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J. Kevin O'Regan [18]J. K. O'Regan [4]
  1. J. K. O'Regan, Thoughts on Change Blindness.
    Recent results showing that large changes in a scene are not noticed if they occur at the same time as a global visual disturbance caused by saccades, flicker, "mudsplashes", or film cuts, are generally explained in terms of a theory in which it is assumed that the observer's internal representation of the outside world is very sparse, containing only what the observer is currently processing. The present paper presents some clarifications of the theory, and some new implications and predictions that (...)
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  2. J. Kevin O'Regan, Experience is Not Something We Feel but Something We Do: A Principled Way of Explaining Sensory Phenomenology, with Change Blindness and Other Empirical Consequences.
    Any theory of experience which postulates that brain mechanisms generate "raw feel" encounters the impassable "explanatory gap" separating physics from phenomenology.
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  3. J. Kevin O'Regan, For Peer Review.
    Call u the triplet of cone quantum catch for the light that is incident on a surface, and v the triplet of cone quantum catch for the light that is reflected off that surface. Philipona & O'Regan (2006) present results from numerical calculations showing that: 1. each surface can be associated with a 3 by 3 matrix A such that the relation v = A u to a very high degree of accuracy for any natural illuminant, 2. the vast majority (...)
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  4. J. Kevin O'Regan, How to Build a Robot That Feels.
    Overview. Consciousness is often considered to have a "hard" part and a not-so-hard part. With the help of work in artificial intelligence and more recently in embodied robotics, there is hope that we shall be able solve the not-so-hard part and make artificial agents that understand their environment, communicate with their friends, and most importantly, have a notion of "self" and "others". But will such agents feel anything? Building the feel into the agent will be the "hard" part.
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  5. J. Kevin O'Regan, Letter Legibility and Visual Word Recognition.
    Word recognition performance varies systematically as a function of where the eyes fixate in the word. Performance is maximal with the eye slightly left of the center of the word, and decreases drastically to both sides of this 'Optimal Viewing Position'. While manipulations of lexical factors have only marginal effects on this phenomenon, previous studies have pointed to a relation between the viewing position effect and letter legibility: When letter legibility drops, the viewing position effect becomes more exaggerated. To further (...)
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  6. Camila Valenzuela Moguillansky, J. Kevin O'Regan & Claire Petitmengin (2013). Exploring the Subjective Experience of the “Rubber Hand” Illusion. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
    Despite the fact that the rubber hand illusion (RHI) is an experimental paradigm that has been widely used in the last 14 years to investigate different aspects of the sense of bodily self, very few studies have sought to investigate the subjective nature of the experience that the RHI evokes. The present study investigates the phenomenology of the RHI through a specific elicitation method. More particularly, this study aim at assessing whether the conditions usually used as control in the RHI (...)
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  7. J. K. O'Regan (2011). Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    The catastrophe of the eye -- A new view of seeing -- Applying the new view of seeing -- The illusion of seeing everything -- Some contentious points -- Towards consciousness -- Types of consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness, raw feel, and why they're hard -- Squeeze a sponge, drive a porsche : a sensorimotor account of feel -- Consciously experiencing a feel -- The sensorimotor approach to color -- Sensory substitution -- The localization of touch -- The phenomenality plot -- (...)
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  8. J. Kevin O'Regan & Erik Myin (2007). Phenomenal Consciousness Lite: No Thanks! Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):520-521.
    The target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man's cognitive access.
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  9. J. Kevin O'Regan, Erik Myin & Alva Noë (2006). Skill, Corporality and Alerting Capacity in an Account of Sensory Consciousness. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.
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  10. A. Bompas & J. K. O'Regan (2004). Induced Dependence of Colour Perception on Eye-Movements. In Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception. Malden Ma: Blackwell Publishing. 17-18.
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  11. J. Kevin O'Regan (2003). Change Blindness. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
  12. Erik Myin & J. Kevin O'Regan (2002). Perceptual Consciousness, Access to Modality and Skill Theories: A Way to Naturalize Phenomenology? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1):27-45.
  13. J. Kevin O'Regan (2001). The 'Feel' of Seeing. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (6):278-279.
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  14. J. Kevin O'Regan (2001). The 'Feel'of Seeing:: An Interview with J. Kevin O'Regan. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (6):278-279.
     
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  15. J. Kevin O'Regan (2001). What It is Like to See: A Sensorimotor Theory of Perceptual Experience. Synthese 129 (1):79-103.
    The paper proposes a way of bridging the gapbetween physical processes in the brain and the ''''felt''''aspect of sensory experience. The approach is based onthe idea that experience is not generated by brainprocesses themselves, but rather is constituted by theway these brain processes enable a particular form of''''give-and-take'''' between the perceiver and theenvironment. From this starting-point we are able tocharacterize the phenomenological differences betweenthe different sensory modalities in a more principledway than has been done in the past. We are also (...)
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  16. J. Kevin O'Regan & A. Noe (2001). A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting Out Our Sensory Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1011.
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  17. J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë (2001). Acting Out Our Sensory Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1011-1021.
    The most important clarification we bring in our reply to commentators concerns the problem of the “explanatory gap”: that is, the gulf that separates physical processes in the brain from the experienced quality of sensations. By adding two concepts (bodiliness and grabbiness) that were not stressed in the target article, we strengthen our claim and clarify why we think we have solved the explanatory gap problem, – not by dismissing qualia, but, on the contrary, by explaining why sensations have a (...)
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  18. J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë (2001). A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
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  19. J. Kevin O'Regan, H. Deubel, James J. Clark & R. Rensink (2000). Picture Changes During Blinks: Looking Without Seeing and Seeing Without Looking. Visual Cognition 7:191-211.
    Observers inspected normal, high quality color displays of everyday visual scenes while their eye movements were recorded. A large display change occurred each time an eye blink occurred. Display changes could either involve "Central Interest" or "Marginal Interest" locations, as determined from descriptions obtained from independent judges in a prior pilot experiment. Visual salience, as determined by luminance, color, and position of the Central and Marginal interest changes were equalized.
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  20. J. K. O'Regan (1998). No Evidence for Neural Filling-in – Vision as an Illusion – Pinning Down “Enaction”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):767-768.
    (1) The purported evidence for neural filling-in is not evidence for filling-in, but just for long-range dynamic interactions. (2) Vision is perhaps not an “illusion,” but at any rate it is not “pictorial.” (3) The idea of the “world as an outside memory” as well as MacKay's “conditional readiness for action” may help approach an “enactive” theory of vision.
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  21. Ronald A. Rensink, J. Kevin O'Regan & James J. Clark (1997). To See or Not to See: The Need for Attention to Perceive Changes in Scenes. Psychological Science 8:368-373.
    Methods. We employed a "flicker" technique, in which an original and a modified image (each of duration 240 ms) continually alternated, with a blank field (duration 80 ms) between each display. Images were all of real-world scenes. One of three kinds of change (appearance/disappearance, color, or translation) was made to an object or region in each scene. Changes were large and easily seen under normal conditions. Subjects viewed the flicker display, and pressed a key when they noticed the change.
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  22. J. Kevin O'Regan (1994). The World as an Outside Iconic Memory – No Strong Internal Metric Means No Problem of Visual Stability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):270.
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