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  1.  16
    Ishtiyaque Haji (1998). Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities. Oxford University Press.
    This book explores the epistemic or knowledge requirement of moral responsibility. Haji argues that an agent can be blamed (or praised) only if the agent harbors a belief that the action in question is wrong (or right or obligatory). Defending the importance of an "authenticity" condition when evaluating moral responsibility, Haji holds that one cannot be morally responsible for an action unless the action issues from sources (like desires or beliefs) that are truly the agent's own. Engaging crucial arguments in (...)
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  2.  2
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2012). Reason's Debt to Freedom: Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will. OUP Usa.
    To have free will with respect to an act is to have the ability both to perform and to refrain from performing it. In this book, Ishtiyaque Haji argues that no one can have practical reasons of a certain sort - "objective reasons" - to perform some act unless one has free will regarding that act.
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  3.  2
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2002). Deontic Morality and Control. Cambridge University Press.
    This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation . If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma can be evaded (...)
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  4. Ishtiyaque Haji, Stefaan E. Cuypers & Yannick Joye (2013). Architecture, Ethical Perception, and Educating for Moral Responsibility. Journal of Aesthetic Education 47 (3):1-23.
    Architecture has a marked influence on ethical perception. Ethical perception, in turn, has a pronounced influence on what we are morally responsible for, our decisions, choices, intentional omissions, and overt actions, for instance. It thus stands to reason that architecture bears saliently on moral responsibility. If we now introduce a widely accepted premise that one of the fundamental aims of education is to see that our children turn into morally responsible agents, we can further infer that architecture has an influence (...)
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  5.  49
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2008). Moral Responsibility, Authenticity, and Education. Routledge.
    Introduction: The metaphysics of responsibility and philosophy of education -- Moral responsibility, authenticity, and the problem of manipulation -- A novel perspective on the problem of authenticity -- Forward-looking authenticity in the internalism/externalism debate -- Authentic education, indoctrination, and moral responsibility -- Moral responsibility, hard incompatibilism, and interpersonal relationships -- On the significance of moral responsibility and love -- Love, commendability, and moral obligation -- Love, determinism, and normative education.
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  6. Ishtiyaque Haji (2008). Incompatibilism's Allure: Principle Arguments for Incompatibilism. Broadview Press.
    The role of freedom in assigning moral responsibility is one of the deepest problems in metaphysics and moral theory. Incompatibilism's Allure provides original analysis of the principal arguments for incompatibilism. Ishtiyaque Haji incisively examines the consequence argument, the direct argument, the deontic argument, the manipulation argument, the impossibility argument and the luck objection. He introduces the most important contemporary discussions in a manner accessible to advanced undergraduates, but also suited to professional philosophers. The result is a unique and compelling account (...)
     
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  7.  59
    Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2007). Love Imperiled. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3 (1):0-0.
    In this paper, we argue that hard incompatibilism imperils a typical component of loving relations —lovable behavior—if it imperils moral praiseworthiness. We propose that to be lovable behavior, the behavior must exemplify the property of being commendable (the property of being praiseworthy from the standpoint of love), in contrast to being morally praiseworthy (praiseworthy from the point of view of moral duty). But if hard incompatibilism undermines moral praiseworthiness, then it just as surely undermines commendability. Thus, hard incompatibilism imperils a (...)
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  8.  24
    Ishtiyaque Haji & Michael S. McKenna (2004). Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate About Freedom and Alternative Possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 101 (6):299-314.
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  9.  6
    Ishtiyaque Haji (forthcoming). A Paradox Concerning Frankfurt Examples. Synthese:1-17.
    The set with the following members is inconsistent: F-Lesson: A person can be blameworthy for performing an action even though she cannot refrain from performing it. Equivalence: ‘Ought not’ is equivalent to ‘impermissible.’ OIC: ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ and ‘ought not’ implies ‘can refrain from.’ BRI: Necessarily, one is morally blameworthy for doing something only if it is overall morally impermissible for one to do it. Since Equivalence seems unassailable, one can escape the inconsistency by renouncing any one of the other (...)
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  10. Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.
    Key elements of Randolph Clarke's libertarian account of freedom that requires both agent-causation and non-deterministic event-causation in the production of free action is assessed with an eye toward determining whether agent-causal accounts can accommodate the truth of judgments of moral obligation.
