Assessment is at the heart of teaching as it provides a necessary condition for judging success or failure. It is also necessary to ensure that providers of education are accountable to users and providers of resources. Inferential hazard is an inescapable part of any assessment procedure but cannot be an argument against assessment as such. Rich knowledge may be the aim of education but it does not follow that it is the aim of every stage of education. Teaching to tests (...) is the most natural way of ensuring that teaching matches assessment. Failure to assess places public education in jeopardy. (shrink)

Assessment is at the heart of teaching as it provides a necessary condition for judging success or failure. It is also necessary to ensure that providers of education are accountable to users and providers of resources. Inferential hazard is an inescapable part of any assessment procedure but cannot be an argument against assessment as such. Rich knowledge may be the aim of education but it does not follow that it is the aim of every stage of education. Teaching to tests (...) is the most natural way of ensuring that teaching matches assessment. Failure to assess places public education in jeopardy. (shrink)

We begin by examining the widespread scepticism about the value of empirical educational research that is found within sections of the philosophy of education community. We argue that this scepticism, in its strongest form, is incoherent as it suggests that there are no educational facts susceptible of discovery. On the other hand, if there are such facts, then commonsense is not an adequate way of accessing them, due to its own contested and variable nature. We go on to examine the (...) claim that teaching is a moral enterprise whose successful pursuit demands the grasp of moral concepts and their implications. We show that while this is the case, it is a necessary, not a sufficient condition for successful teaching, which also requires a grasp of facts that are relevant to effective teaching and learning. Finally we examine some protocols for educational research. (shrink)

Continuing the debate on assessment, we argue that Andrew Davis' use of examples fails to address issues in the assessibility of specific items of knowledge, and show that one of his examples supports our view rather than his. We argue that John White's preferred replacement of assessment by monitoring, based on teachers' personal knowledge of their pupils, confuses personal and professional knowledge, oversimplifies the teacher's role and does not address the need for objectivity. Finally we argue that neither White nor (...) Davis grasps the relationship between assessment and the need for wider forms of accountability for public education systems. (shrink)

Continuing the debate on assessment, we argue that Andrew Davis' use of examples fails to address issues in the assessibility of specific items of knowledge, and show that one of his examples supports our view rather than his. We argue that John White's preferred replacement of assessment by monitoring, based on teachers' personal knowledge of their pupils, confuses personal and professional knowledge, oversimplifies the teacher's role and does not address the need for objectivity. Finally we argue that neither White nor (...) Davis grasps the relationship between assessment and the need for wider forms of accountability for public education systems. (shrink)

Robin Barrow has been one of the leading philosophers of education for more than forty years. This book is a critical but appreciative examination of his work by some of the leading philosophers of education at work today, with responses from Professor Barrow. It will focus on his work on curriculum, the analytic tradition in philosophy, education and schooling, and his use of Greek philosophy to enrich current debates in the subject. This work will be of interest to all those (...) who have been influenced by his contributions to educational and philosophical debate. (shrink)

The authors attempt to outline a notion of high culture and its role within education, following a broad modern tradition springing from Matthew Arnold. The book is written with a concern for clarity and argument that is not always found within that tradition, and the authors reject the elitist conclusions of many who have followed the tradition, such as Eliot, Leavis, Bantock and Scruton.

This new edition of _Philosophy of Education: The Key Concepts_ is an easy to use A-Z guide summarizing all the key terms, ideas and issues central to the study of educational theory today. Fully updated, the book is cross-referenced throughout and contains pointers to further reading, as well as new entries on such topics as: Citizenship and Civic Education Liberalism Capability Well-being Patriotism Globalisation Open-mindedness Creationism and Intelligent Design. Comprehensive and authoritative this highly accessible guide provides all that a student, (...) teacher or policy-maker needs to know about the latest thinking on education in the 21st century.'. (shrink)

Michael Hand's interesting analysis of the concept of intelligence crucially depends upon three assumptions: firstly, that there is an ordinary use of the term which, when applied to an individual is perfectly general and not context dependent. Secondly, that this use is best cashed in terms of aptitude. Thirdly, that the aptitude in question is to be explained in terms of theorizing. I shall argue in what follows that the first assumption may be true, but, if it is true, this (...) presents a problem for Hand's analysis and not a path to a solution. That the second assumption is false but, even if it were true, it would sit badly with assumption one. And, finally, that the third assumption runs into too many difficulties to be acceptable. (shrink)

The justifications that are usually offered - in England - for teaching the arts are either in terms of the development of "creativity" or the possibility of self expression, or, in terms of moral and social education. I examine both types of claim and reject them. In their place I offer justifications in terms of intrinsic value and enculturisation.

