Online research in philosophy

Environmental rights are diagonal if they are held by individuals or groups against the governments of states other than their own. The potential importance of such rights is obvious: governments' actions often affect the environment beyond their jurisdiction, and those who live in and rely upon the environment affected would like to be able to exercise rights against the governments causing them harm. Although international law has not adopted a comprehensive, uniform approach to such rights, human rights law and international (...) environmental law have begun to develop some possible bases for diagonal environmental rights. Human rights law operates primarily along a vertical axis, setting out individuals' rights against their governments and the corresponding duties owed by the governments, but it may also be diagonal, giving rise to duties on the part of states that extend beyond their own territory. The scope and extent of diagonal human rights are often controversial, and environmental rights face additional difficulties, because the environmental protection required by human rights is clarifying only gradually, on a case-by-case basis. To the extent that human rights require such protection when aligned vertically, it would be logical to conclude that they require the same degree of protection whenever they may be aligned diagonally. Human rights law provides few precedents to support that conclusion, however. Compared to human rights law, international environmental law (IEL) provides a clearer and more specific set of duties with respect to environmental protection. Moreover, most IEL is extraterritorial, in that it requires states to regulate actions within their control that could harm the environment beyond their territory. The problem with grounding diagonal environmental rights in IEL is that, in contrast to human rights law, most IEL operates along a horizontal axis: its duties are owed by states to other states, not to private actors. If the challenge for human rights law is to extend rights from the vertical axis to the diagonal, the challenge for IEL is to derive diagonal rights from horizontal ones. (shrink)

Certain facts about subjective successions support, I hold, a theory of mind?dependent sensory data. Suppose that no such theory is true and, furthermore, that as one experiences a visual subjective succession, that of which one is visually aware consists typically in a static physical array. Nevertheless one will, I hold, experience a certain change taking place within one's visual field; and under the imagined conditions, it is hard to fathom what this change could be. Various seemingly plausible and helpful suggestions (...) are examined and rejected. I conclude that neither a common?sense realism nor, in fact, any view which rejects mind?dependent sensory data can deal satisfactorily with subjective successions. (shrink)

Certain facts about subjective successions support, I hold, a theory of mind?dependent sensory data. Suppose that no such theory is true and, furthermore, that as one experiences a visual subjective succession, that of which one is visually aware consists typically in a static physical array. Nevertheless one will, I hold, experience a certain change taking place within one's visual field; and under the imagined conditions, it is hard to fathom what this change could be. Various seemingly plausible and helpful suggestions (...) are examined and rejected. I conclude that neither a common?sense realism nor, in fact, any view which rejects mind?dependent sensory data can deal satisfactorily with subjective successions. (shrink)

It is argued that statements about the ways in which objects appear entail the existence of appearances; in other words, ?A appears ?? ('appears? used phenomenologically) entails ?(Ex) ?x?. The argument turns on the proper analysis of comparative appearance statements, such as ?A feels warmer (to someone) than B?. Here A and B are not being compared directly with respect to the complex character of feeling warm. One is not, in other words, saying that A feels warm more than does (...) B ? an ambiguous statement. Instead, one is saying that A's feel or appearance, or way of feeling or appearing, is warmer than B's. And in making this statement one asserts the existence of appearances. This result is then extended to cover statements of the form ?A appears ??. It is maintained that this generalized result serves to reinstate most of the traditional problems of perception. (shrink)

It is argued that statements about the ways in which objects appear entail the existence of appearances; in other words, ?A appears ?? ('appears? used phenomenologically) entails ?(Ex) ?x?. The argument turns on the proper analysis of comparative appearance statements, such as ?A feels warmer (to someone) than B?. Here A and B are not being compared directly with respect to the complex character of feeling warm. One is not, in other words, saying that A feels warm more than does (...) B ? an ambiguous statement. Instead, one is saying that A's feel or appearance, or way of feeling or appearing, is warmer than B's. And in making this statement one asserts the existence of appearances. This result is then extended to cover statements of the form ?A appears ??. It is maintained that this generalized result serves to reinstate most of the traditional problems of perception. (shrink)