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  1.  31
    J. C. Beall (2009). Spandrels of Truth. Oxford University Press.
    In Spandrels of Truth, Beall concisely presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.
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  2.  74
    J. C. Beall (ed.) (2007). Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    The Liar paradox raises foundational questions about logic, language, and truth (and semantic notions in general). A simple Liar sentence like 'This sentence is false' appears to be both true and false if it is either true or false. For if the sentence is true, then what it says is the case; but what it says is that it is false, hence it must be false. On the other hand, if the statement is false, then it is true, since (...)
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  3. J. C. Beall (2003). Possibilities and Paradox: An Introduction to Modal and Many-Valued Logic. Oxford University Press.
    Extensively classroom-tested, Possibilities and Paradox provides an accessible and carefully structured introduction to modal and many-valued logic. The authors cover the basic formal frameworks, enlivening the discussion of these different systems of logic by considering their philosophical motivations and implications. Easily accessible to students with no background in the subject, the text features innovative learning aids in each chapter, including exercises that provide hands-on experience, examples that demonstrate the application of concepts, and guides to further reading.
     
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  4.  18
    J. C. Beall (2013). Deflated Truth Pluralism. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press
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  5. J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.) (2005). Deflationary Truth. Open Court.
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  6.  84
    J. C. Beall (2001). Is Yablo’s Paradox Non-Circular? Analysis 61 (271):176–87.
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  7.  17
    J. C. Beall (2010). Logic: The Basics. Routledge.
    Background ideas -- Consequences -- Relations of support -- Logical consequence : the basic recipe -- Valid arguments and truth -- Language, form, and logical theories -- Language -- Atoms, connectives, and molecules -- Connectives and form -- Validity and form -- Language and formal languages -- Logical theories : rivalry -- Set-theoretic tools -- Sets -- Ordered sets : pairs and n-tuples -- Relations -- Functions -- Sets as tools -- Basic connectives -- Classical theory -- Cases : complete (...)
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  8.  15
    J. C. Beall (2009). Knowability and Possible Epistemic Oddities. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press 105--125.
  9.  1
    J. C. Beall & B. Amour-Garb (eds.) (2005). Deflation and Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox.
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  10. J. C. Beall (ed.) (2003). Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    Semantic and soritical paradoxes challenge entrenched, fundamental principles about language - principles about truth, denotation, quantification, and, among others, 'tolerance'. Study of the paradoxes helps us determine which logical principles are correct. So it is that they serve not only as a topic of philosophical inquiry but also as a constraint on such inquiry: they often dictate the semantic and logical limits of discourse in general. Sixteen specially written essays by leading figures in the field offer new thoughts and arguments (...)
     
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  11.  66
    J. C. Beall (1999). Completing Sorensen's Menu: A Non-Modal Yabloesque Curry. Mind 108 (432):737-739.
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  12.  41
    J. C. Beall, T. Bigaj, T. Fernando, B. Fitelson, N. Foo, W. Goldfarb, D. Gregory, T. Hailperin, H. Halvorson & K. Harris (2001). Arló-Costa, H., 479 Armour-Garb, B., 593 Azzouni, J., 329 Batens, D., 267. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (619).
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  13.  34
    Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (2001). Can Deflationists Be Dialetheists? Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):593-608.
    Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his "Deflationary Truth and the Liar" (JPL 28:455-488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for inflationist conceptions. (...)
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  14.  10
    J. C. Beall (2006). Modelling the `Ordinary View'. In Patrick Greenough & Michael Lynch (eds.), Truth and Relativism. Clarendon Press 61--76.
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  15.  39
    B. Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (2005). Deflationary Truth. Open Court Press.
    Deflationary theories are generally characterized negatively, in terms of a contrast with the more substantive theories of truth whose claims they aim to ...
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  16. J. C. Beall (ed.) (2004). Liars and Heaps. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Semantic and soritical paradoxes challenge entrenched, fundamental principles about language - principles about truth, denotation, quantification, and, among others, 'tolerance'. Study of the paradoxes helps us determine which logical principles are correct. So it is that they serve not only as a topic of philosophical inquiry but also as a constraint on such inquiry: they often dictate the semantic and logical limits of discourse in general. Sixteen specially written essays by leading figures in the field offer new thoughts and arguments (...)
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  17.  67
    J. C. Beall (2000). A Neglected Response to the Grim Result. Analysis 60 (265):38–41.
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  18.  4
    J. C. Beall (2000). A Neglected Response to the Grim Result. Analysis 60 (1):38-41.
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  19. Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (2008). Minimalism, Epistemicism, and Paradox. In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. OUP Oxford
     
