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John Campbell [97]James Campbell [88]J. Campbell [25]Joseph Keim Campbell [22]
Joe Campbell [19]Joseph Campbell [12]Jamie I. D. Campbell [10]Jack K. Campbell [10]

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Profile: John H Campbell (University of California, Los Angeles)
Profile: Joe Campbell (Washington State University)
Profile: Jay Campbell
Profile: Jennifer Campbell (University of Notre Dame Australia)
Profile: J. Tyler Campbell (Georgia Southern University)
Profile: Joan Campbell (Bowdoin College)
Profile: Jake Campbell (University of St. Thomas, Minnesota)
Profile: Justin Campbell
Profile: Jen Campbell (University of California at Santa Barbara)
  1. J. Campbell (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    John Campbell investigates how consciousness of the world explains our ability to think about the world; how our ability to think about objects we can see depends on our capacity for conscious visual attention to those things. He illuminates classical problems about thought, reference, and experience by looking at the underlying psychological mechanisms on which conscious attention depends.
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  2.  37
    John Campbell (2015). L. A. Paul's Transformative Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):787-793.
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  3.  41
    J. Campbell (1994). Past, Space, and Self. MIT Press.
    In this book John Campbell shows that the general structural features of human thought can be seen as having their source in the distinctive ways in which we...
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  4. John Campbell (2011). Tyler Burge: Origins of Objectivity. Journal of Philosophy 108 (5).
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  5.  73
    J. Campbell (1999). Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process. The Monist 82 (4):609-625.
  6. John Campbell (1993). A Simple View of Colour. In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection. OUP 257-268.
    Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
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  7. John Campbell (2002). The Ownership of Thoughts. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):35-39.
  8.  6
    Joe Campbell (forthcoming). P. F. Strawson’s Free Will Naturalism. Brill.
    _ Source: _Page Count 27 This is an explication and defense of P. F. Strawson’s naturalist theory of free will and moral responsibility. I respond to a set of criticisms of the view by free will skeptics, compatibilists, and libertarians who adopt the _core assumption_: Strawson thinks that our reactive attitudes provide the basis for a rational justification of our blaming and praising practices. My primary aim is to explain and defend Strawson’s naturalism in light of criticisms based on the (...)
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  9.  96
    Joseph Keim Campbell (2007). Free Will and the Necessity of the Past. Analysis 67 (294):105-111.
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  10.  96
    John Campbell (1992). British Academy: One-Day Conference on the Philosophy of Mind. Mind 101:404.
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  11. J. Campbell (2001). Rationality, Meaning, and the Analysis of Delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.
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  12.  16
    John Campbell & Quassim Cassam (2014). Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us? OUP Oxford.
    Sensory experience seems to be the basis of our knowledge of mind-independent things. The puzzle is to understand how that can be: how does our sensory experience enable us to conceive of them as mind-independent? This book is a debate between two rival approaches to understanding the relationship between concepts and sensory experience.
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  13. John Campbell (2011). Consciousness and Reference. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
  14. John Campbell (2002). Berkeley's Puzzle. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. MIT Press
    But say you,surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees,for instance,in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no dif?culty in it:but what is all this,I beseech you,more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them? But do you not yourself perceive or think of (...)
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  15.  52
    Joseph Keim Campbell (2011). Free Will. Polity Press.
    Free will -- Moral responsibility -- The problem of free will -- Moral responsibility : incompatibilism and skepticism -- Free will theories.
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  16. James Campbell (2003). A Study in Human Nature Entitled The Varieties of Religious Experience. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17 (1):14 - 29.
  17.  77
    John Campbell (2010). Control Variables and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):15-30.
    I introduce the notion of a ‘control variable’ which gives us a way of seeing how mental causation could be an unproblematic case of causation in general, rather than being some sui generis form of causation. Psychological variables may be the control variables for a system for which there are no physical control variables, even in a deterministic physical world. That explains how there can be psychological causation without physical causation, even in a deterministic physical world.
