L'examen de la philosophie kantienne de la religion sur ses deux fronts (le dogmatisme théologique et le scepticisme des Lumières) et celui de sa postérité contrastée (pour l'essentiel, Hegel et l'hégélo-marxisme, Schleiermacher et la culture du protestantisme, Kierkegaard et la dialectique existentielle) permettent de poser cette question : comment s'approprier l'héritage sémantique des traditions religieuses (et spécialement l'idée d'un « règne de Dieu sur terre » et celle d'une « république éthique ») sans estomper la frontière entre foi et savoir, (...) donc : comment aujourd'hui s'approprier rationnellement les contenus religieux face à ce qui menace la raison de l'extérieur (les réactions fondamentalistes) comme de l'intérieur (la normativité en crise) de la modernité ? (shrink)
Abstract: Human rights developed in response to specific violations of human dignity, and can therefore be conceived as specifications of human dignity, their moral source. This internal relationship explains the moral content and moreover the distinguishing feature of human rights: they are designed for an effective implementation of the core moral values of an egalitarian universalism in terms of coercive law. This essay is an attempt to explain this moral-legal Janus face of human rights through the mediating role of the (...) concept of human dignity. This concept is due to a remarkable generalization of the particularistic meanings of those "dignities" that once were attached to specific honorific functions and memberships. In spite of its abstract meaning, "human dignity" still retains from its particularistic precursor concepts the connotation of depending on the social recognition of a status—in this case, the status of democratic citizenship. Only membership in a constitutional political community can protect, by granting equal rights, the equal human dignity of everybody. (shrink)
Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas have long represented opposite camps in contemporary thought. Derrida, who pioneered the intellectual style of inquiry known as deconstruction, ushered in the postmodern age with his dramatic critique of reason; Habermas, on the other hand, has consistently argued in defense of reason, modernity, and the legacy of the Enlightenment. Their many differences led to a long-standing, if scattered, dialogue, evidence of which has been available in only bits and pieces. But now, for the first time, (...) The Derrida-Habermas Reader brings these pieces together, along with a collection of essays documenting the intellectual relationship between two of the twentieth century’s preeminent thinkers. Taken together, Derrida and Habermas’s writings—combined here with contributions by other prominent philosophers and social theorists—tell the story of the two thinkers’ provocative engagement with each other’s ideas. Beyond exploring the conflict between Derrida’s deconstruction and Habermas’s communicative rationality, they show how the Derrida-Habermas encounter changed over the years, becoming more theoretically productive without ever collapsing into mutual rejection or simple compromise. Lasse Thomassen has divided the essays—including works on philosophy and literature, ethics, politics, and international law—into four parts that cover the full range of thought in which Derrida and Habermas engaged. The last of these sections fittingly includes the thinkers’ jointly signed work on European solidarity and the Iraq War, highlighting the hopes they held in common despite their differences. The wide breadth of this book, along with Thomassen’s lucid introductions to each section, makes The Derrida-Habermas Reader an ideal starting point for anyone interested in one of the most dynamic intellectual debates of our time. (shrink)
This article is a translation of Eine politische Verfassung für die pluralistische Weltgesellschaf which is published in Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion: philosophische Aufsäze (2005). The article deals with the project of forming a cosmopolitan order and a harmonization of national policies by agreeing upon and implementing shared global politics which require an intergovernmental coordination. This project has its origin from Hobbes and Kant, and Habermas discuss Kant"s concept of a world republic and a constitution which apply to all the citizens (...) in the world. Habermas argues that the Kantian project must be understood in the international political situation today, and that we have to substitute the traditional and Kantian cosmopolitan ideal of a world republic by the project of a "constitutionalizationâ€? of international law. Habermas suggest that the world community need a political constitution for an emerging world society which allows for global governance without a global government. This solution Habermas denotes as a global extension of domestic politics. A presupposition for this argument is that it has been a shift that has taken place from the former national to the present post-national constellation. In order to realize this international coordination and transnational harmonization, the national states has to perceive themselves as members of an international community and to act accordingly. Such an arrangement requires first a change in the conception of state-sovereignty. Then citizens will enjoy, in addition to their national citizenship, the status of world-citizens. (shrink)
Religious toleration first became legally enshrined in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. Religious toleration led to the practice of more general inter-subjective recognition of members of democratic states which took precedence over differences of conviction and practice. After considering the extent to which a democracy may defend itself against the enemies of democracy and to which it should be prepared to tolerate civil disobedience, the article analyses the contemporary dialectic between the notion of civil inclusion and multiculturalism. Religious (...) toleration is seen as the pacemaker for modern multiculturalism, in which the claims of minorities to civic inclusion are recognized so long as members of all groups understand themselves to be citizens of one and the same political community. Footnotes1 Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture, 2003. (shrink)
The idea for Philosophy in a Time of Terror was born hours after the attacks on 9/11 and was realized just weeks later when Giovanna Borradori sat down with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida in New York City, in separate interviews, to evaluate the significance of the most destructive terrorist act ever perpetrated. This book marks an unprecedented encounter between two of the most influential thinkers of our age as here, for the first time, Habermas and Derrida overcome their mutual (...) antagonism and agree to appear side by side. As the two philosophers disassemble and reassemble what we think we know about terrorism, they break from the familiar social and political rhetoric increasingly polarized between good and evil. In this process, we watch two of the greatest intellects of the century at work. (shrink)
The liberating power of symbols -- The conflict of beliefs -- Between traditions -- Tracing the other of history in history -- A master builder with hermeneutic tact -- Israel or Athens : where does anamnestic reason belong? -- Communicative freedom and negative theology -- The useful mole who ruins the beautiful lawn.
