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Profile: Itay Snir (Tel Aviv University)
  1.  4
    Itay Snir (2015). Experts Of Common Sense: Philosophers, Laypeople And Democratic Politics. Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 28:187-210.
    This paper approaches the question of the relations between laypeople and experts by examining the relations between <span class='Hi'>common</span> <span class='Hi'>sense</span> and philosophy. The analysis of the philosophical discussions of the concept of <span class='Hi'>common</span> <span class='Hi'>sense</span> reveals how it provides democratic politics with an egalitarian foundation, but also indicates how problematic this foundation can be. The egalitarian foundation is revealed by analyzing arguments for the validity of <span class='Hi'>common</span> <span class='Hi'>sense</span> in the writings of Thomas Reid. However, a look (...)
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    Itay Snir (2016). “Not Just One Common Sense”: Gramsci's Common Sense and Laclau and Mouffe's Radical Democratic Politics. Constellations 23 (1).
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    Itay Snir (2010). The “New Categorical Imperative” and Adorno's Aporetic Moral Philosophy. Continental Philosophy Review 43 (3):407-437.
    This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s new categorical imperative : it suggests that the new imperative is an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential part of moral philosophy, (...)
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    Itay Snir (2015). Bringing Plurality Together: Common Sense, Thinking and Philosophy in Arendt. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):362-384.
    Arendt's concept of common sense has generally been misunderstood. It is almost exclusively interpreted in light of Kant's common sense, either as an espousal of the latter or as a distortion of it. This narrow reading of Arendtian common sense has led to a problem, as her uses of the concept do not always fit its Kantian understanding. This has led to accusing her of being inconsistent, or as holding on to several, incompatible concepts of common sense. This article argues (...)
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