competing views of practical rationality. How do we think about what we plan to do? One dominant answer is that we select the best possible option available. However, a growing number of philosophers would offer a different reply. Since we are not equipped to maximize, we must often choose the next best alternative--one that is no more than satisfactory. This strategy choice is called "satisficing" (a term coined by the economist Herb Simon).
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  49.  3
    Manuel Vargas (2005). Practical Reason, Instrumental Irrationality, and Time. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):241-252.
    Standard models of practical rationality face a puzzle that has gone unnoticed: given a modest assumption about the nature of deliberation, we are apparently frequently briefly irrational. In what follows, I explain the problem, consider what is wrong with several possible solutions, and propose an account that does not generate the objectionable result.
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  50. Alexander Sarch (2011). Internalism About a Person's Good: Don't Believe It. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):161-184.
    Internalism about a person's good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person's well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person's good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think (...)
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