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Profile: Jérôme Dokic (Institut Jean Nicod)
  1.  52
    Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire (2013). Are Emotions Perceptions of Value? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):227-247.
    A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from outside. We then (...)
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  2.  18
    Jerome Dokic (2012). Seeds of Self-Knowledge: Noetic Feelings and Metacognition. In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press 302--321.
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  3.  87
    Jérôme Dokic & Paul Égré (2009). Margin for Error and the Transparency of Knowledge. Synthese 166 (1):1 - 20.
    In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them is a reflective (...)
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  4.  11
    Elisabeth Pacherie & Jérôme Dokic, From Mirror Neurons to Joint Actions.
    The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with speculations on their potential role in the evolution of specifically human capacities. Thus, mirror neurons have been thought to ground many aspects of human social cognition, including the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions and to understand them. We propose an evaluation of this latter claim. On the one hand, we will argue that mirror neurons do not by themselves provide a (...)
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  5.  50
    Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.) (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.
    CHAPTER Simulation theory and mental concepts Alvin I. Goldman Rutgers University. Folk psychology and the TT-ST debate The study of folk psychology, ...
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  6.  58
    Jean-Rémy Martin & Jérôme Dokic (2013). Seeing Absence or Absence of Seeing? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):117-125.
    Imagine that in entering a café, you are struck by the absence of Pierre, with whom you have an appointment. Or imagine that you realize that your keys are missing because they are not hanging from the usual ring-holder. What is the nature of these absence experiences? In this article, we discuss a recent view defended by Farennikova (2012) according to which we literally perceive absences of things in much the same way as we perceive present things. We criticize and (...)
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  7.  7
    Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire (2015). Are Emotions Evaluative Modes? Dialectica 69 (3):271-292.
    Following Meinong, many philosophers have been attracted by the view that emotions have intrinsically evaluative correctness conditions. On one version of this view, emotions have evaluative contents. On another version, emotions are evaluative attitudes; they are evaluative at the level of intentional mode rather than content. We raise objections against the latter version, showing that the only two ways of implementing it are hopeless. Either emotions are manifestly evaluative or they are not. In the former case, the Attitudinal View threatens (...)
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  8.  8
    Roberto Casati & Jérôme Dokic, La Philosophie du Son.
    We discuss the distinction between the sensory modalities; the metaphysics of sounds; and the structure of sound space. We defend a physicalist conception of sounds, without accepting the identification of sounds with sound-waves in the medium. Sounds, we hold, are events in resonating objects. We evaluate the two main accounts of orientation in perceptual space: relationism and absolutism. We then address Strawson's problem of whether the logical space of sounds could be spatial in the full sense of the term. In (...)
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  9.  4
    Jérôme Dokic (2016). IV—Aesthetic Experience as a Metacognitive Feeling? A Dual-Aspect View. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (1):69-88.
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  10.  7
    Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel, Ramsey's Principle Re-Situated.
    This paper is about Ramsey's Principle, according to which a belief's truth-conditions are those that guarantee the success of an action based on that belief whatever the underlying motivating desires. Some philosophers have argued that the Principle should be rejected because it leads to the apparently implausible consequence that any failure of action is the result of some false belief on the agent's part. There is a gap between action and success that cannot be bridged by the agent's cognitive state. (...)
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  11.  64
    Jérôme Dokic & Jean-Rémy Martin (2012). Disjunctivism, Hallucination and Metacognition. WIREs Cognitive Science 3:533-543.
    Perceptual experiences have been construed either as representational mental states—Representationalism—or as direct mental relations to the external world—Disjunctivism. Both conceptions are critical reactions to the so-called ‘Argument from Hallucination’, according to which perceptions cannot be about the external world, since they are subjectively indiscriminable from other, hallucinatory experiences, which are about sense-data ormind-dependent entities. Representationalism agrees that perceptions and hallucinations share their most specific mental kind, but accounts for hallucinations as misrepresentations of the external world. According to Disjunctivism, the phenomenal (...)
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  12.  2
    Jean-Rémy Martin, Guillaume Dezecache, Daniel Pressnitzer, Philippe Nuss, Jérôme Dokic, Nicolas Bruno, Elisabeth Pacherie & Nicolas Franck (2014). Perceptual Hysteresis as a Marker of Perceptual Inflexibility in Schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition 30:62-72.
