Search results for 'Internalism about Practical Reason' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. David O. Brink, Handout #5: Anti-Rationalism and Internalism About Practical Reason.score: 181.5
    Given these worries about strategic ethical egoism, we might conclude that morality and rationality are two independent points of view. We might agree that morality is impartial but insist that practical reason is instrumental or prudential. If so, we can see how there might be conflicts between practical reason and other-regarding morality, because other-regarding duties need not always advance the agent's own aims and interests. If there can be such conflicts, then immoral action is not (...)
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  2. Kate Manne (2014). Internalism About Reasons: Sad but True? Philosophical Studies 167 (1):89-117.score: 151.0
    Internalists about reasons following Bernard Williams claim that an agent’s normative reasons for action are constrained in some interesting way by her desires or motivations. In this paper, I offer a new argument for such a position—although one that resonates, I believe, with certain key elements of Williams’ original view. I initially draw on P.F. Strawson’s famous distinction between the interpersonal and the objective stances that we can take to other people, from the second-person point of view. I suggest (...)
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  3. Guy Kahane (2010). Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):20-49.score: 130.5
    In this paper I present a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason. My argument is inpired by Frank Jackson's celebrated Knowledge Argument. I ask what will happen when an agent experiences pain for the first time. Such an agent, I argue, will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot explain. This argument presents a similar difficulty for other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value. I end by suggesting that some debates (...)
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  4. Matthew S. Bedke (2008). Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):85 - 111.score: 123.0
    There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new (...)
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  5. Christine M. Korsgaard (1986). Skepticism About Practical Reason. Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.score: 117.0
    Content skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice. Motivational skepticism is doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. Some people think that motivational considerations alone provide grounds for skepticism about the project of founding ethics on practical reason. I will argue, against this view, that motivational skepticism must always be based on content skepticism. I will not address (...)
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  6. David Enoch (2011). Can There Be a Global, Interesting, Coherent Constructivism About Practical Reason? Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):319-339.score: 117.0
    More and more people seem to think that constructivism - in political philosophy, in moral philosophy, and perhaps in practical reasoning most generally - is the way to go. And yet it is surprisingly hard to even characterize the view. In this paper, I go to some lengths trying to capture the essence of a constructivist position - mostly in the realm of practical reason - and to pinpoint its theoretical attractions. I then give some reason (...)
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  7. R. Jay Wallace (1990). How to Argue About Practical Reason. Mind 99 (395):355-385.score: 117.0
    What are the comparative roles of reason and the passions in explaining human motivation and behaviour? Accounts of practical reason divide on this central question, with proponents of different views falling into rationalist and Humean camps. By 'rationalist' accounts of practical reason, I mean accounts which make the characteristically Kantian claim that pure reason can be practical in its issue. To reject this view is to take the Humean position that reasoning or ratiocination (...)
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  8. Joshua Gert (2012). Internalism and Hyperexternalism About Reasons. Journal of Ethics 16 (1):15-34.score: 114.5
    Alan Goldman’s Reasons from Within is one of the most thorough recent defenses of what might be called ‘orthodox internalismabout practical reasons. Goldman’s main target is an opposing view that includes a commitment to the following two theses: (O) that there are such things as objective values, and (E) that these values give rise to external reasons. One version of this view, which we can call ‘orthodox externalism’, also includes a commitment to the thesis (I) that (...)
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  9. Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). Constitutivism About Practical Reasons. In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford.score: 113.5
    This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim, principle, or standard – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the (...)
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  10. Joshua Gert (2001). Skepticism About Practical Reasons Internalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):59-77.score: 107.3
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  11. Deborah Roberts (2005). Does the Explanatory Constraint on Practical Reasons Favour Naturalism About Practical Reasons? South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):97-108.score: 105.8
    There is an explanatory constraint on practical reasons: practical reasons have to be the kinds of things that we can act for. Some philosophers, notably Bernard Williams, have argued that the explanatory constraint favours internalism about reasons: for an agent to have a reason to x, it is at least a necessary condition that she would, after ideal deliberation, be motivated to x. Internalism suggests that naturalism about reasons is more plausible for, in (...)
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  12. James Skidmore (2002). Skepticism About Practical Reason: Transcendental Arguments and Their Limits. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):121 - 141.score: 101.3
    Transcendental arguments offer a particularlypowerful strategy for combating skepticism. Such arguments, after all, attempt to show thata particular skepticism is not simply mistakenbut inconsistent or self-refuting. Whilethus tempting to philosophers struggling withskepticism of various sorts, the boldconclusions of these arguments have longrendered them suspicious in the eyes of many. In fact, in a famous paper from 1968 BarryStroud develops what is often taken to be adecisive case against transcendental argumentsin general.Recent work in the area of practical reason,however, suggests (...)
