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Profile: Jan Melia (University of Ulster)
  1.  89
    J. Melia (2000). Weaseling Away the Indispensability Argument. Mind 109 (435):455-480.
    According to the indispensability argument, the fact that we quantify over numbers, sets and functions in our best scientific theories gives us reason for believing that such objects exist. I examine a strategy to dispense with such quantification by simply replacing any given platonistic theory by the set of sentences in the nominalist vocabulary it logically entails. I argue that, as a strategy, this response fails: for there is no guarantee that the nominalist world that go beyond the set of (...)
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  2. Joseph Melia (2005). Truthmaking Without Truthmakers. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon 67.
     
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  3. Joseph Melia (2002). Response to Colyvan. Mind 111 (441):75-80.
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  4. John Divers & Joseph Melia (2002). The Analytic Limit of Genuine Modal Realism. Mind 111 (441):15-36.
    According to the Genuine Modal Realist, there is a plurality of possible worlds, each world nothing more than a maximally inter-related spatiotemporal sum. One advantage claimed for this position is that it offers us the resources to analyse, in a noncircular manner, the modal operators. In this paper, we argue that the prospects for such an analysis are poor. For the analysis of necessity as truth in all worlds to succeed it is not enough that no modal concepts be used (...)
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  5. Joseph Melia (1995). On What There's Not. Analysis 55 (4):223 - 229.
    (1) The average Mum has 2.4 children. (2) The number of Argle’s fingers equals the number of Bargle’s toes. (3) There are two possible ways in which Joe could win this chess game. In the right contexts, and outside the philosophy room, all the above sentences may be completely uncontroversial. For instance, if we know that Joe could win either by exchanging queens and entering an endgame, or by initiating a kingside attack then, if ignorant of Quine’s work on ontology, (...)
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  6.  40
    Joseph Melia (2005). Review of Jody Azzouni, Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (8).
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  7.  61
    Joseph Melia & Juha Saatsi (2006). Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):561-585.
    Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realist's reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument which cannot be so easily blocked by the structural realist. (...)
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  8.  31
    Joseph Melia (2003). Modality. Acumen.
    The book begins by introducing readers to various notions of possibility, the de re/de dicto distinction, and the ubiquity of our modal concepts. It then presents an accessible introduction to modal logic and possible worlds semantics.
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  9.  36
    J. Melia (2011). Response to Daly and Langford. Mind 119 (476):1117-1121.
    In this note, I defend Melia 2000 against objections in Daly and Langford 2010. I show that my formulation of the Comprehension Schema is correct while their modification is inadequate and that their approach to the problem through infinitary sentences is irrelevant to my original arguments. Finally, I argue that it is not a puzzle that we could find mathematics indispensable in our theorising, even when the mathematics is false.
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  10.  99
    Joseph Melia (1998). Field's Programme: Some Interference. Analysis 58 (2):63–71.
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  11. Joseph Melia (2008). Ersatz Possible Worlds. In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell Pub. 135--51.
     
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  12. Joseph Melia (2006). The Conservativeness of Mathematics. Analysis 66 (3):202–208.
  13.  35
    Joseph Melia (2008). 5. A World of Concrete Particulars. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 4 4:99.
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  14.  93
    Joseph Melia (1992). Against Modalism. Philosophical Studies 68 (1):35 - 56.
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  15.  84
    Joseph Melia (1992). A Note on Lewis's Ontology. Analysis 52 (3):191--192.
  16.  66
    Joseph Melia (1992). An Alleged Disanalogy Between Numbers and Propositions. Analysis 52 (1):46 - 48.
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  17.  94
    John Divers & Joseph Melia (2003). Genuine Modal Realism Limited. Mind 112 (445):83-86.
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  18.  80
    Joseph Melia (1991). Anti-Realism Untouched. Mind 100 (3):341-342.
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  19.  64
    John Divers & Joseph Melia (2006). Genuine Modal Realism: Still Limited. Mind 115 (459):731-740.
    In this reply, we defend our argument for the incompleteness of Genuine Modal Realism against Paseau's criticisms. Paseau claims that isomorphic set of worlds represent the same possibilities, but not only is this implausible, it is inimical to the target of our paper: Lewis's theory of possible worlds. We argue that neither Paseau's model-theoretic results nor his comparison to arithmetic carry over to GMR. We end by distinguishing two notions of incompleteness and urge that, for all that Paseau has said, (...)
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  20. Joseph Melia (2001). Reducing Possibilities to Language. Analysis 61 (1):19–29.
    Ehring, D. 1997. Causation and Persistence. New York: Oxford University Press. Fair, D. 1979. Causation and the flow of energy. Erkenntnis 14: 219–50. Goldman, A. 1977. Perceptual objects. Synthese 35: 257–84. Lewis, D. 1986a. Causation. In Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, 159–213. New York.
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  21.  37
    Joseph Melia (2003). Mark Colyvan, The Indispensability of Mathematics. Metascience 12 (1):55-58.
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  22. Joseph Melia & Duncan Watson (2009). Properties, Possibilia and Contingent Second-Order Predication. Analysis 69 (4):643-649.
    1. The problemLewis identifies the monadic property being F with the set of all actual and possible Fs; the dyadic relation R is identified with the set of actual and possible pairs of things that are related by R; and so on . 1 Egan has argued that the fact that some properties have some of their properties contingently leads to trouble: " Let @ be the actual world, in which being green is [someone's] favourite property, and let w be (...)
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  23.  82
    Joseph Melia (1995). The Significance of Non-Standard Models. Analysis 55 (3):127--34.
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  24.  84
    J. Melia (1999). Holes, Haecceitism and Two Conceptions of Determinism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):639--64.