  13.  25
    Jérôme Dokic & Jean-Rémy Martin (forthcoming). Felt Reality and the Opacity of Perception. Topoi:1-11.
    We investigate the nature of the sense of presence that usually accompanies perceptual experience. We show that the notion of a sense of presence can be interpreted in two ways, corresponding to the sense that we are acquainted with an object, and the sense that the object is real. In this essay, we focus on the sense of reality. Drawing on several case studies such as derealization disorder, Parkinson’s disease and virtual reality, we argue that the sense of reality is (...)
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  14.  6
    Paul Egré & Jérôme Dokic, Margin for Error and the Transparency of Knowledge.
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  15. Jérôme Dokic (2001). Is Memory Purely Preservative? In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press 213--232.
  16.  4
    Jérôme Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie, Shades and Concepts.
    In this paper, we criticise the claim, made by J. McDowell and B. Brewer, that the contents of perceptual experience are purely conceptual.
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  17.  21
    Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel (2002). Frank Ramsey: Truth and Success. Routledge.
    This book provides a much-needed critical introduction to the main doctrines of Frank Ramsey's work and assesses their contemporary significance.
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  18.  65
    Eros Corazza & Jérôme Dokic (2012). Situated Minimalism Versus Free Enrichment. Synthese 184 (2):179-198.
    In this paper, we put forward a position we call “situationalism” (or “situated minimalism”), which is a middle-ground view between minimalism and contextualism in recent philosophy of language. We focus on the notion of free enrichment, which first arose within contextualism as underlying the claim that what is said is typically enriched relative to the logical form of the uttered sentence. However, minimalism also acknowledges some process of pragmatic intrusion in its claim that what is thought and communicated is typically (...)
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  19. Jérôme Dokic & Eros Corazza (2007). Sense and Insensibility: Or Where Minimalism Meets Contextualism. In G. Preyer (ed.), Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford University Press 169--193.
  20.  90
    Roberto Casati & Jérôme Dokic (1991). Brains in a Vat, Language and Metalanguage. Analysis 51 (2):91 - 93.
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  21.  60
    Jérôme Dokic (2006). From Linguistic Contextualism to Situated Cognition: The Case of Ad Hoc Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):309 – 328.
    Our utterances are typically if not always "situated," in the sense that they are true or false relative to unarticulated parameters of the extra-linguistic context. The problem is to explain how these parameters are determined, given that nothing in the uttered sentences indicates them. It is tempting to claim that they must be determined at the level of thought or intention. However, as many philosophers have observed, thoughts themselves are no less situated than utterances. Unarticulated parameters need not be mentally (...)
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  22.  3
    Jérôme Dokic, Perception as Openness to Facts.
    The image of perception as openness to fact is best understood as the claim that the contents of perception are mind-independent facts. However, I argue against John McDowell that this claim, which he accepts, is incompatible with his conceptualism, namely the thesis that the contents of perception are fully conceptual. If we want to give justice to the image of perception as openness to facts, we have to acknwoledge that perception relates us to a non-conceptual world.
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  23.  76
    Jérôme Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). Too Much Ado About Belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):185-200.
    Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’ commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/appearance distinction for consciousness. (...)
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  24.  14
    Jérôme Dokic (forthcoming). Knowledge, Perception, and the Art of Camouflage. Synthese:1-9.
    I present a novel argument against the epistemic conception of perception according to which perception either is a form of knowledge or puts the subject in a position to gain knowledge about what is perceived. ECP closes the gap between a perceptual experience that veridically presents a given state of affairs and an experience capable of yielding the knowledge that the state of affairs obtains. Against ECP, I describe a particular case of perceptual experience in which the following triad of (...)
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  25.  2
    Roberto Casati & Jérôme Dokic, La Philosophie du Son Ch4 Physicalisme.
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  26.  2
    Jérôme Dokic, From Linguistic Contextualism to Situated Cognition: The Case of Ad Hoc Concepts.
    Our utterances are typically if not always ‘‘situated,'' in the sense that they are true or false relative to unarticulated parameters of the extra-linguistic context. The problem is to explain how these parameters are determined, given that nothing in the uttered sentences indicates them. It is tempting to claim that they must be determined at the level of thought or intention. However, as many philosophers have observed, thoughts themselves are no less situated than utterances. Unarticulated parameters need not be mentally (...)