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  13. Hallvard Lillehammer (1999). Analytical Dispositionalism and Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (2):117-133.score: 97.8
    The paper examines the plausibility of analytical dispositionalism about practical reason, according to which the following claims are conceptual truths about common sense ethical discourse: i) Ethics: agents have reasons to act in some ways rather than others, and ii) Metaphysical Modesty: there is no such thing as a response independent normative reality. By elucidating two uncontroversial assumptions which are fundamental to the common sense commitment to ethics, I argue that common sense ethical discourse is most (...)
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  14. Lorraine Besser-Jones (2012). The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):203-220.score: 97.0
    Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. This paper explores how it is that an empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological naturalism, ought to respond to the skeptical challenge presented by this research. While many think taking this challenge seriously requires revising, sometimes dramatically, how we think about moral agency, this (...)
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  15. Michelle Mason (2005). Hume and Humeans on Practical Reason. Hume Studies 31 (2):347-378.score: 96.8
    I introduce a distinction between two divergent trends in the literature on Hume and practical reason. One trend, action-theoretic Humeanism, primarily concerns itself with defending a general account of reasons for acting. The other trend, virtue-theoretic Humeanism, concentrates on defending the case for being an agent of a particular practical character, one whose enduring dispositions of practical thought are virtuous. I discuss work exemplifying these two trends and warn against decoupling thought about Hume's and a (...)
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  16. Ariela Tubert (2011). Korsgaard's Constitutive Arguments and the Principles of Practical Reason. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):343-362.score: 96.0
    Constitutive arguments for the principles of practical reason attempt to justify normative requirements by claiming that we already accept them in so far as we are believers or agents. In two constitutive arguments for the requirement that we must will universally, Korsgaard attempts first to arrive at the requirement that we will universally from observations about the causality of the will, and secondly to establish that willing universally is constitutive of having a self. Some rational requirements may (...)
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  17. R. Jay Wallace (ed.) (2006). Normativity and the Will: Selected Papers on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.score: 96.0
    Normativity and the Will collects fourteen important papers on moral psychology and practical reason by R. Jay Wallace, one of the leading philosophers currently working in these areas. The papers explore the interpenetration of normative and psychological issues in a series of debates that lie at the heart of moral philosophy. Themes that are addressed include reason, desire, and the will; responsibility, identification, and emotion; and the relation between morality and other normative domains. Wallace's treatments of these (...)
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  18. Valerie Tiberius (2002). Practical Reason and the Stability Standard. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):339-354.score: 96.0
    Practical reasoning, reasoning about what to do, is a very familiar activity. When we think about whether to cook or to go out for dinner, to buy a house or rent, or to study law or business, we are engaged in practical reasoning. If the kind of reasoning we engage in is truly a rational process, there must be some norms or standards that govern it; the process cannot be arbitrary or random. In this paper I (...)
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  19. Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.) (2010). Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford University Press.score: 96.0
    Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis (...)
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  20. Carla Bagnoli (forthcoming). Constructivism About Practical Knowledge. In , Constructivism in Ethics. Cambridge University Press.score: 96.0
    It is largely agreed that if constructivism contributes anything to meta-ethics it is by proposing that we understand ethical objectivity “in terms of a suitably constructed point of view that all can accept” (Rawls 1980/1999: 307). Constructivists defend this “practical” conception of objectivity in contrast to the realist or “ontological” conception of objectivity, understood as an accurate representation of an independent metaphysical order. Because of their objectivist but not realist commitments, Kantian constructivists place their theory “somewhere in the space (...)
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  21. Alessandro Giordani & Paolo Gomarasca (2012). Trust as the End of Practical Reason. Justification Procedures. In Botturi Francesco (ed.), Understanding Human Experience. Peter Lang.score: 96.0
    This paper is about the epistemology of practical reason and, in particular, the function of trust as an end to be pursued rationally in praxis. Our purpose is threefold: first, to present an outline of the structure of practical reason; secondly, to compare practical reason and scientific reason in order to determine the main differences between these two basic manifestations of human reason; finally, to argue in favour of a non-utilitarian model (...)
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  22. Houston Smit (2003). Internalism and the Origin of Rational Motivation. Journal of Ethics 7 (2):183-231.score: 94.5
    What makes a subject''s motivationrational is its originating in her practicalreasoning. I explain the appeal of this thesisabout rational motivation, and explore itsrelation to recent discussions of internalismabout reasons for action. I do so in theservice of clarifying an important meta-ethicaldebate between Humean motivational skeptics andtheir Kantian opponents. This debate is oneover whether, as this skeptic contends andKantians deny, considerations about ourmotivational capacities, together withinternalism, restrict genuine reasons foraction to merely instrumental ones. I arguethat properly adjudicating this debate requiresidentifying (...)
