1. Joan Esteban & József Sákovics (2008). A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict: The Genesis of Bargaining Power. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 65 (3):227-252.
    We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the direct conflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic building block is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomes into a disagreement point. Adding this function to the description of a bargaining problem, a weak axiom based on individual rationality leads to a unique solution: the agreement in the shadow of conflict, ASC. (...)
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  2. Joan Esteban & József Sákovics (2003). Olson VS. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict. Theory and Decision 55 (4):339-357.
    We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and – in case they win – later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative (...)
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  3. József Sákovics (2001). Games of Incomplete Information Without Common Knowledge Priors. Theory and Decision 50 (4):347-366.
    We relax the assumption that priors are common knowledge, in the standard model of games of incomplete information. We make the realistic assumption that the players are boundedly rational: they base their actions on finite-order belief hierarchies. When the different layers of beliefs are independent of each other, we can retain Harsányi's type-space, and we can define straightforward generalizations of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) and Rationalizability in our context. Since neither of these concepts is quite satisfactory, we propose a hybrid (...)
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