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  1. Joseph T. Giacino & J. T. Whyte (2005). The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: Current Knowledge and Remaining Questions. Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilation 20 (1):30-50.
  2. J. T. Whyte (1997). Success Again: Replies to Brandom and Godfrey-Smith. Analysis 57 (1):84–88.
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  3. J. T. Whyte (1993). Purpose and Content. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):45-60.
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  4. J. T. Whyte, N. Rescher & U. Majer (1993). Frank Plumpton Ramsey on Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 43 (173):550.
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  5. J. T. Whyte (1992). Review. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (2):279-282.
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  6. J. T. Whyte (1992). Weak-Kneed Desires. Analysis 52 (2):107-11.
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  7. J. T. Whyte (1991). Coherence and the Causation of Beliefs. Analysis 51 (4):231 - 235.
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  8. J. T. Whyte (1991). The Normal Rewards of Success. Analysis 51 (2):65 - 73.
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  9. J. T. Whyte (1990). Success Semantics. Analysis 50 (3):149 - 157.
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  10. J. T. Whyte (1990). The Psycho-Physical Laws of Intentionality. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):295 – 304.
    Abstract Intentional mental states have causes and effects. Davidson has shown that this fact alone does not entail the existence of psycho?physical laws, but his anomalism makes the connection between the content and causation of intentional states utterly mysterious. By defining intentional states in terms of their causes and effects, functionalism promises to explain this connection. If intentional states have their causes and effects in virtue of their contents, then there must be intrinsic states (of the people who have them) (...)
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