Online research in philosophy

One hundred years ago, Flexner emphasized the role of science in medical education. With a 21st-century perspective, the question may be posed anew: is science relevant to medical education and practice? If so, then which areas of science are fundamental to learning and making ongoing decisions in medicine? The answers to these questions should determine what is needed in the preparation of an undergraduate student for medical school.Educators and students alike question the relevance of current premedical requirements, and there is (...) concern that these in fact diminish student interest in medical or biomedical research careers. For example, premedical science courses are viewed by many students (including those who .. (shrink)

Democracy may well be the primary virtue of political systems. Yet European politics is marked by a democracy deficit that will not disappear spontaneously. While legal and political theory on this issue is dominated by supporters of civic institutionalism and constitutional republicanism, liberal nationalists seem to be split. They justify the civic nationhood of member states, but they shrink away from the idea of a European people. This essay claims that a quasi-national conception of European identity can be conducive to (...) the rise of a democratic political union of Europe. It discusses the mechanisms and rules for Europeanization of the sense of equal dignity and solidarity. This approach to supranational identity is explicitly instrumental and orientated towards the long run. However, the main liberal objections against it can be countered. (shrink)

'Ideologies of Discrimination' considers the implications of the new genetics for understandings of personhood and for understandings of the relationship between people in groups. In particular, the essay delineates and examines the emerging notion of a 'genetic group' and considers the social implications of redefining families, racial groups and ethnic groups through express, and often exclusive, reference to a shared genome. One consequence of such redefinition has been the justification and elaboration of stigmatizing images of and discrimination against such groups-especially (...) those, such as Jews and African-Americans, that have long been identified with specific somatic characteristics. A few worrisome trends begin to emerge in the response of the American legal system to the notion of genetic groups. Among these is a shift in the locus of privacy and identity from the autonomous individual to the genetic group. This shift challenges (and threatens) long-standing Western values (including equality and liberty) that depend upon the ideological centrality of autonomous individuality. (shrink)

The Western Tradition has long struggled to define and understand evil, yet definitive answers continue to elude us. So, too, the role of evil in Goethe's Faust remains problematic. With the help of Mephistopheles, Faust acquires a forbidden ,,knowledge of good and evil“, evoking the biblical story of the Fall. This study uncovers important layers of meaning in that story and reveals its special and unrecognized significance for Faust.

The realities and myths of long-term care and the challenges it poses for the ethics of autonomy are analyzed in this perceptive work. The book defends the concept of autonomy, but argues that the standard view of autonomy as non-interference and independence has only a limited applicability for long term care. The treatment of actual autonomy stresses the developmental and social nature of human persons and the priority of identification over autonomous choice. The work balances analysis of the (...) ethical concepts associated with autonomy with discussion of the implications of the ethical analysis for long term care. A central chapter involves a phenomenological analysis of four general features of everyday experience (space, time, communication, and affectivity) and explores their practical implications for long term care. This work concludes with a discussion of the advantages associated with a phenomenologically-inspired treatment of actual autonomy for the ethics of long-term care. (shrink)

The thesis presents a development of J. L. Austin's analysis of truth and its accompanying analysis of sentence structure. This involves a discussion and refinement of Austin's notions of the demonstrative and descriptive conventions of language and of the demonstrative and descriptive devices of sentences. The main point of the thesis is that ordinary language must be treated as an historical phenomenon: one that has evolved its more complex features through a long series of variations upon a small number (...) of rudimentary conventions and locutions. The utility of Austin's analysis is shown to lie in the description that it provides of the functions of these rudimentary conventions and locutions. The analysis is used to illuminate a number of problematic sentences and expressions of ordinary language, including identity sentences, definite descriptions, existential sentences, and conditionals. (shrink)

. This paper examines the association between long-term compensation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) for 90 publicly traded Canadian firms. Social responsibility is considered to include concerns for social factors and the environment (e.g. Johnson, R. and D. Greening: 1999, Academy of Management Journal 42(5), 564-578; Kane, E. J. (2002, Journal of Banking and Finance 26:, 1919-1933; McGuire, J. et al. 2003, Journal of Business Ethics 45 (4), 341-359). Long-term compensation attempts to focus executives efforts on optimizing (...) the longer term, which should direct their attention to factors traditionally associated with socially responsible executives (Mahapatra, S. 1984, Journal of Financial Economicsit 20, 347-376). As hypothesized, we found a significant relationship between the long-term compensation and total CSR weakness as well as the product/environmental weakness dimension of CSR. In addition, we found a marginally significant relationship between long-term compensation and total corporate responsibility. Our findings are that executives long-term compensation is associated with a firms environmental actions, and that firms that utilize long-term compensation are more likely to mitigate product/environment weaknesses than those that do not. Implications for practice and research are discussed. (shrink)

The philosopher John J. McDermott comes out of the long American tradition that takes the aim of philosophical inquiry to be interpretation of the open meanings of experience, so that we might all live fuller and richer lives. Here, the authors of these nine essays explore his highly original interpretations of philosophy's various questions about our shared existence. How are we to understand the nature of American culture and to carry forward its important contributions? What is the personal importance (...) of embodiment, of living in the realization of death? How does our physical and personal environment nourish bodies and spirits? What does the deliberate pursuit of a morality offer us? How can we carry forward the fundamental tasks of education to enable those who follow us to use our shared past to address their civic and spiritual problems? What are the possibilities for community? Together, these essays offer a clear, multi-layered understanding of the compelling vision that McDermott has presented over the years. In an Afterword, McDermott responds to the authors' queries and concerns, offering a restatement of his understanding of the American philosopher's task. These essays indicate, and McDermott's response confirms, that for him philosophy is not a purely cerebral activity. Philosophy is, rather, an intellectual means of exploring the fullness of human experience, and it functions best when it operates in the context of the broad sweep of the humanities. Similarly, for McDermott the self is no given substantial entity. On the contrary, it is relational, rooted geographically and socially in its place and its fellows, and damaged when these life-giving processes fail. Further, McDermott does not accept any ultimate canopy of meaning. The human journey is a personal project within which provisional meanings must be created to sustain our advance. (shrink)

Há muito tempo o progresso científico provoca nossas convicções e ameaça deixar o discurso moral para trás. Mais recentemente, a polêmica em torno da permissão ou proibição da eugenia negativa e positiva questiona nossa autocompreensão de natureza, moralidade e liberdade. O presente texto tem por objeto uma série de artigos de J. Habermas, convertidos posteriormente em livro, onde são expostos argumentos fortemente plausíveis em favor da tese da indisponibilidade da natureza humana no âmbito da eugenia positiva. Após contextuar o problema (...) e mapeá-lo no horizonte filosófico, o trabalho apresenta a posição metafísica habermasiana, com destaque para a distinção entre eugenia negativa e positiva, e a confronta com os argumentos liberais dworkinianos acerca do tema. O artigo pleiteia a favor da tese de que a naturalidade humana consiste, desde os primórdios da espécie, em autocriação natural, de modo que cabe à moralidade e ao direito preencherem o vácuo do destino criado pela biotecnologia. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Natureza humana. Habermas. Eugenia negativa e positive. Ética. Filosofia do direito. ABSTRACT For a long time scientific progress has been challeging our moral convictions, bringing the threat of making moral discourse totally surpassed. More recently the controversy around the permission or prohibition of negative and positive eugeny questions our selfunderstanding of nature, morality and freedom. The text has as its object several articles of J. Habermas, which turned afterwards into a volume, where the author exposes strongly plausible arguments for the thesis of the unavailability of human nature in the field of positive eugeny. After contextualising the problem and mapping it in the scientific horizon, the study presents Habermas’s metaphysical account, putting emphasis on the distinction between negative and positive eugeny, and confronts that same account of Habermas with Dworkin’s liberal arguments about the topic. The article pleads for the thesis that human naturality consists since the beginning of humanity in natural self-creation, so that it is a task of morality and science of law to fulfill the empty space of the destiny built up by biotechnology. KEY WORDS – Human nature. Negative and positive eugeny. Philosophy of law. (shrink)

This classic work is a general introduction to Indian philosophy that covers the Vedic and Epic periods, including expositions on the hymns of the Rig Veda, the Upanisads, Jainism, Buddhism and the theism of the Bhagvadgita. Long acknowledged as a classic, this pioneering survey of Indian thought charts a fascinating course through an intricate history. From the Rig Veda to Ramanuja, Radhakrishnan traces the development of Indian philosophy as a single tradition of thought through the ages. The author showcases (...) ancient philosophical texts and relates them to contemporary issues of philosophy and religion. This second edition with a new Introduction by eminent philosopher J.N. Mohanty, highlights the continuing relevance of the work and the philosophic tradition it represents. (shrink)

This classic work is a general introduction to Indian philosophy that covers the Vedic and Epic periods, including expositions on the hymns of the Rig Veda, the Upanisads, Jainism, Buddhism and the theism of the Bhagvadgita. Long acknowledged as a classic, this pioneering survey of Indian thought charts a fascinating course through an intricate history. From the Rig Veda to Ramanuja, Radhakrishnan traces the development of Indian philosophy as a single tradition of thought through the ages. The author showcases (...) ancient philosophical texts and relates them to contemporary issues of philosophy and religion. This second edition with a new Introduction by eminent philosopher J.N. Mohanty, highlights the continuing relevance of the work and the philosophic tradition it represents. (shrink)

The Long Life invites the reader to range widely from the writings of Plato through to recent philosophical work by Derek Parfit, Bernard Williams, and others, and from Shakespeare's King Lear through works by Thomas Mann, Balzac, Dickens, Beckett, Stevie Smith, Philip Larkin, to more recent writing by Saul Bellow, Philip Roth, and J. M. Coetzee. -/- Helen Small argues that if we want to understand old age, we have to think more fundamentally about what it means to be (...) a person, to have a life, to have (or lead) a good life, to be part of a just society. What did Plato mean when he suggested that old age was the best place from which to practice philosophy - or Thomas Mann when he defined old age as the best time to be a writer - and were they right? If we think, as Aristotle did, that a good life requires the active pursuit of virtue, how will our view of later life be affected? If we think that lives and persons are unified, much as stories are said to be unified, how will our thinking about old age differ from that of someone who thinks that lives and/or persons can be strongly discontinuous? In a just society, what constitutes a fair distribution of limited resources between the young and the old? How, if at all, should recent developments in the theory of evolutionary senescence alter our thinking about what it means to grow old? -/- This is a groundbreaking book, deep as well as broad, and likely to alter the way in which we talk about one of the great social concerns of our time - the growing numbers of those living to be old, and the growing proportion of the old to the young. (shrink)

The West has long had an ambivalent attitude toward the philosophical traditions of the East. Voltaire claimed that the East is the civilization "to which the West owes everything", yet C.S. Peirce was contemptuous of the "monstrous mysticism of the East". And despite the current trend toward globalizations, there is still a reluctance to take seriously the intellectual inheritance of South and East Asia. Oriental Enlightenment challenges this Eurocentric prejudice. J. J. Clarke examines the role played by the ideas (...) of Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism in the intellectual life of the West and how these ideas, far more than exotic distractions, or even instruments of colonial domination, have been the means towards serious self-questioning and self-renewal, used to dispute and even to undermine Western orthodoxies. (shrink)

In §50 of Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein wrote the sentence, "There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris." Although some interpreters have claimed that Wittgenstein's statement is mistaken, while others have proposed various explanations showing that this must be correct, none have questioned the fact that he intended to assert that it is impossible to describe (...) the standard meter as being a meter long. Given that Wittgenstein introduces this sentence as analogous to the claim that "existence cannot be attributed to an element," and that the preceding passages discuss a language-game the simples of which can be described by their own names, there is good reason to think that Wittgenstein did not intend to assert this infamous sentence. (shrink)

Ruchkin et al. ascribe a pivotal role to long-term memory representations and binding within working memory. Here we focus on the interaction of working memory and long-term memory in supporting on-line representations of experience available to guide on-going processing, and we distinguish the role of frontal-lobe systems from what the hippocampus contributes to relational long-term memory binding.

