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Ishtiyaque Haji [105]Ishtiyaque H. Haji [1]
  1. Ishtiyaque Haji (2013). Conversation and Responsibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):267 - 286.
    (2013). Conversation and responsibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 267-286.
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  2. Ishtiyaque Haji (2013). Historicism, Non-Historicism, or a Mix? Journal of Ethics 17 (3):185-204.
    This paper revisits the issue of whether responsibility is essentially historical. Roughly, the leading question here is this: Do ways in which we can acquire pertinent antecedents of action, such as beliefs, desires, and values, have an essential bearing on whether we are responsible for actions that are suitably related to these antecedents? I argue, first, that Michael McKenna’s interesting case for nonhistoricism is indecisive, and, second, his brand of modest historicism, while highly insightful, yields results concerning responsibility that ought (...)
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  3. Ishtiyaque Haji & Justin Caouette (2013). Introduction: Mapping the Terrain. In Ishtiyaque Haji & Justin Caouette (eds.), Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press. 1-25.
    Determinism is, roughly, the thesis that facts about the past and the laws of nature entail all truths. A venerable, age-old dilemma concerning responsibility distils to this: if either determinism is true or it is not true, we lack "responsibility-grounding" control. Either determinism is true or it is not true. So, we lack responsibility-grounding control. Deprived of such control, no one is ever morally responsible for anything. A number of the freshly-minted essays in this collection address aspects of this dilemma. (...)
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  4. Ishtiyaque Haji & Justin Caouette (eds.) (2013). Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Determinism is, roughly, the thesis that facts about the past and the laws of nature entail all truths. A venerable, age-old dilemma concerning responsibility distils to this: if either determinism is true or it is not true, we lack "responsibility-grounding" control. Either determinism is true or it is not true. So, we lack responsibility-grounding control. Deprived of such control, no one is ever morally responsible for anything. A number of the freshly-minted essays in this collection address aspects of this dilemma. (...)
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  5. Ishtiyaque Haji, Stefaan E. Cuypers & Yannick Joye (2013). Architecture, Ethical Perception, and Educating for Moral Responsibility. Journal of Aesthetic Education 47 (3):1-23.
    Architecture has a marked influence on ethical perception. Ethical perception, in turn, has a pronounced influence on what we are morally responsible for, our decisions, choices, intentional omissions, and overt actions, for instance. It thus stands to reason that architecture bears saliently on moral responsibility. If we now introduce a widely accepted premise that one of the fundamental aims of education is to see that our children turn into morally responsible agents, we can further infer that architecture has an influence (...)
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  6. Ishtiyaque Haji, Stefaan E. Cuypers, Yannick Joye, S. K. Wertz, Estelle R. Jorgensen, Iris M. Yob, Jeffrey Wattles, Sabrina D. Misirhiralall, Eric C. Mullis & Seth Lerer (2013). 1. Front Matter Front Matter (Pp. I-Iii). Journal of Aesthetic Education 47 (3).
     
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  7. Ishtiyaque Haji (2012). Modest Libertarianism and Practical Reason. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):201-216.
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  8. Ishtiyaque Haji (2012). Reason's Debt to Freedom: Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will. Oup Usa.
    To have free will with respect to an act is to have the ability both to perform and to refrain from performing it. In this book, Ishtiyaque Haji argues that no one can have practical reasons of a certain sort - "objective reasons" - to perform some act unless one has free will regarding that act.
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  9. Ishtiyaque Haji (2012). Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.
    This paper highlights and discusses some key positions on free will and moral responsibility that I have defended. I begin with reflections on a Strawsonian analysis of moral responsibility. Then I take up objections to the view that there is an asymmetry in freedom requirements for moral responsibility and moral obligation: obligation but not responsibility requires that we could have done otherwise. I follow with some thoughts on the viability of different sorts of semi-compatibilism. Next, I turn to defending the (...)
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  10. Ishtiyaque Haji (2011). On the Reason View of Freedom and Semi-Compatibilism. Acta Analytica 26 (4):343-353.
  11. Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2011). Ultimate Educational Aims, Overridingness, and Personal Well-Being. Studies in Philosophy and Education 30 (6):543-556.
    Discussion regarding education’s aims, especially its ultimate aims, is a key topic in the philosophy of education. These aims or values play a pivotal role in regulating and structuring moral and other types of normative education. We outline two plausible strategies to identify and justify education’s ultimate aims. The first associates these aims with a normative standpoint, such as the moral, prudential, or aesthetic, which is overriding, in a sense of ‘overriding’ to be explained. The second associates education’s ultimate aims (...)
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  12. Ishtiyaque Haji & Michael Mckenna (2011). Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):400-414.
    Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom-relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt-style examples are not cogent. In this (...)
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  13. Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). Free Will and Reactive Attitudes – Michael McKenna and Paul Russell (Eds). Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):213-218.
  14. Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410.
