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James Woodward [56]James F. Woodward [24]Jim Woodward [19]J. Woodward [6]
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  1. James Woodward (forthcoming). (B. 1939) Are Professors at the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California. Woodward Teaches Philosophy; Goodstein Teaches Physics. Woodward has Served Caltech as Executive Officer. [REVIEW] Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence.
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  2. James Woodward (forthcoming). Methodology, Ontology, and Interventionism. Synthese:1-23.
    This paper defends an interventionist account of causation by construing this account as a contribution to methodology, rather than as a set of theses about the ontology or metaphysics of causation. It also uses the topic of causation to raise some more general issues about the relation between, on the one hand, methodology, and, on the other hand, ontology and metaphysics, as these are understood in contemporary philosophical discussion, particularly among so-called analytic metaphysicians. It concludes with the suggestion that issues (...)
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  3. Julie Woodward & Kate Kimball (forthcoming). Argument Paper. ARGUMENT.
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  4. J. Woodward (2014). Simplicity in the Best Systems Account of Laws of Nature. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (1):91-123.
    This article discusses the role of simplicity and the notion of a best balance of simplicity and strength within the best systems account (BSA) of laws of nature. The article explores whether there is anything in scientific practice that corresponds to the notion of simplicity or to the trade-off between simplicity and strength to which the BSA appeals. Various theoretical rationales for simplicity preferences and their bearing on the identification of laws are also explored. It is concluded that there are (...)
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  5. James Woodward (2014). Interventionism and Causal Exclusion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2).
    A number of writers, myself included, have recently argued that an “interventionist” treatment of causation of the sort defended in Woodward, can be used to cast light on so-called “causal exclusion” arguments. This interventionist treatment of causal exclusion has in turn been criticized by other philosophers. This paper responds to these criticisms. It describes an interventionist framework for thinking about causal relationships when supervenience relations are present. I contend that this framework helps us to see that standard arguments for causal (...)
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  6. James Woodward (2013). Mechanistic Explanation: Its Scope and Limits. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):39-65.
    This paper explores the question of whether all or most explanations in biology are, or ideally should be, ‘mechanistic’. I begin by providing an account of mechanistic explanation, making use of the interventionist ideas about causation I have developed elsewhere. This account emphasizes the way in which mechanistic explanations, at least in the biological sciences, integrate difference-making and spatio-temporal information, and exhibit what I call fine-tunedness of organization. I also emphasize the role played by modularity conditions in mechanistic explanation. I (...)
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  7. James Woodward (2012). Cooperation and Reciprocity : Empirical Evidence and Normative Implications. In Harold Kincaid (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science. Oxford University Press.
     
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  8. James Woodward (2012). Causation: Interactions Between Philosophical Theories and Psychological Research. Philosophy of Science 79 (5):961-972.
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  9. James Woodward (2011). Causal Perception and Causal Cognition. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
    This paper explores some issues having to do with the perception of causation. It discusses the role that phenomena that that are associated with causal perception, such as Michottean launching interactions, play within philosophical accounts of causation and also speculates on their possible role in development.
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  10. James Woodward (2011). Mechanisms Revisited. Synthese 183 (3):409-427.
    This paper defends an interventionist treatment of mechanisms and contrasts this with Waskan (forthcoming). Interventionism embodies a difference-making conception of causation. I contrast such conceptions with geometrical/mechanical or “actualist” conceptions, associating Waskan’s proposals with the latter. It is argued that geometrical/mechanical conceptions of causation cannot replace difference-making conceptions in characterizing the behavior of mechanisms, but that some of the intuitions behind the geometrical/mechanical approach can be captured by thinking in terms of spatio-temporally organized difference-making information.
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  11. James Woodward (2011). Psychological Studies of Causal and Counterfactual Reasoning. In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation. Oxford University Press. 16.
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  12. James F. Woodward (2011). Data and Phenomena: A Restatement and Defense. Synthese 182 (1):165-179.