Many studies show that punishment, although able to stabilize cooperation at high levels, destroys gains which makes it less efficient than alternatives with no punishment. Standard public goods games (PGGs) in fact show exactly these patterns. However, both evolutionary theory and real world institutions give reason to expect institutions with punishment to be more efficient, particularly in the long run. Long-term cooperative partnerships with punishment threats for non-cooperation should outperform defection prone non-punishing ones. This article demonstrates that fieldwork (...) data from hunter-gatherers, common pool resource management cases and even PGGs support this hypothesis. Although earnings in PGGs with a punishment option may be lower at the beginning, efficiency increases dramatically over time. Most ten-period PGGs cannot capture this change because their time horizon is too short. (shrink)

We consider the implications of a model for long-duration gamma-ray bursts in which the progenitor is spun up in a close binary by tidal interactions with a massive black-hole companion. We investigate a sample of such binaries produced by a binary population synthesis, and show that the model predicts several common features in the accretion on to the newly formed black hole. In all cases, the accretion rate declines as approximately t−5/3 until a break at a time of order (...) 104 s. The accretion rate declines steeply thereafter. Subsequently, there is flaring activity, with the flare peaking between 104 and 105 s, the peak time being correlated with the flare energy. We show that these times are set by the semi-major axis of the binary, and hence the process of tidal spin-up; furthermore, they are consistent with flares seen in the X-ray light curves of some long gamma-ray bursts. (shrink)

Debates over the existence of intrinsic value have long been central to professional environmental ethics. Holmes Rolston, III’s version of intrinsic value is, perhaps, the most well known. Recently, powerful critiques leveled by Bryan G. Norton and J. Baird Callicott have suggested that there is an epistemological problem with Rolston’s account. In this paper, I argue first that the debates over intrinsic value are as pertinent now as they have ever been. I then explain the objections that Norton and (...) Callicott have raised against Rolston’s position. In the main body of the paper, I attempt to show that Rolston’s position can accommodate these objections. In this defense of Rolston’s position, I have two goals: first, to show that the notion of non-subjective intrinsic value in nature is coherent, and second, to illuminate the places where further philosophical work on intrinsic value remains to be done. (shrink)

Economic markets are not morally free zones. Contrary to popular misconceptions, market functioning rests on the ethical principles of fairness and voluntariness. This ethical foundation can be traced back at least to moral philosopher Adam Smith, one of the founders of modern economics. In the inconspicuous form of microeconomic axioms, these moral foundations are preserved. Thus, virtually all “neo-classic” economic concepts presuppose a market ethics of fairness and voluntariness. In a world of pervasive uncertainty on the long-term development of (...) the human-environment interaction, the protection of the global life-support systems is an important test case for the scope of the ethical content of market ethics. We review risk protection strategies in the face of this uncertainty that are (i) based on the insurance effect of biological diversity, and (ii) that employ a safe minimum standard (SMS). Because the fairness principle of market ethics requires that economic agents who cause “external” costs must, at least, compensate those who are burdened with these costs, the interests of future generations have to be included in responsible economic decision-making. The market and market ethics approach is applied to the analysis of a SMS for biological diversity, and to the inherent problems of such an approach. At the microeconomic level of individual decision-making, an unconditional protection is supported by market ethics neither for the putative interests of future generations nor for biological diversity: Poor people who struggle to cover their basic needs cannot not be required to care for biological diversity. In all other cases, the protection of biological diversity in favour of future generations is supported—if costs are not “unacceptably high”. At which cost level this point is approached, market ethics is not designed to decide. (shrink)

This paper proposes a revised Theory of Moves (TOM) to analyze matrix games between two players when payoffs are given as ordinals. The games are analyzed when a given player i must make the first move, when there is a finite limit n on the total number of moves, and when the game starts at a given initial state S. Games end when either both players pass in succession or else a total of n moves have been made. Studies are (...) made of the influence of i, n, and S on the outcomes. It is proved that these outcomes ultimately become periodic in n and therefore exhibit long-term predictable behavior. Efficient algorithms are given to calculate these ultimate outcomes by computer. Frequently the ultimate outcomes are independent of i, S, and n when n is sufficiently large; in this situation this common ultimate outcome is proved to be Pareto-optimal. The use of ultimate outcomes gives rise to a concept of stable points, which are analogous to Nash equilibria but consider long-term effects. If the initial state is a stable point, then no player has an incentive to move from that state, under the assumption that any initial move could be followed by a long series of moves and countermoves. The concept may be broadened to that of a stable set. It is proved that every game has a minimal stable set, and any two distinct minimal stable sets are disjoint. Comparisons are made with the results of standard TOM. (shrink)

Long-term ecological research (LTER), addressing problems that encompass decadal or longer time frames, began as a formal term and program in the United States in 1980. While long-term ecological studies and observation began as early as the 1400s and 1800s in Asia and Europe, respectively, the long-term approach was not formalized until the establishment of the U.S. long-term ecological research programs. These programs permitted ecosystem-level experiments and cross-site comparisons that led to insights into the biosphere’s structure (...) and function. The holistic ecosystem approach of this initiative also allowed the incorporation of the human-dimension of ecology and recently has given rise to a new concept of long-term socio-ecological research (LTSER). Today, long-term ecological research programs exist in at least thirty-two countries (i.e., members of the International Long-Term Ecological Research Network, ILTER). However, consolidation of the international network within the long-term socio-ecological research paradigm still requires: (1) inclusion of certain remote regions of the world, such as southwestern South America, that are still poorly represented; (2) modifications of the type of research conducted, such as integrating social and natural sciences with the humanities and ethics; and (3) the incorporation of findings and results into broader social and political processes. In this context, a nascent long-term socio-ecological research network in Chile, which extends over the longest latitudinal range of temperate forest in the Southern Hemisphere, adds a new remote region to international long-term ecological research previously overlooked. In addition, collaboration with the University of North Texas and other international partners helps to further develop an interdisciplinary approach for the integration of the ecological sciences and environmental philosophy together with traditional ecological knowledge, informal and formal education, policy, the humanities, socio-political processes, and biocultural conservation. (shrink)

Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS; also called motor neuron disease) is a devastating medical condition that progressively robs patients of their ability to move, speak and eventually breathe. At present, many physicians are hesitant to propose tracheostomy and respiratory support in the terminal phase of ALS. In accordance with the principle of patient autonomy, physicians should respect the right of the ALS patient to accept or refuse any treatment, including mechanical ventilation. Also, in environments where euthanasia or physician-assisted death is legal, (...) such requests can be acceptable. At least two conditions are necessary for full autonomy. To have a claim on full autonomy, people need to have intact cognitive abilities, and to exercise this right they must be able to communicate. In the past, the first condition was in doubt (indeed, overlap with other neurodegenerative diseases is sometimes suspected and some patients with ALS are thought to have associated frontotemporal dementia) and the second was severely compromised in patients with devastating motor impairment (communication being limited to the twitch of a finger or the blink of an eye). In this issue of J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry, Lakerveld and colleagues1 investigated cognition in 11 patients with late stage ALS (see page 25). They showed preserved cognitive functioning (ie, language, executive function, intelligence, learning and long term memory) compared with healthy controls. Assessments were exclusively based on a ‘‘yes–no’’ response mode. Because of the absence of verbal and motor communication, the neuropsychological assessment of these patients is complicated, and adapted testing is needed. By using a ‘‘yes–no’’ response mode based on the remaining motor abilities of the patient, this study proves the possibility of assessing patients with minimal motor capacities. (shrink)

Universals: Loux, M. J. The existence of universals. Russell, B. The world of universals. Quine, W. V. O. On what there is. Pears, D. F. Universals. Strawson, P. F. Particular and general. Wolterstorff, N. Qualities. Bambrough, R. Universals and family resemblances. Donagan, A. Universals and metaphysical realism. Sellars, W. Abstract entities. Wolterstorff, N. On the nature of universals.--Particulars: Loux, M. J. Particulars and their individuation. Black. M. The identity of indiscernibles. Ayer, A. J. The identity of indiscernibles. O'Connor, D. J. (...) The identity of indiscernibles. Allaire, E. B. Bare particulars. Chappell, V. C. Particulars re-clothed. Allaire, E. B. Another look at bare particulars. Meiland, J. W. Do relations individuate? Long, D. C. Particulars and their qualities. Copi, I. Essence and accident. Chandler, H. S. Essence and accident. Plantinga, A. World and essence. (shrink)

Two essays on utilitarianism, written from opposite points of view, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams. In the first part of the book Professor Smart advocates a modern and sophisticated version of classical utilitarianism; he tries to formulate a consistent and persuasive elaboration of the doctrine that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined solely by their consequences, and in particular their consequences for the sum total of human happiness. This is a revised version of Professor Smart's (...) famous essay 'an outline of a system of utilitarian ethics', first published in 1961 but long unobtainable. In Part II Bernard Williams offers a sustained and vigorous critique of utilitarian assumptions, arguments and ideals. He finds inadequate the theory of action implied by utilitarianism, and he argues that utilitarianism fails to engage at a serious level with the real problems of moral and political philosophy, and fails to make sense of notions such as integrity, or even human happiness itself. Both authors are agreed on utilitarianism's importance: it cuts across a number of different philosophical disputes and combines a systematic account of mata-ethical problems with a distinctive and substantive moral stand. It thus is, or involves, philosophy in both the traditional and the narrower, professional sense of the word, and is a key topic (often the first topic) in introductory philosophy courses. This book should also be of interest to welfare economists, political scientists and decision-theorists. (shrink)