    Take determinism to be the thesis that for any instant, there is exactly one physically possible future (van Inwagen 1983, 3), and understand incompatibilism regarding responsibility to be the view that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. Of the many different arguments that have been advanced for this view, the crux of a relatively traditional one is this: If determinism is true, then we lack alternatives.1 If we lack alternatives, then we can't be morally responsible for any of our behavior. (...)
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  15. Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). Intrinsic Value, Alternative Possibilities, and Reason. Journal of Ethics 14 (2):149-171.
    I address three issues in this paper: first, just as many have thought that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of judgments of moral responsibility, is there reason to think that the truth of judgments of intrinsic value also presupposes our having alternatives? Second, if there is this sort of requirement for the truth of judgments of intrinsic value, is there an analogous requirement for the truth of judgments of moral obligation on the supposition that obligation (...)
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  16. Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). Psychopathy, Ethical Perception, and Moral Culpability. Neuroethics 3 (2):135-150.
    I argue that emotional sensitivity (or insensitivity) has a marked negative influence on ethical perception. Diminished capacities of ethical perception, in turn, mitigate what we are morally responsible for while lack of such capacities may altogether eradicate responsibility. Impairment in ethical perception affects responsibility by affecting either recognition of or reactivity to moral reasons. It follows that emotional insensitivity (together with its attendant impairment in ethical perception) bears saliently on moral responsibility. Since one distinguishing mark of the psychopath is emotional (...)
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  17. Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). The Inauthentic Evaluative Schemes of Psychopaths and Culpability. In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry, and Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Usa. 261--282.
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  18. Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). A Conundrum Concerning Creation. Sophia 48 (1):1-14.
    In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds presupposes, appears to sanction the conclusion that God has no practical reasons to create the actual world.
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  19. Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). Demotivating Semi-Compatibilism. Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):125-140.
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  20. Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). Freedom and Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2):169 - 179.
    Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing to determinism's imperiling practical reason.
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  21. Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). Incompatibilism's Threat to Worldly Value: Source Incompatibilism, Desert, and Pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):621-645.
  22. Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). On the Viability of Semi-Compatibilism. Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):125-140.
    Semi-compatibilism regarding responsibility is the position according to which determinism is compatible with moral responsibility quite apart from whether determinism rules out the sort of freedom that involves access to alternative possibilities. I motivate the view that whether or not semi-compat..
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  23. Ishtiyaque Haji (2008). Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):239 - 261.
    What is the connection between action that is caused by inauthentic antecedent springs of action, such as surreptitiously engineered-in desires and beliefs, and moral obligation? If, for example, an agent performs an action that derives from such antecedent springs can it be that the agent is not obligated to perform this action owing to the inauthenticity of its causal antecedents? I defend an affirmative response, assuming that we morally ought to bring about the states of affairs that occur in the (...)
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  24. Ishtiyaque Haji (2008). Dispositional Compatibilism and Frankfurt‐Type Examples. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):226-241.
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  25. Ishtiyaque Haji (2008). Incompatibilism's Allure: Principle Arguments for Incompatibilism. Broadview Press.
    The role of freedom in assigning moral responsibility is one of the deepest problems in metaphysics and moral theory. Incompatibilism's Allure provides original analysis of the principal arguments for incompatibilism. Ishtiyaque Haji incisively examines the consequence argument, the direct argument, the deontic argument, the manipulation argument, the impossibility argument and the luck objection. He introduces the most important contemporary discussions in a manner accessible to advanced undergraduates, but also suited to professional philosophers. The result is a unique and compelling account (...)
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  26. Ishtiyaque Haji (2008). Moral Responsibility, Authenticity, and Education. Routledge.
    Introduction: The metaphysics of responsibility and philosophy of education -- Moral responsibility, authenticity, and the problem of manipulation -- A novel perspective on the problem of authenticity -- Forward-looking authenticity in the internalism/externalism debate -- Authentic education, indoctrination, and moral responsibility -- Moral responsibility, hard incompatibilism, and interpersonal relationships -- On the significance of moral responsibility and love -- Love, commendability, and moral obligation -- Love, determinism, and normative education.
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  27. Ishtiyaque Haji (2008). Reflections on the Incompatibilist's Direct Argument. Erkenntnis 68 (1):1 - 19.
    The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by (...)
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  28. Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2008). Authenticity-Sensitive Preferentism and Educating for Well-Being and Autonomy. Journal of Philosophy of Education 42 (1):85-106.
    An overarching aim of education is the promotion of children's personal well-being. Liberal educationalists also support the promotion of children's personal autonomy as a central educational aim. On some views, such as John White's, these two goals—furthering well-being and cultivating autonomy—can come apart. Our primary aim in this paper is to argue for a species of a stronger view: assuming preferentism as our axiology, we suggest that there is an essential association between the autonomy of our springs of action, such (...)
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  29. Stefaan E. Cuypers & Ishtiyaque Haji (2007). Authentic Education and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (1):78–94.
  30. Ishtiyaque H. Haji (2007). Modest Libertarianism, Luck, and Control. Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):77-89.