    This paper provides a restatement and defense of the data/ phenomena distinction introduced by Jim Bogen and me several decades ago (e.g., Bogen and Woodward, The Philosophical Review, 303–352, 1988). Additional motivation for the distinction is introduced, ideas surrounding the distinction are clarified, and an attempt is made to respond to several criticisms.
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  13. Jim Woodward (2011). Causes, Conditions, and the Pragmatics of Causal Explanation. In Gregory J. Morgan (ed.), Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein. Oxford University Press. 247.
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  14. Jim Woodward, Barry Loewer, John Carroll & Marc Lange (2011). Counterfactuals All the Way Down? Metascience 20 (1):27-52.
    Counterfactuals all the way down? Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9437-9 Authors Jim Woodward, History and Philosophy of Science, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA Barry Loewer, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA John W. Carroll, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-8103, USA Marc Lange, Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, CB#3125—Caldwell Hall, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125, USA Journal Metascience Online (...)
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  15. E. Bonawitz, D. Ferranti, R. Saxe, A. Gopnik, A. Meltzoff, J. Woodward & L. Schulz (2010). Just Do It? Toddlers' Ability to Integrate Prediction and Action. Cognition 115:104-117.
     
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  16. Elizabeth Baraff Bonawitz, Darlene Ferranti, Rebecca Saxe, Alison Gopnik, Andrew N. Meltzoff, James Woodward & Laura E. Schulz (2010). Just Do It? Investigating the Gap Between Prediction and Action in Toddlers' Causal Inferences. Cognition 115 (1):104-117.
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  17. Leah Henderson, Noah D. Goodman, Joshua B. Tenenbaum & James F. Woodward (2010). The Structure and Dynamics of Scientific Theories: A Hierarchical Bayesian Perspective. Philosophy of Science 77 (2):172-200.
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  18. Denis M. Walsh, Leah Henderson, Noah D. Goodman, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, James F. Woodward, Hannes Leitgeb, Richard Pettigrew, Brad Weslake & John Kulvicki (2010). 1. Not a Sure Thing: Fitness, Probability, and Causation Not a Sure Thing: Fitness, Probability, and Causation (Pp. 147-171). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 77 (2).
     
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  19. James Woodward (2010). Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and the Choice of Levels of Explanation. Biology and Philosophy 25 (3):287-318.
    This paper attempts to elucidate three characteristics of causal relationships that are important in biological contexts. Stability has to do with whether a causal relationship continues to hold under changes in background conditions. Proportionality has to do with whether changes in the state of the cause “line up” in the right way with changes in the state of the effect and with whether the cause and effect are characterized in a way that contains irrelevant detail. Specificity is connected both to (...)
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  20. James Woodward (2010). Data, Phenomena, Signal, and Noise. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):792-803.
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  21. James Woodward (2009). Agency and Interventionist Theories. In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oup Oxford.
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  22. Jim Woodward (2009). Why Do People Cooperate as Much as They Do? In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press.
    This paper makes use of recent empirical results, mainly from experimental economics, to expore the conditions under which people will cooperate and to assess competing explantions of this cooperation. It is argued that the evidence supports the claim that people differ in type, with some being conditional cooperators and others being motivated by more or less sophisticated forms of self-interest. Stable cooperation requires, among other things, rules and institutions that protect conditional cooperators from myopically self-interested types. Additional empirical features of (...)
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  23. John Allman & Jim Woodward (2008). What Are Moral Intuitions and Why Should We Care About Them? A Neurobiological Perspective. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):164-185.
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  24. James Woodward (2008). Cause and Explanation in Psychiatry: An Interventionist Perspective. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press.