In the course of this book we shall frequently appeal to what we call an Arnoldian filter, a principle we wish to urge for choosing much of what should form part of education in schools. This priniciple is based on a remark in Matthew Arnold's Preface to Culture and Anarchy,1 that culture is a matter of getting ‘to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world’ (1935, p.6, emphasis (...) added). Arnold's work here and elsewhere is often seen as a key monument in English humanist thought. Trilling claims that ‘he established criticism as an intellectual discipline among the people of two nations and set its best tone’ (1949, p.3). It may not be of merely historical interest to consider some of the concerns that drove Arnold to offer culture in his sense as a contribution to contemporary and future society. (shrink)

Defenders of high culture can be found invoking many and various allies. Many are, we think, out of place. These defences raise issues that we do not need to worry about or themselves create unnecessary difficulties for clarity of thought on these matters. In this chapter we will touch upon a number of such irrelevancies. We will begin by examining the assimilation of high culture to religion and religious concerns in the thought of Eliot and Scruton: this will allow us (...) to indicate our stance on the place of religion in schools. We will then examine some psychological and sociological issues that Bantock has invoked in defending his secular vision of the role of culture, and conclude with Barrow's curious identification of culture with general intelligence. (shrink)

This chapter deals with a crucial component of our position, the presumption that there are objective grounds for preferring one thing to another within the various cultural institutions we deal with, that there are better or worse symphonies, soufflés and theories of the atom. The task of showing this is more urgent for some institutions than others. While philosophers can doubt anything, most people are persuaded of the objectivity of our efforts to comprehend the physical world and to weigh, count (...) and measure accurately in many areas of human activity. Again, when we are faced with a choice among functional objects or processes, most people will admit that we can ground a preference for a knife or an exercise routine on objectively established facts: sharpness, or measurable increase in strength. Here, certainly, various conflicting desiderata may enter and make actual decisions more difficult — the sharpest knife may also be the most expensive; we may need to worry about its safety features; it may be ugly; and so on. But many will doubt that our judgements of comparative worth for non-functional objects such as paintings or sonatas can claim a similarly objective basis. We shall, therefore, concentrate our efforts on the most doubted areas, but will begin with the less contentious, where we think it is useful to draw attention to the genuine problems some philosophers have stressed, to show in fact that what we believe to be popular unconcern deserves to be somewhat ruffled. (shrink)

J. Gingell, E. P. Brandon; Popular Culture, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 34, Issue 3, 7 March 2003, Pages 461–485, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-97.

The fact that education is, and must be, a process of enculturation for those being educated gives us some, but by no means enough, guidance as to what we would expect to see going on in our schools. For given that our educational institutions are part of our culture and, given that anything that is part of our culture will transmit cultural messages, if we put children in school and let them play all day, or simply asked teachers to explain (...) their hobbies to the children, then some processes of enculturalisation would be going on. But no one with any real concern for either our children or their education would think such things fulfil a proper role for schools. Certainly if, as Arnold thought, education is a question of passing on, or trying to pass on, the features from our culture that we value, then any such reliance on random processes must be ruled out. Instead we have to select those aspects of our culture which we wish our children to partake of and insist that our educational establishments make sustained and intentional efforts to ensure such participation. (shrink)

Arnold wrote in an educational tradition that both lay in a main line of descent from the cultural formations he most valued and equipped him with the tools necessary to appreciate many of the elements in those traditions that are not in his native language. So when he referred, as exemplars of high culture, to Homer and Cicero, Montesquieu and Goethe, he presumed acquaintance with their works in the original languages on his own part and on that of his audience. (...) His own vernacular derived from that of Shakespeare and the Authorised Version of the Bible. (shrink)

Peters is best known for ‘Ethics and Education’, (1966) an attempt, using analytical methods, to provide a universal canonical account of the nature of education. This corresponded closely with the prevailing conception of liberal education of the time. Despite the acclaim with which this work was received, Peters became increasingly dissatisfied with his early views of education and in a series of papers written between 1973 and 1982, he retreated slowly from the view that one could construct a universal canonical (...) account of education and even from the view that this could be possible for liberal education. As his views changed, his philosophical methods developed as well, moving from the Moorean essentialist analysis of 1966, through a more Strawsonian connective analysis in the mid 1970s to a position based on W.B. Gallie's account of essentially contested concepts in the early 1980s. Parallel to and connected with this changing philosophical methodology came a distinction between an overarching concept of education and particular conceptions of education related to different societies and their values. (shrink)