1. Iuliana Corina Vaida (2014). The Problem of Agency and the Problem of Accountability in Kant's Moral Philosophy. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):110-137.
    : This paper discusses the function and scope of incompatibilist or transcendental freedom in Kant's moral philosophy. The prevailing view among scholars, most notably Allison, is that the function of transcendental freedom is to enable us to articulate a first-person conception of ourselves as rational agents involved in deliberation and choice. Thus, the scope of transcendental freedom is rational agency in general. In order to perform this function, freedom has to be merely conceivable. Pace Allison, I argue that our first-person (...)
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  2. Iuliana Corina Vaida (2009). A New Kantian Solution to the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason and to the Free Will Problem. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):403-431.
    The goal of this paper is to articulate a new solution to Kant’s third antinomy of pure reason, one that establishes the possibility ofincompatibilist freedom—the freedom presupposed by our traditional conceptions of moral responsibility, moral worth, and justice—without relying on the doctrine of transcendental idealism (TI). A discussion of Henry Allison’s “two-aspect” interpretation of Kant’s TI allows me both to criticize one of the best defenses of TI today and to advance my own TI-free solution to the third antinomy by (...)
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  3. Iuliana Corina Vaida (1998). The Quest for Objectivity: Secondary Qualities and Aesthetic Qualities. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (3):283-297.
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