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  27.  2
    Jérôme Dokic, Situated Representations and Ad Hoc Concepts.
    Situation theorists such as Jon Barwise, John Etchemendy, and John Perry have advanced the hypothesis that linguistic and mental representations are ‘situated' in the sense that they are true or false only relative to partial situations. François Recanati has done an important task in reviving and in many respects deepening situation theory. In this chapter, I explore some aspects of Recanati's own account. I focus on situated mental representations, and stress the connection between them and ad hoc or temporary concepts.
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  28.  2
    Jérôme Dokic, The Dynamics of Deictic Thoughts.
    Defense of a non-psychological dynamics of demonstrative thoughts.
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  29.  2
    Jérôme Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie, Too Much Ado About Belief.
    Three commitments guide Dennett's approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls 'heterophenomenology.' Third, a 'doxological' commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject's beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/ appearance distinction for (...)
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  30.  8
    Jérôme Dokic (2010). Perceptual Recognition and the Feeling of Presence. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press 33.
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  31.  22
    Jérôme Dokic (2014). Feeling the Past: A Two-Tiered Account of Episodic Memory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3):413-426.
    Episodic memory involves the sense that it is “first-hand”, i.e., originates directly from one’s own past experience. An account of this phenomenological dimension is offered in terms of an affective experience or feeling specific to episodic memory. On the basis of recent empirical research in the domain of metamemory, it is claimed that a recollective experience involves two separate mental components: a first-order memory about the past along with a metacognitive, episodic feeling of knowing. The proposed two-tiered account is contrasted (...)
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  32. Roberto Casati & Jérôme Dokic (2009). Some Varieties of Spatial Hearing. In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays. OUP Oxford
     
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  33.  8
    Jérôme Dokic (2015). The Framework of Perception. In Annalisa Coliva, Volker Munz & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter 347-356.
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  34.  18
    Eros Corazza & Jérôme Dokic (1993). Fiction, Counterfactuals and Truth. Grazer Philosophische Studien 45:117-123.
    An account of the evaluation of fictional discourse in terms of counterfactuals is sketched which accommodates the insights of D. Lewis and G. Evans but is not committed to the existence of possibilia on the one hand and to taking counterfactuals as barely true on the other hand. By adopting a two-step theory of evaluation which does not evaluate expressions (sentences) across possible worlds modal realism is avoided. And the use of a modified incorporation principle saying that every singular reference (...)
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  35.  7
    Jérôme Dokic (2014). Common Sense and Metaperception: A Practical Model. Res Philosophica 91 (2):241-259.
    Aristotle famously claimed that we perceive that we see or hear, and that this metaperception necessarily accompanies all conscious sensory experiences. In this essay I compare Aristotle’s account of metaperception with three main models of self-awareness to be found in the contemporary literature. The first model countenances introspection or inner sense as higher-order perception. The second model rejects introspection altogether, and maintains that judgments that we see or hear can be directly extracted from the first-order experience, using a procedure sometimes (...)
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  36.  27
    Jérôme Dokic (1997). Une théorie réflexive du souvenir épisodique. Dialogue 36 (03):527-554.
    Cet article porte sur une distinction familière entre deux formes de souvenirs: les souvenirs factuels ('Je me souviens que p', où 'p' est une proposition) et les souvenirs épisodiques ('Je me souviens de x', où x est une entité particulière). Les souvenirs épisodiques ont, contrairement aux souvenirs factuels, un rapport immédiat et interne à une expérience particulière que le sujet a eue dans le passé. Les souvenirs épisodique et factuel sont des souvenirs explicites au sens de la psychologie cognitive. J'esquisse (...)
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  37.  10
    Jérôme Dokic (2000). Qui a peur des qualia corporels? Philosophiques 27 (1):77-98.
    Qualia, conceived as intrinsic properties of experiences, are not always welcomed by materialists, who prefer to see them as intentional properties presented in our experience. I ask whether this form of reductionism applies to the qualia of bodily awareness. According to the standard materialist theory, the intentional object of pain experience, for instance, is a bodily damage. This theory, though, is unable to account for the phenomenal difference between feeling pain 'inside' and perceiving it 'outside' (seeing oneself or another in (...)
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  38.  27
    Jérôme Dokic (1998). Music, Noise, Silence: Some Reflections on John Cage. Angelaki 3 (2):103 – 112.
