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Profile: Isaac Levi (Columbia University)
  1.  38
    Isaac Levi (1980). The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance. The MIT Press.
    This major work challenges some widely held positions in epistemology - those of Peirce and Popper on the one hand and those of Quine and Kuhn on the other.
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  2. Isaac Levi (1967/1973). Gambling with Truth. Cambridge,MIT Press.
  3.  29
    Isaac Levi (1991). The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.
    Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is proposed which rejects the conventional view that a propositional attitude involves a relation between an agent and either a linguistic entity (...)
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  4.  27
    Isaac Levi (1996). For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
    This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made 'for the sake of argument' sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two (...)
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  5.  20
    Isaac Levi (2004). Mild Contraction: Evaluating Loss of Information Due to Loss of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    Isaac Levi's new book develops further his pioneering work in formal epistemology, focusing on the problem of belief contraction, or how rationally to relinquish old beliefs. Levi offers the most penetrating analysis to date of this key question in epistemology, offering a completely new solution and explaining its relation to his earlier proposals. He mounts an argument in favor of the thesis that contracting a state of belief by giving up specific beliefs is to be evaluated in terms of the (...)
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  6.  39
    Isaac Levi (1986). Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict. Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, Isaac Levi denies this assumption, arguing instead that agents often should choose without having balanced the competing values and that rationality does not require that an act be optimal, only that it be what Levi terms 'admissible'. He explains the consequences of denying this assumption, and develops a general approach to decision making under unresolved conflict. He investigates the phenomenon of conflicting values in several areas, in each of which he develops a framework for rational (...)
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  7. Isaac Levi (1974). On Indeterminate Probabilities. Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.
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  8.  17
    Isaac Levi (1997). The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought. Cambridge University Press.
    Isaac Levi is one of the preeminent philosophers in the areas of pragmatic rationality and epistemology. This collection of essays constitutes an important presentation of his original and influential ideas about rational choice and belief. A wide range of topics is covered, including consequentialism and sequential choice, consensus, voluntarism of belief, and the tolerance of the opinions of others. The essays elaborate on the idea that principles of rationality are norms that regulate the coherence of our beliefs and values with (...)
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  9.  31
    Isaac Levi (1977). Direct Inference. Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):5-29.
  10.  6
    Isaac Levi (1978). On Indeterminate Probabilities. In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. D. Reidel 233--261.
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  11. Isaac Levi (2012). Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict. Cambridge University Press.
    It is a commonplace that in making decisions agents often have to juggle competing values, and that no choice will maximise satisfaction of them all. However, the prevailing account of these cases assumes that there is always a single ranking of the agent's values, and therefore no unresolvable conflict between them. Isaac Levi denies this assumption, arguing that agents often must choose without having balanced their different values and that to be rational, an act does not have to be (...)
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  12.  33
    Isaac Levi (1988). Iteration of Conditionals and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 76 (1):49 - 81.
  13.  24
    Isaac Levi (1977). Subjunctives, Dispositions and Chances. Synthese 34 (4):423 - 455.
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  14. Isaac Levi (1981). Should Bayesians Sometimes Neglect Base Rates? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):342.
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  15.  13
    Isaac Levi (1965). Deductive Cogency in Inductive Inference. Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):68-77.
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  16.  6
    Isaac Levi (2006). Decisions and Revisions: Philosophical Essays on Knowledge and Value. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a collection of Isaac Levi’s philosophical papers. Over the period represented by the work here, Professor Levi has developed an interrelated set of views, in the tradition of Peirce and Dewey, on epistemology and the philosophy of science and social science. This focus has been on the problem of induction and the growth of knowledge, the foundations of probability and the theory of rational decision-making. His most important essays in these areas are assembled here, with an introduction setting (...)
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  17.  30
    Isaac Levi (1986). The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg. Economics and Philosophy 2 (1):23.
    In The Enterprise of Knowledge, I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed induce an ordering of feasible options in a context of deliberation. My reasons for taking this position are related to my commitment to the inquiry-oriented approach (...)
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  18.  36
    Isaac Levi (1985). Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment. Philosophy of Science 52 (3):390-409.
    Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey.
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  19. Isaac Levi (1992). Conflict and Inquiry. Ethics 102 (4):814-834.
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  20. Isaac Levi (1967). Probability Kinematics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (3):197-209.
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  21.  72
    Isaac Levi (1960). Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments? Journal of Philosophy 57 (11):345-357.
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  22.  13
    Isaac Levi (1961). Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 58 (9):241-249.
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  23. Isaac Levi (1990). Pareto Unanimity and Consensus. Journal of Philosophy 87 (9):481-492.
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  24. Isaac Levi (1983). Kyburg on Random Designators. Philosophy of Science 50 (4):635-642.
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  25. Isaac Levi (1978). Confirmational Conditionalization. Journal of Philosophy 75 (12):730-737.
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  26.  2
    Isaac Levi (1975). Newcomb's Many Problems. Theory and Decision 6 (2):161-175.
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  27.  12
    Isaac Levi (2012). Pragmatism and Inquiry: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Corrigibilism without solidarity -- Inquiry, deliberation, and method -- Pragmatism and change of view -- Beware of syllogism : statistical reasoning and conjecturing according to Peirce -- Dewey's logic of inquiry -- Wayward naturalism : saving Dewey from himself -- Seeking truth -- The logic of consistency and the logic of truth -- Belief, doubt, and evidentialism -- Induction, abduction, and oracles -- Knowledge as true full belief.
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  28.  21
    Isaac Levi (1987). The Demons of Decision. The Monist 70 (2):193-211.
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  29.  10
    Isaac Levi (2003). Contracting From Epistemic Hell is Routine. Synthese 135 (1):141 - 164.
    I respond to Erik Olsson's critique of my account of contraction frominconsistent belief states, by admitting that such contraction cannot be rationalized as adeliberate decision problem. It can, however, be rationalized as a routine designed prior toinadvertent expansion into inconsistency when the deliberating agent embraces a consistent point of view.
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  30.  10
    Isaac Levi (1958). Foundations of Inductive Logic. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 55 (5):209-212.
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  31.  22
    Isaac Levi (2004). List and Pettit. Synthese 140 (1-2):237 - 242.
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  32.  23
    Isaac Levi (2004). Jaakko Hintikka. Synthese 140 (1-2):37 - 41.
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  33.  27
    Isaac Levi (1982). A Note on Newcombmania. Journal of Philosophy 79 (6):337-342.
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  34.  3
    Isaac Levi (1978). Newcomb's Many Problems. In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Theory and Decision. D. Reidel 369--383.
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  35.  33
    Isaac Levi, Contraction and Informational Value.
    According to the approach made famous by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (1985), revision is a transformation K*h of a potential belief state K by adding h yielding another potential belief state.1 This AGM revision transformation is a composition of two other transformations: contraction and expansion. K*h = [K-~h]+h. This is the expansion by adding h of the contraction K-~h of K by removing ~h.
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  36.  9
    Isaac Levi (1963). Statistical and Inductive Probabilities. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):21-25.
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  37.  24
    Isaac Levi (1962). On the Seriousness of Mistakes. Philosophy of Science 29 (1):47-65.
    Several authors have recently contended that modern statistical theory provides a powerful argument in favor of the view that if scientists accept or reject hypotheses at all they do so only in a behavioral sense--i.e., in a sense which reduces "accepting P" to "acting on the basis of P relative to an objective O". In this paper, the argument from statistics in favor of a behavioral view is outlined; an interpretation of two statistical procedures (Bayes method and signifigance testing) is (...)
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  38.  77
    Isaac Levi (2010). Probability Logic, Logical Probability, and Inductive Support. Synthese 172 (1):97 - 118.
    This paper seeks to defend the following conclusions: The program advanced by Carnap and other necessarians for probability logic has little to recommend it except for one important point. Credal probability judgments ought to be adapted to changes in evidence or states of full belief in a principled manner in conformity with the inquirer’s confirmational commitments—except when the inquirer has good reason to modify his or her confirmational commitment. Probability logic ought to spell out the constraints on rationally coherent confirmational (...)
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  39.  22
    Isaac Levi (2007). Identity and Conflict. Social Research: An International Quarterly 74 (1):25-50.
    A sketch of a way of characterizing multidimensional value commitments and the way they can come into conflict derived from my book Hard Choices is presented and applied to the question of how to characterize the relevance of identity to value commitments and conflict. The views of A.K. Sen and A. Bilgrami are examined in the light of these ideas.
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  40.  23
    Isaac Levi (1990). Chance. Philosophical Topics 18 (2):117-149.
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  41.  8
    Isaac Levi (1961). Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 58 (14):387-390.
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  42.  11
    Isaac Levi (1990). Chance. Philosophical Topics 18 (2):117--49.
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  43.  23
    Isaac Levi (1967). Information and Inference. Synthese 17 (1):369 - 391.
  44.  11
    Isaac Levi (2011). Knowledge as True Belief. In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science. Springer 269--302.
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  45.  35
    Isaac Levi (2002). Money Pumps and Diachronic Books. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S235-S247.
    The idea that rational agents should have acyclic preferences and should obey conditionalization has been defended on the grounds that otherwise an agent is threatened with becoming a “money pump.” This essay argues that such arguments fail to prove their claims.
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  46.  36
    Isaac Levi (1982). Ignorance, Probability and Rational Choice. Synthese 53 (3):387-417.
  47.  59
    Isaac Levi (1985). Illusions About Uncertainty. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):331-340.
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  48.  13
    Isaac Levi (2004). The Logic of Consistency and the Logic of Truth. Dialectica 58 (4):461–482.
    In “Truth and Probability” Ramsey claimed that the logic of consistency for probability is not a logic of truth. After supporting this claim, he proceeded to explore the possibilities for a logic of truth for probability. An examination of Ramsey's intent reveals that Ramsey was far from being an orthodox Bayesian when it comes to statistical reasoning. The relations between Ramsey's thought and the ideas of Keynes and Peirce are discussed.
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  49.  25
    Horacio Arló Costa & Isaac Levi (1996). Two Notions of Epistemic Validity. Synthese 109 (2):217 - 262.
    How to accept a conditional? F. P. Ramsey proposed the following test in (Ramsey 1990).(RT) If A, then B must be accepted with respect to the current epistemic state iff the minimal hypothetical change of it needed to accept A also requires accepting B.
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  50.  43
    Isaac Levi & Sidney Morgenbesser (1964). Belief and Disposition. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (July):221-232.
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