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Profile: Jérôme Dokic (Institut Jean Nicod)
  1. Jérôme Dokic (forthcoming). Knowledge, Perception, and the Art of Camouflage. Synthese:1-9.
    I present a novel argument against the epistemic conception of perception according to which perception either is a form of knowledge or puts the subject in a position to gain knowledge about what is perceived. ECP closes the gap between a perceptual experience that veridically presents a given state of affairs and an experience capable of yielding the knowledge that the state of affairs obtains. Against ECP, I describe a particular case of perceptual experience in which the following triad of (...)
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  2. Jérôme Dokic (2015). Athanasios Raftopoulos and Peter Machamer , Perception, Realism and the Problem of Reference, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 300 Pp., £62 , ISBN 9780521198776. [REVIEW] Dialectica 69 (1):134-138.
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  3. Jérôme Dokic (2015). The Framework of Perception. In Annalisa Coliva, Volker Munz & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter. 347-356.
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  4. Jérôme Dokic (2014). Common Sense and Metaperception: A Practical Model. Res Philosophica 91 (2):241-259.
    Aristotle famously claimed that we perceive that we see or hear, and that this metaperception necessarily accompanies all conscious sensory experiences. In this essay I compare Aristotle’s account of metaperception with three main models of self-awareness to be found in the contemporary literature. The first model countenances introspection or inner sense as higher-order perception. The second model rejects introspection altogether, and maintains that judgments that we see or hear can be directly extracted from the first-order experience, using a procedure sometimes (...)
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  5. Jérôme Dokic (2014). Feeling the Past: A Two-Tiered Account of Episodic Memory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3):413-426.
    Episodic memory involves the sense that it is “first-hand”, i.e., originates directly from one’s own past experience. An account of this phenomenological dimension is offered in terms of an affective experience or feeling specific to episodic memory. On the basis of recent empirical research in the domain of metamemory, it is claimed that a recollective experience involves two separate mental components: a first-order memory about the past along with a metacognitive, episodic feeling of knowing. The proposed two-tiered account is contrasted (...)
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  6. Reinaldo Bernal, Pierre Jacob, Maximilian Kistler, David Papineau & Jérôme Dokic (2013). E-phisicalism - A Phisicalist Theory Of Phenomenal Consciousness. Ideas Y Valores 62 (152):267-297.
    El libro E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of PhenomenalConsciousness presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de laconciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experienciasubjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real,y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.
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  7. R. Casati, E. Di Bona & J. Dokic (2013). The Ockhamization of the Event Sources of Sound. Analysis 73 (3):462-466.
    There is one character too many in the triad sound, event source, thing source. As there are neither phenomenological nor metaphysical grounds for distinguishing sounds and sound sources, we propose to identify them.
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  8. Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire (2013). Are Emotions Perceptions of Value? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):227-247.
    A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from outside. We then (...)
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  9. Jean-Rémy Martin & Jérôme Dokic (2013). Seeing Absence or Absence of Seeing? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):117-125.
    Imagine that in entering a café, you are struck by the absence of Pierre, with whom you have an appointment. Or imagine that you realize that your keys are missing because they are not hanging from the usual ring-holder. What is the nature of these absence experiences? In this article, we discuss a recent view defended by Farennikova (2012) according to which we literally perceive absences of things in much the same way as we perceive present things. We criticize and (...)
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  10. Eros Corazza & Jérôme Dokic (2012). Situated Minimalism Versus Free Enrichment. Synthese 184 (2):179-198.
    In this paper, we put forward a position we call “situationalism” (or “situated minimalism”), which is a middle-ground view between minimalism and contextualism in recent philosophy of language. We focus on the notion of free enrichment, which first arose within contextualism as underlying the claim that what is said is typically enriched relative to the logical form of the uttered sentence. However, minimalism also acknowledges some process of pragmatic intrusion in its claim that what is thought and communicated is typically (...)
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  11. J. Dokic (2012). Pictures in the Flesh Presence and Appearance in Pictorial Experience. British Journal of Aesthetics 52 (4):391-405.
    This essay explores the prospects of grounding an account of pictorial experience or ‘seeing-in’ on a theory of presence in ordinary perception. Even though worldly objects can be perceptually recognized in a picture, they do not feel present as when they are perceived face to face. I defend a dual view of perceptual phenomenology according to which the sense of presence is dissociated from the contents of perception. On the one hand, the sense of presence is best conceived as a (...)
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  12. Jérôme Dokic (2012). Le donné, l'intuition et la présence dans la perception. Les Etudes Philosophiques 4 (4):481-492.
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  13. Jerome Dokic (2012). Seeds of Self-Knowledge: Noetic Feelings and Metacognition. In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press. 302--321.
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  14. Jérôme Dokic & Jean-Rémy Martin (2012). Disjunctivism, Hallucination and Metacognition. WIREs Cognitive Science 3:533-543.
