On assiste à un « surplace » de la recherche philosophique en Occident. L'importance de l'histoire, le caractère décisif de la culture, la dimension sociale de l'esprit, ne suscitent plus qu'un intérêt épisodique. On a oublié les apories de Kuhn. Américains et Occidentaux sont des solipsiste s qui font mine d'ignorer la formation historique de l'esprit, renouvelant l'oubli de Kant et Husserl qui n'avaient pas su prendre en compte le caractère contingent, changeant, collectif, fortement historicisé des compétences intellectuelles et cognitives. (...) Séparée des pratiques consensuelles, la science perd son sens. Il faut revenir au problème de l'individuation et reposer la question de l'acquisition de qualités uniques et pourtant générales qui font l'individualité. There is a general stagnation in western philosophical research. The importance of History, of Culture, the social nature of the Spirit, is of secondary interest, nowadays the meanest interest. What about the hard and sharp questions raised by Kuhn ? Americans or western nations are but solipsits, who get rid of the historical making of the spirit. To a certain extent, they keep on with Kant's or Husserl's tradition. None of them was in fact able to take care of historicism in the contingent and moving constitution of our intellectual capacities. In these conditions, no sense at all can be found in science. So, we must come back to the question of individuation and to these unique qualities of individuality, that is, at the same time, singularity and universality. (shrink)
Gary Gutting argues, in his recent book What Philosophers Know, that analytic philosophy provides a sizable collection of exemplary arguments that effectively yield a “disciplinary body of philosophical knowledge”—“metaphilosophy,” he names it—that is, specimens that define in a notably perspicuous way what we should understand as philosophical knowledge itself. He concedes weaknesses in the best-known specimens, and he admits that, generally, even the best specimens do not provide answers to the usual grand questions. I admire his treatment of the matter (...) but argue that the metaphilosophical issues are, normally, of a much grander gauge than that of his sort of specimen; that they require a much more open, informal sort of inquiry and exchange than that of the distinctive rigor of the classic specimens themselves; that analytic philosophy, not uncharacteristically, tends to ignore the metaphilosophical issue or takes the validity of its method of argument for granted; and that the issue itself invites an appraisal of competing second-order conceptions of how philosophical argument proves fruitful. I proceed by way of the examination of cases drawn from Quine and Kripke. (shrink)
I show the sense in which the concept of history as a human science affects our theory of the natural sciences and, therefore, our theory of the unity of the physical and human sciences. The argument proceeds by way of reviewing the effect of the Darwinian contribution regarding teleologism and of post-Darwinian paleonanthropology on the transformation of the primate members of Homo sapiens into societies of historied selves. The strategy provides a novel way of recovering the unity of the sciences: (...) by construing the physical sciences themselves as human sciences - and, therefore, as themselves historied. (shrink)
Peter Hare took a belle-lettriste pleasure in hopping from one philosophical topic to another. Not carelessly but lightheartedly enough. I mean by that, not that there is no deeper interlocking linkage among his many papers—there is—but rather that the center of gravity of each piece rests with the special patience and affection Peter spends on the specific topic some chanced-upon author or authors bring into view. He pursues each such topic intensively in a deliberately narrow-gauged way, testing its best possibilities (...) in its own terms seconded by his own wider reading, as if he were loyal to opposed doctrines. He usually runs through a rather tight, well-informed set of occasional readings and reflections .. (shrink)
These books will prove valuable to philosophy teachers and their students as well as to other readers who share a general interest in philosophy. -/- What is art? Must art be beautiful? Must art be politically or culturally significant? How does art differ from other products of human activity? Joseph Margolis has spent decades thinking through these and related questions. In this book, he introduces his reader to the field of Aesthetics by thinking through the most fundamental philosophical questions about (...) art in a way that is engaging and accessible. This book could be used alongside a textbook of classic readings in Aesthetics, or as a stand-alone text in Aesthetics. THE WADSWORTH PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS SERIES presents readers with concise, timely, and insightful introductions to a variety of traditional and contemporary philosophical subjects. With this series, students of philosophy will be able to discover the richness of philosophical inquiry across a wide array of concepts, including hallmark philosophical themes and themes typically underrepresented in mainstream philosophy publishing. Written by a distinguished list of scholars who have garnered particular recognition for their excellence in teaching, this series presents the vast sweep of today's philosophical exploration in highly accessible and affordable volumes. These books will prove valuable to philosophy teachers and their students as well as to other readers who share a general interest in philosophy. (shrink)
The definition of the human -- Perceiving paintings as paintings I -- Perceiving paintings as paintings II -- "One and only one correct interpretation" -- Toward a phenomenology of painting and literature -- "Seeing-in," "make-believe," transfiguration" : the perception of pictorial representation -- Beauty and truth and the passing of transcendental philosophy.
