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Jonathan Weisberg [22]Josh Weisberg [19]J. Weisberg [5]J. M. Weisberg [1]
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Profile: Jonathan Weisberg (University of Toronto)
Profile: Josh Weisberg (University of Houston)
  1. Jonathan Weisberg, Indiscriminate Evidence, Easy Knowledge.
    Offers a diagnosis of the easy knowledge problem, according to which easy knowledge is unjustified belief because the inferences that deliver easy knowledge feign evidential support that is not actually there. This diagnosis leads to a rejection of Closure. But, I argue, this rejection of Closure is more plausible than the traditional one endorsed by tracking theorists. I also argue that my diagnosis suggests a general plausibility argument against Closure, since a number of epistemic goods traditionally associated with knowledge do (...)
     
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  2. Jonathan Weisberg, You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.
    F orty years ago Bayesian philosophers were just catching a new wave of technical innovation, entering an era of scoring rules, imprecise credences, and infinitesimal probabilities. Meanwhile, down the hall, Gettier’s (1963) paper was shaping an epistemological literature with little obvious interest in the formal programs of Reichenbach, Hempel, and Carnap, or their successors like Jeffrey, Levi, Skyrms, van Fraassen, and Lewis. And how Bayesians might accommodate the epistemological discourses of belief and knowledge was but a glimmer in the eye (...)
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  3. Jonathan Weisberg, The Preface Paradox and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.
    The preface paradox is a problem for everyone; you don’t need to be committed to any special epistemological theory to face the problem it raises. The problem of easy knowledge is supposed to be different in this respect. It is generally thought to arise only for those who believe there is such a thing as basic knowledge, i.e. knowledge acquired through a source that one does not know to be reliable or trustworthy. Because it is thought to arise only for (...)
     
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  4. Jonathan Weisberg, Varieties of Bayesianism.
    Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 10, eds. Dov Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann, and John Woods, forthcoming.
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  5. Josh Weisberg, $34.95, ISBN 1-55619-185-5 (Pbk).
    When you have ruled everything else out, then what you are left with, no matter how improbable, must be the truth. This adage from Doyle describes the path taken by Leopold Stubenberg in his book, Consciousness and Qualia. He spends most of the work critically examining and then discarding potential explications of consciousness before finally, in the last chapter, offering his own theory, carefully selected to avoid the pitfalls that did in rival accounts. He delivers a bold and simple slogan (...)
     
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  6. Josh Weisberg, The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.
    Over the last quarter century or so, no one has done more to shape debate in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science than Jerry Fodor. He is best known for championing the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), the view that thinking consists of computations over syntactically structured mental representations (Fodor, 1975). He has also developed the idea that the mind is partially made up of isolated mechanisms called “modules” that employ innate databases informationally encapsulated from the rest of the (...)
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  7. J. Weisberg (forthcoming). Updating, Undermining, and Independence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axt052.
    Sometimes appearances provide epistemic support that gets undercut later. In an earlier paper I argued that standard Bayesian update rules are at odds with this phenomenon because they are ‘rigid’. Here I generalize and bolster that argument. I first show that the update rules of Dempster–Shafer theory and ranking theory are rigid too, hence also at odds with the defeasibility of appearances. I then rebut three Bayesian attempts to solve the problem. I conclude that defeasible appearances pose a more difficult (...)
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  8. Jonathan Weisberg (2013). Knowledge in Action. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (22).
    Recent proposals that frame norms of action in terms of knowledge have been challenged by Bayesian decision theorists. Bayesians object that knowledge-based norms conflict with the highly successful and established view that rational action is rooted in degrees of belief. I argue that the knowledge-based and Bayesian pictures are not as incompatible as these objectors have made out. Attending to the mechanisms of practical reasoning exposes space for both knowledge and degrees of belief to play their respective roles.
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  9. Josh Weisberg (2013). The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts, by Rocco J Gennaro. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):1-4.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 92, Issue 2, Page 401-404, June 2014.
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  10. Josh Weisberg (2013). The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts, by Rocco J Gennaro: Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2012, Pp. X+ 378, US $42 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  11. Adam Sennet & Jonathan Weisberg (2012). Embedding "If and Only If". Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):449 - 460.