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  11.  23
    Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2007). Magical Agents, Global Induction, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):343 – 371.
    Externalism is the view that facts about one's history or past in the external world that bear on the acquisition of one's responsibility-grounding psychological elements are pertinent to whether one's actions are free and, hence, pertinent to whether one can be morally responsible for them. Internalism is the thesis that the conditions of moral responsibility can be specified independently of facts about how the person acquired her responsibility-grounding psychological elements. In this paper we defend a position that navigates between externalism (...)
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  12.  64
    Ishtiyaque Haji & Michael Mckenna (2011). Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):400-414.
    Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom-relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt-style examples are not cogent. In this (...)
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  13.  44
    Ishtiyaque Haji (1999). Indeterminism and Frankfurt-Type Examples. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.
    I assess Robert Kane's view that global Frankfurt-type cases don't show that freedom to do otherwise is never required for moral responsibility. I first adumbrate Kane's indeterminist account of free will.This will help us grasp Kane's notion of ultimate responsibility, and his claim that in a global Frankfurt-type case, the counterfactual intervener could not control all of the relevant agent's actions in the Frankfurt manner, and some of those actions would be such that the agent could have done otherwise. Appealing (...)
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  14.  21
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2005). Libertarianism, Luck, and Action Explanation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.
    My primary objective is to motivate the concern that leading libertarian views of free action seem unable to account for an agent’s behavior in a way that reveals an explanatorily apt connection between the agent’s prior reasons and the intentional behavior to be explained. I argue that it is this lack of a suitable reasons explanation of purportedly free decisions that underpins the objection that agents who act with the pertinent sort of libertarian freedom cannot be morally responsible for what (...)
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  15. Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). Psychopathy, Ethical Perception, and Moral Culpability. Neuroethics 3 (2):135-150.
    I argue that emotional sensitivity (or insensitivity) has a marked negative influence on ethical perception. Diminished capacities of ethical perception, in turn, mitigate what we are morally responsible for while lack of such capacities may altogether eradicate responsibility. Impairment in ethical perception affects responsibility by affecting either recognition of or reactivity to moral reasons. It follows that emotional insensitivity (together with its attendant impairment in ethical perception) bears saliently on moral responsibility. Since one distinguishing mark of the psychopath is emotional (...)
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  16.  14
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2001). Control Conundrums: Modest Libertarianism, Responsibility, and Explanation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2):178–200.
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  17.  42
    Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2004). Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Manipulation Reconsidered. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (4):439 – 464.
    It has been argued that all compatibilist accounts of free action and moral responsibility succumb to the manipulation problem: evil neurologists or their like may manipulate an agent, in the absence of the agent's awareness of being so manipulated, so that when the agent performs an action, requirements of the compatibilist contender at issue are satisfied. But intuitively, the agent is not responsible for the action. We propose that the manipulation problem be construed as a problem of deviance. In troubling (...)
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  18.  12
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2015). Luck, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism. Dialogue 54 (4):611-631.
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  19.  8
    Ishtiyaque Haji & Michael S. McKenna (2006). Defending Frankfurt's Argument in Deterministic Contexts: A Reply to Palmer. Journal of Philosophy 103 (7):363-372.
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  20.  28
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2012). Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.
    This paper highlights and discusses some key positions on free will and moral responsibility that I have defended. I begin with reflections on a Strawsonian analysis of moral responsibility. Then I take up objections to the view that there is an asymmetry in freedom requirements for moral responsibility and moral obligation: obligation but not responsibility requires that we could have done otherwise. I follow with some thoughts on the viability of different sorts of semi-compatibilism. Next, I turn to defending the (...)
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  21.  57
    Ishtiyaque Haji & Justin Caouette (2013). Introduction: Mapping the Terrain. In Ishtiyaque Haji & Justin Caouette (eds.), Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press 1-25.
    Determinism is, roughly, the thesis that facts about the past and the laws of nature entail all truths. A venerable, age-old dilemma concerning responsibility distils to this: if either determinism is true or it is not true, we lack "responsibility-grounding" control. Either determinism is true or it is not true. So, we lack responsibility-grounding control. Deprived of such control, no one is ever morally responsible for anything. A number of the freshly-minted essays in this collection address aspects of this dilemma. (...)