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  23. John Robertson (2001). Internalism, Practical Reason, and Motivation. In Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning. Mit Press. 127--150.score: 92.0
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  24. Henry S. Richardson (1994). Practical Reasoning About Final Ends. Cambridge University Press.score: 91.5
    Henry Richardson argues that we can determine our ends rationally. He constructs a rich and original theory of how we can reason about our final goals. Richardson defuses the counter-arguments for the limits of rational deliberation, and develops interesting ideas about how his model might be extended to interpersonal deliberation of ends, taking him to the borders of political theory. Along the way Richardson offers illuminating discussions of, inter alia, Aristotle, Aquinas, Sidgwick, and Dewey, as well as (...)
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  25. R. Jay Wallace (1990). How to Argue About Practical Reason. Mind 99 (395):355-385.score: 90.8
    How to Argue about . Bibliographic Info. Citation. How to Argue about ; Author(s): R. Jay Wallace; Source: Mind , New Series, Vol.
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  26. Sharon Street (2012). Coming to Terms with Contingency : Humean Constructivism About Practical Reason. In Jimmy Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 90.8
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  27. Ralph Wedgwood (2002). Practical Reason and Desire. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):345 – 358.score: 90.0
    Many philosophres have attempted to argue from the "Humean Theory of Motivation" (HTM) and the "Internalism Requirement" (IR) to the "Humean Theory of Practical Reason" (HTPR). This argument is familiar, but it has rarely been stated with sufficient precision. In this paper, I shall give a precise statement of this argument. I shall then rely on this statement to show two things. First, the HTPR is false: it is incompatible with some extremely plausible assumptions about weakness (...)
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  28. Jacob Ross (2009). How to Be a Cognitivist About Practical Reason. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:243-281.score: 87.8
  29. Michael E. Bratman (1991). Cognitivism About Practical Reason (Review of Practical Reflection, by J. David Velleman). [REVIEW] Ethics 102 (1):117-.score: 87.8
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  30. G. F. Schueler (1995). Why "Oughts" Are Not Facts (or What the Tortoise and Achilles Taught Mrs. Ganderhoot and Me About Practical Reason). Mind 104 (416):713-723.score: 87.8
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  31. Michael E. Bratman (1991). Review: Cognitivism About Practical Reason. [REVIEW] Ethics 102 (1):117 - 128.score: 87.8
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  32. Robert C. Roberts (2012). Paraplegic in a Car Accident, the Horror and Shame I Feel at Feeling Such Joy Set Going a Dialectic of Reflection That Seeks Equilibrium in a More or Less Stable Moral Outlook. De Sousa Seeks No Foundation of the Usual Kind for Ethics—No Theology, No Appeal to Tradition, No Story About Practical Reason or Univocal Human. Mind 121:483.score: 87.8
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  33. Jacob Ross (2009). Reflections on Cognitivism About Practical Reason. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Four. Oup Oxford.score: 87.8
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  34. Kirsten B. Endres & Practical Reasons (2003). O Ne Main Topic in Practical Philosophy is the Question of When Someone has a Reason for a Certain Action. Most Philosophers Agree on the Necessity of a Motivational and a Justificatory Condition, but They Still Disagree About How These Conditions Can Be Fulfilled. Though These Conditions Are Important in Forming Convincing Concepts of Practical. [REVIEW] In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik. 1--67.score: 87.0
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  35. John J. Tilley (1992). Moral Relativism, Internalism, and the "Humean" View of Practical Reason. The Modern Schoolman 69 (2):81-109.score: 85.5
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  36. John J. Tilley (1992). Moral Relativism, Internalism, and the "Humean" View of Practical Reason. Modern Schoolman 69 (2):81-109.score: 85.5
  37. Paul Russell (2006). Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism. In Heiner F. Klemme Dieter Schönecker & Manfred Kuehn (eds.), “Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism”, in Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kuehn, Dieter Schönecker, eds., Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen. Kant-Forschungen. Felix Meiner Verlag.score: 83.3
    In her influential and challenging paper “Skepticism about Practical Reason” Christine Korsgaard sets out to refute an important strand of Humean scepticism as it concerns a Kantian understanding of practical reason.1 Korsgaard distinguishes two components of scepticism about practical reason. The first, which she refers to as content scepticism, argues that reason cannot of itself provide any “substantive guidance to choice and action” (SPR, 311). In its classical formulation, as stated by (...)
     
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  38. David Phillips (2007). Mackie on Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):457 - 468.score: 82.0
    I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism, the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism by invoking an instrumentalist (...)
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  39. Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). Freedom and Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2):169 - 179.score: 82.0
    Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing (...)