    Perceptual experiences have been construed either as representational mental states—Representationalism—or as direct mental relations to the external world—Disjunctivism. Both conceptions are critical reactions to the so-called ‘Argument from Hallucination’, according to which perceptions cannot be about the external world, since they are subjectively indiscriminable from other, hallucinatory experiences, which are about sense-data ormind-dependent entities. Representationalism agrees that perceptions and hallucinations share their most specific mental kind, but accounts for hallucinations as misrepresentations of the external world. According to Disjunctivism, the phenomenal (...)
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  15. Jérôme Dokic (2010). Perceptual Recognition and the Feeling of Presence. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. 33.
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  16. Roberto Casati & Jérôme Dokic (2009). Some Varieties of Spatial Hearing. In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays. Oup Oxford.
     
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  17. Jérôme Dokic (2009). L'esprit (bipolaire) et le monde (vérifacteur). Quelques réflexions sur L'esprit et le monde de John McDowell. Philosophiques 36 (1):205-214.
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  18. Jérôme Dokic & Paul Égré (2009). Margin for Error and the Transparency of Knowledge. Synthese 166 (1):1 - 20.
    In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them is a reflective (...)
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  19. Jérôme Dokic (2008). Epistemic perspectives on imagination. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1:99-118.
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  20. Eros Corazza & Jirdme Dokic (2007). 1. The Essence of Minimalism. In G. Preyer (ed.), Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford University Press. 169.
     
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  21. Jérome Dokic (2007). Situated Representations and Ad Hoc Concepts. In María José Frápolli (ed.), Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
     
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  22. Jérôme Dokic (2007). Two Ontologies of Sound. The Monist 90 (3):391-402.
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  23. Jérôme Dokic & Eros Corazza (2007). Sense and Insensibility: Or Where Minimalism Meets Contextualism. In G. Preyer (ed.), Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford University Press. 169--193.
  24. Jérôme Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). Too Much Ado About Belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):185-200.
    Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’ commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/appearance distinction for consciousness. (...)
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  25. Jérôme Dokic (2006). From Linguistic Contextualism to Situated Cognition: The Case of Ad Hoc Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):309 – 328.
    Our utterances are typically if not always "situated," in the sense that they are true or false relative to unarticulated parameters of the extra-linguistic context. The problem is to explain how these parameters are determined, given that nothing in the uttered sentences indicates them. It is tempting to claim that they must be determined at the level of thought or intention. However, as many philosophers have observed, thoughts themselves are no less situated than utterances. Unarticulated parameters need not be mentally (...)
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  26. Jerome Dokic (2006). From Linguistic Contextualism to Situated Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):309-328.
    Our utterances are typically if not always ‘‘situated,'' in the sense that they are true or false relative to unarticulated parameters of the extra-linguistic context. The problem is to explain how these parameters are determined, given that nothing in the uttered sentences indicates them. It is tempting to claim that they must be determined at the level of thought or intention. However, as many philosophers have observed, thoughts themselves are no less situated than utterances. Unarticulated parameters need not be mentally (...)
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  27. Jérôme Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie, On the Very Idea of a Frame of Reference.
    It is widely assumed, both in philosophy and in the cognitive sciences, that perception essentially involves a relative or egocentric frame of reference. Levinson has explicitly challenged this assumption, arguing instead in favour of the 'neo-Whorfian' hypothesis that the frame of reference dominant in a given language infiltrates spatial representations in non-linguistic, and in particular perceptual, modalities. Our aim in this paper is to assess Levinson's neo-Whorfian hypothesis at the philosophical level and to explore the further possibility that perception may (...)
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  28. J. É. R. Ô. M. E. Dokic (2005). Introspection, d? ploiement et simulation. Philosophiques 32 (2):383-397.
    Selon une théorie cognitiviste de l’auto-attribution, je peux parvenir à la connaissance directe, non-inférentielle de mes propres croyances. Cette théorie a été traditionnellement associée à la notion d’introspection conçue comme source de connaissance interne. On sait que le recours à cette notion compromet l’application à soi-même d’un concept unifié de croyance, valable également pour autrui. Dans cet essai, j’explore une autre méthode d’auto-attribution, également envisagée par Wittgenstein , que j’appelle « méthode de déploiement ». Selon cette méthode, je parviens à (...)
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  29. Jérôme Dokic (2005). L'interprétation ordinaire, entre simulation et méta-représentation. Philosophiques 32 (1):19-37.
    Cet essai porte sur quelques aspects de l’opposition entre un modèle perceptif de la communication, selon lequel le témoignage est une source de connaissance directe du fait témoigné, et un modèle inférentiel de la communication, selon lequel le témoignage implique de la part du récepteur une inférence à partir des signes utilisés, des états mentaux de l’émetteur et du reste du contexte. À partir d’une réflexion sur la nature de la capacité de méta-représentation, et sur sa dépendance à l’égard des (...)
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  30. Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel (2005). Ramsey's Principle Re-Situated. In Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy. Oup Oxford.
    This paper is about Ramsey's Principle, according to which a belief's truth-conditions are those that guarantee the success of an action based on that belief whatever the underlying motivating desires. Some philosophers have argued that the Principle should be rejected because it leads to the apparently implausible consequence that any failure of action is the result of some false belief on the agent's part. There is a gap between action and success that cannot be bridged by the agent's cognitive state. (...)
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  31. Nicolas J. Bullot, Roberto Casati, Jérôme Dokic & Maurizio Giri, Sounding Objects.
    Taxonomy of philosophical theories of Sound: proximal theories; medial theories; distal theories. A distal theory: The Located Event Theory of sound. Understanding sound and the cognition of sounding objects; ontology of sound according to the LET; epistemology of the perception of sound and sounding objects; auditory images according to the LET; conceptual revisions entailed by distal theories and the LET; replies to objections.
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  32. Jérôme Dokic (2004). Qu’Est-Ce Que la Perception? Vrin.
    La perception est au cœur de notre rapport au monde, mais son statut philosophique reste cependant difficile à cerner : laperception est-elle une forme de connaissance? A-t-elle un contenu conceptuel? Quel est son rapport à l’espace?
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  33. Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel (2004). Introduction. Dialectica 58 (4):459–459.
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  34. J. Dokic (2003). The Sense of Ownership: An Analogy Between Sensation and Action. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 321–344.
  35. Jérôme Dokic (2003). Editorial: On the Philosophical Foundations of Situated Representing. Dialectica 57 (4):353–355.
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  36. Jérôme Dokic (2003). L’identification De Soi, Entre Savoir-faire Et Introspection. Cahiers de Philosophie de L’Université de Caen 40:45.
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  37. Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel (2003/2002). Frank Ramsey: Truth and Success. Routledge.
    This book provides a much-needed critical introduction to the main doctrines of Frank Ramsey's work and assesses their contemporary significance.
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  38. Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel (2003). Vérité et succès, coll. « Philosophies ». Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 193 (4):468-469.
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  39. Jerome Dokic (2002). Reply to Pierre Jacob. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. 45--111.
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  40. Jérôme Dokic (2002). Reply to 'the Scope and Limit of Mental Simulation'. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.
  41. Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.) (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.
    CHAPTER Simulation theory and mental concepts Alvin I. Goldman Rutgers University. Folk psychology and the TT-ST debate The study of folk psychology, ...
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  42. J. Dokic (2001). Shades and Concepts. Analysis 61 (3):193-201.
    In this paper, we criticise the claim, made by J. McDowell and B. Brewer, that the contents of perceptual experience are purely conceptual.
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  43. Jérôme Dokic (2001). Is Memory Purely Preservative? In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press. 213--232.
  44. Jérôme Dokic (2001). L'esprit En Mouvement Essai Sur la Dynamique Cognitive.
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  45. J. Dokic (2000). Perception as Openness to the Facts. Facta Philosophica 2:95-112.
    The image of perception as openness to fact is best understood as the claim that the contents of perception are mind-independent facts. However, I argue against John McDowell that this claim, which he accepts, is incompatible with his conceptualism, namely the thesis that the contents of perception are fully conceptual. If we want to give justice to the image of perception as openness to facts, we have to acknwoledge that perception relates us to a non-conceptual world.
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  46. Jérôme Dokic (2000). Qui a peur des qualia corporels? Philosophiques 27 (1):77-98.
    Qualia, conceived as intrinsic properties of experiences, are not always welcomed by materialists, who prefer to see them as intentional properties presented in our experience. I ask whether this form of reductionism applies to the qualia of bodily awareness. According to the standard materialist theory, the intentional object of pain experience, for instance, is a bodily damage. This theory, though, is unable to account for the phenomenal difference between feeling pain 'inside' and perceiving it 'outside' (seeing oneself or another in (...)
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  47. R. Casati & J. Dokic (1998). Lo spazio Del suono. Rivista di Estetica 38 (9):35-40.
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  48. J. Dokic (1998). The Ontology of Perception: Bipolarity and Content. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 48 (2):153-69.
    The notion of perceptual content is commonly introduced in the analysis of perception. It stems from an analogy between perception and propositional attitudes. Both kinds of mental states, it is thought, have conditions of satisfaction. I try to show that on the most plausible account of perceptual content, it does not determine the conditions under which perceptual experience is veridical. Moreover, perceptual content must be bipolar (capable of being correct and capable of being incorrect), whereas perception as a mental state (...)
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  49. J. Dokic (1998). Quassim Cassam, Self and World. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (3):448.
     
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  50. Jérôme Dokic (1998). La perception interne et la critique du langage privé. Revue de Théologie Et de Philosophie 130.
    Dans cet article, je me demande ce qui distingue la conscience 'externe' du monde (par exemple, la perception visuelle) et la conscience 'interne' du corps propre (par exemple, l'expérience de la douleur). Je rejette les théories analytiques récentes qui assimilent l'expérience de la douleur à une forme de perception externe, à savoir la perception d'un dommage physique relatif au corps du sujet. Mais je ne souscris pas pour autant à la thèse phénoménologique selon laquelle il y a un 'espace douloureux', (...)
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