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  1. Ira M. Schnall & David Widerker (2012). The Direct Argument and the Burden of Proof. Analysis 72 (1):25-36.
    Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) for incompatibilism purports to establish incompatibilism with respect to moral responsibility and determinism without appealing to assumptions that compatibilists usually consider controversial. Recently, Michael McKenna has presented a novel critique of DA. McKenna's critique raises important issues about philosophical dialectics. In this article, we address those issues and contend that his argument does not succeed.
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  2. Ira M. Schnall (2010). Weak Reasons-Responsiveness Meets its Match: In Defense of David Widerker's Attack on PAP. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):271 - 283.
    David Widerker, long an opponent of Harry Frankfurt's attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), has recently come up with his own Frankfurt-style scenario which he claims might well be a counterexample to PAP. Carlos Moya has argued that this new scenario is not a counterexample to PAP, because in it the agent is not really blameworthy, since he lacks weak reasonsresponsiveness (WRR), a property that John Fischer has argued is a necessary condition of practical rationality, and hence of (...)
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  3. Ira M. Schnall (2009). Anthropic Observation Selection Effects and the Design Argument. Faith and Philosophy 26 (4):361-377.
    The Argument from Fine-Tuning, a relatively new version of the Design Argument, has given rise to an objection, based on what is known as the An­thropic Principle. It is alleged that the argument is fallacious in that it involves an observation selection effect—that given the existence of intelligent living observers, the observation that the universe is fine-tuned for the existence of intelligent life is not surprising. Many find this objection puzzling, or at least easily refutable. My main contribution to the (...)
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  4. Ira M. Schnall (2007). Hume on “Popular” and “Philosophical” Skeptical Arguments. Hume Studies 33 (1):41-66.
    In section 12 of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Hume presents several skeptical arguments, including “popular” and “philosophical”objections to inductive reasoning. I point out a puzzling aspect of Hume’s treatment of these two kinds of objection, and I suggest a way to deal with the puzzle. I then examine the roles of both kinds of objection in leading to “mitigated” skepticism. In particular, Hume claims that the philosophical objection can lead to limiting investigation to matters of common life; but several (...)
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  5. Ira M. Schnall (2007). Sceptical Theism and Moral Scepticism. Religious Studies 43 (1):49-69.
    Several theists have adopted a position known as ‘sceptical theism’, according to which God is justified in allowing suffering, but the justification is often beyond human comprehension. A problem for sceptical theism is that if there are unknown justifications for suffering, then we cannot know whether it is right for a human being to relieve suffering. After examining several proposed solutions to this problem, I conclude that one who is committed to a revealed religion has a simpler and (...)
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  6. Ira M. Schnall (2004). Constancy, Coherence, and Causality. Hume Studies 30 (1):33-50.
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  7. Ira M. Schnall (2004). Ignorance and Blame. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):307-329.
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  8. Ira M. Schnall (2004). Philosophy of Language and Meta-Ethics. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):587 - 594.
    Meta-ethical discussions commonly distinguish 'subjectivism' from 'emotivism', or 'expressivism'. But Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have argued that plausible assumptions in the philosophy of language entail that expressivism collapses into subjectivism. Though there have been responses to their argument, I think the responses have not adequately diagnosed the real weakness in it. I suggest my own diagnosis, and defend expressivism as a viable theory distinct from subjectivism.
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  9. Ira M. Schnall (2001). The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’. Analysis 61 (272):335–340.
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