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  40. Pauline Kleingeld (1998). Kant on the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason. Review of Metaphysics 52 (2):500-528.score: 81.0
    In his critical works of the 1780's, Kant claims, seemingly inconsistently, that (1) theoretical and practical reason are one and the same reason, applied differently, (2) that he still needs to show that they are, and (3) that theoretical and practical reason are united. I first argue that current interpretations of Kant's doctrine of the unity of reason are insufficient. But rather than concluding that Kant’s doctrine becomes coherent only in the Critique of Judgment, (...)
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  41. Christine M. Korsgaard (2008). The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.score: 81.0
    Christine M. Korsgaard is one of today's leading moral philosophers: this volume collects ten influential papers by her on practical reason and moral psychology ...
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  42. Alison Hills (2007). Practical Reason, Value and Action. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):375-392.score: 81.0
    How should we decide which theory of practical reason is correct? One possibility is to link each conception of practical reason with a theory of value, and to assess the first in combination with the second. Recently some philosophers have taken a different approach. They have tried to link theories of practical reason with theories of action instead. I try to show that it can be illuminating to think of practical reason in (...)
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  43. Philip A. Quadrio (2009). Kant and Rousseau on the Critique of Philosophical Theology: The Primacy of Practical Reason. Sophia 48 (2):179-193.score: 81.0
    This paper explores the Rousseauian background to Kant’s critique of metaphysics and philosophical theology. The core idea is that the rejection of metaphysics and philosophical theology is part of a turn from theoretical to practical reason influential on European philosophy of religion, a turn we associate with Kant but that is prefigured by Rousseau. Rousseau is not, however, a thinker normally associated with the notion of metaphysical criticism, nor the notion of the primacy of practical reason. (...)
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  44. Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.) (1997). Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.score: 81.0
    These thirteen new, specially written essays by a distinguished international line-up of contributors, including some leading contemporary moral philosophers, give a rich and varied view of current work on ethics and practical reason. The three main perspectives on the topic, Kantian, Humean, and Aristotelian, are all well represented. Issues covered include: the connection between reason and motivation; the source of moral reasons and their relation to reasons of self-interest; the relation of practical reason to value, (...)
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  45. Francesco Orsi (2008). The Dualism of the Practical Reason: Some Interpretations and Responses. Etica and Politica / Ethics and Politics 10 (2):19-41.score: 81.0
    Sidgwick’s dualism of the practical reason is the idea that since egoism and utilitarianism aim both to have rational supremacy in our practical decisions, whenever they conflict there is no stronger reason to follow the dictates of either view. The dualism leaves us with a practical problem: in conflict cases, we cannot be guided by practical reason to decide what all things considered we ought to do. There is an epistemic problem as well: (...)
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  46. Immanuel Kant (1909/2004). Critique of Practical Reason. Dover Publications.score: 81.0
    The second of Kant’s three critiques, Critique of Practical Reason forms the center of Kantian philosophy. Kant establishes his role as a vindicator of the truth of Christianity in this work, published in 1788, and he approaches his proof by presenting positive affirmations of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. The philosopher offers an argument concerning the summum bonum of life: people should not simply search after happiness, but follow the moral law and seek (...)
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  47. Danny Frederick, Theoretical and Practical Reason: A Critical Rationalist View.score: 81.0
    If the task of theoretical reason is to discover truth or reasons for belief, then theoretical reason is impossible. Attempts to circumvent this by appeal to probabilities are self-defeating. If the task of practical reason is to discover what we ought to do or what actions are desirable or valuable, then practical reason is impossible. Appeal to the subjective ought is self-defeating and often gives either a wrong answer or a self-contradictory one. I argue (...)
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  48. Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Standards, Advice, and Practical Reason. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1):57-67.score: 81.0
    Is there a mode of sincere advice in which the standards of the adviser are put aside in favor of the standards of the advisee? I consider two sorts of cases that appear to be such that the adviser is evaluating things from within the advisee’s system of standards even though this system conflicts with her own; and I argue that these cases are best interpreted in ways that dissolve this appearance. I then argue that the nature of sincere advice (...)
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  49. Julie Tannenbaum (2007). The "Should" Of Full Practical Reason. Philosophical Books 48 (2):124-135.score: 81.0
    In Ethics and the A Priori Michael Smith discusses two types of claims that invoke the term ‘should.’ The first type invokes the ‘should’ of instrumental reason (shouldIR) and the second type invokes the should of full practical reason (shouldFPR). I argue that these are not mutually exhaustive categories. There is a third type of should-claim that does not fall into either category, such as when we say to someone who is going to smoke, ‘You should smoke (...)
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  50. Immanuel Kant (1909/2004). Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics. Barnes & Noble Books.score: 81.0
    CHAPTER I OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON § i. — DEFINITION PRACTICAL principles are propositions which contain a general determination of the ...
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