E.J. Lowe has recently proposed a model of mental causation on which mental events are emergent, thus exerting a novel, downward causal influence on physical events. Yet on Lowe's model, mental causation is at the same time empirically undetectable, and in this sense is "invisible". Lowe's model is ingenious, but I don't think emergentists should welcome it, for it seems to me that a primary virtue of emergentism is its bold empirical prediction about the long-term results of human physiology. (...) Here I'll try to restore emergentism's empirical status, but my broader aim is to use Lowe's model to explore some central topics in the mental causation debate, including the "causal closure" of the physical world and the nature of causal powers. (shrink)

Simulation techniques, especially those implemented on a computer, are frequently employed in natural as well as in social sciences with considerable success. There is mounting evidence that the "model-building era" (J. Niehans) that dominated the theoretical activities of the sciences for a long time is about to be succeeded or at least lastingly supplemented by the "simulation era". But what exactly are models? What is a simulation and what is the difference and the relation between a model and a (...) simulation? These are some of the questions addressed in this article. I maintain that the most significant feature of a simulation is that it allows scientists to imitate one process by another process. "Process" here refers solely to a temporal sequence of states of a system. Given the observation that processes are dealt with by all sorts of scientists, it is apparent that simulations prove to be a powerful interdisciplinarily acknowledged tool. Accordingly, simulations are best suited to investigate the various research strategies in different sciences more carefully. To this end, I focus on the function of simulations in the research process. Finally, a somewhat detailed case-study from nuclear physics is presented which, in my view, illustrates elements of a typical simulation in physics. (shrink)

Elliot Eisner has spent the last 40 years researching, thinking and writing about some of the key and enduring issues in Arts Education, Curriculum Studies and Qualitative Research. He has contributed over 20 books and 500 articles to the field. In this book, Professor Eisner has compiled a career-long collection of his finest pieces-extracts from books, key articles, salient research findings and major theoretical contributions-so the world can read them in a single manageable volume. Starting with a specially written (...) Introduction, which gives an overview of Professor Eisner's career and contextualizes his selection, the chapters cover a wide range of issues, including: · Children and art · The use of educational connoisseurship · Aesthetic modes of knowing · Absolutism and relativism in curriculum theory · Education reform and the ecology of schooling · The future of education research This is a must-have book for anyone wishing to know more about the development of Arts Education, Curriculum Studies and Qualitative Research over the last four decades, and about Elliot Eisner's contribution to these exciting fields. This book is part of the World Library of Educationalists series, which celebrates the contributions made to education by leading figures. Each scholar has selected his or her own key writings from across numerous books and journal articles, and often spread across two or more decades to be presented in a single volume. Through these books, readers can chase up the themes and strands that have been lodged in a lifetime's work, and so follow the development of these scholars' contributions to the field, as well as the development of the fields themselves. Other scholars included in the series: Richard Aldrich, Stephen J. Ball, John Elliott, Howard Gardner, John Gilbert, Ivor F. Goodson, David Hargreaves, David Labaree, E.C. Wragg, John White. (shrink)

The early twentieth century witnessed a shift in the way philosophers of science thought about traditional 'problems of induction'. Keynes championed the idea that Hume's Problem was not a problem about causation (which had been the traditional reading of Hume) but rather a problem about induction. Moreover, Keynes (and later Nicod) viewed such problems as having both logical and epistemological components. Hempel picked up where Keynes and Nicod left off, by formulating a rigorous formal theory of inductive logic. This spawned (...) a new branch of philosophy of science called confirmation theory. Hempel's theory of confirmation was based on a few very simple (and seemingly plausible) assumptions about (instantial) 'inductive-logical support'. However, as Hempel himself was keenly aware, even such simple and seemingly plausible assumptions give rise to various puzzles and paradoxes. The two most famous paradoxes of confirmation were discovered by Hempel and Goodman. This article discusses Hempel's paradox (which is known as 'the' paradox of confirmation, since it was discovered first). However, many of the historical developments surrounding Hempel's paradox (also known as the 'raven paradox') are also crucial for understanding Goodman's later ('grue') paradox. Author Recommends: Branden Fitelson, 'The Paradox of Confirmation', Philosophy Compass 1/1 (2006): 95–113, doi: [DOI link]. In this article, I explain how the inconsistency between Hempel's intuitive resolution and his official theory of confirmation affects the historical dialectic about the paradox and how it illuminates the nature of confirmation. After the survey, I argue that Hempel's intuitions about the paradox of confirmation were basically correct, and that it is his theory that should be rejected, in favor of a (broadly) Bayesian account of confirmation. C. G. Hempel, 'Studies in the Logic of Confirmation' (I and II), Mind 54 (1945): 1–26, 97–121, dois: [DOI link]; [DOI link]. This is the locus classicus of traditional (instantial) confirmation theory. It is here that original motivations for, traditional approaches to, and paradoxes of confirmation are discussed in depth for the first time, under the rubric 'confirmation theory'. Hempel's discussion (which picks up where Keynes and Nicod left off) is chock full of crucial historical, logical, and epistemological insights. J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London: Macmillan, 1921). Keynes does not get enough credit in this context. But, basically, chapters 18 to 23 of this classic book planted the seeds for almost all of modern confirmation theory. Nicod and Hempel (as well as Hosiasson-Lindenbaum, Carnap, and others) were, basically, just picking-up where Keynes left off. J. Nicod, The Logical Problem of Induction (1923), reprinted in Foundations of Geometry and Induction (London: Routledge, 2000). Nicod's essay expands upon Keynes's work. Nicod is the first to use the term 'confirmation', in connection with a relation of 'inductive-logical support'. Nicod endorses several key confirmation-theoretic principles (which were already advanced by Keynes). In the hands of Hempel, Nicod's work later becomes an important historical foil. J. Hosiasson–Lindenbaum, 'On Confirmation', Journal of Symbolic Logic 5 (1940): 133–48. This essay contains most (if not all) of the basic ingredients of the 'Bayesian' approaches to the paradox of confirmation that appeared later. It also sheds much light on an important dispute between Keynes and Nicod concerning one of the claims Keynes makes (in his Treatise) about 'long-run convergence' in certain (instantial) confirmation-theoretic problems. This paper also contains one of the earliest rigorous axiomatizations of conditional (subjective or logical) probability. R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1950). This is Carnap's encyclopaedic work on inductive logic and probability. There is a tremendous amount of wisdom in here. For present purposes, the sections on Hempel's theory of confirmation (in contrast to probabilistic approaches to confirmation, such as Hosiasson–Lindenbaum's and Carnap's) are probably most important and salient (see §§87–8). I. J. Good, 'The Paradox of Confirmation', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (1960): 145–9. C. Chihara, 'Quine and the Confirmational Paradoxes', in Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Vol. 6: The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, eds. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 425–52. J. Earman, Bayes or Bust: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), specifically: pp. 63–73. R. M. Royall, Statistical Evidence: A Likelihood Paradigm (New York, NY: Chapman & Hall, 1997), specifically: the Appendix on 'The Paradox of the Ravens'. C. McKenzie and L. Mikkelsen, 'The Psychological Side of Hempel's Paradox of Confirmation', Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 7 (2000): 360–6. P. Maher, 'Probability Captures the Logic of Scientific Confirmation', in Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Christopher Hitchcock (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 69–93. P. Vranas, 'Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2004): 545–60. This is a list of seven of my favourite papers on the paradox of confirmation, since 1950 (listed in chronological order). Most of these are coming from a broadly 'Bayesian' perspective. In particular, I recommend Vranas as a good starting point here. Online Materials: http://fitelson.org/probability/ Probability & Induction (PHIL 148, UC-Berkeley, Spring 2008) This is the Web site for an undergraduate course on probability and induction that I taught at UC-Berkeley in Spring 2008. Much of the course focuses on confirmation theory (including the paradoxes of confirmation). There are many links there to lecture notes, papers, books and other salient online resources. http://fitelson.org/confirmation/ Confirmation (graduate seminar, UC-Berkeley, Fall 2007) This is the Web site for a graduate seminar on confirmation that I taught at UC-Berkeley in Fall 2007. This seminar is a historical trace of induction/confirmation, from Aristotle to Goodman (mostly, focusing on the 20th century and the paradoxes of confirmation). Sample Syllabus: See the online syllabi for Confirmation and/or Probability & Induction (above). Note: those online syllabi contain electronic copies of many of the salient readings. (shrink)