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  18.  4
    Joe Campbell (forthcoming). P. F. Strawson’s Free Will Naturalism. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 27 This is an explication and defense of P. F. Strawson’s naturalist theory of free will and moral responsibility. I respond to a set of criticisms of the view by free will skeptics, compatibilists, and libertarians who adopt the _core assumption_: Strawson thinks that our reactive attitudes provide the basis for a rational justification of our blaming and praising practices. My primary aim is to explain and defend Strawson’s naturalism in light of criticisms based on the (...)
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  19. Joseph K. Campbell (2010). Incompatibilism and Fatalism: Reply to Loss. Analysis 70 (1):71-76.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  20. John Campbell (2005). Transparency Vs. Revelation in Color Perception. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):105-115.
    What knowledge of the colors does perception of the colors provide? My first aim in this essay is to characterize the way in which color experience seems to provide knowledge of colors. This in turn tells us something about what it takes for there to be colors. Color experience provides knowledge of the aspect of the world that is being acted on when we, or some external force, act on the color of an object and thus make a difference to (...)
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  21.  77
    Joseph K. Campbell (1997). A Compatibilist Theory of Alternate Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 67 (3):339-44.
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  22. John Bigelow, John Campbell & Robert Pargetter (1990). Death and Well-Being. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):119-40.
  23.  16
    Brendan A. Maher, A. W. Young, Philip Gerrans, John Campbell, Kai Vogeley, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Owen Flanagan, Robert L. Woolfolk, Barry Smith & Joëlle Proust (1999). Cognitive Theories of Mental Illness. The Monist 82 (4).
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  24.  38
    John L. Campbell (1998). Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy. Theory and Society 27 (3):377-409.
  25. J. Campbell (1999). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Meaning of a Referring Term. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):89-104.
  26. John Campbell (2006). Manipulating Colour: Pounding an Almond. In T. S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. OUP 31--48.
    It seems a compelling idea that experience of colour plays some role in our having concepts of the various colours, but in trying to explain the role experience plays the first thing we have to describe is what sort of colour experience matters here. I will argue that the kind of experience that matters is conscious attention to the colours of objects as an aspect of them on which direct intervention is selectively possible. As I will explain this idea, it (...)
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  27.  82
    John Campbell (2013). Susanna Siegel's the Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):819-826.
  28. Joseph K. Campbell (2005). Compatibilist Alternatives. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):387-406.
    _If you were free in doing something and morally responsible for it, you could have done otherwise. That_ _has seemed a pretty firm proposition among the old, new, clear, unclear and other propositions in the_ _philosophical discussion of freedom and determinism. If you were free in what you did, there was an_ _alternative. It is also at least natural to think that if determinism is true, you can never do otherwise than_ _you do. G. E. Moore, that Cambridge reasoner in (...)
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  29.  51
    Joseph Keim Campbell (2008). Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 68 (299):264–269.
  30. J. Campbell (1997). The Structure of Time in Autobiographical Memory. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):105-17.
    Much of ordinary memory is autobiographical; memory of what one saw and did, where and when. It may derive from your own past experiences, or from what other people told you about your past life. It may be phenomenologically rich, redolent of that autumn afternoon so long ago, or a few austere reports of what happened. But all autobiographical memory is first-person memory, stateable using ‘I’. It is a memory you would express by saying, ‘I remember I . . .’.
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  31.  46
    Charles Hermes & Joe Campbell (2012). More Trouble for Direct Source Incompatibilism: Reply to Yang. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 27 (3):335-344.
    Direct source incompatibilism (DSI) is the conjunction of two claims: SI-F: there are genuine Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs); SI-D: there is a sound version of the direct argument (DA). Eric Yang ( 2012 ) responds to a recent criticism of DSI (Campbell 2006 ). We show that Yang misses the mark. One can accept Yang’s criticisms and get the same result: there is a deep tension between FSCs and DA, between SI-F and SI-D. Thus, DSI is untenable. In this essay, we (...)
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  32. John Campbell (2006). An Interventionist Approach to Causation in Psychology. In Alison Gopnik & Larry J. Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation. OUP 58--66.
  33. John Campbell (2005). Information-Processing, Phenomenal Consciousness and Molyneux's Question. In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press
    Ordinary common sense suggests that we have just one set of shape concepts that we apply indifferently on the bases of sight and touch. Yet we understand the shape concepts, we know what shape properties are, only because we have experience of shapes. And phenomenal experience of shape in vision and phenomenal experience of shape in touch seem to be quite different. So how can the shape concepts we grasp and use on the basis of vision be the same as (...)
