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  1. J. William Forgie (2008). How is the Question 'is Existence a Predicate?' Relevant to the Ontological Argument? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 64 (3):117 - 133.
    It is often said that the ontological argument fails because it wrongly treats existence as a first-level property or predicate. This has proved a controversial claim, and efforts to evaluate it are complicated by the fact that the words ‘existence is not a property/predicate’ have been used by philosophers to make at least three different negative claims: (a) one about a first-level phenomenon possessed by objects like horses, stones, you and me; (b) another about the logical form of assertions of (...)
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  2. J. William Forgie (2008). Kant and Existence: Critique of Pure Reason A 600/B 628. Kant-Studien 99 (1):1-12.
    By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing – even if we completely determine it – we do not make the least addition to the thing when we further declare that this thing is. Otherwise, it would not be exactly the same thing that exists, but something more than we had thought in the concept; and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept exists.
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  3. J. William Forgie (2003). The Alleged Dependency of the Cosmological Argument on the Ontological. Faith and Philosophy 20 (3):364-370.
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  4. J. William Forgie (2000). Kant and Frege: Existence as a Second-Level Property. Kant-Studien 91 (2):165-177.
  5. J. William Forgie (1998). The Possibility of Theistic Experience. Religious Studies 34 (3):317-323.
    In a recent issue of "Religious Studies" Kevin Corcoran has criticized my arguments for the impossibility of theistic experience (i.e. an experience which is phenomenologically of God). Building on, and amending, criticisms already levelled against my views by Nelson Pike (in the latter's "Mystic Union"), Corcoran argues that my views are based on an account of what it is for an experience to be 'phenomenologically of' an individual (or kind of thing) which leads to 'wildly implausible' results. I here try (...)
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  6. J. William Forgie (1995). The Cosmological and Ontological Arguments: How Saint Thomas Solved the Kantian Problem. Religious Studies 31 (1):89 - 100.
    Let us call the Dependency Theses (DT) the view, first stated by Kant, that certain versions of the cosmological argument depend on the ontological argument. At least two different reasons have been given for the supposed dependence. Given the DT, some of Aquinas' views about God's essence, and about our knowledge of God's existence, can seem, at least at first, to be inconsistent. I consider two different ways of defending Aquinas against this suspicion of inconsistency. On the first defence, based (...)
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  7. J. William Forgie (1994). Pike's "Mystic Union" and the Possibility of Theistic Experience. Religious Studies 30 (2):231 - 242.
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  8. J. William Forgie (1993). Kant on the Relation Between the Cosmological and Ontological Arguments. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 34 (1):1 - 12.
  9. J. William Forgie (1991). The Modal Ontological Argument and the Necessary a Posteriori. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29 (3):129 - 141.
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  10. J. William Forgie (1990). The Caterus Objection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 28 (2):81 - 104.
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  11. J. William Forgie (1986). The Principle of Credulity and the Evidential Value of Religious Experience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 19 (3):145 - 159.
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  12. J. William Forgie (1985). Hyper-Kantianism in Recent Discussions of Mystical Experience. Religious Studies 21 (2):205 - 218.
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  13. J. William Forgie (1985). Mystical Experience and the Argument From Agreement. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 17 (3):97 - 113.
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  14. J. William Forgie (1984). Thestic Experience and the Doctrine Of Unanimity. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 15 (1/2):13 - 30.
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  15. J. William Forgie (1977). Existence and Properties. New Scholasticism 51 (1):102-116.
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  16. J. William Forgie (1976). Is the Cartesian Ontological Argument Defensible? New Scholasticism 50 (1):108-121.
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  17. J. William Forgie (1976). Wittgenstein on Naming and Ostensive Definition. International Studies in Philosophy 8:13-26.
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  18. J. William Forgie (1975). Kant and the Question "Is Existence a Predicate?". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (4):563 - 582.
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  19. J. William Forgie (1975). Kant and the Question. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (4):563-582.
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  20. J. William Forgie (1974). Existence Assertions and the Ontological Argument. Mind 83 (330):260-262.
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  21. J. William Forgie (1972). Frege's Objection to the Ontological Argument. Noûs 6 (3):251-265.
    Frege argued that 1) in making existence assertions we ascribe (or deny) the second-Level property, 'not being empty', To a first-Level concept. He inferred from this that 2) existence is a second-Level property, The property 'not being empty'. He therefore rejected the ontological proof of the existence of God because, He claimed, It depends on the assumption that existence is a first-Level, And not a second-Level, Property. In this paper it is argued, First, That frege is unsuccessful in his attempt (...)
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