    Some left-nested indicative conditionals are hard to interpret while others seem fine. Some proponents of the view that indicative conditionals have No Truth Values (NTV) use their view to explain why some left-nestings are hard to interpret: the embedded conditional does not express the truth conditions needed by the embedding conditional. Left-nestings that seem fine are then explained away as cases of ad hoc, pragmatic interpretation. We challenge this explanation. The standard reasons for NTV about indicative conditionals (triviality results, Gibbardian (...)
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  12. Jonathan Weisberg (2012). The Argument From Divine Indifference. Analysis 72 (4):707-714.
    I argue that the rationale behind the fine-tuning argument for design is self-undermining, refuting the argument’s own premise that fine-tuning is to be expected given design. In (Weisberg 2010) I argued on informal grounds that this premise is unsupported. White (2011) countered that it can be derived from three plausible assumptions. But White’s third assumption is based on a fallacious rationale, and is even objectionable by the design theorist’s own lights. The argument that shows this, the argument from divine indifference, (...)
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  13. Jonathan Weisberg (2012). The Bootstrapping Problem. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.
    Bootstrapping is a suspicious form of reasoning that verifies a source's reliability by checking it against itself. Theories that endorse such reasoning face the bootstrapping problem. This article considers which theories face the problem, and surveys potential solutions. The initial focus is on theories like reliabilism and dogmatism, which allow one to gain knowledge from a source without knowing that it is reliable. But the discussion quickly turns to a more general version of the problem that does not depend on (...)
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  14. Josh Weisberg (2012). Comments on David Miguel Gray's “HOT. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):59-63.
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  15. Josh Weisberg (2012). Hard Problem of Consciousness. In J. Feiser & B. Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  16. Christopher J. G. Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg (2011). Representation Theorems and the Foundations of Decision Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663.
    Representation theorems are often taken to provide the foundations for decision theory. First, they are taken to characterize degrees of belief and utilities. Second, they are taken to justify two fundamental rules of rationality: that we should have probabilistic degrees of belief and that we should act as expected utility maximizers. We argue that representation theorems cannot serve either of these foundational purposes, and that recent attempts to defend the foundational importance of representation theorems are unsuccessful. As a result, we (...)
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  17. J. Weisberg (2011). Abusing the Notion of What-It's-Like-Ness: A Response to Block. Analysis 71 (3):438-443.
    Ned Block argues that the higher-order (HO) approach to explaining consciousness is ‘defunct’ because a prominent objection (the ‘misrepresentation objection’) exposes the view as ‘incoherent’. What’s more, a response to this objection that I’ve offered elsewhere (Weisberg 2010) fails because it ‘amounts to abusing the notion of what-it’s-like-ness’ (xxx).1 In this response, I wish to plead guilty as charged. Indeed, I will continue herein to abuse Block’s notion of what-it’s-like-ness. After doing so, I will argue that the HO approach accounts (...)
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  18. J. Weisberg (2011). Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory, by Uriah Kriegel. [REVIEW] Mind 120 (478):538-542.
  19. Jonathan Weisberg (2011). Varieties of Bayesianism. In Dov Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann & John Woods (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 10. Elsevier. 477.
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  20. Josh Weisberg (2011). The Zombie's Cogito: Meditations on Type-Q Materialism. Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):585 - 605.
    Most materialist responses to the zombie argument against materialism take either a ?type-A? or ?type-B? approach: they either deny the conceivability of zombies or accept their conceivability while denying their possibility. However, a ?type-Q? materialist approach, inspired by Quinean suspicions about a priority and modal entailment, rejects the sharp line between empirical and conceptual truths needed for the traditional responses. In this paper, I develop a type-Q response to the zombie argument, one stressing the theory-laden nature of our conceivability and (...)
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  21. Josh Weisberg (2011). Misrepresenting Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.
    An important objection to the "higher-order" theory of consciousness turns on the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation. I argue that the objection fails because it illicitly assumes a characterization of consciousness explicitly rejected by HO theory. This in turn raises the question of what justifies an initial characterization of the data a theory of consciousness must explain. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic characterizations of consciousness, and I propose several desiderata a successful characterization of consciousness must meet. I then defend the (...)
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  22. Jonathan Weisberg (2010). A Note on Design: What's Fine-Tuning Got to Do with It? Analysis 70 (3):431 - 438.