Three clusters of philosophically significant issues arise from Frege's discussions of definitions. First, Frege criticizes the definitions of mathematicians of his day, especially those of Weierstrass and Hilbert. Second, central to Frege's philosophical discussion and technical execution of logicism is the so-called Hume's Principle, considered in The Foundations of Arithmetic . Some varieties of neo-Fregean logicism are based on taking this principle as a contextual definition of the operator 'the number of …', and criticisms of such neo-Fregean programs sometimes appeal (...) to Frege's objections to contextual definitions in later writings. Finally, a critical question about the definitions on which Frege's proofs of the laws of arithmetic depend is whether the logical structures of the definientia reflect our pre-Fregean understanding of arithmetical terms. It seems that unless they do, it is unclear how Frege's proofs demonstrate the analyticity of the arithmetic in use before logicism. Yet, especially in late writings, Frege characterizes the definitions as arbitrary stipulations of the senses or references of expressions unrelated to pre-definitional understanding. One or more of these topics may be studied in a survey course in the philosophy of mathematics or a course on Frege's philosophy. The latter two topics are obviously central in a seminar in the philosophy of mathematics in general or more specialized seminars on logicism, or on mathematical definitions and concept formation. Author Recommends: 1. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason . Trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 [1781, 1787], A7-10/B11-14, A151/B190. In the first Critique , Kant appears to give four distinct accounts of analytic judgments. The initial famous account explains analyticity in terms of the predicate-concept belonging to the subject-concept (A6–7/B11). In this passage, we also find an account of establishing analytic judgments on the basis of conceptual containments and the principle of non-contradiction. (The other accounts are in terms of 'identity' (A7/B1l), in terms of the explicative–ampliative contrast (A7/B11), and by reference to the notion of 'cognizability in accordance with the principle of contradiction' (A151/B190).) 2. Frege, Gottlob. The Foundations of Arithmetic . Trans. J. L. Austin. 2nd ed. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1980 [1884], especially sections 1–4, 87–91. Frege here criticizes and reformulates Kant's account of analyticity. Central to Frege's account is the provability of an analytic statement on the basis of (Frege's) logic and definitions that express analyses of (mathematical, especially arithmetical) concepts. 3. Frege, Gottlob. Review of E. G. Husserl. 'Philosophie der Arithmetik I [1894],' in Frege, Collected Papers . Ed. B. McGuinness. Trans. M. Black et al. Oxford: Blackwell, 1984. 195–209. In this review, Frege responds to Husserl's charge that Frege's definitions fail to capture our intuitive pre-analytic arithmetical concepts by claiming that the adequacy of mathematical definitions is measured, not by their expressing the same senses, but merely by their having the same references, as pre-definitional vocabulary. It follows not only that Husserl's criticism is unfounded, but also that there can be alternative, equally legitimate, definitions of mathematical terms. 4. Frege, 'Logic in Mathematics,' in Frege, Posthumous Writings . Trans. P. Long and R. White. Oxford: Blackwell, 1979 [1914]. 203–50. These are a set of lecture notes including, among other things, an account of proper definitions as mere abbreviation of complex signs by simple ones, in contrast to definitions which purport to express the analyses of existing concepts. Frege here claims that if there is any doubt whether a definition purporting to express an analysis succeeds in capturing the senses of the pre-definitional expressions, then the definition fails as an analysis, and should be regarded as the introduction of an entirely new expression abbreviating the definiens . 5. Picardi, Eva. 'Frege on Definition and Logical Proof,' Temi e Prospettive della Logica e della Filosofia della Scienza Contemporanee . i vol. Eds. C. Cellucci and G. Sambin. Bologna: Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria Editrice Bologna, 1988. 227–30. Picardi sets out forcefully the view that unless Frege's definitions capture the meanings of existing arithmetical terms, his logicism cannot have the epistemological significance he takes it to have. 6. Dummett, Michael. 'Frege and the Paradox of Analysis,' in Dummett, Frege and other Philosophers . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 17–52. Dummett agrees with Picardi's view and analyzes the philosophical pressures that led Frege to the account of definition in 'Logic in Mathematics.' Especially significant is Dummett's claim of the centrality of the transparency of sense – that if one grasps the senses of any two expressions, one must know whether they have the same sense – in Frege's account. 7. Benacerraf, Paul. 'Frege: The Last Logicist,' Midwest Studies in Philosophy . vol. 6. Eds. P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981. 17–35. Frege's aims, on Benacerraf's reading, are primarily mathematical. Frege was interested in traditional philosophical issues such as the analyticity of arithmetic only to the extent that they can be exploited for the mathematical goal of proving previously unproven arithmetical statements. Hence, Frege never had any serious interest in or need for showing that his definitions of arithmetical terms reflect existing arithmetical conceptions. 8. Weiner, Joan. 'The Philosopher Behind the Last Logicist,' in Frege: Tradition and Influence . Ed. C. Wright. Oxford: Blackwell, 1984. 57–79. Weiner argues that on Frege's view, prior to his definitions of arithmetical terms the references of such expressions are in fact not known by those who use arithmetical vocabulary. Thus, in Foundations , Frege operated with a 'hidden agenda' (263) namely, replacing existing arithmetic with a new science based on stipulative definitions that assign new senses to key arithmetical terms. 9. Tappenden, Jamie. 'Extending Knowledge and 'Fruitful Concepts': Fregean Themes in the Foundations of Mathematics.' Noûs 29 (1995): 427–67. Tappenden argues that Frege takes his crucial innovation over previous practices and accounts of mathematical concept formation to be the role of quantificational structure made possible by his logical discoveries. 10. Horty, John. Frege on Definitions: A Case Study of Semantic Content . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. A useful interpretation of Frege's views of definition, together with suggestive extensions for resolving the issues framing Frege's views. 11. Shieh, Sanford. 'Frege on Definitions,' Philosophy Compass 3/5 (2008): 992–1012. A more detailed account of Frege's views on definition and the philosophical issues they raise, surveying and discussing critically the main substantive and interpretive issues. Online Materials On Frege http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege/ On the Paradox of Analysis http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/ Sample Syllabus The following is a 3-week module that can be incorporated into fairly focused historically oriented graduate-level seminars on logicism or on the paradox of analysis. It is also possible to compress the material into 2 weeks in an undergraduate or graduate class Frege's thought in general. Week I: Background, Kant on Analyticity; Definition in Foundations , Review of Husserl, and 'Logic in Mathematics' Readings Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason , A7–10/B11–14. Frege, Gottlob. The Foundations of Arithmetic , sections 1–4, 87–91. Frege, Gottlob. Review of E. G. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik I. Frege, Gottlob. 'Logic in Mathematics.' Optional Proops, Ian. 'Kant's Conception of Analytic Judgment,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXX, 3 (2005): 588–612. Week II: The Supposed Paradox of Analysis, Picardi and Dummett; Bypassing Traditional Epistemological Issues About Mathematics, Benacerraf Readings Picardi, Eva. 'Frege on Definition and Logical Proof.' Dummett, Michael. 'Frege and the Paradox of Analysis.' Benacerraf, Paul. 'Frege: The Last Logicist.' Optional Tappenden, Jamie. 'Extending Knowledge and 'Fruitful Concepts': Fregean Themes in the Foundations of Mathematics.' Week III: Weiner's Hidden Agenda Interpretation Readings Weiner, Joan. 'The Philosopher Behind the Last Logicist.' Optional Weiner, Joan. Frege in Perspective . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990. Focus Questions 1. To what extent is Frege's account of analyticity in Foundations a rejection, and to what extent an updating, of Kant's view of analyticity? 2. According to Picardi it 'would be incomprehensible' how Frege's proofs tells us anything about the arithmetic we already have unless his 'definitions [are] somehow responsible to the meaning of [arithmetical] sentences as these are understood' (228). Why does she hold this? Why does Dummett agree with her? Do you think Frege's logicism needs to address this worry? 3. What are the major differences and continuities in Frege's discussions of definition in mathematics in Foundations , the review of Husserl and 'Logic in Mathematics'? 4. Frege writes that definitions must prove their worth by being fruitful. He also says that nothing can be proven using a proper definition that cannot be proven without it. Are these claims consistent? Why or why not? 5. Weiner held that in Foundations Frege had 'hidden agenda.' What, according to her, is this agenda? How does this fit with Frege's later views of definition? 6. What are Frege's main complaints about Weierstrass's definitions in 'Logic in Mathematics'? Are these criticisms consistent with Frege's account of 'definition proper' in the same text? Seminar/Project Ideas What, if anything, is the relation between Frege's critique of Hilbert's use of definitions and Frege's later views of definitions? (shrink)

Genes cannot be selfish or unselfish, any more than atoms can be jealous, elephants abstract or biscuits teleological. This should not need mentioning, but Richard DawkinsÂ’s book The Selfish Gene has succeeded in confusing a number of people about it, including Mr J. L. Mackie.[1] What Mackie welcomes in Dawkins is a new, biological-looking kind of support for philosophic egoism. If this support came from DawkinsÂ’s producing important new facts, or good new interpretations of old facts, about animal life, this (...) could be very interesting. Dawkins, however, simply has a weakness for the old game of Brocken-spectre moralizing - the one where the player strikes attitudes on a peak at sunrise, gazes awe-struck at his gigantic shadow on the clouds, and reports his observations as cosmic truths. He is an uncritical philosophic egoist in the first place, and merely feeds the egoist assumption into his a priori biological speculations, only rarely glancing at the relevant facts of animal behaviour and genetics, and ignoring their failure to support him. There is nothing empirical about Dawkins. Critics have repeatedly pointed out that his notions of genetics are unworkable.[2] I shall come to this point later, but I shall not begin with it, because, damning though it is, it may seem to some people irrelevant to his main contention. It is natural for a reader to suppose that his over-simplified drama about genes is just a convenient stylistic device, because it seems obvious that the personification of them must be just a metaphor. Indeed he himself sometimes says that it is so. But in fact this personification, in its literal sense, is essential for his whole contention; without it he is bankrupt. His central point is that the emotional nature of man is exclusively selfinterested, and he argues this by claiming that all emotional nature is so. Since the emotional nature of animals clearly is not exclusively self-interested, nor based on any long-term calculation at all, he resorts to arguing from speculations about the emotional nature of genes, which he treats as the source and archetype of all emotional nature.. (shrink)

Recently theorists have demonstrated a growing interest in the ethical aspects of resource allocation in international non-governmental humanitarian, development and human rights organizations (INGOs). This article provides an analysis of Thomas Pogge's proposal for how international human rights organizations ought to choose which projects to fund. Pogge's allocation principle states that ?an INGO should govern its decision making about candidate projects by such rules and procedures as are expected to maximize its long-run cost-effectiveness, defined as the expected aggregate moral (...) value of the projects it undertakes divided by the expected aggregate cost of these projects? (2007. Moral priorities for international human rights NGOs. In Ethics in action, ed. D. Bell and J. Coicaud, 218?56. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 241). I critique Pogge's argument on two fronts: (1) I demonstrate that his view is problematic on his own terms, even if we accept the cost-effectiveness framework he employs. (2) I take issue with his overall approach because it generates results which can undermine the integrity of INGOs. Further, his approach mis-characterizes the nature of INGOs, and this mistake is at the root of his problematic view of INGO priority-setting. Ultimately, I argue for a conception of INGOs in which they are understood as ?organizations of principle?, in the sense that they are independent moral agents and so should be permitted a fairly wide sphere of autonomy within reasonable moral constraints. (shrink)

We live in interesting times. Two well-known biologists — E. O. Wilson and Richard Dawkins — and some of their well-known colleagues, who used to employ broadly similar selection models, now deeply disagree over the role of group selection in the evolution of eusociality (or so we argue). Yet they describe their models as interchangeable. As philosophers of biology, we wonder whether there is substantial (i.e., empirical) disagreement here at all, and, if there is, what is this disagreement about? We (...) argue that a substantial disagreement over the processes that caused eusociality best explains this debate, yet the common practice of using overarching definitions for “group selection” and “kin selection” renders empirical differences difficult to detect. We suggest Michael J. Wade’s use of these terms as a basis for models that reveal different selection processes. Wade’s models predict different outcomes for different processes and thus can be tested. (shrink)

God Owes Us Nothing reflects on the centuries-long debate in Christianity: how do we reconcile the existence of evil in the world with the goodness of an omnipotent God, and how does God's omnipotence relate to people's responsibility for their own salvation or damnation. Leszek Kolakowski approaches this paradox as both an exercise in theology and in revisionist Christian history based on philosophical analysis. Kolakowski's unorthodox interpretation of the history of modern Christianity provokes renewed discussion about the historical, intellectual, (...) and cultural omnipotence of neo-Augustinianism. "Several books a year wrestle with that hoary conundrum, but few so dazzlingly as the Polish philosopher's latest."--Carlin Romano, Washington Post Book World "Kolakowski's fascinating book and its debatable thesis raise intriguing historical and theological questions well worth pursuing."--Stephen J. Duffy, Theological Studies "Kolakowski's elegant meditation is a masterpiece of cultural and religious criticism."--Henry Carrigan, Cleveland Plain Dealer. (shrink)