    Whether indeterminism undermines moral responsibility by subverting one or more of responsibility’s requirements is something that has received close attention in the recent literature on free will. In this paper, I take issue with Gerald Harrison’s attempt to deflect various considerations for the view that indeterminism threatens responsibility either by threatening the control that responsibility requires or by posing a problem of luck.
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  31. Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2007). Love Imperiled. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3 (1):0-0.
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  32. Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2007). Magical Agents, Global Induction, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):343 – 371.
    Externalism is the view that facts about one's history or past in the external world that bear on the acquisition of one's responsibility-grounding psychological elements are pertinent to whether one's actions are free and, hence, pertinent to whether one can be morally responsible for them. Internalism is the thesis that the conditions of moral responsibility can be specified independently of facts about how the person acquired her responsibility-grounding psychological elements. In this paper we defend a position that navigates between externalism (...)
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  33. Paul Bloom, Gareth B. Matthews, Scott MacDonald, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Paul Helm, Ishtiyaque Haji, Garry Wills & Richard Sorabji (2006). Augustine's Confessions. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  34. Stefaan E. Cuypers & Ishtiyaque Haji (2006). Education for Critical Thinking: Can It Be Non-Indoctrinative? Educational Philosophy and Theory 38 (6):723–743.
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  35. Ishtiyaque Haji (2006). Frankfurt-Type Examples, Obligation, and Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 10 (3):255 - 281.
    I examine John Martin Fischer's attempt to block an argument for the conclusion that without alternative possibilities, morally deontic judgments (judgments of moral right, wrong, and obligation) cannot be true. I then criticize a recent attempt to sustain the principle that an agent is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if this action is morally wrong. I conclude with discussing Fisher's view that even if causal determinism undermines morally deontic judgments, it still leaves room for other significant moral assessments (...)
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  36. Ishtiyaque Haji (2006). Review of Fischer, John Martin, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (5).
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  37. Ishtiyaque Haji (2006). The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and a Defeated Dilemma. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):179 – 201.
    Famed so-called 'Frankfurt-type examples' have been invoked to cast doubt on the principle that a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Many who disagree that the examples are successful in this respect argue that these examples succumb to a deadly dilemma. I uncover and assess libertarian assumptions upon which the 'dilemma objection' is based. On exposing these assumptions, it becomes clear that various sorts of libertarian are no longer entitled to (...)
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  38. Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2006). Hard- and Soft-Line Responses to Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument. Acta Analytica 21 (4):19 - 35.
    Derk Pereboom has advanced a four-case manipulation argument that, he claims, undermines both libertarian accounts of free action not committed to agent-causation and compatibilist accounts of such action. The first two cases are meant to be ones in which the key agent is not responsible for his actions owing to his being manipulated. We first consider a “hard-line” response to this argument that denies that the agent is not morally responsible in these cases. We argue that this response invites a (...)
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  39. Ishtiyaque Haji & Michael S. McKenna (2006). Defending Frankfurt's Argument in Deterministic Contexts: A Reply to Palmer. Journal of Philosophy 103 (7):363-372.
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  40. Ishtiyaque Haji (2005). Foreknowledge, Freedom, and Obligation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):321-339.
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  41. Ishtiyaque Haji (2005). Freedom, Obligation, and Responsibility: Prospects for a Unifying Theory. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):106-125.
  42. Ishtiyaque Haji (2005). Introduction: Semi-Compatibilism, Reasons-Responsiveness, and Ownership. Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):91 – 93.
  43. Ishtiyaque Haji (2005). Libertarianism, Luck, and Action Explanation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.
    My primary objective is to motivate the concern that leading libertarian views of free action seem unable to account for an agent’s behavior in a way that reveals an explanatorily apt connection between the agent’s prior reasons and the intentional behavior to be explained. I argue that it is this lack of a suitable reasons explanation of purportedly free decisions that underpins the objection that agents who act with the pertinent sort of libertarian freedom cannot be morally responsible for what (...)
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  44. Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2005). Moral Responsibility, Love, and Authenticity. Journal of Social Philosophy 36 (1):106–126.
  45. Justin D.’Arms, Jovan Babic, Eric Cavallero, Ruth Chang, Kai Draper, A. E. Fuchs, Ann Garry, Ishtiyaque Haji, George W. Harris & Richard G. Hensen (2004). Manuscript Referees for The Journal of Ethics Volume 8: September 2003–August 2004. Journal of Ethics 8 (473).
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  46. Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Autonomous Agents. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):735-737.
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  47. Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.
    Key elements of Randolph Clarke's libertarian account of freedom that requires both agent-causation and non-deterministic event-causation in the production of free action is assessed with an eye toward determining whether agent-causal accounts can accommodate the truth of judgments of moral obligation.
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  48. Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Freedom, Hedonism, and the Intrinsic Value of Lives. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):131-151.
  49. Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Libertarian Openness, Blameworthiness, and Time. In M. O.’Rourke J. K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Mit. 2.
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  50. Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Walter Glannon, the Mental Basis of Responsibility. Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (4):575-580.
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