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  23. Jonathan Weisberg (2010). Bootstrapping in General. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525 - 548.
    Vogel (2000) argues that bootstrapping poses a novel problem for reliabilist theories of knowledge. According to the reliabilist, a true belief is knowledge just in case it was formed by a reliable process, even if one does not know that the process is reliable. Vogel argues that reliabilism allows one to gain knowledge of a source’s reliability in an intuitively illicit way, using the deliverances of the source itself. Cohen (2002; 2005), Van Cleve (2003), and others have argued that bootstrapping (...)
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  24. Jonathan Weisberg, Dempster-Shafer Theory.
    An introduction to Dempster-Shafter Theory, from a lecture at the Northern Institute of Philosophy in 2010.
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  25. Jonathan Weisberg, Pollock's Theory of Defeasible Reasoning.
    An introduction to the motivations and mechanics of John Pollock's theory of defeasible reasoning, from a lecture at the Northern Institute of Philosophy in 2010.
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  26. Jonathan Weisberg, Upper & Lower Probabilities.
    An introduction to the motivations and mechanics of upper and lower probabilities, from a lecture given at the Northern Institute of Philosophy in 2010.
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  27. J. Weisberg, F. Huber & E. Swanson (eds.) (2009). Conditionals and Ranking Functions, Special Issue of Erkenntnis. Springer.
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  28. Jonathan Weisberg (2009). Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):793 - 812.
    Conditionalization and Jeffrey Conditionalization cannot simultaneously satisfy two widely held desiderata on rules for empirical learning. The first desideratum is confirmational holism, which says that the evidential import of an experience is always sensitive to our background assumptions. The second desideratum is commutativity, which says that the order in which one acquires evidence shouldn't affect what conclusions one draws, provided the same total evidence is gathered in the end. (Jeffrey) Conditionalization cannot satisfy either of these desiderata without violating the other. (...)
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  29. Jonathan Weisberg (2009). Locating IBE in the Bayesian Framework. Synthese 167 (1):125 - 143.
    Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) and Bayesianism are our two most prominent theories of scientific inference. Are they compatible? Van Fraassen famously argued that they are not, concluding that IBE must be wrong since Bayesianism is right. Writers since then, from both the Bayesian and explanationist camps, have usually considered van Fraassen's argument to be misguided, and have plumped for the view that Bayesianism and IBE are actually compatible. I argue that van Fraassen's argument is actually not so misguided, (...)
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  30. Pete Mandik & Josh Weisberg (2008). Type-Q Materialism. In Chase Wrenn (ed.), Naturalism, Reference and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson. Peter Lang Publishing Group.
    s Gibson (1982) correctly points out, despite Quine’s brief flirtation with a “mitigated phenomenalism” (Gibson’s phrase) in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, Quine’s ontology of 1953 (“On Mental Entities”) and beyond left no room for non-physical sensory objects or qualities. Anyone familiar with the contemporary neo-dualist qualia-freak-fest might wonder why Quinean lessons were insufficiently transmitted to the current generation.
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  31. David Rosenthal & Josh Weisberg (2008). Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Scholarpedia 3 (5):4407.
  32. Josh Weisberg (2008). Same Old, Same Old: The Same-Order Representational Theory of Consciousness and the Division of Phenomenal Labor. Synthese 160 (2):161-181.
    The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of intimacy' is exposed by the possibility (...)
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  33. Jonathan Weisberg (2007). Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):179-97.
    Van Fraassen famously endorses the Principle of Reflection as a constraint on rational credence, and argues that Reflection is entailed by the more traditional principle of Conditionalization. He draws two morals from this alleged entailment. First, that Reflection can be regarded as an alternative to Conditionalization – a more lenient standard of rationality. And second, that commitment to Conditionalization can be turned into support for Reflection. Van Fraassen also argues that Reflection implies Conditionalization, thus offering a new justification for Conditionalization. (...)
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  34. Josh Weisberg (2007). The Problem of Consciousness: Mental Appearance and Mental Reality. Dissertation, The City University of New York
    of (from Philosophy Dissertations Online).
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  35. Josh Weisberg (2006). Consciousness Constrained: A Commentary on Being No One. Psyche 12 (1).