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  22.  25
    Stefaan E. Cuypers & Ishtiyaque Haji (2006). Education for Critical Thinking: Can It Be Non-Indoctrinative? Educational Philosophy and Theory 38 (6):723–743.
  23.  11
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2003). The Emotional Depravity of Psychopaths and Culpability. Legal Theory 9 (1):63-82.
    In this paper, I restrict discussion to cases of psychopathy in which it is assumed that psychopaths who satisfy epistemic requirements of responsibility, including the requirement that one is culpable for an action only if one performs it in light of the belief that one is doing wrong, can and do perform actions they take to be immoral or illegal. I argue that in such cases, the well-documented emotional impairment of psychopaths fails to subvert moral culpability. In particular, it does (...)
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  24.  55
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). Incompatibilism's Threat to Worldly Value: Source Incompatibilism, Desert, and Pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):621-645.
  25.  24
    Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2008). Authenticity-Sensitive Preferentism and Educating for Well-Being and Autonomy. Journal of Philosophy of Education 42 (1):85-106.
    An overarching aim of education is the promotion of children's personal well-being. Liberal educationalists also support the promotion of children's personal autonomy as a central educational aim. On some views, such as John White's, these two goals—furthering well-being and cultivating autonomy—can come apart. Our primary aim in this paper is to argue for a species of a stronger view: assuming preferentism as our axiology, we suggest that there is an essential association between the autonomy of our springs of action, such (...)
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  26. Ishtiyaque Haji (2007). Deontic Morality and Control. Cambridge University Press.
    This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation. If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma can be evaded but (...)
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  27.  9
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2012). Modest Libertarianism and Practical Reason. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):201-216.
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  28. Ishtiyaque Haji (2002). Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press
     
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  29.  29
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2013). Historicism, Non-Historicism, or a Mix? Journal of Ethics 17 (3):185-204.
    This paper revisits the issue of whether responsibility is essentially historical. Roughly, the leading question here is this: Do ways in which we can acquire pertinent antecedents of action, such as beliefs, desires, and values, have an essential bearing on whether we are responsible for actions that are suitably related to these antecedents? I argue, first, that Michael McKenna’s interesting case for nonhistoricism is indecisive, and, second, his brand of modest historicism, while highly insightful, yields results concerning responsibility that ought (...)
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  30.  71
    Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2006). Hard- and Soft-Line Responses to Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument. Acta Analytica 21 (4):19 - 35.
    Derk Pereboom has advanced a four-case manipulation argument that, he claims, undermines both libertarian accounts of free action not committed to agent-causation and compatibilist accounts of such action. The first two cases are meant to be ones in which the key agent is not responsible for his actions owing to his being manipulated. We first consider a “hard-line” response to this argument that denies that the agent is not morally responsible in these cases. We argue that this response invites a (...)
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  31.  62
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2003). Alternative Possibilities, Luck, and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 7 (3):253-275.
    I first question whether genuinealternatives are necessary for moralresponsibility by assessing the assumption thataccessibility to such alternatives is vital tohaving the kind of control required forresponsibility. I next suggest that theavailability of genuine alternatives courtsproblems of responsibility-subverting luck foran important class of libertarian theories. Isummarize one such problem and respond torecent replies it has elicited. I then proposethat if this ``luck objection'''' against theidentified class of libertarian theories ispersuasive, a similar objection appears toafflict compatibilist theories as well.Finally, I show that (...)
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  32.  36
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). Intrinsic Value, Alternative Possibilities, and Reason. Journal of Ethics 14 (2):149-171.
    I address three issues in this paper: first, just as many have thought that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of judgments of moral responsibility, is there reason to think that the truth of judgments of intrinsic value also presupposes our having alternatives? Second, if there is this sort of requirement for the truth of judgments of intrinsic value, is there an analogous requirement for the truth of judgments of moral obligation on the supposition that obligation (...)
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  33. Ishtiyaque Haji (2008). Incompatibilism's Allure: Principle Arguments for Incompatibilism. Broadview Press.
    The role of freedom in assigning moral responsibility is one of the deepest problems in metaphysics and moral theory. _Incompatibilism’s Allure_ provides original analysis of the principal arguments for incompatibilism. Ishtiyaque Haji incisively examines the consequence argument, the direct argument, the deontic argument, the manipulation argument, the impossibility argument and the luck objection. He introduces the most important contemporary discussions in a manner accessible to advanced undergraduates, but also suited to professional philosophers. The result is a unique and compelling account (...)