    This paper explores some issues concerning the nature and structure of causal explanation in psychiatry and psychology from the point of view of the “interventionist” theory defended in my book, Making Things Happen. Among the issues is explored is the extent to which candidate causal explanations involving “upper level” or relatively coarse-grained or macroscopic variables such as mental/psychological states (e.g. highly self critical beliefs or low self esteem) or environmental factors (e.g. parental abuse) compete with explanations that instead appeal to (...)
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  25. James Woodward, Causation and Manipulability. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Manipulablity theories of causation, according to which causes are to be regarded as handles or devices for manipulating effects, have considerable intuitive appeal and are popular among social scientists and statisticians. This article surveys several prominent versions of such theories advocated by philosophers, and the many difficulties they face. Philosophical statements of the manipulationist approach are generally reductionist in aspiration and assign a central role to human action. These contrast with recent discussions employing a broadly manipulationist framework for understanding causation, (...)
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  26. James Woodward (2008). Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
    This paper discusses some issues concerning the relationship between the mental and the physical, including the so-called causal exclusion argument, within the framework of a broadly interventionist approach to causation.
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  27. James Woodward (2008). Social Preferences in Experimental Economics. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):646-657.
    This article explores some issues having to do with the use of experimental results from one‐shot games to reach conclusions about the existence of social preferences that are taken to figure in the explanation of cooperation in repeated interactions in real life. †To contact the author, please write to: Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125; e‐mail: jfw@hss.caltech.edu.
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  28. James F. Woodward (2008). Comment: Levels of Explanation and Variable Choice. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press. 216.
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  29. Jim Woodward (2008). Response to Strevens. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):193-212.
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  30. James Woodward (2007). Causation with a Human Face. In Huw Price & Richard Corry (eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell's Republic Revisited. Oxford University Press.
    What is the relationship between, on the one hand, the sorts of causal claims found in the special sciences (and in common sense) and, on the other hand, the world as described by physics? A standard picture goes like this: the fundamental laws of physics are causal laws in the sense that they can be interpreted as telling us that realizations of one set of physical factors or properties “causes” realizations of other properties. Causal claims in the special sciences are (...)
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  31. James Woodward, Experimental Investigations of Social Preferences.
    This article surveys some of the philosophical issues raised by recent experimental work in economics on so-called social preferences. This work raises a number of fascinating methodological and interpretive issues that are of central importance both to economics and to social and political philosophy.
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  32. James Woodward & John Allman (2007). Moral Intuition: Its Neural Substrates and Normative Significance. Journal of Physiology-Paris 101 (4-6):179-202.
    We use the phrase "moral intuition" to describe the appearance in consciousness of moral judgments or assessments without any awareness of having gone through a conscious reasoning process that produces this assessment. This paper investigates the neural substrates of moral intuition. We propose that moral intuitions are part of a larger set of social intuitions that guide us through complex, highly uncertain and rapidly changing social interactions. Such intuitions are shaped by learning. The neural substrates for moral intuition include fronto-insular, (...)
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  33. Jim Woodward (2007). Interventionist Theories of Causation in Psychological Perspective. In Alison Gopnik & Laura Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation. Oxford University Press. 19--36.
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  34. James Woodward (2006). Sensitive and Insensitive Causation. Philosophical Review 115 (1):1-50.
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  35. James F. Woodward (2006). Book Review: World Without Time: The Forgotten Legacy of Gödel and Einstein. By Palle Yourgrau, Basic Books, New York, New York, USA, 2005, Viii + 210 Pp., $24 (Hard Cover). ISBN 0-465-09293-4. [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 36 (2):321-325.
  36. Jim Woodward (2006). Some Varieties of Robustness. Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (2):219-240.
    It is widely believed that robustness (of inferences, measurements, models, phenomena and relationships discovered in empirical investigation etc.) is a Good Thing. However, there are many different notions of robustness. These often differ both in their normative credentials and in the conditions that warrant their deployment. Failure to distinguish among these notions can result in the uncritical transfer of considerations which support one notion to contexts in which another notion is being deployed. This paper surveys several different notions of robustness (...)