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  34. James Campbell (2005). Community, Conflict, and Reconciliation. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 19 (4):187-200.
    The article deals with the social pragmatist approach to the political conception of community, especially in light of the challenges posed by the tendency to view democracy without community and blur the problem and boundaries between conflict and reconciliation. KEY WORDS – Community. Conflict. Democracy. Pragmatism. Reconciliation.
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  35. John Campbell (2008). Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):666-673.
  36. John Campbell (1997). Sense, Reference and Selective Attention. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (71):55-98.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin.
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  37.  55
    Michelle Pyer & Jackie Campbell (2013). The 'Other Participant' in the Room: The Effect of Significant Adults in Research with Children. Research Ethics 9 (4):153-165.
    This article discusses the practical implications and ethical dilemmas of ‘other’ adults being present in a research setting where the participant is a child. The article focuses on three key issues in relation to this theme. First, the range of ways that ‘other’ adults (for example, parents or guardians, teachers or youth workers) may become involved in the process of research is discussed. Second, the article considers how the presence of ‘other’ adults may raise ethical challenges, impact on the research (...)
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  38.  6
    Jamie I. D. Campbell & Qilin Xue (2001). Cognitive Arithmetic Across Cultures. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 130 (2):299.
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  39.  35
    John Campbell (2011). Visual Attention and the Epistemic Role of Consciousness. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press 323.
  40. J. Campbell (2004). Reference as Attention. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):265-76.
  41. J. O. Campbell (1998). Black Holes–Fact or Fiction? Apeiron 5 (3-4):151-156.
     
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  42.  35
    Jamie-Lee Campbell & Anja S. Göritz (2013). Culture Corrupts! A Qualitative Study of Organizational Culture in Corrupt Organizations. Journal of Business Ethics 120 (3):1-21.
    Although theory refers to organizational culture as an important variable in corrupt organizations, only little empirical research has addressed the characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture. Besides some characteristics that go hand in hand with unethical behavior and other features of corrupt organizations, we are still not able to describe a corrupt organizational culture in terms of its underlying assumptions, values, and norms. With a qualitative approach, we studied similarities of organizational culture across different corrupt organizations. In this study, we (...)
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  43.  73
    John Campbell (1987). Is Sense Transparent? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:273-292.
  44.  1
    Jamie I. D. Campbell (1994). Architectures for Numerical Cognition. Cognition 53 (1):1-44.
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  45. John Campbell (1996). Molyneux's Question. Philosophical Issues 7:301-318.
    in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues vol. 7) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1996), 301-318, with replies by Brian Loar and Kirk Ludwig.
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  46. J. Campbell (1995). The Body Image and Self-Consciousness. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press 29--42.
    in N. Eilan, A. Marcel and J. Bermudez, The Body and the Self, 29-42.
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  47.  78
    John Campbell (2006). Does Visual Reference Depend on Sortal Classification? Reply to Clark. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):221-237.
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  48. John Campbell (2007). The Metaphysics of Perception. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):1–15.
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  49. John Campbell, 1. Acquaintance Vs. Knowledge of Truths.
    Suppose your conscious life were surgically excised, but everything else left intact, what would you miss? In this situation you would not have the slightest idea what was going on. You would have no idea what there is in the world around you; what the grounds are of the potentialities and threats are that you are negotiating. Experience of your surroundings provides you with knowledge of what is there: with your initial base of knowledge of what the things are that (...)
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  50.  43
    John Campbell (2012). Cogito Ergo Sum: Christopher Peacocke and John Campbell: II—Lichtenberg and the Cogito. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3):361-378.
    Our use of ‘I’, or something like it, is implicated in our self-regarding emotions, in the concern to survive, and so seems basic to ordinary human life. But why does that pattern of use require a referring term? Don't Lichtenberg's formulations show how we could have our ordinary pattern of use here without the first person? I argue that what explains our compulsion to regard the first person as a referring term is our ordinary causal thinking, which requires us to (...)
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