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  39.  8
    Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel (2005). Ramsey's Principle Re-Situated. In Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy. OUP Oxford
    This paper is about Ramsey's Principle, according to which a belief's truth-conditions are those that guarantee the success of an action based on that belief whatever the underlying motivating desires. Some philosophers have argued that the Principle should be rejected because it leads to the apparently implausible consequence that any failure of action is the result of some false belief on the agent's part. There is a gap between action and success that cannot be bridged by the agent's cognitive state. (...)
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  40.  11
    Eros Corazza & Jerome Dokič (1995). Why is Frege's Puzzle Still Puzzling? In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer 151--168.
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  41.  23
    Jérôme Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie, On the Very Idea of a Frame of Reference.
    It is widely assumed, both in philosophy and in the cognitive sciences, that perception essentially involves a relative or egocentric frame of reference. Levinson has explicitly challenged this assumption, arguing instead in favour of the 'neo-Whorfian' hypothesis that the frame of reference dominant in a given language infiltrates spatial representations in non-linguistic, and in particular perceptual, modalities. Our aim in this paper is to assess Levinson's neo-Whorfian hypothesis at the philosophical level and to explore the further possibility that perception may (...)
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  42.  48
    Eros Corazza & Jérôme Dokic (1992). On the Cognitive Significance of Indexicals. Philosophical Studies 66 (2):183 - 196.
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  43.  1
    Roberto Casati & Jérôme Dokic, Philosophy of Sound, Ch. 2.
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  44.  1
    Roberto Casati & Jérôme Dokic, Philosophy of Sound, Ch. 1.
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  45.  1
    Roberto Casati & Jérôme Dokic, Some Varieties of Spatial Hearing.
    We provide some meta-theoretical constraints for the evaluation of a-spatial theories of sounds and auditory perception. We point out some forms of spatial content auditory experience can have. If auditory experience does not necessarily have a rich egocentric spatial content, it must have some spatial content for the relevant mode of perception to be recognizably auditory. An auditory experience devoid of any spatial content, if the notion makes sense at all, would be very different from the auditory experiences we actually (...)
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  46.  1
    Jérôme Dokic, Qui a Peur des Qualia Corporels?
    Qualia, conceived as intrinsic properties of experiences, are not always welcomed by materialists, who prefer to see them as intentional properties presented in our experience. I ask whether this form of reductionism applies to the qualia of bodily awareness. According to the standard materialist theory, the intentional object of pain experience, for instance, is a bodily damage. This theory, though, is unable to account for the phenomenal difference between feeling pain "inside" and perceiving it "outside". I sketch another reductionist analysis (...)
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  47.  1
    Jérôme Dokic & Eros Corazza, Sense and Insensibility: Or Where Minimalism Meets Contextualism.
    In this paper we present some benefits of semantic minimalism. In particular, we stress how minimalism allows us to avoid cognitive overloading, in that it does not posit hidden indexicals or variables at the LF or representational level and it does not posit the operation of free enrichment processes when we produce or hear a sentence. We nonetheless argue that a fully adequate semantic minimalism should embrace a form of relativism—that is, the view that semantic content must be evaluated, pace (...)
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  48.  1
    Jérôme Dokic, Situated Mental Representations.
    Situation theorists such as John Barwise, John Etchemendy, John Perry and François Recanati have put forward the hypothesis that linguistic representations are situated in the sense that they are true or false only relative to partial situations which are not explicitly represented as such. Following Recanati's lead, I explore this hypothesis with respect to mental representations. First, I introduce the notion of unarticulated constituent, due to John Perry. I suggest that the question of whether there really are such constituents should (...)
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  49.  23
    Jérôme Dokic (1996). The Dynamics of Deictic Thoughts. Philosophical Studies 82 (2):179 - 204.
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  50.  12
    Jerome Dokic (2006). From Linguistic Contextualism to Situated Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):309-328.
    Our utterances are typically if not always ‘‘situated,'' in the sense that they are true or false relative to unarticulated parameters of the extra-linguistic context. The problem is to explain how these parameters are determined, given that nothing in the uttered sentences indicates them. It is tempting to claim that they must be determined at the level of thought or intention. However, as many philosophers have observed, thoughts themselves are no less situated than utterances. Unarticulated parameters need not be mentally (...)
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