Edo Pivčević's The Reason Why is a thoroughly admirable book: absolutely straightforward and simple in argument, charmingly written, uncompromisingly legible but widely and tactfully informed, bent on asking and answering a single fundamental question usually cast as "metaphysical" or (after Kant) "epistemological", but, in Pivčević's hands, skillfully turned in what must be called a "pragmatist" direction. Careful readers may find (as I do) that the general lines of the argument are notably congruent with some of Charles Peirce's earliest accounts of (...) the pragmatist treatment of "belief" or "believing-true" meant to displace the entire strategy of "proofs of truth" in the "metaphysical sense of proof" (24) that have been stalemated by the "skeptic's" countermeasures. (shrink)
The argument proceeds from a sense of imminent danger; 9/11 and its sequel challenge our deepest pretensions regarding the universality and self-evidence of moral/political conviction. The intransigence of such convictions is now an important source of international conflict and terror. It also signifies that the resolution of the disorder that now confronts the international community requires a transformation in our conception of morality itself. In this regard, philosophy has an important task to address. The discussion explores a radical change in (...) our understanding of just war, the distinction between war and peace, the logic of conflict, and similar topics. (shrink)
I begin with a kind of phenomenological reporting of the recent war between Israel and the Hezbollah in Lebanon, in order to explain the meaning of the thesis that "historicity is predication" - meaning by that to clarify the sense in which predication is a kind of political act (for good and sufficient philosophical reasons) and how the "objective" description of an evolving war illuminates such a philosophical reading of history.
s effort to examine the prospects of inferentialism (inspired by Wilfrid Sellars work) is examined in terms of the uncertainties of contemporary philosophy and Brandoms reading of selected prominent figures in the history of philosophy. The very idea of there being anything like a set of rules governing non-deductive inference (inferentialism) is problematic; so is Brandoms reading of the figures he has selected in order to illuminate his own proposal along historical lines. We never quite learn how inferentialism bears on (...) the trajectory of Eurocentric philosophy and what the corrective is that Brandom advocates. Key Words: concept history inferentialism postmodernism pragmatism rule. (shrink)
: Peirce's fallibilism is shown to be the "linchpin" of his mature philosophy. In passing, objections regarding a seemingly serious paradox, a textual discrepancy, and the plausibility of an alternative approach to Peirce are answered. Peirce's fallibilism is indeed a puzzling thesis, particularly in that it appears to violate familiar finitist, practical, "here and now" (pragmatist) constraints. But that's precisely where Peirce's ingenuity takes its most interesting form. The solution provided shows the paradox and aporias of Peirce's account to be (...) no more than apparent, the textual infelicity of what would otherwise be a contradiction to be part of Peirce's rhetorical strategy (in combating the effects of James' misreading of his theory of truth), the doctrine of the continuum to be already entailed by Peirce's fallibilism, and the ultimate reconciliation between the infinite limit of inquiry and its finite phases to be essential to Peirce's theory of science cast in terms of what may be described as a Hegelianized reading of Kantian Hope—in effect, a reading of abduction as an original pragmatist version of what may be saved in the sparest way within the post-Kantian tradition. (shrink)
A Companion to Pragmatism, comprised of 38 newly commissioned essays, provides comprehensive coverage of one of the most vibrant and exciting fields of philosophy today. Unique in depth and coverage of classical figures and their philosophies as well as pragmatism as a living force in philosophy. Chapters include discussions on philosophers such as John Dewey, Jürgen Habermas and Hilary Putnam.
Efforts to trace the evolutionary antecedents of human morality introduce challenges and opportunities for business ethics. The biological precedents of responsibility suggest that human tendencies to respond morally are deeply rooted. This does not mean, however, that those tendencies are always consistent with ends human beings seek to pursue. This paper investigates the conflicts that may arise between human beings’ moral predispositions and the purposes human beings pursue.
Detailed arguments are provided, chiefly with regard to recent Darwinian accounts of genetic selectionism (Dawkins, Dennett) and the Chomskyan view of natural language, but touching also on reductionism in general and computational accounts of the mind, that demonstrate that we are very far from supporting the adequacy of reductive materialism in science.
