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  1. J. Scott Jordan, Dawn M. McBride & A. Potentially (forthcoming). Stable Instabilities in the Study of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
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  2. J. Scott Jordan (2008). Toward a Theory of Embodied Communication: Self-Sustaining Wild Systems as Embodied Meaning. In Ipke Wachsmuth, Manuela Lenzen & Günther Knoblich (eds.), Embodied Communication in Humans and Machines. Oup Oxford. 53.
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  3. J. Scott Jordan & Marcello Ghin (2007). The Role of Control in a Science of Consciousness: Causality, Regulation and Self-Sustainment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):177-197.
    There is quite a bit of disagreement in cognitive science regarding the role that consciousness and control play in explanations of how people do what they do. The purpose of the present paper is to do the following: (1) examine the theoretical choice points that have lead theorists to conflicting positions, (2) examine the philosophical and empirical problems different theories encounter as they address the issue of conscious agency, and (3) provide an integrative framework (Wild Systems Theory) that addresses these (...)
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  4. J. Scott Jordan & Dawn M. McBride (2007). Stable Instabilities in the Study of Consciousness: A Potentially Integrative Prologue? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):viii-xii.
  5. J. Scott Jordan & Dawn M. McBride (2007). The Concepts of Consciousness: Integrating an Emerging Science. Imprint Academic.
  6. J. Scott Jordan & Marcello Ghin (2006). (Proto-) Consciousness as a Contextually Emergent Property of Self-Sustaining Systems. Mind and Matter 4 (1):45-68.
    The concept of contextual emergence has been introduced as a speci?c kind of emergence in which some, but not all of the conditions for a higher-level phenomenon exist at a lower level. Further conditions exist in contingent contexts that provide stability conditions at the lower level, which in turn accord the emergence of novelty at the higher level. The purpose of the present paper is to propose that (proto-) consciousness is a contextually emergent property of self-sustaining systems. The core assumption (...)
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  7. J. Scott Jordan (2004). The Role of “Prespecification” in an Embodied Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):408-409.
    Grush makes extensive use of von Holst and Mittelstaedt's (1950) efference copy hypothesis. Although his embellishment of the model is admirably more sophisticated than that of its progenitors, I argue that it still suffers from the same conceptual limitations as entailed in its original formulation.
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  8. J. Scott Jordan (2003). Consciousness on the Edge: The Intentional Nature of Experience. Science and Consciousness Review 1.
     
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  9. J. Scott Jordan (2003). Emergence of Self and Other in Perception and Action: An Event-Control Approach. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):633-646.
    The present paper analyzes the regularities referred to via the concept 'self.' This is important, for cognitive science traditionally models the self as a cognitive mediator between perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs. This leads to the assertion that the self causes action. Recent findings in social psychology indicate this is not the case and, as a consequence, certain cognitive scientists model the self as being epiphenomenal. In contrast, the present paper proposes an alternative approach (i.e., the event-control approach) that is (...)
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  10. J. Scott Jordan (2002). Deriving Intentionality From Artifacts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):412-412.
    Cognitive psychologists tend to treat intentionality as a control variable during experiments, yet ignore it when generating mechanistic descriptions of performance. Wynn's work brings this conflict into striking relief and, when considered in relation to recent neurophysiological findings, makes it clear that intentionality can be regarded mechanistically if one defines it as the planning of distal effects.
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  11. J. Scott Jordan (2001). The Theory of Event Coding (TEC)'s Framework May Leave Perception Out of the Picture. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):890-890.
    Hommel et al. propose that action planning and perception utilize common resources. This implies perception should have intention-relative content. Data supporting this implication are presented. These findings challenge the notion of perception as “seeing.” An alternative is suggested (i.e., perception as distal control) that may provide a means of integrating representational and ecological approaches to the study of organism-environment coordination.
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  12. J. Scott Jordan (2000). The Role of" Control" in an Embodied Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 13 (2):233-237.
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  13. J. Scott Jordan (1999). “Mind is Brain” is Trivial and Nonscientific in Both Neurobiology and Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):842-842.
    Gold & Stoljar reveal that adherence to the radical neuron doctrine cannot be maintained via appeals to scientific principles. Using arguments from (1) naturalism and materialism, (2) unification, and (3) exemplars, it is shown that the “mind-is-brain” materialism explicit in the trivial version of the neuron doctrine ultimately suffers the same theoretical fate. Cognitive science, if it is to adopt an ontology at all, would be better served by a metaphysically neutral ontology such as double-aspect theory or neutral monism.
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  14. J. Scott Jordan (1997). Spatial Perception is Contextualized by Actual and Intended Deictic Codes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):750-751.
    Ballard et al. model eye position as a deictic pointer for spatial perception. Evidence from research on gaze control indicates, however, that shifts in actual eye position are neither necessary nor sufficient to produce shifts in spatial perception. Deictic context is instead provided by the interaction between two deictic pointers; one representing actual eye position, and the other, intended eye position.
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  15. Wayne A. Hershberger & J. Scott Jordan (1996). The Phantom Array. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):552-553.
    The array seen when saccading across a point light source blinking in the dark is displaced in the direction of the saccade. This displacement reflects an abrupt shift of spatiotopic coordinates that precedes the actual eye movement. The extraretinal signal mediating this discrete shift appears to be an oculomotor reference signal, specifying intended eye orientation, that changes discretely before saccades.
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