The origin of paraconsistent logic is closely related with the argument, 'from the assertion of two mutually contradictory statements any other statement can be deduced'; this can be referred to as ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet (ECSQ). Despite its medieval origin, only by the 1930s did it become the main reason for the unfeasibility of having contradictions in a deductive system. The purpose of this article is to study what happened earlier: from Principia Mathematica to that time, when it became well (...) established. The two main historical claims that I am going to advance are the following: (1) the first explicit use of ECSQ as the main argument for supporting the necessity of excluding any contradiction from deductive systems is to be found in the first edition of the book Grundz ge der Theoretischen Logik (Hilbert, D. and Ackermann, W. 1928. Grundz ge der Theoretischen Logik . Berlin: Julius Springer Verlag); (2) ukasiewicz's position regarding the logical constraints against contradictions varies considerably from his studies on the principle of (non-) contradiction in Aristotle, published in 1910 and what is stated in his 'authorized lectured notes' on mathematical logic that appeared in 1929. The two texts are: 1) a paper in German ( ukasiewicz, J. 1910. ' ber den Satz des Widerspruchs bei Aristotles'. Bulletin International de l'Acad mie des sciences de Cracovie, Classe d'Histoire et de Philosophie, pp. 15-38) [English translation: ukasiewicz, J. 1971. 'On the principle of contradiction in Aristotle', Review of Metaphysics , XXIV , 485-509]; and 2) a book in Polish. ukasiewicz, J. 1910. O zasadzie sprzecznosci u Aristotelesa Studium krytyczne , Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe [German translation: ukasiewicz, J. 1993. ber den Satz des Widerspruchs bei Aristotles . Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag]. The lecture notes were then published as a book ( ukasiewicz, J. 1958. Elementy Logiki Matematycznej . Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe [PWN] and then translated into English ( ukasiewicz, J. 1963. Elements of Mathematical Logic. Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press/The Macmillan Company) . The second half of this article will concentrate on ukasiewicz's position on ECSQ. This will lead me to propose that to regard him as a forerunner of paraconsistent logic by virtue of those early writings is accurate only if his book published in Polish is considered but not if the analysis is restricted to the paper originally published in German (as has been the case for the principal reconstructions of the history of paraconsistent logic). Furthermore, I will stress that in the 1929 book he presented one formalization of ECSQ as an axiom for sentential calculus and, also, he used ECSQ to defend the necessity of consistency, apparently independently of Hilbert and Ackermann's book. At the end, I will suggest that the aim of twentieth century usage of ECSQ was to change from the centuries-long philosophical discussion about contradictions to a more 'technical' one. But with paraconsistent logic viewed as a technical solution to this restriction, then, the philosophical problem revives but having now at one's disposal an improved understanding of it. Finally, ukasiewicz's two different positions about ECSQ open an interesting question about the history of paraconsistent logic: do we have to attempt a consistent reconstruction of it, or are we prepared to admit inconsistencies within it? (shrink)

J. W. Goethe is well known as one of the world's greatest poets. Some are also aware that throughout his long and active life Goethe devoted much of his time to natural science. His theory of colour and studies in the morphology of plants are acknowledged contributions in their fields. What is much less known is that in his scientific work Goethe was attempting to elaborate and justify a new basic methodology for the natural sciences. He opposed and wished (...) to refute the one-sided quantitative-mechanistic method which had been dominant since Galileo and Newton (and in principle still prevails today) and to set up against it a qualitative method. An essential characteristic of this qualitative method, according to Goethe, is that it is immune to a Humean reduction of the status of 'natural laws' to mere hypotheses. This claim makes Goethe's view directly relevant for current discussion of such questions as the status of scientific 'laws' and the correct method of theory construction. The present essay tries to show the fruitfulness of Goethe's view for such discussions, partly by means of an exposition of the view — drawn from various works — and partly by drawing consequences from it which bring it into direct contact with contemporary discussions in philosophy of science. (shrink)

What does it mean to practice socially responsible science on controversial issues? In a fresh turn focussing on the neuroscientists’ responsibility in producing knowledge about politically charged subjects, Chalfin et al. (Am J Bioethics 8(1):1–2, 2008) caution neuroscientists to be careful about how they present their findings lest their results be used to support unfounded biases, social stereotypes and prejudices. Weisberg et al. (J Cogn Neurosci 20(3):470–477, 2008) discuss the allure of neuroscience explanations and demonstrate how laypersons easily accept dubious (...) claims as long as (even non-relevant) neuroscientific descriptions are provided. Fine (2010) exposes the use of scientific evidence in propagating outdated gender myths by popular writers and discusses the infiltration of these prejudices into popular belief, folk culture and lifestyle. This paper discusses ways in which the ‘neuroscience of gender difference’ itself inadvertently contributes to normalising socially constructed theories about sex difference in cognitive performance. This unpremeditated effect has evident implications on the structuring of society because gender relations cut across social, political and economic boundaries. We present a theoretical reflection of factors that could interact with the scientists’ attempted objective evaluation of the subject, the methods and some principle problems, and we engage a science studies approach as our methodological tool. Our object of critique is drawn from the research on spatial abilities that articulate the dissention pertaining to sex differences in intellectual capacity. (shrink)

Un des principaux enjeux de la théorie du jugement de Russell consistait à élaborer une théorie qui n’engage pas à admettre des entités complexes vraies, fausses ou inexistantes tels que les objectifs meinongiens. Dans l’etude du débat entre Russell et Wittgenstein sur cette théorie, on n’a jamais sérieusement envisagé que Wittgenstein n’ait pas suivi Russell sur cette question et qu’il ait plutôt adopteune position plus proche de celle de Meinong. Dans cet article, j’aborde cette question et soutiens que Wittgenstein a (...) trouvé la solution aux problèmes posés par la théorie du jugement de Russell dans la théorie de l’image et qu’il a longuement hésité dans les Carnets entre des versions de la théorie de l’image en accord avec la position de Russell et des versions en accord avec celle de Meinong. Enfin, je soutiens qu’il a finalement tranché la question dans le Tractatus en optant pour une théorie du type de celle privilégiée par Meinong.One of the main challenges faced by Russell’s theory of judgement was to provide a satisfactory account of judgement that was not committed to the existence of true, false, or non-existent complex entities such as Meinongian objectives. In the study of the Russell-Wittgenstein debate on that theory, scholars never considered the idea that Wittgenstein might not have followed Russell on that issue. In this article, I address that question and hold, first, that problems raised by Russell’s theory of judgement find their solution in the picture theory. Then, I show that Wittgenstein hesitated for a long period of time in the Notebooks between a version of his solution which is committed to the existence of possible (non-existing) complex entities and one which is not. Finally, I argue that he did, along with Meinong, go for a committing version in the Tractatus. (shrink)

Bryan Norton's convergence hypothesis, which predicts that nonanthropocentric and human-based philosophical positions will actually converge on long-sighted, multi-value environmental policy, has drawn a number of criticisms from within environmental philosophy. In particular, nonanthropocentric theorists like J. Baird Callicott and Laura Westra have rejected the accuracy of Norton's thesis, refusing to believe that his model's contextual appeals to a plurality of human and environmental values will be able adequately to provide for the protection of ecological integrity. These theoretical (...) criticisms of convergence, however, have made no real attempt to engage the empirical validity of the hypothesis, the dimension that Norton clearly takes to be the centerpiece of his project. Accordingly, the present paper attempts to provide an empirical analysis of the convergence argument, by means of a study of the Vermont public's environmental commitments and their attitudes toward national forest policy. Our findings support a generalized version of Norton's thesis, and lead us to suggest that environmental philosophers should try to be more inclusive and empirically minded in their discussions about public moral claims regarding nature. (shrink)

In 2008 I published I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies with Cambridge University Press. I Was Wrong provides a nuanced framework for the ethical meanings of apologies from individuals and collectives, considering along the way the historical and cultural traditions that inform modern acts of contrition. I have discussed I Was Wrong on NPR (an hour-long interview with Diane Rehm), CNN, BBC, CBC, Philosophy Talk, and various other national and international programs.I am now working on the follow-up (...) book, tentatively titled Apologies in Law and also under contract with Cambridge University Press. Apologies in Law will apply the framework for the ethical meanings of apologies from I Was Wrong to acts of contrition in civil and criminal law. As a recently tenured J.D./Ph.D. experienced as a litigator in a major Manhattan law firm and as a staff attorney for the U.S. Court of Appeals, I hope to use my upcoming sabbatical to complete a draft of Apologies in Law. I will revise and polish the draft during the summer of 2009. (shrink)

Theoria , the international Swedish philosophy journal, was founded in 1935. Its contributors in the first 75 years include the major Swedish philosophers from this period and in addition a long list of international philosophers, including A. J. Ayer, C. D. Broad, Ernst Cassirer, Hector Neri Castañeda, Arthur C. Danto, Donald Davidson, Nelson Goodman, R. M. Hare, Carl G. Hempel, Jaakko Hintikka, Saul Kripke, Henry E. Kyburg, Keith Lehrer, Isaac Levi, David Lewis, Gerald MacCallum, Richard Montague, Otto Neurath, Arthur (...) N. Prior, W. V. Quine, Nicholas Rescher, Ernest Sosa, Robert C. Stalnaker, P. F. Strawson, Patrick Suppes, Johan van Benthem, Georg Henrik von Wright and many others. Hempel's confirmation paradoxes, Ross's deontic paradox, Montague's universal grammar and Lindström's theorem are among the contributions to philosophy that were first published in Theoria. (shrink)

A concert pianist the second author videotaped herself learning J.S. Bach's Italian Concerto Presto , and commented on the problems she encountered as she practised. Approximately two years later the pianist wrote out the first page of the score from memory. The pianist's verbal reports indicated that in the early sessions she identified and memorised the formal structure of the piece, and in the later sessions she practised using this organisation to retrieve the memory cues that controlled her playing. The (...) practice and recall data supported this account. Both were organised by the formal structure of the music. Practice segments were more likely to start and stop at boundaries of the formal structure than at other locations, and recall was higher for the beginnings of sections than for later portions. Like other forms of expert memory, pianistic memory appears to be based on use of a highly practised retrieval scheme which permits rapid retrieval of information from long-term memory. (shrink)

Physicist J. Richard Gott uses the Copernican principle that “we are not special” to make predictions about the future lifetime of the human race, based on how long the human race has been in existence so far. We show that the predictions which can be derived from Gott’s argument are less strong than one might be inclined to believe, that Gott’s argument illegitimately assumes that the human race will not last forever, that certain versions of Gott’s argument are incompatible (...) with Bayesian conditionalization, and that Gott’s argument is self-refuting. (shrink)

A sermon on the wonders of creation? "But I don't know if I believe in creation any more, since I've been studying evolution in school," "Well, you do still think that Earth is a wonderland, don't you? Is there anything you have learned in your biology class that has talked you out of that?" The college student home for Easter puzzles a moment. "Not really. You know, I was wondering during the last lecture before I left. Wow! How is it (...) that DNA has generated such a wealth of biodiversity on Earth?" Nature on Earth has spun quite a story, going from zero through several billion species, evolving microbes into persons. M. J. Benton concludes: "Analysis of the fossil record of microbes, algae, fungi, protists, plants, and animals shows that the diversity of both marine and continental life-increased exponentially since the end of the Precambrian."1 Andrew H. Knoll celebrates "Earth's immense evolutionary epic": "The scientific account of life's long history abounds in both narrative verve and mystery."2.. (shrink)

