Search results for 'Intrinsic' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  67
    Luis R. G. Oliveira (2016). Rossian Totalism About Intrinsic Value. Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2069-2086.
    This paper defends a novel account of how to determine the intrinsic value of possible worlds. Section 1 argues that a highly intuitive and widely accepted account leads to undesirable consequences. Section 2 takes the first of two steps towards a novel account by clarifying and defending a view about value-contribution that is based on some of W. D. Ross’ claims about the value of pleasure. Section 3 takes the second step by clarifying and defending a view about value-suppression (...)
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  2. Robert Francescotti (2014). Intrinsic/Extrinsic: A Relational Account Defended. In Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter 175-198.
    In "How to Define Intrinsic Properties" I offered a relational account of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. The basic idea is that F is an intrinsic property of an item x just in case x’s having F consists entirely in x’s having certain internal properties, where an internal property is one whose instantiation does not consist in one’s relation to any distinct items (items other than oneself and one’s proper parts). I still think that this relational analysis is largely (...)
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  3.  66
    Carrie Figdor (2014). What's the Use of an Intrinsic Property? In Robert Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter 139-156.
    Work on the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is often motivated by its use in other areas, such as intrinsic value, real vs. Cambridge change, supervenience and other topics. With the exception of Figdor 2008, philosophers have sought to articulate a global distinction -- a distinction between kinds of properties, rather than ways in which individuals have properties. I argue that global I/E distinctions are unable to do the work that allegedly motivates them, focusing on the case of intrinsic value.
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  4. Shelly Kagan (1998). Rethinking Intrinsic Value. Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297.
    According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsic value must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsic value may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object''s intrinsic value may sometimes depend (in part) on its instrumental value. If this is right, of course, (...)
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  5.  63
    Luciano Floridi (2002). On the Intrinsic Value of Information Objects and the Infosphere. Ethics and Information Technology 4 (4):287-304.
    What is the most general common set ofattributes that characterises something asintrinsically valuableand hence as subject to some moral respect, andwithout which something would rightly beconsidered intrinsically worthless or even positivelyunworthy and therefore rightly to bedisrespected in itself? Thispaper develops and supports the thesis that theminimal condition of possibility of an entity'sleast intrinsic value is to be identified with itsontological status as an information object.All entities, even when interpreted as only clusters ofinformation, still have a minimal moral worthqua information (...)
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  6. Robert Francescotti (1999). How to Define Intrinsic Properties. Noûs 33 (4):590-609.
    An intrinsic property, according to one important account, is a property that is had by all of one's duplicates. Instead, one might choose to characterize intrinsic properties as those that can be had in the absence of all distinct individuals. After reviewing the problems with these earlier accounts, the author presents a less problematic analysis. The goal is to clarify the rough idea that an intrinsic property is a special sort of non-relational property; having the property does (...)
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  7. Guy Fletcher (2008). 'Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value'. Social Theory and Practice 34 (4):517-32.
    In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsic value. The main idea I wish to bring out and defend is that Moore was insufficiently attentive to how distinctive his conception of intrinsic value was, as compared with those of the writers he discussed, and that such inattentiveness skewed his understanding of the positions of others that he discussed and dismissed. My way into this issue is by examining the charge of inconsistency (...)
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  8.  16
    Tu Yidong & Lu Xinxin (2013). How Ethical Leadership Influence Employees' Innovative Work Behavior: A Perspective of Intrinsic Motivation. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 116 (2):441-455.
    Drawing on the cognitive evaluation theory, we proposed a homologous multilevel model to explore how ethical leadership influenced employees’ innovative work behavior through the mediation of intrinsic motivation at both group and individual level. With questionnaires rated by 302 employees from 34 work units of two companies in the mainland of China, we conducted multilevel analysis to examine our hypotheses. The results showed that individual innovative work behavior was positively related to both individual perception of ethical leadership and group (...)
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  9. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values (...)
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  10. Toby Svoboda (2011). Why There is No Evidence for the Intrinsic Value of Non-Humans. Ethics and the Environment 16 (2):25-36.
    The position of some environmental ethicists that some non-humans have intrinsic value as a mind-independent property is seriously flawed. This is because human beings lack any evidence for this position and hence are unjustified in holding it. For any possible world that is alleged to have this kind of intrinsic value, it is possible to conceive an observationally identical world that lacks intrinsic value. Hence, one is not justified in inferring the intrinsic value of some non-human (...)
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  11.  74
    Erich Schienke, Seth Baum, Nancy Tuana, Kenneth Davis & Klaus Keller (2011). Intrinsic Ethics Regarding Integrated Assessment Models for Climate Management. Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (3):503-523.
    In this essay we develop and argue for the adoption of a more comprehensive model of research ethics than is included within current conceptions of responsible conduct of research (RCR). We argue that our model, which we label the ethical dimensions of scientific research (EDSR), is a more comprehensive approach to encouraging ethically responsible scientific research compared to the currently typically adopted approach in RCR training. This essay focuses on developing a pedagogical approach that enables scientists to better understand and (...)
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  12. Ben Bradley (2006). Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):111 - 130.
    Recent literature on intrinsic value contains a number of disputes about the nature of the concept. On the one hand, there are those who think states of affairs, such as states of pleasure or desire satisfaction, are the bearers of intrinsic value (“Mooreans”); on the other hand, there are those who think concrete objects, like people, are intrinsically valuable (“Kantians”). The contention of this paper is that there is not a single concept of intrinsic value about which (...)
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  13.  93
    Dale Dorsey (2012). Intrinsic Value and the Supervenience Principle. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):267-285.
    An important constraint on the nature of intrinsic value---the “Supervenience Principle” (SP)---holds that some object, event, or state of affairs ϕ is intrinsically valuable only if the value of ϕ supervenes entirely on ϕ 's intrinsic properties. In this paper, I argue that SP should be rejected. SP is inordinately restrictive. In particular, I argue that no SP-respecting conception of intrinsic value can accept the importance of psychological resonance, or the positive endorsement of persons, in explaining value.
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  14. Stuart Rachels (2000). Is Unpleasantness Intrinsic to Unpleasant Experiences? Philosophical Studies 99 (2):187-210.
    Unpleasant experiences include backaches, moments of nausea, moments of nervousness, phantom pains, and so on. What does their unpleasantness consist in? The unpleasantness of an experience has been thought to consist in: (1) its representing bodily damage; (2) its inclining the subject to fight its continuation; (3) the subject's disliking it; (4) features intrinsic to it. I offer compelling objections to (1) and (2) and less compelling objections to (3). I defend (4) against five challenging objections and offer two (...)
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  15. Katherine Hawley (1998). Merricks on Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic. Mind 107 (428):841-843.
    This is a short response to a paper by Trenton Merricks in which he argues against the following doctrine: Microphysical Supervenience (MS) Necessarily, if atoms A1 through An compose an object that exemplifies intrinsic qualitative properties Q1 through Qn, then atoms like A1 through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A1 through An, compose an object that exemplifies Q1 through Qn.
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  16. Karol Horodecki, Michał Horodecki, Pawel Horodecki & Jonathan Oppenheim (2005). Information Theories with Adversaries, Intrinsic Information, and Entanglement. Foundations of Physics 35 (12):2027-2040.
    There are aspects of privacy theory that are analogous to quantum theory. In particular one can define distillable key and key cost in parallel to distillable entanglement and entanglement cost. We present here classical privacy theory as a particular case of information theory with adversaries, where similar general laws hold as in entanglement theory. We place the result of Renner and Wolf—that intrinsic information is lower bound for key cost—into this general formalism. Then we show that the question of (...)
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  17.  25
    Attila Tanyi (2015). On the Intrinsic Value of Genetic Integrity: A Commentary. Ethics, Policy and Environment 18 (3):248-251.
    In their article “Is There a Prima Facie Duty to Preserve Genetic Integrity in Conservation Biology?” Yasha Rower and Emma Harris argue that there is no underived prima facie obligation to preserve genetic integrity. In particular, it is argued that there is no such obligation because genetic integrity has no intrinsic value. In this commentary I raise doubts about this part of the authors’ argument. I argue that there might well be at least prima facie value in genetic integrity, (...)
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  18.  79
    William S. Robinson (1998). Intrinsic Qualities of Experience: Surviving Harman's Critique. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 47 (3):285-309.
    Gilbert Harman (1990) seeks to defend psychophysical functionalism by articulating a representationalist view of the qualities of experience. The negative side of the present paper argues that the resources of this representationalist view are insufficient to ground the evident distinction between perception and (mere) thought. This failure makes the view unable to support the uses to which Harman wishes to put it. Several rescuing moves by other representationalists are considered, but none is found successful. Part of the difficulty in Harman's (...)
