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  1. Jean-Paul Vessel, Commentaries on 'Supererogation for Utilitarianism'.
    Utilitarianism seems to imply that there cannot be any supererogatory acts, since no act can be above or beyond the call of utilitarian moral duty. Many argue, however, that there can be, indeed are, supererogatory acts, and so utilitarianism is wrong if it really implies that there cannot be any such acts. Vessel aim to respond to this challenge in two ways. First, he argues that even classical hedonistic utilitarianism doesn’t imply the impossibility of supererogation. Second, he discusses and – (...)
     
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  2. Jean-Paul Vessel, Moore's Maneuvering.
    I consider metaethics to be a sub-branch of moral philosophy. Some of the most central questions in metaethical inquiry include the following: What are the natures of the meanings of moral terms? If there are such things as moral properties (rightness, wrongness, goodness, badness, etc.), what are their natures?
     
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  3. Jean-Paul Vessel, Moore's Open Question Maneuvering.
    I consider metaethics to be a sub-branch of moral philosophy. Some of the most central questions in metaethical inquiry include the following: • What are the natures of the meanings of moral terms? • If there are such things as moral properties (rightness, wrongness, goodness, badness, etc.), what are their natures?
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  4. Jean-Paul Vessel, Rebuttal to Coleman.
    Coleman suggests three central things in her commentary: (i) SUB is just as well-suited to deal with our case as PROB SUB is; thus, there aren’t any interesting reasons to prefer PROB SUB to SUB; (ii) I may have failed to describe Feldman’s possibilist view accurately; and (iii) an “intentionally accessible” version of possibilism will solve all our problems without appealing to objective subjunctive probabilities. Let me attend to each point.
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  5. Jean-Paul Vessel, Rebuttal to Decker and Goble.
    Theorists who endorse a subjunctive formulation of consequentialism with a “possibilist”-modified similarity relation are not plagued by this problem of incompatible obligations. Without some other interesting theoretical support, the burden is upon the actualists. Here’s a sketch of my favorite objective, weakly-centered, subjunctive brand of consequentialism containing the appropriate possibilist injection.
     
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  6. Jean-Paul Vessel, What Objective Consequentialism Must Be Like.
    Theorists have consistently maintained that the most plausible forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic if and only if indeterminism is true.2 They claim: If indeterminism is true, then objective probabilities used to map such indeterminacies must be utilized by objective consequentialist moral theories; however, if determinism is true, probabilities play no role in objective consequentialist theorizing. I beg to differ. Assume determinism is true and I will show you that attractive forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic—and not for (...)
     
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  7. Jean-Paul Vessel (2012). Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Pp. Xx + 266. [REVIEW] Utilitas 24 (04):551-554.
  8. Jean-Paul Vessel (2010). For Utilitarianism. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4).
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  9. Jean-Paul Vessel (2010). Supererogation for Utilitarianism. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):299 - 319.
    Many believe that traditional consequentialist moral theories are incapable of incorporating the allegedly important phenomenon of supererogation. After surveying the “ties at the top,” “satisficing,” and “egoistic-adjustment” strategies to avoid the supererogation objection, I argue that a recent formulation of utilitarianism incorporating the self-other asymmetry exhibits interesting supererogatory properties. I then incorporate this asymmetry into a version of egoistically-adjusted act utilitarianism, arguing that such a view exhibits very rich supererogatory properties, properties that should assuage the theoretical worries of a vast (...)
     
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  10. Jean-Paul Vessel (2009). Defending a Possibilist Insight in Consequentialist Thought. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):183 - 195.
    There is a heated dispute among consequentialists concerning the following deontic principle.
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  11. JEAN-PAUL VESSEL (2008). The Probabilistic Nature of Objective Consequentialism. Theoria 73 (1):46 - 67.
    Theorists have consistently maintained that the most plausible forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic if and only if indeterminism is true. This standard position, however popular, lacks sufficient motivation. Assume determinism to be true and an attempt will be made to show that attractive forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic - and not for reasons related to our epistemic limitations either. -/- Here it is argued that all extant objective formulations of consequentialism fail to deliver the normative implications (...)
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  12. Jean-Paul Vessel (2005). Consequentialist Reactions to Cain's Objection From the Individual. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (2):139-144.
    James Cain issues forth a two-pronged attack against classical forms of act utilitarianism, elucidating objections from infinite utility streams and distributive justice through his novel examples.1 In his first example, we are to imagine an infinite number of immortals, living on an infinitely long street (Elm Street), bracing to suffer an infinite amount of migraine pain with the onset of this horrific disease. Left untreated, the disease would wreak havoc among our immortals in the following way. Year 1: P1 Year (...)
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  13. Jean-Paul Vessel (2003). Counterfactuals for Consequentialists. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):103 - 125.
    That all subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents and trueconsequents are themselves also true is implied by every plausibleand popularly endorsed account. But I am wary of endorsing thisimplication. I argue that all presently endorsed accounts fail tocapture the nature of certain subjunctive conditionals in contextsof consequentialist reasoning. I attempt to show that we must allowfor the possibility that some subjunctive conditionals with trueantecedents and true consequents are false, if we are to believethat certain types of straightforward consequentialist reasoningare coherent. I (...)
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