The topic of synthetic life has long been a subject for science fiction writers, philosophers, and even scientists. With the announcement in 2010 by renowned biologist J. Craig Venter that he and a team of scientists from the J. Craig Venter Institute (JCVI) had created a bacterial cell with chemically synthesized genome, discussions of synthetic life were no longer just conjecture.Humans had assembled nonliving components to make a living cell (Gibson et al. 2010). I was one of the leaders (...) of that endeavor, and this article will be a first-person account of how we made our cell, along with my conjectures about what will come next in the new fields of synthetic biology and synthetic genomics.Scanning electron .. (shrink)

The problems of the social responsibility of the scientist became a subject of public debate after the World War II in Japan, thanks to the activities and publications of Yukawa and Tomonaga. And such authors as J. Karaki, M.Taketani, Y. Murakami, and S. Fujinaga continued discussion in their books. However, many people seem to be still unaware of the most important source of these problems. As I see it, one of the most important treatments of these problems was the Franck (...) Report (June 11, 1945) submitted to the US government by James Franck (chairman) toward the end of the war. This Report contains many important ideas and suggestions as regards the responsibility of the scientist, the morality of the use of atomic bombs, the prospective nuclear armaments race, and the possibility of international control of nuclear power. However, I should like to concentrate only on the first topic in this paper. Why did Franck and his committee at Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago feel the urgent need for writing and submitting this Report? According to the Report, "in the past, scientists could disclaim direct responsibility for the use to which mankind had put their disinterested discoveries. We cannot take the same attitude now because the success which we have achieved in the development of nuclear power is fraught with infinitely greater dangers than were all the inventions of the past." (I. Preamble) This passage seems to contain the crux of our problem: These scientists clearly recognize the "new" responsibility for them, and the ground of this responsibility is also clear enough; i.e., when a new scientific discovery or invention turns out to have grave bearings on human interests, the scientists who became aware of that are responsible for notifying people of this and advise to look for suitable means for avoiding prospective dangers. In the rest of the paper, I elaborate the reasoning behind the preceding passage, and confirm that basically the same idea and reasoning has been repeated and developed in Russell-Einstein Manifesto (1955), by Pugwash Conferences (first in 1957), by Tomogana, and by Rotblat (the long-time Secretary of Pugwash, who received the Nobel Peace Prize together with the Conference in 1995). (shrink)

A sequel to Shapin’s earlier work, The Scientific Life: A Moral History of a Late Modern Vocation again solves the problem of induction by observing that researchers are decent. Shapin dismisses most of the literature on both the philosophy of science and (more so) on the sociology of science as ideologically biased and as irrelevant. Approaches to the book as light reading and as serious scholarly reading are considered before a critical summary is offered as a conclusion.

Suppose for a moment, that J.R.R. Tolkien, the famous author of the cult fantasy saga Lord of the Rings, did not publish anything of his writings during his lifetime; suppose that after his death the manuscripts of all his writings are lying on his table. Where, then, is the Middlearth, the glorious land of hobbits, dwarfs, elfs and human heroes, situated? We might be tempted to say that it is within our world, namely inside the pile of the papers on (...) the writer’s table - for it exists solely through the letters written on these papers. However, to say this would be wrong (or at least strongly misleading) - surely we do not expect that should the heroes of the book walk in a straight line long enough, they would cross the boundaries of the book and appear in Mr. Tolkien’s room. Middlearth is, of course, not within our world - despite existing solely due to certain things which are within it. Now the situation is not substantially different actually, when Middlearth does not exist solely through a single pile of papers, but rather through millions of printed copies of Tolkien’s books and through the minds of millions of their readers. Again, the land exists exclusively through the existence of entities which are parts of our world (albeit that they are now scattered throughout the whole Earth), but this does not mean that the land itself is a part of our world. The point of this anecdotal excursion is now that this relationship between our world and Middlearth is, in a sense, similar to the relationship between our physical space of things and „the space of reasons“ (Sellars, 1956, §36); or between „the causal story“ and „the justificatory story“ (Rorty, 1991, 148). Like Middlearth, the space of reasons exists exclusively due to us, humans, and our minds (and perhaps also of some of our artifacts), and in this sense we might be tempted to situate it in our world, to see it as a certain, perhaps scattered, compartment of the world of things within which we live; but just as in the case of Middlearth, this might be dangerously misguiding.. (shrink)

This book successfully achieves to serve two different purposes. On the one hand, it is a readable physics-based introduction into the philosophy of science, written in an informal and accessible style. The author, himself a professor of physics at the University of Notre Dame and active in the philosophy of science for almost twenty years, carefully develops his metatheoretical arguments on a solid basis provided by an extensive survey along the lines of the historical development of physics. On the other (...) hand, this book supplies one long argument for Cushing´s own attitude in the philosophy of science. While former studies of the author, from which this book draws in part, focused each on one special episode in the history of science, this book gathers case material from many different parts of physics and epochs. The main goal of this book is ”to impress upon the reader the essential and ineliminable role that philosophical considerations have played in the actual practice of science” (p. xv). The book is beautifully edited and produced; it contains a wealth of illustrative figures, well-chosen short quotations from original sources and contemporary commentators (some longer quotations are relegated in an appendix at the end of a chapter) and does not dispense with insightful mathematical arguments in the main text (some advanced deductions are, however, relegated in the appendices). It contains nine parts, whereas only the first and the last one are exclusively devoted to philosophical issues. The seven remaining parts, each subdivided into three chapters, centre around one major episode (a theory, a world view, etc.) in the history of physics. The author presents this material in a clear and philosophically unbiased way so that also readers who do not share Cushing’s subsequent philosophical conclusions will find this inspiring book extremely useful. Part 1 (”The scientific enterprise”) discusses some traditional (”objectivist”) views concerning the status of scientific knowledge, ”the” scientific method, and the relation.... (shrink)

This work is the latest contribution to the Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers series edited by Jonathan Barnes and A. A. Long. As with the earlier volumes (John Dillon's Alcinous, The Handbook of Platonism , R. J. Hankinson's Galen, On the Therapeutic Method Books I and II, Richard Bett's Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists , and D. L. Blank's Sextus Empiricus, Against the Grammarians ), D(obbin) provides an introduction, an English translation, and a critical commentary predominantly focused on the philosophical (...) content of the text of an author from the period ranging from the first century BC to the fifth century AD. A bibliography of a dozen earlier editions of E(pictetus), a painstaking bibliography of secondary literature, an index nominum, a generous index locorum, and a brief subject index are also included. Overall this edition maintains the high standards characteristic of the CLAP series. (shrink)

This work is the latest contribution to the Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers series edited by Jonathan Barnes and A. A. Long. As with the earlier volumes (John Dillon's Alcinous, The Handbook of Platonism , R. J. Hankinson's Galen, On the Therapeutic Method Books I and II, Richard Bett's Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists, and D. L. Blank's Sextus Empiricus, Against the Grammarians), D(obbin) provides an introduction, an English translation, and a critical commentary predominantly focused on the philosophical content of (...) the text of an author from the period ranging from the first century BC to the fifth century AD. A bibliography of a dozen earlier editions of E(pictetus), a painstaking bibliography of secondary literature, an index nominum, a generous index locorum, and a brief subject index are also included. Overall this edition maintains the high standards characteristic of the CLAP series. (shrink)

Iamblichus has long lived under the shadow of Plotinus. One can easily recognize this from the historiography of the Neoplatonic school starting, for example, with J.J. Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae (1742) and continuing with Hegel and 19th century historians like Simon and Vacherot in France, Kroll and Zeller in Germany. But from Praechter on Iamblichus was acknowledged more and more as an original thinker and the real systematizer of the late Neoplatonic School. We can see more clearly now that (...) the inclusion of theurgy into Neoplatonism does not mean a simple abandonment of philosophy or rational discourse, and that the discipline of textual exegesis does not negate the originality of the commentator. In Proclus, for one, these complementary strains are strongly present. In rebuilding the whole Platonic system, Iamblichus - the Chrysippus of Neoplatonism - skillfully incorporated elements like the Chaldean triads which were unknown to Plotinus, and presented a completely new account of the nature of theology. This feat shows a genius no less impressive, albeit of another type, than the one disclosed by Plotinus himself. (shrink)

Newell was a founder of artificial intelligence (AI) and a pioneer in the use of computer simulations in psychology. In collaboration with J. Cliff Shaw and Herbert A. <span class='Hi'>Simon</span>, Newell developed the first list-processing programming language as well as the earliest computer programs for simulating human problem solving. Over a long and prolific career, he contributed to many techniques, such as protocol analysis and heuristic search, that are now part of psychology and computer science. Colleagues remembered Newell for (...) his deep commitment to science, his care for details, and his inexhaustible energy. (shrink)

Some anthropocentrists, such as Bryan Norton, claim that intergenerational anthropocentrism provides the best rationale for protecting biodiversity. Some nonanthropocentrists, such as J. Baird Callicott and Eric Katz, disagree. In the present paper, I analyze different varieties of anthropocentrism, argue for adopting what is here called multicultural anthropocentrism, and then advance the following thesis of environmental synergism: combining multicultural anthropocentrism with nonanthropocentrism enables synergists to argue more cogently and effectively than either anthropocentrists or previous nonanthropocentrists for policies that both protect biodiversity (...) and maximize long-term welfare for human beings as a group. (shrink)

Ernst Mayr''s historical writings began in 1935 with his essay Bernard Altum and the territory theory and have continued up through his monumentalGrowth of Biological Thought (1982) and hisOne Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought (1991). Sweeping in their scope, forceful in their interpretation, enlisted on behalf of the clarification of modern concepts and of a broad view of biology, these writings provide both insights and challenges for the historian of biology. Mayr''s general intellectual (...) formation was guided by the GermanBildung ideal, with its emphasis on synthetic and comprehensive knowledge. His understanding of how to write history was inspired further by the example of the historian of ideas Arthur Lovejoy. Some strengths and limitations of this approach are explored here through attention to Mayr''s treatment of the French biologist J.-B. Lamarck. It is contended that Mayr''s contributions to the history of biology are not restricted to his own very substantial historical writings but also include his encouragement of other scholars, his development of an invaluable archive of scientific correspondence, and his insistence that historians who write about evolution and related subjects acquire an adequate understanding of the principles of Darwinian biology. (shrink)