Habermas s’en prend ici à la thèse conservatrice de la continuité de la «nation» allemande par une critique du concept même d’État-nation. Contribuant au débat des historiens, il expose les limites de l’État-nation dans le contexte de la globalisation. En effet, l’importance de 1989 repose sur l’idée de restauration de la nation allemande telle qu’elle se présentait à partir de l’empire guillaumien. Or,l’État national ne serait plus à la hauteur du défi qu’impose la globalisation des interactions sociales, politiques, culturelles et (...) systémiques. Il lui faut, de l’avis de Habermas, se départir d’un reliquat d’ethnicité et de nationalisme pour épouser pleinement la dimension républicaine qui, elle, n’admet que le processus démocratique de délibération publique pour l’intégration sociale des individus. L’Union européenne, dans la mesure oú elle restreint la souveraineté des nations qui la composent, permet justement d’accorder plus d’importance à l’héritage républicain au détriment du nationalisme allemand.In this article, Habermas challenges the conservative thesis of the continuity of the German “nation” through a critique of the very concept of Nation-State. Further pursuing the historian debate, he exposes the limits of the Nation-State in the context of globalization. Indeed, the importance of1989 lies in the idea of the restoration of the German nation as it exists since the Wilhelmine empire. Habermas suggests that the national State would no longer be up to the challenge imposed by globalization of social, political, cultural and systemic interactions. It must do away with a remainder of ethnicity and nationalism if it is to embrace fully the republican dimension, which only admits democratic process of public deliberation for the social integration of individuals. The European Union, insomuch as it restricts the sovereignty of its members, allows precisely to put more importance on the republican heritage than on German nationalism. (shrink)
Erling Skjei's criticisms (Inquiry 28, this issue) of my account of communicative action in The Theory of Communicative Action are based on a misunderstanding of the role of the analysis of speech acts in that work. I begin by restating the terms of my analysis, and after dealing with Skjei's objections to my claims for the explanatory power of illocutionary acts, draw attention to a problem with imperatives that I haven't yet done justice to.
In this, the first of two articles outlining a theory of communicative competence, the author shows how the requirements of such a theory are to be found in an analysis not of the linguistic competence of a native speaker, but of systematic distortion of communication of the kind postulated by psychoanalytic theory. The psychoanalyst's hermeneutic understanding of initially incomprehensible acts and utterances depends on the explanatory power of this understanding, and therefore rests on theoretical assumptions. After a preliminary delineation of (...) the range of incomprehensible acts and utterances dealt with in psychoanalysis, the author presents an account of psychoanalysis as linguistic analysis. He then explicates the key theoretical assumptions underlying the analytical procedure, in particular those relating to the notion of ?scenic understanding?, and concludes by indicating the place of explanatory understanding in a theory of communicative competence. (shrink)
In this, the second of two articles outlining a theory of communicative competence, the author questions the ability of Chomsky's account of linguistic competence to fulfil the requirements of such a theory. ?Linguistic competence? for Chomsky means the mastery of an abstract system of rules, based on an innate language apparatus. The model by which communication is understood on this account contains three implicit assumptions, here called ?monologism?, ?a priorism?, and ?elementarism?. The author offers an outline of a theory of (...) communicative competence that is based on the negations of these assumptions. In opposing the first two assumptions he introduces distinctions, respectively, between semantic universals which process experiences and those that make such processing possible, and between semantic universals which precede all socialization and those that are linked to the conditions of potential socialization. Against elementarism, he argues that the semantic content of all possible natural languages does not consist of combinations of a finite number of meaning components. Differences in systems of classification preclude this, and such differences can be seen to infect all respects of intercultural comparison. Using the notion of ?performative utterance?, the author elucidates the role of dialogue?constitutive universals as part of the formal apparatus required of a?; speaker's capacity to communicate. He then notes what would be required of a general semantics based on a theory of communicative competence; and finally points out how this theory might be used for social analysis. (shrink)
Husserl saw as a reason for the crisis of a positivistic science its dissociation from practical interests. His remedy was to institute a purely contemplative attitude which should not only release the sciences from the grip of the illusion that the world is a ready?made universe of facts to be grasped in purely descriptive terms, but also, by its own therapeutic powers, lead to ?a new kind of practice?. In adhering to this traditional concept of the relation of knowledge to (...) interest Husserl misconceived the scientific crisis. Even though phenomenological description would effectively dispel the illusion of objectivism, objectivism in no way prevents science from influencing practice; what was needed was not to restore the practical significance of the sciences by making them finally break with interest, but rather to reveal the true relationship of knowledge and interest which the objectivistic attitude conceals. After outlining the fundamental interests guiding the respective scientific enterprises, the author summarizes in five theses what he takes to be the basic aspects of the relationship between knowledge and interest. (shrink)