    ABSTRCT: In this commentary, I criticize Metzinger's interdisciplinary approach to fixing the explanandum of a theory of consciousness and I offer a commonsense alternative in its place. I then re-evaluate Metzinger's multi-faceted working concept of consciousness, and argue for a shift away from the notion of "global availability" and towards the notio ns of "perspectivalness" and "transparency." This serves to highlight the role of Metzinger's "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation" (PMIR) in explaining consciousness, and it helps to locate Metzinger's (...)
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  36. Jonathan Weisberg, Conditionalization Without Reflection.
    Conditionalization is an intuitive and popular epistemic principle. By contrast, the Reflection principle is well known to have some very unappealing consequences. But van Fraassen argues that Conditionalization entails Reflection, so that proponents of Conditionalization must accept Reflection and its consequences. Van Fraassen also argues that Reflection implies Conditionalization, thus offering a new justification for Conditionalization. I argue that neither principle entails the other, and thus neither can be used to motivate the other in the way van Fraassen says. I (...)
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  37. Jonathan Weisberg (2005). Firing Squads and Fine-Tuning: Sober on the Design Argument. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):809-821.
    Elliott Sober has recently argued that the cosmological design argument is unsound, since our observation of cosmic fine-tuning is subject to an observation selection effect (OSE). I argue that this view commits Sober to rejecting patently correct design inferences in more mundane scenarios. I show that Sober's view, that there are OSEs in those mundane cases, rests on a confusion about what information an agent ought to treat as background when evaluating likelihoods. Applying this analysis to the design argument shows (...)
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  38. Josh Weisberg (2005). Consciousness Constrained: Commentary on Metzinger. Psyche 11 (5).
    ABSTRCT: In this commentary, I criticize Metzinger's interdisciplinary approach to fixing the explanandum of a theory of consciousness and I offer a commonsense alternative in its place. I then re-evaluate Metzinger's multi-faceted working concept of consciousness, and argue for a shift away from the notion of "global availability" and towards the notio ns of "perspectivalness" and "transparency." This serves to highlight the role of Metzinger's "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation" (PMIR) in explaining consciousness, and it helps to locate Metzinger's (...)
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  39. Christopher J. G. Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg (2003). Clark and Shackel on the Two-Envelope Paradox. Mind 112 (448):685-689.
    Clark and Shackel have recently argued that previous attempts to resolve the two-envelope paradox fail, and that we must look to symmetries of the relevant expected-value calculations for a solution. Clark and Shackel also argue for a novel solution to the peeking case, a variant of the two-envelope scenario in which you are allowed to look in your envelope before deciding whether or not to swap. Whatever the merits of these solutions, they go beyond accepted decision theory, even contradicting it (...)
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  40. Josh Weisberg (2003). Being All That We Can Be: Review of Metzinger's Being No-One. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):89-96.
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  41. Josh Weisberg (2003). Being All That We Can Be: A Critical Review of Thomas Metzinger's Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):89-96.
    Some theorists approach the Gordian knot of consciousness by proclaiming its inherent tangle and mystery. Others draw out the sword of reduction and cut the knot to pieces. Philosopher Thomas Metzinger, in his important new book, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity,1 instead attempts to disentangle the knot one careful strand at a time. The result is an extensive and complex work containing almost 700 pages of philosophical analysis, phenomenological reflection, and scientific data. The text offers a sweeping (...)
     
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  42. J. Weisberg (2001). Jerry Fodor, The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):75-75.
     
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  43. Josh Weisberg (2001). The Appearance of Unity: A Higher-Order Interpretation of the Unity of Consciousness. Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Conference of The Cognitive Science Society.
    subjective appearance of unity, but respects unity can be adequately dealt with by the theory. I the actual and potential disunity of the brain will close by briefly considering some worries about processes that underwrite consciousness. eliminativism that often accompany discussions of unity and consciousness.
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  44. Josh Weisberg (1999). Active, Thin, and HOT: An Actualist Response to Carruthers' Dispositionalist HOT View. Psyche 5 (6).
    Carruthers proposes that for a mental state to be conscious (state consciousness), it must be present in a.
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  45. Josh Weisberg (1999). Leopold Stubenberg, Consciousness and Qualia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:154-154.
     
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  46. J. M. Weisberg (1994). Court Affirms Prisoner's Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics: A Journal of the American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 22 (1):92.
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