    In this paper I claim that Earman and Norton 's hole argument against substantivalist interpretations of General Relativity assumes that the substantivalist must adopt a conception of determinism which I argue is unsatisfactory. Butterfield and others have responded to the hole argument by finding a conception of determinism open to the substantivalist that is not prone to the hole argument. But, unfortunately for the substantivalist, I argue this conception also turns out to be unsatisfactory. Accordingly, I search for a conception (...)
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  25.  73
    Joseph Melia (2001). Reducing Possibilities to Language. Analysis 61 (269):19-29.
    Ehring, D. 1997. Causation and Persistence. New York: Oxford University Press. Fair, D. 1979. Causation and the flow of energy. Erkenntnis 14: 219–50. Goldman, A. 1977. Perceptual objects. Synthese 35: 257–84. Lewis, D. 1986a. Causation. In Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, 159–213. New York.
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  26. Nikk Effingham & Joseph Melia (2007). Endurantism and Timeless Worlds. Analysis 67 (294):140–147.
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  27. Joseph Melia (2002). Reply to Colyvan. Mind 111:75-9.
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  28.  33
    Joseph Melia (2000). Continuants and Occurrents, II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):77–92.
    [Peter Simons] Commonsense ontology contains both continuants and occurrents, but are continuants necessary? I argue that they are neither occurrents nor easily replaceable by them. The worst problem for continuants is the question in virtue of what a given continuant exists at a given time. For such truthmakers we must have recourse to occurrents, those vital to the continuant at that time. Continuants are, like abstract objects, invariants under equivalences over occurrents. But they are not abstract, and their being invariants (...)
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  29.  74
    J. Melia (2000). Review. The Worlds of Possibility. CS Chihara. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):333-337.
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  30.  27
    Joseph Melia (2013). Comments on 'De Jure and De Facto Validity in the Logic of Time and Modality. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):206-209.
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  31.  6
    J. Melia (2001). Reducing Possibilities to Language. Analysis 61 (1):19-29.
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  32.  55
    J. Melia (1999). Review. Realistic Rationalism. Jerrold J Katz. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):475-477.
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  33.  5
    N. Effingham & J. Melia (2007). Endurantism and Timeless Worlds. Analysis 67 (2):140-147.
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  34.  5
    J. Melia (1998). Field's Programme: Some Interference. Analysis 58 (2):63-71.
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  35.  6
    Joseph Melia & Graeme Forbes (1990). Languages of Possibility. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):271.
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  36. Joseph Melia (1991). ``Anti-Realism Untouched&Quot. Mind 100:341-342.
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  37.  4
    J. Melia (2006). The Conservativeness of Mathematics. Analysis 66 (3):202-208.
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  38.  1
    Joseph Melia (2000). II–Joseph Melia. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):77-92.
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  39.  25
    Joseph Melia (1996). Against Taylor's Putnam. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):171 – 174.
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  40. J. Melia (1999). Jerold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50:475-477.
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  41.  7
    Joseph Melia (2002). Tensing the Copula, David Lewis. Mind 111 (441).
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  42. Joseph Melia (1990). Books Received. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159).
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  43. Juan Carlos Castelló Meliá (2003). Educar en Valores: una propuesta desde la pedagogía de la "inmersión". Diálogo Filosófico 57:473-485.
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  44. Juan Carlos Castelló Meliá (1995). La pobreza en la sociedad de la abundancia: la miseria del bienestar. Diálogo Filosófico 32:164-178.
    La pobreza es un fenómeno que ha acompañado desde siempre la historia de la humanidad en prácticamente todas sus formas sociales. Pero esta perennidad no ha conseguido imponerse con el rostro de la normalidad. La pobreza aparece ante los ojos humanos, especialmente en el mundo moderno con el estigma del "no deber ser". Es paradójico que la modernidad, tan potente para producir y generalizar bienes materiales y culturales, no haya conseguido vencer a este secular enemigo. En este artículo se presentan (...)
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  45. J. Melia (1999). Heck, R.(Ed.)-Language, Thought Aid Logic. Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett. Philosophical Books 40:178-179.
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  46. Juan Carlos Castelló Meliá (1998). Ética, ecología y empobrecimiento. Diálogo Filosófico 40:75-86.
    Hace ya más de veinticinco años, Murray Boockchin, uno de los portavoces del movimiento estudiantil de Berkeley, afirmaba: "si ni hacemos lo imposible, nos veremos confrontados con lo impensable". Esa confrontación ya ha empezado. ¿A qué se estaba refiriendo Boockchin? Lo impensable suponía la destrucción de la naturaleza y lo imposible exigía ponernos todos (políticos, empresarios, ciudadanos, naciones...) de acuerdo para evitarlo, y fomentar un estilo de vida distinto y no extraño a ella. (Lo impensableimposible también es, a mi entender, (...)
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  47.  1
    Joseph Melia (1990). Graeme Forbes, "Languages of Possibility". [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 40 (59):271.
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  48. N. Effingham & J. Melia, Endurantism and Timeless Worlds.
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  49. Juan Carlos Castelló Meliá (2008). Lectura y libertad. Diálogo Filosófico 70:89-100.
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  50. Joseph Melia (2003). Modality. Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    This introduction to modality places the emphasis on the metaphysics of modality rather than on the formal semetics of quantified modal logic. The text begins by introducing students to the "de re/de dicto" distinction, conventionalist and conceptualist theories of modality and some of the key problems in modality, particularly Quine's criticisms. It then moves on to explain how possible worlds provide a solution to many of the problems in modality and how possible worlds themselves have been used to analyse notions (...)
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