A new theory for basic function in the nervous system has recently been proposed (Dempsher, J., 1979a, 1979b; 1980, 1981). The major basic themes of the new theory are as follows: (1) There are two fundamental units of structure and function, the fibre or conducting mechanism, and the neurocentre, where nervous system function as we know it takes place. (2) The nerve impulse is regarded as a mathematical event. The mathematics is the result of a prescribed fusion of energy and (...) matter. (3) Nervous system function everywhere in the nervous system is mathematical. In the fibre, the prescribed fusion of energy and matter results in a number. In the neurocentre, the prescribed fusion of energy and matter results in a mathematical function. Basic function in the nervous system everywhere requires a transformation of a nerve impulse in the fibre into a nerve impulse in the neurocentre with opposing properties: The nerve impulse in the fibre is confined to the fibre; cannot sum with another nerve impulse; can travel long distances with constant form and velocity; curvature in space and time are not significant features; and it is regarded as a number. On the other hand, the nerve impulse in the neurocentre is confined to the neurocentre; can sum with other nerve impulses; cannot travel long distances - even in a very short distance, it changes form; curvature in space and time is a very significant feature; and it is regarded as a mathematical function.The approach to determine how one form of the nerve impulse is transformed into the other at the input region is based on two of the differences listed above: (1) The nerve impulse in the fibre cannot sum with another nerve impulse in the fibre, whereas in the neurocentre, several nerve impulses sum to form a larger nerve impulse. (2) The nerve impulse in the fibre is regarded as a number, in the neurocentre, it is regarded as a mathematical function. The commonality of (1) and (2) is that the properties defining the nerve impulse in the fibre are associated with the property ofdiscreteness, whereas, the properties defining the nerve impulse in the neurocentre are associated with the property ofcontinuousness. Thus, the basic theme of unification of function at the input region of the neurocentre is the transformation of a phenomenon with the property of discreteness into a phenomenon with the property of continuousness. The solution to this transformation is approached from two directions:biologic andmathematical. In the biologic approach, the unit element of the nerve impulse in the fibre terminations (as.u. as a wave of energy, a spike in the classical theory) fuses with a. calcium-binding protein causing the release of Ca++. The calcium ions then combine with another protein. Associated with the second reaction is a conformational change in the Ca++-protein complex and the unit element in the neurocentre, bs.u., is emitted. Individual bs.u. then fuse with acetylcholine; summation occurs andwave b is emitted. In the mathematical approach, the nerve impulse as a number, is partitioned into two numbers with a precise rule relating these two numbers. One possibility suggested is that the number can be regarded as the value of a trigonometric function. This value then gives rise to an angle with sides related in a ratio or proportionality fashion — a relationship with the property of continuousness, as contrasted with that of a single number, discreteness. Both biologic and mathematical approaches are united so as to suggest that the mathematical (trigonometric) function arose as the result of a fusion of energy (as.u. as a wave of energy) and the calcium-binding protein as matter; following this reaction, bs.u., with opposing properties, is emitted. (shrink)

Hypoxia hampers ATP production and threatens cell survival. Since cellular energetics tightly controls cell responses and fate, ATP levels and dynamics are of utmost importance. An integrated mathematical model of ATP synthesis by the mitochondrial oxidative phosphorylation/electron transfer chain system has been recently published (Beard, PLoS Comput Biol 1(4):e36, 2005). This model was validated under static conditions. To evaluate its performance under dynamical situations, we implemented and simulated it (Simulink®, The Mathworks). Inner membrane potential (ΔΨ) and [NADH] (feeding the electron (...) transfer chain) were used as indicators of mitochondrial function. Root mean squared error (rmse) was used to compare simulations and experiments (isolated cardiac mitochondria, Bose et al. J Biol Chem 278(40):39155–39165, 2003). Steady-state experimental data were reproduced within 2–6%. Model dynamics were evaluated under: (i) baseline, (ii) activation of NADH production, (iii) addition of ADP, (iv) addition of inorganic phosphate, (v) oxygen exhaustion. In all phases, except the last one, ΔΨ and [NADH] as well as oxygen consumption, were reproduced (within 10, 7 and 12%, respectively). Under anoxia, simulated ΔΨ markedly depolarized (no change in experiments). In conclusion, the model reproduces dynamic data as long as oxygen is present. Anticipated improvement by the inclusion of ATP consumption and explicit Krebs cycle are under evaluation. (shrink)

J. L. Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason claims that the existence of reflective persons who long to solve the problem of God’s existencebut cannot do so constitutes an evil rendering God’s existence improbable. In this essay, I present Schellenberg’s argument and argue that the kind of reasonable nonbelief Schellenberg needs for his argument to succeed is unlikely to exist. Since Schellenberg’s argument is an inductive-style version of the problem of evil, the empirical improbability of the premise I challenge (...) renders the conclusions derived from it empirically improbable as well. (shrink)

In Time Deposits, Dimension, and Fraud ( 2009 ), William Barnett and Walter Block argue that by borrowing short and lending long there is an over issuance of property rights. Their article, however, does not fully extend the consequences of their contribution. Once this is done, it becomes clearer that their argument suits a great impediment to banking, becoming a possible reason to support rather than to oppose fractional reserve banking. Bagus and Howden (J Bus Ethics 90(3):399–406, 2009 ) (...) comment on Barnett and Block (J Bus Ethics 88(4):711–716, 2009 ), the authors claim that while maintaining the illegitimacy of fractional reserve deposits, borrowing short and lending long it is actually not illegitimate. An extension on Bagus and Howden ( 2009 ) will show that their line of argumentation can be applied as a defense of fractional reserve banking as well. (shrink)

An NP-hardness proof for non-local Multicomponent Tree Adjoining Grammar (MCTAG) by Rambow and Satta (1st International Workshop on Tree Adjoining Grammers 1992 ), based on Dahlhaus and Warmuth (in J Comput Syst Sci 33:456–472, 1986 ), is extended to some linguistically relevant restrictions of that formalism. It is found that there are NP-hard grammars among non-local MCTAGs even if any or all of the following restrictions are imposed: (i) lexicalization: every tree in the grammar contains a terminal; (ii) dominance links: (...) every tree set contains at most two trees, and in every such tree set, there is a link between the foot node of one tree and the root node of the other tree, indicating that the former node must dominate the latter in the derived tree. This is the version of MCTAG proposed in Becker et al. (Proceedings of the 5th conference of the European chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics 1991 ) to account for German long-distance scrambling. This result restricts the field of possible candidates for an extension of Tree Adjoining Grammar that would be both mildly context-sensitive and linguistically adequate. (shrink)

Since the Second Vatican Council (1962-65), particularly its Pastoral Constitution on the Church and the Modern World, many Catholic theologians, including J. B. Metz, Karl Rahner, and Edward Schillebeeckx, have taken note of the need to see the practical implications of our theoretical doctrines. Taking its cue from a remark of Karl Rahner (1970) that the theological as such must be a principle of action, this article studies the implications of this for Christology, soteriology, and ecclesiology. The Christological implications are (...) rooted in the long overdue recovery of the faith and hope of Jesus himself as the basis of the church’s faith in Jesus. The soteriological implications are rooted in recovering Jesus’ proclamation of the reign of God as the center of Christian soteriology. Finally, the ecclesiological implications are rooted in seeing the church as existing not for itself, but for the sake of the ongoing proclamation and realization of God’s reign in the present. (shrink)

Not by Genes Alone excellently explains Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd's important ideas about human gene-culture co-evolution to a broader audience but remains short of a larger vision of civilization. Several decades ago Ralph Burhoe had seen that fertile possibility in Richerson and Boyd's work. I suggest getting past present reductionistic customs to a scientific perspective having an integral place for virtue. Subsystem agency is part of this view, as is the driving role of abundance, whose ultimate origins are (...) in the mysterious, quintessentially energetic Big Bang. The free-rider problem may not impede higher social organization as inexorably as Richerson and Boyd believe; "the tragedy" of enervating leakage from "the commons" may often be less influential than an invigorating flow of externalities to the commons. Eukaryotic origins mark the origin of inevitable wider sharing as higher living systems evolve. I use a metaphor of flesh and spirit in drawing a parallel between that turning point and the wide sharing that occurs in civilization. This helps solve the enigma of the demographic transition. Why do so many productive participants in first-world societies severely restrict their selfish-gene reproduction to below replacement birth rate? It is not because culture is maladaptive but because civilization's brain and womb have become partially differentiated in distinct populations. Considerations of social boundaries, myths of sacrifice, and human creativity help in understanding how human social evolution taps potentials present in reality. Human beings' diverse vigorous activities—the organized ones and the inadvertent ones, the wise and the foolish, the good and the bad, the carefully thoughtful and the merely playful—provide the ground of being, or primordial soup, for cultural entities that transcend our intentions. If we have it right for the most part and are fortunate, we will continue to emerge at higher levels. (shrink)

Beginning in 1946 Henri de Lubac, S.J., sparked controversy by arguing against the Scholastic doctrine of “pure nature,” according to which God could have created man with a purely natural end rather than the supernatural end of the beatific vision. Although de Lubac’s view prevailed after his 1965 book, The Mystery of the Supernatural, the debate over the natural desire for God and pure nature has recently been renewed. This essay discusses the current state of the debate with particular attention (...) to four recent books, a collection of essays edited by Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P., and monographs by Lawrence Feingold, Steven A. Long, and John Milbank. (shrink)

Abstract Vedder and Gallaway are mistaken in their attempted demonstration that government policies to raise real wages have been the source of most or all U.S. unemployment in the twentieth century. Their case depends on a presumed correlation between high unemployment and high real wages that has not existed since World War II, and on a naive confusion between correlation and causation: just because real wages and unemployment were both relatively high during the Great Depression does not mean that high (...) real wages were the cause of high unemployment. More likely, the reverse is true. The ascription of high unemployment to higher?than?equilibrium real wages is not always in error. But there is no reason whatsoever to believe Vedder and Gall?away's claim that the government's policies to raise wages have been ?the major cause of high unemployment in the United States.? (shrink)

Abstract In their Out of Work: Government and Unemployment in Twentieth Century America, Richard Vedder and Lowell Gallaway contend that government intervention in American labor markets has caused unemployment by raising the real price of labor. In my critique of the book, I allowed that while this might sometimes be the case, it is not as important as Vedder and Gallaway claim. Their Reply does not succeed in vindicating their argument, because their wage averages fail to take into account (...) variations in wages within phases of the business cycle; because they fail to take into account the effects of unemployment on potential productivity, distorting their measures of real wages; and because they ignore the vast literature on the subject. (shrink)

Van der Klaauw was a professor of Descriptive Zoology in the period 1934–1958.This paper presents a concise annotated overview of his publications. In his work three main topics can be recognized: comparative anatomy of the mammalian auditory region, theoretical studies about ecology and ecological morphology, and vertebrate functional morphology. In particular van der Klaauw developed new concepts on functional morphology, based upon a holistic approach. A series of studies in functional morphology of Vertebrates by his students is added. An overview (...) of recent morphological and theoretical studies show that this new approach had a long lasting impact in studies of functional morphology. (shrink)

1. Germanic prosody. The early Germanic languages are characterized by fixed initial stress, free quantity, and a preference for moraic trochees, left-headed bimoraic feet consisting either of two light syllables (LL) or of one heavy syllable (H).1 The two-mora foot template places indirect constraints on syllable structure, by making it hard to accommodate three-mora syllables, as well as one-mora syllables in contexts where they cannot join another one-mora syllable to form a two-mora trochee. Syllable structure is also constrained more directly (...) by a preference for simple onsets, which entails an avoidance both of hiatus and of syllable-initial consonant clusters. Processes of syllabification, deletion, shortening and lengthening in the Germanic languages favor those quantitative and syllabic patterns that fit these prosodic conditions, and repair those that do not.2 It is not always possible to satisfy all of the preferences at the same time, however, and so the morphophonology must adjudicate between their conflicting demands. While the preferences themselves are invariant, the languages diverge in how they resolve contradictions between them. Some stretch the prosodic limits by allowing excess segments to be accommodated by overlength or resolution, others delete segments (e.g. glide deletion, high vowel deletion), adjust vowel length to fit the template, or tolerate hiatus. For example, a long ja-stem such as /herdi-/ with a vocalic ending, say /herdi-a/,3 presents a prosodic quandary to which the languages respond with three different compromises: (1) a. Proto-Germanic: *hir. i.a (hiatus) b. Gothic: herd.ja (a three-mora syllable) c. Old Icelandic: hir. a (deletion of j). (shrink)

Working memory span forms an important cornerstone of current accounts of cognition, and cognitive development. We describe data that challenge the conventional interpretation of span as a measure of working memory capacity. We argue that the implications of these data undermine the analysis provided by Caplan & Waters concerning the role of working memory in sentence comprehension.

