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  1.  195 DLs
    JC Beall & Mark Colyvan (2001). Heaps of Gluts and Hyde-Ing the Sorites. Mind 110 (438):401--408.
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  2.  160 DLs
    JC Beall & Michael Glanzberg (2010). The Liar Paradox. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Csli
    The first sentence in this essay is a lie. There is something odd about saying so, as has been known since ancient times. To see why, remember that all lies are untrue. Is the first sentence true? If it is, then it is a lie, and so it is not true. Conversely, suppose that it is not true. As we (viz., the authors) have said it, presumably with the intention of you believing it when it is not true, it is (...)
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  3.  150 DLs
    JC Beall & Mark Colyvan (2001). Looking for Contradictions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):564 – 569.
  4.  128 DLs
    JC Beall & Greg Restall, Defending Logical Pluralism.
    We are pluralists about logical consequence [1]. We hold that there is more than one sense in which arguments may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the name deductive validity. Our pluralism starts with our analysis of consequence. This analysis of consequence is not idiosyncratic. We agree with Richard Jeffrey, and with many other philosophers of logic about how logical consequence is to be defined. To quote Jeffrey.
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  5.  111 DLs
    Jc Beall & David Ripley, Nonclassical Theories of Truth.
    This chapter attempts to give a brief overview of nonclassical (-logic) theories of truth. Due to space limitations, we follow a victory-through-sacrifice policy: sacrifice details in exchange for clarity of big-picture ideas. This policy results in our giving all-too-brief treatment to certain topics that have dominated discussion in the non-classical-logic area of truth studies. (This is particularly so of the ‘suitable conditoinal’ issue: §4.3.) Still, we present enough representative ideas that one may fruitfully turn from this essay to the more-detailed (...)
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  6.  106 DLs
    Jc Beall & David Ripley (2004). Analetheism and Dialetheism. Analysis 64 (281):30–35.
  7.  104 DLs
    JC Beall (2000). On Truthmakers for Negative Truths. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):264 – 268.
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  8.  97 DLs
    Jc Beall & Greg Restall (2006). Logical Pluralism. Oxford University Press.
    Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a (...)
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  9.  93 DLs
    Jc Beall & Greg Restall (2000). Logical Pluralism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
    Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a (...)
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  10.  90 DLs
    Jc Beall, Graham Priest & Zack Weber (2011). Can U Do That? Analysis 71 (2):280-285.
    In his ‘On t and u and what they can do’, Greg Restall presents an apparent problem for a handful of well-known non-classical solutions to paradoxes like the liar. In this article, we argue that there is a problem only if classical logic – or classical-enough logic – is presupposed. 1. Background Many have thought that invoking non-classical logic – in particular, a paracomplete or paraconsistent logic – is the correct response to the liar and related paradoxes. At the most (...)
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  11.  87 DLs
    Jc Beall, Ross Brady, J. Michael Dunn, A. P. Hazen, Edwin Mares, Robert K. Meyer, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, David Ripley, John Slaney & Richard Sylvan (2012). On the Ternary Relation and Conditionality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):595 - 612.
    One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley-Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly discussing (...)
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  12.  80 DLs
    Jc Beall (2012). Future Contradictions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):547-557.
    A common and much-explored thought is ?ukasiewicz's idea that the future is ?indeterminate??i.e., ?gappy? with respect to some claims?and that such indeterminacy bleeds back into the present in the form of gappy ?future contingent? claims. What is uncommon, and to my knowledge unexplored, is the dual idea of an overdeterminate future?one which is ?glutty? with respect to some claims. While the direct dual, with future gluts bleeding back into the present, is worth noting, my central aim is simply to sketch (...)
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  13.  79 DLs
    Jc Beall, Curry's Paradox.
    Curry's paradox, so named for its discoverer, namely Haskell B. Curry, is a paradox within the family of so-called paradoxes of self-reference (or paradoxes of circularity). Like the liar paradox (e.g., ‘this sentence is false’) and Russell's paradox , Curry's paradox challenges familiar naive theories, including naive truth theory (unrestricted T-schema) and naive set theory (unrestricted axiom of abstraction), respectively. If one accepts naive truth theory (or naive set theory), then Curry's paradox becomes a direct challenge to one's theory of (...)
