Reason, egoism, and utilitarianism, by H. Sidgwick.--Is egoism reasonable? By G. E. Moore.--Ultimate principles and ethical egoism, by B. Medlin.--In defense of egoism, by J. Kalin.--Virtuous affections and self-love, by F. Hutcheson.--Our obligation to virtue, by D. Hume.--Duty and interest, by H. A. Prichard.--The natural condition of mankind and the laws of nature, by T. Hobbes.--Why should we be moral? By K. Baier.--Morality and advantage, by D. P. Gauthier.--Bibliographical essay (p. 181-184).
Many social philosophers and ethicists contend that a modern society cannot remain stable merely by its citizens obeying all of its rules. Such prominent theoreticians as J. Habermas, J. Rawls, D. Gauthier or R. Rorty hold the view that the citizens of a modern society must exhibit additional anthropological qualities which are termed moral surpluses here. Christoph Lütge argues, however, that no moral surplus is immune to erosion by systematic counter-incentives and that anthropological qualities in general cannot serve as (...) a basis for ethics in the globalized world. An order ethics, which is based on weaker prerequisites, namely the characteristics of situations and their basic conditions (orders), is more likely to count on cross-cultural approval in the era of globalization. (shrink)