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  19.  28
    Robert Streiffer & Thomas Hedemann (2005). The Political Import of Intrinsic Objections to Genetically Engineered Food. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18 (2):191-210.
    Many people object to genetically engineerehd (GE) food because they believe that it is unnatural or that its creation amounts to playing God. These objections are often referred to as intrinsic objections, and they have been widely criticized in the agricultural bioethics literature as being unsound, incompatible with modern science, religious, inchoate, and based on emotion instead of reason. Many of their critics also argue that even if these objections did have some merit as ethicalobjections, their quasi-religious nature means (...)
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  20.  47
    Hans-Jürgen Link (2013). Playing God and the Intrinsic Value of Life: Moral Problems for Synthetic Biology? Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (2):435-448.
    Most of the reports on synthetic biology include not only familiar topics like biosafety and biosecurity but also a chapter on ‘ethical concerns’; a variety of diffuse topics that are interrelated in some way or another. This article deals with these ‘ethical concerns’. In particular it addresses issues such as the intrinsic value of life and how to deal with ‘artificial life’, and the fear that synthetic biologists are tampering with nature or playing God. Its aim is to analyse (...)
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  21.  41
    H. Verhoog (1992). The Concept of Intrinsic Value and Transgenic Animals. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 5 (2):147-160.
    The creation of transgenic animals by means of modern techniques of genetic manipulation is evaluated in the light of different interpretations of the concept of intrinsic value. The zoocentric interpretation, emphasizing the suffering of individual, sentient animals, is described as an extension of the anthropocentric interpretation. In a biocentric or ecocentric approach the concept of intrinsic value first of all denotes independence of humans and a non-instrumental relation to animals. In the zoocentric approach of Bernard Rollin, genetic engineering (...)
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  22.  39
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). Intrinsic Value, Alternative Possibilities, and Reason. Journal of Ethics 14 (2):149-171.
    I address three issues in this paper: first, just as many have thought that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of judgments of moral responsibility, is there reason to think that the truth of judgments of intrinsic value also presupposes our having alternatives? Second, if there is this sort of requirement for the truth of judgments of intrinsic value, is there an analogous requirement for the truth of judgments of moral obligation on the supposition (...)
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  23.  76
    Fred Feldman (1998). Hyperventilating About Intrinsic Value. Journal of Ethics 2 (4):339-354.
    Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Brentano, Moore, and Chisholm have suggested marks or criteria of intrinsic goodness. I distinguish among eight of these. I focus in this paper on four: (a) unimprovability, (b) unqualifiedness, (c) dependence upon intrinsic natures, and (d) incorruptibility. I try to show that each of these is problematic in some way. I also try to show that they are not equivalent – they point toward distinct conceptions of intrinsic goodness. In the end it appears that (...)
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  24.  10
    Federico Zuolo (2016). Individuals, Species and Equality. A Critique of McMahan’s Intrinsic Potential Account. Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (3):573-592.
    Jeff McMahan has recently provided a forceful defense of methodological anti-speciesism against speciesists’ claim that species standard is a meaningful criterion to assess the value of lives and the nature of deprivation. In this paper I discuss McMahan’s favored account (the Intrinsic Potential Account) to assess the value of life and the nature of deprivation and challenge its overall ethical and methodological tenability. I level three charges against the Intrinsic Potential Account. I argue, first, that it cannot be (...)
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  25.  68
    David Decosimo (2012). Intrinsic Goodness and Contingency, Resemblance and Particularity: Two Criticisms of Robert Adams's Finite and Infinite Goods. Studies in Christian Ethics 25 (4):418-441.
    Robert Adams’s Finite and Infinite Goods is one of the most important and innovative contributions to theistic ethics in recent memory. This article identifies two major flaws at the heart of Adams’s theory: his notion of intrinsic value and his claim that ‘excellence’ or finite goodness is constituted by resemblance to God. I first elucidate Adams’s complex, frequently misunderstood claims concerning intrinsic value and Godlikeness. I then contend that Adams’s notion of intrinsic value cannot explain what it (...)
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  26.  16
    Itay Shani (2007). Teleonomic Functions and Intrinsic Intentionality: Dretske's Theory as a Test Case. Cognitive Systems Research 8 (1):15-27.
    Fred Dretske's theory of indicatory functions (Dretske 1988 & 1994)is undoubtedly one of the more ambitious attempts to articulate a sound naturalistic foundation for an adequate theory of intentional content. In what follows I argue that, contrary to Dretske's explicit intentions, his theory fails a crucial adequacy test - that of accounting for mental content as a system-intrinsic property. Once examined in light of the first-person perspective of an embodied psy- chological agent, I argue, it becomes clear that neither (...)
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  27.  90
    Julia Tanner (2007). Intrinsic Value and the Argument From Regress. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 12 (2):313-322..
    Proponents of the argument from regress maintain that the existence of Instrumental Value is sufficient to establish the existence of Intrinsic Value. It is argued that the chain of instrumentally valuable things has to end somewhere. Namely with intrinsic value. In this paper, I shall argue something a little more modest than this. I do not want to argue that the regress argument proves that there is intrinsic value but rather that it proves that the idea of (...)
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  28.  90
    Ralph Wedgwood (2009). Diotima's Eudaemonism: Intrinsic Value and Rational Motivation in Plato's Symposium. Phronesis 54 (4):297-325.
    This paper gives a new interpretation of the central section of Plato’s Symposium (199d–212a). According to this interpretation, the term ‘καλόν’, as used by Plato here, stands for what many contemporary philosophers call “intrinsic value”; and “love” (ἔρως) is in effect rational motivation, which for Plato consists in the desire to “possess” intrinsically valuable things – that is, according to Plato, to be happy – for as long as possible. An explanation is given of why Plato believes that “possessing” (...)
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  29.  6
    Patrick Loobuyck (2010). Intrinsic and Equal Human Worth in a Secular Worldview. Fictionalism in Human Rights Discourse. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 3 (9):58-77.
    One of the most central ideas of secular, humanistic morality is the thesis of intrinsic and equal human worth. Paradoxically, it is very hard to place this thesis in a secular worldview, because an indifferent universe can not make room for intrinsic values and a priori human rights. Nevertheless, it would not be a good solution to jettison the whole human rights discourse. Therefore, this paper proposes the stance of moral fictionalism: to believe that the discourse entails or (...)
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  30.  1
    Ole Martin Moen (forthcoming). An Argument for Intrinsic Value Monism. Philosophia:1-11.
    In this paper I argue that there is only one intrinsic value. I start by examining three aspects of values that are often taken to count against this suggestion: that values seem heterogeneous, that values are sometimes incommensurable, and that we sometimes experience so-called “rational regret” after having forsaken a smaller value for a greater one. These aspects, I argue, are in fact compatible with both monism and pluralism about intrinsic value. I then examine a fourth aspect: That (...)
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  31.  25
    Chong Ju Choi, Sae Won Kim & Shui Yu (2009). Global Ethics of Collective Internet Governance: Intrinsic Motivation and Open Source Software. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 90 (4):523 - 531.
    The ethical governance of the global Internet is an accelerating global phenomenon. A key paradox of the global Internet is that it allows individual and collective decision making to co-exist with each other. Open source software (OSS) communities are a globally accelerating phenomenon. OSS refers to groups of programs that allow the free use of the software and further the code sharing to the general and corporate users of the software. The combination of private provision and public knowledge and software, (...)
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  32.  56
    Roger Harris (2010). Do Material Things Have Intrinsic Properties? Metaphysica 11 (2):105-117.
    Possession of any actual physical property depends on the ambient conditions for its bearers, irrespective of one's particular theory of dispositions. If 'self-sufficiency' makes a property intrinsic, then, because of this dependence, things in the actual world cannot have an intrinsic physical resemblance to one another or to things in other possible worlds. Criteria for the self-sufficiency of intrinsic properties based on, or implying indifference to both 'loneliness' and 'accompaniment' entail that no self-sufficient property can require its (...)
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  33.  2
    Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: II. An Examination of a Conception of Consciousness 'Subscript 4' as Intrinsic, Necessary, and Concomitant. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (4):369-390.
    The present article is the second one in a series and begins to spell out the case for the intrinsic kind of theory of consciousness4. According to such theory, a mental-occurrence instance is conscious4 on its own, that is, as a part of its own internal structure. Considered here are a prominent phenomenologist’s argument in favor of an intrinsic theory of consciousness4, and his conception of how such inner awareness occurs in the case of objectivating mental acts, which (...)
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  34.  25
    P. Hájíček & J. Tolar (2009). Intrinsic Properties of Quantum Systems. Foundations of Physics 39 (5):411-432.
    A new realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is introduced. Quantum systems are shown to have two kinds of properties: the usual ones described by values of quantum observables, which are called extrinsic, and those that can be attributed to individual quantum systems without violating standard quantum mechanics, which are called intrinsic. The intrinsic properties are classified into structural and conditional. A systematic and self-consistent account is given. Much more statements become meaningful than any version of Copenhagen interpretation would (...)
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  35.  60
    Ralph Wedgwood (2009). Diotima's Eudaemonism: Intrinsic Value and Rational Motivation in Plato's Symposium. Phronesis 54 (4):297-325.
    This paper gives a new interpretation of the central section of Plato's Symposium (199d-212a). According to this interpretation, the term "καλóν", as used by Plato here, stands for what many contemporary philosophers call "intrinsic value"; and "love" (ἔρως) is in effect rational motivation , which for Plato consists in the desire to "possess" intrinsically valuable things - that is, according to Plato, to be happy - for as long as possible. An explanation is given of why Plato believes that (...)
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  36.  16
    Antoine C. Dussault (2014). Fitting-Attitude Analyses and the Relation Between Final and Intrinsic Value. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):166-189.
    This paper examines the debate as to whether something can have final value in virtue of its relational (i.e., non-intrinsic) properties, or, more briefly put, whether final value must be intrinsic. The paper adopts the perspective of the fitting-attitude analysis (FA analysis) of value, and argues that from this perspective, there is no ground for the requirement that things may have final value only in virtue of their intrinsic properties, but that there might be some grounds for (...)
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  37. Thomas Natsoulas (1999). The Case for Intrinsic Theory IV: An Argument From How Conscious Mental-Occurrence Instances Seem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (3):257-276.
    More consistently than Aron Gurwitsch, whose intrinsic account of consciousness4 was the topic of the previous two articles of the present series, David Woodruff Smith maintains that, within any objectivating act that is its object, inner awareness is inextricably interwoven with the outer awareness that is involved in the act. I begin here an examination of arguments Woodruff Smith proffers pro an understanding of inner awareness as intrinsic. However, in the present article, I give attention only to one (...)
     
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  38.  45
    Erik Carlson (2001). Organic Unities, Non-Trade-Off, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value. Journal of Ethics 5 (4):335-360.
    Whether or not intrinsic value is additively measurable is often thought to depend on the truth or falsity of G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities. I argue that the truth of this principle is, contrary to received opinion, compatible with additive measurement. However, there are other very plausible evaluative claims that are more difficult to combine with the additivity of intrinsic value. A plausible theory of the good should allow that there are certain kinds of states of (...)
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  39. Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: I. An Introduction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):267-286.
    This is the introductory installment in a projected series of articles in which I shall be advancing the positive case for the "intrinsic" kind of explanatory account of "consciousness4." "Consciousness4" has reference to a property of individual mental-occurrence instances wherein there takes place an immediate awareness of them either upon their occurrence or as part of their very occurrence. The immediacy or directness of such inner awareness amounts to the absence of mental mediation by any other occurrent awareness. An (...)
     
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  40.  23
    Norman Kreitman (2011). Intrinsic Aesthetic Value Revisted. Metaphilosophy 42 (4):470-478.
    Abstract: Every sentient organism needs constantly to re-assess its environment in order to adjust to any changes in it and to ascertain which aspects are, or become, salient for its current purposes. Such adaptation is of basic evolutionary importance, but for human beings it can be difficult to achieve in the face of radical novelty or when different frames of reference are in conflict. Art by virtue of its integrated structure presents examples of how a partial unification of experience may (...)
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  41.  13
    Theodore W. Nunez (1999). Rolston, Lonergan, and the Intrinsic Value of Nature. Journal of Religious Ethics 27 (1):105 - 128.
    In recent metaethical debate over ways to justify the notion of intrinsic natural value, some neopragmatists have challenged realist conceptions of scientific and moral truth. Holmes Rolston defends a critical-realist epistemology as the basis for a metaphysics of "projective nature" and a cosmological narrative--both of which set up a historical ontology of objective natural value. Pure ecological science informs the wilderness experience of Rolston's ideal epistemic subject, the "sensitive naturalist." The author argues that Rolston's account of the relation between (...)