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  14.  72 DLs
    JC Beall (2000). On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism About Truth Predicates. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):380-382.
  15.  72 DLs
    Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.) (2004). The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    The Law of Non-Contradiction - that no contradiction can be true - has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle, in Book G of the Metaphysics. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twenty-three of the world's leading experts investigate the 'law', considering arguments for and against it and discussing methodological issues that arise whenever we question the legitimacy of logical principles. The result is a balanced inquiry into (...)
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  16.  70 DLs
    Jc Beall & Julien Murzi (2013). Two Flavors of Curry's Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):143-165.
    In this paper, we distinguish two versions of Curry's paradox: c-Curry, the standard conditional-Curry paradox, and v-Curry, a validity-involving version of Curry's paradox that isn’t automatically solved by solving c-curry. A unified treatment of curry paradox thus calls for a unified treatment of both c-Curry and v-Curry. If, as is often thought, c-Curry paradox is to be solved via non-classical logic, then v-Curry may require a lesson about the structure—indeed, the substructure—of the validity relation itself.
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  17.  58 DLs
    Jc Beall (1999). Prom Full Blooded Platonism to Really Full Blooded Platonism. Philosophia Mathematica 7 (3):322-325.
    Mark Balaguer argues for full blooded platonism (FBP), and argues that FBP alone can solve Benacerraf's familiar epistemic challenge. I note that if FBP really can solve Benacerraf's epistemic challenge, then FBP is not alone in its capacity so to solve; RFBP—really full blooded platonism—can do the trick just as well, where RFBP differs from FBP by allowing entities from inconsistent mathematics. I also argue briefly that there is positive reason for endorsing RFBP.
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  18.  52 DLs
    JC Beall (2000). Fitch's Proof, Verificationism, and the Knower Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247.
    I have argued that without an adequate solution to the knower paradox Fitch's Proof is- or at least ought to be-ineffective against verificationism. Of course, in order to follow my suggestion verificationists must maintain that there is currently no adequate solution to the knower paradox, and that the paradox continues to provide prima facie evidence of inconsistent knowledge. By my lights, any glimpse at the literature on paradoxes offers strong support for the first thesis, and any honest, non-dogmatic reflection on (...)
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  19.  48 DLs
    Jc Beall (2012). Why Priest's Reassurance is Not Reassuring. Analysis 72 (3):517-525.
    In the service of paraconsistent (indeed, ‘dialetheic’) theories, Graham Priest has long advanced a non-monotonic logic (viz., MiLP) as our ‘universal logic’ (at least for standard connectives), one that enjoys the familiar logic LP (for ‘logic of paradox’) as its monotonic core (Priest, G. In Contradiction , 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. First printed by Martinus Nijhoff in 1987: Chs. 16 and 19). In this article, I show that MiLP faces a dilemma: either it is (plainly) unsuitable as a (...)
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  20.  48 DLs
    Jc Beall (2002). Deflationism and Gaps: Untying ‘Not’s in the Debate. Analysis 62 (276):299–305.
  21.  46 DLs
    JC Beall, Ross T. Brady, A. P. Hazen, Graham Priest & Greg Restall (2006). Relevant Restricted Quantification. Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):587 - 598.
    The paper reviews a number of approaches for handling restricted quantification in relevant logic, and proposes a novel one. This proceeds by introducing a novel kind of enthymematic conditional.
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  22.  44 DLs
    JC Beall (2000). On the Identity Theory of Truth. Philosophy 75 (1):127-130.
    According to the so-called identity theory of truth. A proposition is true if the given proposition is identical to some fact. But with which fact must a proposition be identical if it is to be true? This question, according to some philosophers (notably Stewart Candlish), raises serious problems for the identity theory of truth. The worry is that the identity must specify the "right fact" if it is to be an acceptable theory. The current paper aims to help the identity (...)
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  23.  43 DLs
    Jc Beall (2015). Free of Detachment: Logic, Rationality, and Gluts. Noûs 49 (2):410-423.
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  24.  42 DLs
    B. Armour-Garb & Jc Beall (2003). Minimalism and the Dialetheic Challenge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):383 – 401.