This study examined the relationship between the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) and Confucian Dynamism in a sample of 1,757 respondents from several provinces in mainland China. Mirels and Garrett’s (J Consult Clin Psychol 36:40–44, 1971 ) PWE Scale and Robertson’s (Manag Int Rev 40:253–268, 2000 ) Confucian Dynamism Scale were used to measure the work ethics. The 16 items of the PWE Scale and eight items of the Confucian Dynamism Scale were initially subjected to a principal components analysis. Factor analysis (...) produced four factors of the PWE, which were labeled as follows: hard work, internal motive, admiration of work itself, and negative attitude to leisure; and three factors of the Confucian Dynamism, which were labeled: long-term orientation, short-term orientation, and guanxi orientation. The results of a multiple regression analysis indicated that all the dimensions of PWE were positively related to Confucian Dynamism, but negatively to guanxi orientation. The results also indicated that three PWE dimensions (“hard work,” “internal motive,” and “admiration of work itself”) were positively and significantly related to long-term orientation, but two of them were related negatively and significantly to the short-term orientation of Confucian Dynamism. In addition, the results showed that the dimension—admiration of work itself—of PWE was significantly and negatively associated with the guanxi orientation, but significantly and positively to the short-term orientation. (shrink)

A unique anthology of essays exploring the philosophical wisdom runners contemplate when out for a run. It features writings from some of America’s leading philosophers, including Martha Nussbaum, Charles Taliaferro, and J.P. Moreland. A first-of-its-kind collection of essays exploring those gems of philosophical wisdom runners contemplate when out for a run Topics considered include running and the philosophy of friendship; the freedom of the long distance runner; running as aesthetic experience, and “Could a Zombie Run a Marathon?” Contributing essayists (...) include philosophers with athletic experience at the collegiate level, philosophers whose pasttime is running, and one philosopher who began running to test the ideas in his essay. (shrink)

The politics of the popular-music business clearly showed its head at this year�s Grammy Awards. Two worthy artists were vying for New Female artists: Alicia Keys and India Arie. When the winner was called, Alicia Keys walked away with the award (and five others) while India Arie was shut out. I�m convinced that the reason Keys won was not that her work�the strong and ubiquitous Songs in A Minor �was so much better than Arie�s Acoustic Soul. It isn�t. Instead it (...) was because of the power and major push on the Grammy voters supplied by Clive Davis, the long-time music power broker who runs Keys� label, J-Records. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Part I. Introduction: 1. Personal epistemology in the classroom: a welcome and guide for the reader Florian C. Feucht and Lisa D. Bendixen; Part II. Frameworks and Conceptual Issues: 2. Manifestations of an epistemological belief system in pre-k to 12 classrooms Marlene Schommer-Aikins, Mary Bird, and Linda Bakken; 3. Epistemic climates in elementary classrooms Florian C. Feucht; 4. The integrative model of personal epistemology development: theoretical underpinnings and implications for education Deanna C. Rule and Lisa D. (...) Bendixen; 5. An epistemic framework for scientific reasoning in informal contexts Fang-Ying Yang and Chin-Chung Tsai; Appendices; 6. Who knows what and who can we believe? Epistemological beliefs are beliefs about knowledge (mostly) to be attained from others Rainer Bromme, Dorothe Kienhues, and Torsten Porsch; Part III. Students' Personal Epistemology, its Development, and Relation to Learning: 7. Stalking young persons' changing beliefs about belief Michael J. Chandler and Travis Proulx; 8. Epistemological development in very young knowers Leah K. Wildenger, Barbara K. Hofer, and Jean E. Burr; 9. Beliefs about knowledge and revision of knowledge: on the importance of epistemic beliefs for intentional conceptual change in elementary and middle school students Lucia Mason; 10. The reflexive relation between students' mathematics-related beliefs and the mathematics classroom culture Erik De Corte, Peter Op 't Eynde, Fien Depaepe, and Lieven Verschaffel; 11. Examining the influence of epistemic beliefs and goal orientations on the academic performance of adolescent students enrolled in high-poverty, high-minority schools P. Karen Murphy, Michelle M. Buehl, Jill A. Zeruth, Maeghan N. Edwards, Joyce F. Long, and Shinichi Monoi; 12. Using cognitive interviewing to explore elementary and secondary school students' epistemic and ontological cognition Jeffrey A. Greene, Judith Torney-Purta, Roger Azevedo, and Jane Robertson; Part IV. Teachers' Personal Epistemology and its Impact on Classroom Teaching: 13. Epistemological resources and framing: a cognitive framework for helping teachers interpret and respond to their students' epistemologies Andrew Elby and David Hammer; 14. The effects of teachers' beliefs on elementary students' beliefs, motivation, and achievement in mathematics Krista R. Muis and Michael J. Foy; Appendices; 15. Teachers' articulation of beliefs about teaching knowledge: conceptualizing a belief framework Helenrose Fives and Michelle M. Buehl; Appendices; 16. Beyond epistemology: assessing teachers' epistemological and ontological world views Lori Olafson and Gregory Schraw; Part V. Conclusion: 17. Personal epistemology in the classroom: what does research and theory tell us and where do we need to go next? Lisa D. Bendixen and Florian C. Feucht. (shrink)

Burns, C. R. Introduction.--Antiquity: Margalith, D. The ideal doctor as depicted in ancient Hebrew writings. Edelstein, L. The Hippocratic oath. Edelstein, L. The professional ethics of the Greek physician. Michler, M. Medical ethics in Hippocratic bone surgery. Maas, P. L., Oliver, J. H. An ancient poem on the duties of a physician.--The medieval era: Levey, M. Medical deontology in ninth century Islam. Bar-Sela, A., Hoff, H. E. Isaac Israeli's fifty admonitions of the physicians. Rosner, F. The physician's prayer attributed to (...) Moses Maimonides. MacKinney, L. C. Medical ethics and etiquette in the early middle ages, the persistence of Hippocratic ideals. Welborn, M. C. The long tradition, a study in fourteenth-century medical deontology.--The modern period: Larkey, S. V. The Hippocratic oath in Elizabethan England. Pleadwell, F. L. Samuel Sorbiere and his Advice to a young physician. Clark, G. Bernard Mandeville, M.D., and eighteenth-century ethics. Burns, C. R. Thomas Percival, medical ethics or medical jurisprudence? Burns, C. R. Reciprocity in the development of Anglo-American medical ethics, 1765-1865. Williams, T. F. Cabot, Peabody, and the care of the patient. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the extent to which implicit learning is subtended by somatic markers, as evidenced by skin conductance measures. On each trial subjects were asked to decide which ‘word’ from a pair of ‘words’ was the ‘correct’ word. Unknown to subjects, each ‘word’ of a pair was constructed using a different set of rules (grammar ‘A’ and grammar ‘B’). A (monetary) reward was given if the subject choose the ‘word’ from grammar ‘A’. Choosing the grammar ‘B’ word (...) resulted in (monetary) punishment. Skin conductance was measured during each of 100 trials. After each set of 10 trials subjects were asked how they selected the ‘correct word’. Task performance increased long before the subjects could even formulate a single relevant rule. In this ‘pre-conceptual’ phase of the experiment, skin conductance was larger before incorrect than before correct choices. Thus it was shown that artificial grammar learning is accompagnied by a somatic marker, possibly ‘warning’ the subject for the incorrect decision. (shrink)

Deconstruction both by its friends and enemies has come to be associated with a set of cliches that completely misunderstands its ethical aspiration. It is particularly within the field of law that we can see the ethical force of deconstruction, and also illuminate its concrete and practical importance. In The Philosophy of the Limit Drucilla Cornell examines the relationship of deconstruction to questions of ethics, justice and legal interpretation. She argues that renaming deconstruction "the philosophy of the limit" will allow (...) us to be more precise about what deconstruction actually is philosophically and hence to articulate more clearly its significance for law. Cornell explores the ethical and juridical significance of the so-called postmodern rebellion against metaphysics. A shared ethical rebellion links philosophers as different as Theodor Adorno, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, and Emmanuel Levinas. Together they present a new ethical configuration, new in its difference from both the critical social theory of J$u$urgen Habermas and the analytic jurisprudence of Nagel and Rawls. A key aspect of this newness is the centrality given to the relationship between questions of ethics and sexual difference. Cornell argues that the appeal of Lacan's analysis to feminists is that it helps to explain the profound hold the gender hierarchy has over Western culture, including its theories of political transformation. Under a Lacanian analysis the law of gender identity will be replicated in the laws of an existing legal system. This means that we cannot hope to sustain legal reforms unless the gender hierarchy is challenged. Cornell examines Derrida's position on the significance of the gender hierarchy in philosophy and explores its ethical and political importance. Derrida's intervention against legal positivism has important implications for the legal reforms necessary to protect marginalized groups. His emphasis on the limit, she argues, is crucial to thosewhose well-being and very lives may depend on legal transformation, women and homosexuals, for example. In an important contribution to legal philosophy, Cornell explores the affinities of Derrida's writings with recent liberal analytic jurisprudence. She also explores the differences. Comparing Rawls's and Derrida's accounts of justice, she argues that Derrida gives greater attention to the necessary utopian moment in his insistence on maintaining the divide between law, established norms, and justice. Cornell's focus on the importance of the limit and the centrality of the gender hierarchy allows her to offer a view of jurisprudence different from both critical social theory and analytic jurisprudence. As we watch the long-fought-for civil rights of women systematically overturned, we have reason to think about how the connections she makes shed light on an underlying truth of our social, political, and legal reality. (shrink)