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  42. Thomas Natsoulas (1993). Consciousness: Varieties of Intrinsic Theory. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (2):107-32.
    A mental-occurrence instance is conscious if it is an object of inner consciousness; that is, if a mental-occurrence instance occurs and is conscious on that occasion, one is conscious of it on the spot without having to take notice first of something else. In contrast, Freud's preconscious and unconscious psychical processes, whenever they occur, are examples of nonconscious mental-occurrence instances, which are not objects of inner consciousness; that is, one has no consciousness of them unless one takes notice of something (...)
     
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  43. Thomas Natsoulas (2001). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: Attempted Inroads From the First Person Perspective. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):219-248.
    The Jamesian streams of consciousness are each made up of states of consciousness one at a time in tight temporal succession except when a stream stops flowing momentarily or for a longer time. These pulses of mentality are typically complex in the sense of their possessing, each of them, many ingredients or features. But, also, every state of consciousness is, in a different sense, simple: a unitary awareness, a single mental act. Although unitary, a state of consciousness often has many (...)
     
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  44. Thomas Natsoulas (2004). The Case for Intrinsic Theory IX . Further Discussion of an Equivocal Remembrance Account. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (1):7-32.
    I go on here with my endeavor to ascertain intrinsic-theoretical elements that are explicitly or implicitly present in O’Shaughnessy’s remembrance account of inner awareness, or the immediate cognitive awareness that we have of some of our own mental-occurrence instances. According to an intrinsic theory of such awareness, a directly apprehended state of consciousness includes in its own structure inner awareness of itself. I seek to understand those distinct mental-occurrence instances which O’Shaughnessy holds are the cognitive inner awarenesses of (...)
     
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  45. Thomas Natsoulas (2004). The Case for Intrinsic Theory XI: A Disagreement Regarding the Kind of Feature Inner Awareness Is. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (3):187-211.
    Motivating this article, as well as the immediately preceding article in the present series, is Kriegel’s recent “Intrinsic Theory and the Content of Inner Awareness,” which consists of a defense of six theses regarding the content of inner awareness. I address here only the first of these six theses, along the very same lines as Kriegel does, that is, with special reference to Woodruff Smith’s phenomenological conception of inner awareness. The first thesis is as follows: “Inner awareness is . (...)
     
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  46. Thomas Natsoulas (2001). The Case for Intrinsic Theory V: Some Arguments From James's Varieties. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (1):41-67.
    This and the planned next article of the present series mine the wealth of reports and astute discussions of states of consciousness contained in William James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience. Thus, I bring out further arguments in favor of the kind of understanding of consciousness4, or inner awareness, that, as it happens, James explicitly opposed in The Principles of Psychology. The alternative, appendage kind of account that James advanced there for consciousness4 stands in marked contrast to intrinsic theory: (...)
     
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  47. Thomas Natsoulas (1998). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: III. Intrinsic Inner Awareness and the Problem of Straightforward Objectivation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):1-19.
    Aron Gurwitsch, phenomenologist and intrinsic theorist of consciousness4, contends that every objectivating mental act necessarily involves inner awareness; whenever an objectivating act occurs, it is an intentional object of unmediated apprehension. Moreover, inner awareness is literally intrinsic to every objectivating mental act, a part of its very own individual structure. Gurwitsch further argues that inner awareness is a merely concomitant part of that structure, taking place at the margin of the particular objectivating act, for the reason that the (...)
     
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  48. Andy Clark (2005). Intrinsic Content, Active Memory, and the Extended Mind. Analysis 65 (285):1-11.
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  49. Irwin Goldstein (1989). Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional Intrinsic Values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.
    That all pleasure is good and all pain bad in itself is an eternally true ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict particularism (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and relativism (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa Foot, R M (...)
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    Marko Jurjako (2013). The Problem of Intrinsic Epistemic Significance. Prolegomena 12 (1):83-100.
    Why conduct research concerning human genome or proving the existence of Higgs particle? What makes these problems significant or worthy of investigation? In recent epistemological discussions one can find at least two conceptions of the problem of epistemic significance: research question or cognitive problem can be practically significant or intrinsically epistemically significant, in a way that depends on the consideration whether reasons that support the significance of the problem are practical or epistemic. In this paper I am dealing with the (...)
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