    Minimalists, following Horwich, claim that all that can be said about truth is comprised by all and only the nonparadoxical instances of (E) p is true iff p. It is, accordingly, standard in the literature on truth and paradox to ask how the minimalist will restrict (E) so as to rule out paradox-inducing sentences (alternatively: propositions). In this paper, we consider a prior question: On what grounds does the minimalist restrict (E) so as to rule out paradox-inducing sentences and, thereby, (...)
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  25.  42 DLs
    Jc Beall (2006). True, False and Paranormal. Analysis 66 (290):102–114.
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  26.  41 DLs
    JC Beall & Greg Restall, Logical Consequence.
    A good argument is one whose conclusions follow from its premises; its conclusions are consequences of its premises. But in what sense do conclusions follow from premises? What is it for a conclusion to be a consequence of premises? Those questions, in many respects, are at the heart of logic (as a philosophical discipline). Consider the following argument: 1. If we charge high fees for university, only the rich will enroll. We charge high fees for university. Therefore, only the rich (...)
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  27.  40 DLs
    Jc Beall (2001). Existential Claims and Platonism. Philosophia Mathematica 9 (1):80-86.
    This paper responds to Colin Cheyne's new anti-platonist argument according to which knowledge of existential claims—claims of the form such-tmd-so exist—requires a caused connection with the given such-and-so. If his arguments succeed then nobody can know, or even justifiably believe, that acausal entities exist, in which case (standard) platonism is untenable. I argue that Cheyne's anti-platonist argument fails.
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  28.  39 DLs
    JC Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (2003). Should Deflationists Be Dialetheists? Noûs 37 (2):303–324.
  29.  36 DLs
    JC Beall & David Ripley (2003). Review of Paradox and Paraconsistency. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    When physicists disagree as to whose theory is right, they can (if we radically idealize) form an experiment whose results will settle the difference. When logicians disagree, there seems to be no possibility of resolution in this manner. In Paradox and Paraconsistency John Woods presents a picture of disagreement among logicians, mathematicians, and other “abstract scientists” and points to some methods for resolving such disagreement. Our review begins with (very) short sketches of the chapters. Following the sketches, we respond to (...)
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  30.  36 DLs
    Jc Beall (2013). Shrieking Against Gluts: The Solution to the 'Just True' Problem. Analysis 73 (3):438-445.
    This paper applies what I call the shrieking method (a refined version of an idea with roots in Priest's work) to one of – if not the – issues confronting glut-theoretic approaches to paradox (viz., the problem of ‘just true’ or, what comes to the same, ‘just false’). The paper serves as a challenge to formulate a problem of ‘just true’ that isn't solved by shrieking (as advanced in this paper), if such a problem be thought to exist.
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  31.  36 DLs
    Jc Beall & Michael Glanzberg (2008). Where the Paths Meet: Remarks on Truth and Paradox. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):169-198.
    The study of truth is often seen as running on two separate paths: the nature path and the logic path. The former concerns metaphysical questions about the ‘nature’, if any, of truth. The latter concerns itself largely with logic, particularly logical issues arising from the truth-theoretic paradoxes. Where, if at all, do these two paths meet? It may seem, and it is all too often assumed, that they do not meet, or at best touch in only incidental ways. It is (...)
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  32.  36 DLs
    Jc Beall & Otávio Bueno (2002). The Simple Liar Without Bivalence? Analysis 62 (273):22–26.
  33.  35 DLs
    Jc Beall (2011). Dialetheists Against Pinocchio. Analysis 71 (4):689-691.
    This paper argues that, contrary to P. Eldridge-Smith, the so-called Pinocchio paradox affords no argument against ‘simply semantic dialetheism’.
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  34.  35 DLs
    Jc Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.) (2005). Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox.
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  35.  33 DLs
    Jc Beall (2001). A Neglected Deflationist Approach to the Liar. Analysis 61 (270):126–129.
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  36.  29 DLs
    Jc Beall (2001). The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and its Origins. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):308 – 309.
    Book Information The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and Its Origins. Edited by Paul Humphreys and James Fetzer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Boston. Pp. xiii + 290. Hardback, US$105.
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  37.  25 DLs
    Jc Beall, Time for Curry.