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  34.  25
    Stefaan E. Cuypers & Ishtiyaque Haji (2007). Authentic Education and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (1):78–94.
  35.  28
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2006). Frankfurt-Type Examples, Obligation, and Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 10 (3):255 - 281.
    I examine John Martin Fischer's attempt to block an argument for the conclusion that without alternative possibilities, morally deontic judgments (judgments of moral right, wrong, and obligation) cannot be true. I then criticize a recent attempt to sustain the principle that an agent is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if this action is morally wrong. I conclude with discussing Fisher's view that even if causal determinism undermines morally deontic judgments, it still leaves room for other significant moral assessments (...)
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  36.  19
    Ishtiyaque Haji (1997). An Epistemic Dimension of Blameworthiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):523-544.
    The author first argues against the view that an agent is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if it is morally wrong for that agent to perform that action. The author then proposes a replacement for this view whose gist is summarized in the principle: an agent S is morally blameworthy for performing action A only if S has the belief that it is wrong for her to do A and this belief plays an appropriate role in S's A-ing. (...)
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  37.  69
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2000). Indeterminism, Explanation, and Luck. Journal of Ethics 4 (3):211-235.
    I first adumbrate pertinent aspectsof Robert Kane''s libertarian theory of free choice oraction and an objection of luck that has been levelledagainst the theory. I then consider Kane''s recentresponses to this objection. To meet these responses,I argue that the view that undetermined choices (ofthe sort implied by Kane''s theory) are a matter ofluck is associated with a view about actionexplanation, to wit: when Jones does A and hisdoing of A is undetermined, and when hiscounterpart, Jones*, in the nearest possibleworld in (...)
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  38.  2
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). The Inauthentic Evaluative Schemes of Psychopaths and Culpability. In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry, and Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Usa 261--282.
  39.  29
    Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2001). Libertarian Free Will and CNC Manipulation. Dialectica 55 (3):221-238.
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  40.  19
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2014). Blameworthiness and Alternate Possibilities. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (4):603-621.
    Frankfurt examples attempt to establish that a person can be morally responsible, morally blameworthy, for instance, for doing something despite not being able to do otherwise, as long as the conditions that render him unable to do otherwise play no role in bringing about what he does.Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66 . A more cautious manner of arguing would be to assume only that it is not demonstrated that the agent is not (...)
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  41.  27
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2006). The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and a Defeated Dilemma. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):179 – 201.
    Famed so-called 'Frankfurt-type examples' have been invoked to cast doubt on the principle that a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Many who disagree that the examples are successful in this respect argue that these examples succumb to a deadly dilemma. I uncover and assess libertarian assumptions upon which the 'dilemma objection' is based. On exposing these assumptions, it becomes clear that various sorts of libertarian are no longer entitled to (...)
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  42.  6
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2003). Flickers of Freedom, Obligation, and Responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (4):287 - 302.
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  43.  53
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2008). Reflections on the Incompatibilist's Direct Argument. Erkenntnis 68 (1):1 - 19.
    The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by (...)
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  44.  15
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2000). On Responsibility, History and Taking Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):392-400.
  45.  41
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). Freedom and Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2):169 - 179.
    Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing to determinism's imperiling practical reason.
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  46.  21
    Ishtiyaque Haji (1993). Alternative Possibilities, Moral Obligation, and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Papers 22 (1):41-50.
  47.  9
    Ishtiyaque Haji (1999). Moral Anchors and Control. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):175 - 203.
  48.  33
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2008). Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):239 - 261.
    What is the connection between action that is caused by inauthentic antecedent springs of action, such as surreptitiously engineered-in desires and beliefs, and moral obligation? If, for example, an agent performs an action that derives from such antecedent springs can it be that the agent is not obligated to perform this action owing to the inauthenticity of its causal antecedents? I defend an affirmative response, assuming that we morally ought to bring about the states of affairs that occur in the (...)
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  49.  74
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). Free Will and Reactive Attitudes – Michael McKenna and Paul Russell (Eds). Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):213-218.
  50.  4
    Ishtiyaque Haji (2000). Death and Asymmetries in Normative Appraisals. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):135–150.
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