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  20. J. C. Beall (2007). Prolegomenon to Future Revenge. In Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press
     
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  21. J. C. Beall, Ross T. Brady, A. P. Hazen, Graham Priest & Greg Restall (2006). Relevant Restricted Quantification. Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):587-598.
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  22.  20
    Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (2005). Deflationism: The Basics. In J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationary Truth. Open Court 1--1.
  23.  57
    J. C. Beall (2000). Minimalism, Gaps, and the Holton Conditional. Analysis 60 (268):340–351.
  24. J. C. Beall (2004). True and False - As If. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press
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  25.  20
    J. C. Beall (2001). Understanding Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):304 – 306.
    Book Information Understanding Truth. By Soames Scott. Oxford University Press. New York. 1999. Pp. ix + 268. Cloth.
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  26.  5
    C. J. Acker, G. Baker, J. C. Beall, B. van Fraassen, K. Benson, P. Rehbock, F. Bevilacqua, E. Giannetto, M. Matthews & M. Boon (2003). Anderson, W. The Cultivation of Whiteness (Anderson, Crotty, Garton, and Turnbull) 153 Abir-Am, P. And Elliott, C.(Eds) Commemorative Practices in Sciences Osiris Vol. 14 (Notice-NR) 139. [REVIEW] Metascience 12:455-461.
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  27. J. C. Beall (2002). Lou Goble, Ed., The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 22 (6):411-415.
     
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  28.  4
    J. C. Beall (2001). Dialetheism and the Probability of Contradictions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):114-118.
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  29. J. C. Beall (2005). Transparent Disquotationalism. In J. C. Beall & B. Amour-Garb (eds.), Deflation and Paradox. Oxford University Press
  30.  2
    J. C. Beall (2006). Truth and Paradox: A Philosophical Sketch. In Dale Jacquette (ed.), Philosophy of Logic. North Holland 187--272.
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  31. J. C. Beall (2001). Article Views: 23. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2).
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  32. J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.) (2008). Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists, which their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth.
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  33. J. C. Beall (ed.) (2003). New Essays on the Semantics of Paradox. Oxford University Press.
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  34. J. C. Beall (2004). On the Singularity Theory of Denotation. In Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Clarendon Press
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  35. J. C. Beall (forthcoming). Review of Priest, Towards Non-Being. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
     
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  36. J. C. Beall (2014). Rapunzel Shaves Pinocchio’s Beard. In Elena Ficara (ed.), Contradictions: Logic, History, Actuality. De Gruyter 27-30.
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  37.  4
    J. C. Beall, B. Armour-Garb & G. Priest (eds.) (2004). The Law of Noncontradiction: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    The Law of Non-Contradiction - that no contradiction can be true - has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle, in Book G of the Metaphysics. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twenty-three of the world's leading experts investigate the 'law', considering arguments for and against it and discussing methodological issues that arise whenever we question the legitimacy of logical principles. The result is a balanced inquiry into (...)
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  38. J. C. Beall (ed.) (2007). The Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The Liar paradox raises foundational questions about logic, language, and truth. A simple Liar sentence like 'This sentence is false' appears to be both true and false if it is either true or false. For if the sentence is true, then what it says is the case; but what it says is that it is false, hence it must be false. On the other hand, if the statement is false, then it is true, since it says that it is false.How, (...)
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  39. G. Priest, J. C. Beall, B. Armour-Garb & Francis Jeffry Pelletier (2006). REVIEWS-The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):131-134.
    The Law of Non-Contradiction - that no contradiction can be true - has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twenty-three of the world's leading experts investigate the 'law', considering arguments for and against it and discuss methodological issues that arise. The result is a balanced inquiry into a venerable principle of logic, one that raises questions at the very centre of (...)
     
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