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  37. James Bogen & Jim Woodward (2005). Evading the Irs. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 86 (1):233-268.
    'IRS' is our term for the logical empiricist idea that the best way to understand the epistemic bearing of observational evidence on scientific theories is to model it in terms of Inferential Relations among Sentences representing the evidence, and sentences representing hypotheses the evidence is used to evaluate. Developing ideas from our earlier work, including 'Saving the Phenomena'(Phil Review 97, 1988, p.303-52 )we argue that the bearing of observational evidence on theory depends upon causal connections and error characteristics of the (...)
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  38. Daniel M. Hausman & James Woodward (2004). Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition: A Restatement. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):147-161.
    expose some gaps and difficulties in the argument for the causal Markov condition in our essay ‘Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition’ ([1999]), and we are grateful for the opportunity to reformulate our position. In particular, Cartwright disagrees vigorously with many of the theses we advance about the connection between causation and manipulation. Although we are not persuaded by some of her criticisms, we shall confine ourselves to showing how our central argument can be reconstructed and to casting doubt (...)
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  39. Daniel Hausman & James Woodward (2004). Causation and Bayesian Networks-Manipulation and the Causal Markov Condition. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):846-856.
     
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  40. Daniel Hausman & James Woodward (2004). Manipulation and the Causal Markov Condition. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):846-856.
    This paper explores the relationship between a manipulability conception of causation and the causal Markov condition (CM). We argue that violations of CM also violate widely shared expectations—implicit in the manipulability conception—having to do with the absence of spontaneous correlations. They also violate expectations concerning the connection between independence or dependence relationships in the presence and absence of interventions.
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  41. James Woodward (2004). Counterfactuals and Causal Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):41 – 72.
    This article defends the use of interventionist counterfactuals to elucidate causal and explanatory claims against criticisms advanced by James Bogen and Peter Machamer. Against Bogen, I argue that counterfactual claims concerning what would happen under interventions are meaningful and have determinate truth values, even in a deterministic world. I also argue, against both Machamer and Bogen, that we need to appeal to counterfactuals to capture the notions like causal relevance and causal mechanism. Contrary to what both authors suppose, counterfactuals are (...)
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  42. James F. Woodward (2004). Book Review: The Fabric of the Cosmos. By Brian Greene, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, U.S.A., 2004, Xii + 569 Pp., $28.95 (Hardcover). [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 34 (8):1267-1273.
  43. James F. Woodward (2004). Flux Capacitors and the Origin of Inertia. Foundations of Physics 34 (10):1475-1514.
    The explanation of inertia based on “Mach's principle” is briefly revisited and an experiment whereby the gravitational origin of inertia can be tested is described. The test consists of detecting a small stationary force with a sensitive force sensor. The force is presumably induced when a periodic transient Mach effect mass fluctuation is driven in high voltage, high energy density capacitors that are subjected to 50 kHz, 1.3 kV amplitude voltage signal, and threaded by an alternating magnetic flux of the (...)
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  44. James F. Woodward & Fiona Cowie (2004). The Mind is Not (Just) a System of Modules Shaped (Just) by Natural Selection. In Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. 312-34.
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  45. Christopher Hitchcock & James Woodward (2003). Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth. Noûs 37 (2):181–199.
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  46. James Woodward (2003). Critical Notice: Causality by Judea Pearl. Economics and Philosophy 19 (2):321-340.
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  47. James Woodward (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press.
    Woodward's long awaited book is an attempt to construct a comprehensive account of causation explanation that applies to a wide variety of causal and explanatory claims in different areas of science and everyday life. The book engages some of the relevant literature from other disciplines, as Woodward weaves together examples, counterexamples, criticisms, defenses, objections, and replies into a convincing defense of the core of his theory, which is that we can analyze causation by appeal to the notion of manipulation.
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  48. James Woodward & Christopher Hitchcock (2003). Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account. Noûs 37 (1):1–24.
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