Why does it matter that every negative thought you have had about car salespeople, they have likely had about you? The answerto this question opens up the distinctive challenges, and opportunities, facing business ethics. Those challenges and opportunitiesemerge from the significant bearing organizational reality has upon individuals’ conduct. As we consider how to assign responsibilityfor misconduct; how to provide guidance to organizational actors about what they ought to do; and how to develop responsive ethicaltheory, we need to take psychological and (...) social forces into account. Organizations shape human behavior in ways that pose unavoidable questions about responsibility, practical guidance, and the enterprise of business ethics itself. Adopting the agents’ perspective suggests that business ethics can take a leading role in addressing these vexing questions that confront ethical inquiry and social science more broadly. (shrink)
In offering an overview of late twentieth-century philosophy, I consider the import of three questions: the classic topics of reference and predication and the modern question of the historicity of thought. I show the sense in which a large part of analytic philosophy is “fatigued,” in recycling philosophical programs and theories known to be unworkable already in the ancient and premodern world or at least by the time of the post-Kantians; and in resting programs and theories on presumed solutions of (...) the problems of reference and predication that could not support them. The solutions that are possible would lead us in an altogether different direction that, among other things, would restore a sense of fruitful exchange between Anglo-American and continental European philosophy. (shrink)
The organization is importantly different from both the nation-state and the individual and hence needs its own ethical models and theories, distinct from political and moral theory. To develop a case for organizational ethics, this paper advances arguments in three directions. First, it highlights the growing role of organizations and their distinctive attributes. Second, it illuminates the incongruities between organizations and moral and political philosophy. Third, it takes these incongruities, as well as organizations’ distinctive attributes, as a starting point for (...) suggesting an agenda for an ethics of organizations. (shrink)
Psychological forces in play across individual, group, and organizational levels of analysis increase the likelihood that people inbusiness organizations will engage in misconduct. Therefore, it is argued, we must turn our attention from dominant normative and empirical trends in business ethics, which revolve around boundaries and constraints, and instead concentrate on methods for promoting ethical behavior in practice, exploiting psychological forces conducive to ethical conduct. This calls for a better understanding of how organizations and their inhabitants function, and, in turn, (...) it points to pragmatic solutions. Ethical conduct can be promoted by (1) normatively justifying vivid aims worthy of pursuit alongside economic objectives, and (2) empirically identifying the conditions and practices that advance those aims in firms. This approach challenges us to bring empirical and normative inquiry together—in ways unsettling to both. It pushes us to move beyond an empirical preoccupation with decision making and judgment, and it requires us to cope with political liberalism’s legitimate qualms about discussions of the good. (shrink)
Relativism may take a coherent and self-consistent form, by replacing a bivalent logic with a many-valued logic; “incongruent” propositions may then be valid, that is, propositions that on a bivalent model but not now would be or would yield contradictories. I reject “relationalism,” any relativism in accord with which “true” means “true-for-x” (in accord with the usual reading of Plato’s Theaetetus). I show how epistemic pluralism is an analogue of the “is”/“appears” distinction and presupposes a form of objectivism, however attenuated. (...) By “objectivism” I understand the thesis that what obtains independently in the world is cognitively accessible, is contextless and free of interpretation. The admitted indemonstrability of objectivism affects the force of pluralism and cannot disallow relativism. If objectivity is an artifact of inquiry, then relativism and pluralism can be reconciled. (shrink)
There is a considerable effort in current theorizing about psychological phenomena to eliminate minds and selves as a vestige of folk theories. The pertinent strategies are quite varied and may focus on experience, cognition, interests, responsibility, behavior and the scientific explanation of these phenomena or what they purport to identify. The minimal function of the notion of self is to assign experience to a suitable entity and to fix such ascription in a possessive as well as a predicative way. It (...) is usually argued that Hume formulated an empiricist account of experience that obviated the need for reference to selves; and recent arguments mustered by Derek Parfit claim to show how to preserve experience, interest, responsibility usually assigned selves and persons without invoking any such entities. The argument here advanced demonstrates that Hume actually concedes the minimal use of the notion of self, that there appear to be no convincing grounds for eliminating it, that there are critical uses for the notion that render it ineliminable, that admission is neutral regarding the nature of selves, and that Parfit''s arguments in particular fail. There appear, therefore, to be no empiricist or materialist grounds for the eliminative move. A large recent literature that favors various eliminative strategies is canvassed and shown to be inadequate to its task and unlikely (for principled reasons) to be able to achieve its eliminative objective. (shrink)
The general claim of the present paper is that there may be a very large variety of ways of thinking quite different from one another, not actually in violation of formal canons of consistency, that may vary historically, from community to community or even from context to context. In particular it is argued that, given the present state of theorizing in cognitive science, it is unlikely that any defensible version of the Representational Theory of Mind could preclude a strong or (...) emergent form of concept learning. An argument is presented showing that a Nativist reading of the theory is either undermined by the implications of its own assumptions or is formulably defective with respect to them in a way that may be impossible to remedy — or can only be secured by the fiat of denying this novel sort of concept learning. To account for the puzzles discussed in the paper a new approach to the analysis of thinking is suggested taking as its basis Wittgenstein's notion of 'forms of life' instead of the models favored in current conceptions of cognitive science. (shrink)