    This paper presents a new puzzle for certain positions in the theory of truth. The relevant positions can be stated in a language including a truth predicate T and an operation that takes sentences to names of those sentences; they are positions that take the T-schema A ↔ T ( A ) to hold without restriction, for every sentence A in the language. As such, they must be based on a nonclassical logic, since paradoxes that cannot be handled classically will (...)
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  38.  22 DLs
    Bradley Armour-Garb & JC Beall (2002). Further Remarks on Truth and Contradiction. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):217-225.
    We address an issue recently discussed by Graham Priest: whether the very nature of truth (understood as in correspondence theories) rules out true contradictions, and hence whether a correspondence-theoretic notion of truth rules against dialetheism. We argue that, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, objections from within the correspondence theory do not stand in the way of dialetheism. We close by highlighting, but not attempting to resolve, two further challenges for dialetheism which arise out of familiar philosophical theorizing about truth.
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  39.  22 DLs
    Jc Beall (2014). Strict-Choice Validities: A Note on a Familiar Pluralism. Erkenntnis 79 (2):301-307.
    My aim here is a modest one: to note another example in which the theory of validity and the theory of ‘inference’ naturally come apart. The setting is multiple-conclusion logic. At least on one philosophy of multiple-conclusion logic, there are very clear examples of where logic qua validity and logic qua normative guide to inference are essentially different things. On the given conception, logic tells us only what follows from what, what our ‘choices’ are given a set of premises; it (...)
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  40.  21 DLs
    JC Beall (2000). Is the Observable World Consistent? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):113 – 118.
  41.  20 DLs
    JC Beall (2002). Review of Roy Sorensen, Vagueness and Contradiction. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (8).
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  42.  20 DLs
    Jc Beall (2014). Eco-Logical Lives: The Philosophical Lives of Richard Routley/Sylvan and Val Routley/Plumwood, by Dominic Hyde. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):619-621.
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  43.  18 DLs
    JC Beall (2010). The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):376-376.
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  44.  18 DLs
    Jc Beall (2006). Review of G. Priest, Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (9).
  45.  17 DLs
    JC Beall (2001). Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):309 – 310.
    Book Information Truth. Truth Enrique Villanueva Atascadero, CA Ridgeview Publishing Company 1997 i + 446 Edited by Enrique Villanueva . Ridgeview Publishing Company. Atascadero, CA. Pp. i + 446.
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  46.  17 DLs
    Jc Beall, Thomas Forster & Jeremy Seligman (2013). A Note on Freedom From Detachment in the Logic of Paradox. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 54 (1):15-20.
    We shed light on an old problem by showing that the logic LP cannot define a binary connective $\odot$ obeying detachment in the sense that every valuation satisfying $\varphi$ and $(\varphi\odot\psi)$ also satisfies $\psi$ , except trivially. We derive this as a corollary of a more general result concerning variable sharing.
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  47.  16 DLs
    Jc Beall (2003). Algebraic Methods in Philosophical Logic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):442 – 444.
    Book Information Algebraic Methods in Philosophical Logic. By J. Michael Dunn and Gary Hardegree. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xv + 470. 60.50.
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  48.  16 DLs
    Jc Beall (2012). A Neglected Reply to Prior’s Dilemma. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor.
    This paper offers a novel reply to Prior’s dilemma (for the Is/Ought principle), advocating a so-called Weak Kleene framework motivated by two not uncommon thoughts in the debate, namely, that ought statements are identified as those that use ‘ought’, and that ought statements are ‘funny’ in ways that is statements aren’t (e.g., perhaps sometimes being ‘gappy’ with respect to truth and falsity).
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  49.  15 DLs
    Jc Beall (2011). Multiple-Conclusion Lp and Default Classicality. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (2):326-336.
    Philosophical applications of familiar paracomplete and paraconsistent logics often rely on an idea of . With respect to the paraconsistent logic LP (the dual of Strong Kleene or K3), such is standardly cashed out via an LP-based nonmonotonic logic due to Priest (1991, 2006a). In this paper, I offer an alternative approach via a monotonic multiple-conclusion version of LP.
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  50.  13 DLs
    Jc Beall (2003). Truth and the Absence of Fact. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):437 – 439.
    Book Information Truth and the Absence of Fact. By Hartry <span class='Hi'>Field</span>. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xi + 401. Hardback, 45.00, US$65.00. Paperback, 16.99, $24.95.
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