PhilPapers is currently in read-only mode while we are performing some maintenance. You can use the site normally except that you cannot sign in. This shouldn't last long.
10 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: J. P. Smit (University of Stellenbosch)
  1. J. P. Smit, The Quasi-Verbal Dispute Between Kripke and 'Frege-Russell'.
    Traditional descriptivism and Kripkean causalism are standardly interpreted as rival theories on a single topic. I argue that there is no such shared topic, i.e. that there is no question that they can be interpreted as giving rival answers to. The only way to make sense of the commitment to epistemic transparency that characterizes traditional descriptivism is to interpret Russell and Frege as proposing rival accounts of how to characterize a subject’s beliefs about what names refer to. My argument relies (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. J. P. Smit, Filip Buekens & Stan du Plessis (2013). Developing the Incentivized Action View of Institutional Reality. Synthese:1-18.
    Contemporary discussion concerning institutions focus on, and mostly accept, the Searlean view that institutional objects, i.e. money, borders and the like, exist in virtue of the fact that we collectively represent them as existing. A dissenting note has been sounded by Smit et al. (Econ Philos 27:1–22, 2011), who proposed the incentivized action view of institutional objects. On the incentivized action view, understanding a specific institution is a matter of understanding the specific actions that are associated with the institution and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. J. P. Smit (2012). Why Bare Demonstratives Need Not Semantically Refer. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):43-66.
    I-theories of bare demonstratives take the semantic referent of a demonstrative to be determined by an inner state of the utterer. E-theories take the referent to be determined by factors external to the utterer. I argue that, on the Standard view of communication, neither of these theories can be right. Firstly, both are committed to the existence of conventions with superfluous content. Secondly, any claim to the effect that a speaker employs the conventions associated with these theories cannot have any (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. J. P. Smit, Filip Buekens & Stan du Plessis (2011). What is Money? An Alternative to Searle's Institutional Facts. Economics and Philosophy 27 (1):1-22.
    In The Construction of Social Reality (1995), John Searle develops a theory of institutional facts and objects, of which money, borders and property are presented as prime examples. These objects are the result of us collectively intending certain natural objects to have a certain status, i.e. to ‘count as’ being certain social objects. This view renders such objects irreducible to natural objects. In this paper we propose a radically different approach that is more compatible with standard economic theory. We claim (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. J. P. Smit (2010). Why 'Water'is Nearly an Indexical. SATS 11 (1):33-51.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. J. P. Smit & A. Steglich-Petersen (2010). Anaphora and Semantic Innocence. Journal of Semantics 27 (1):119-124.
    Semantic theories that violate semantic innocence, i.e. require reference-shifts when terms are embedded in ‘that’ clauses and the like, are often challenged by producing sentences where an anaphoric expression, while not itself embedded in a context in which reference shifts, is anaphoric on an antecedent expression that is embedded in such a context. This, in conjunction with a widely accepted principle concerning unproblematic anaphora, is used to show that such reference shifting has absurd consequences. We show that it is the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & J. P. Smit (2010). Anaphora and Semantic Innocence. Journal of Semantics 27 (1):ffp012.
    Semantic theories that violate semantic innocence, i.e. require reference-shifts when terms are embedded in ‘that’ clauses and the like, are often challenged by producing sentences where an anaphoric expression, while not itself embedded in a context in which reference shifts, is anaphoric on an antecedent expression that is embedded in such a context. This, in conjunction with a widely accepted principle concerning unproblematic anaphora, is used to show that such reference shifting has absurd consequences. We show that it is the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Ben Kotzee & J. P. Smit (2009). Why Hobbits Cannot Exist. Think 8 (21):29-36.
    Kotzee and Smit explain why, if unicorns don't exist, then they could not possibly have existed. In fact, even if horned horses were discovered somewhere, they would not necessarily be unicorns. The key to understanding why this is so lies in understanding how so-called natural kind terms function.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. J. P. Smit (2009). Essentialism and the Theory of Direct Reference. SATS 10 (1):135-148.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. J. P. Smit (2003). The Supposed “Inseparability” of Fact and Value. South African Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):51-62.
    A wide variety of philosophers seem to agree that there is something dubious about the distinction between fact and value. This paper evaluates some of the arguments made for such a contention. It is argued that only the crudest form of pragmatism leads to a conflation of fact and value. Other arguments against the fact/value distinction, mostly drawn from Putnam's Reason, Truth and History, are examined in order to show that they are either false or trivial. S. Afr. J. Philos. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation