Search results for 'JW Garson' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  70
    JW Garson (1999). Review. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. T Horgan, J Tienson. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (2):319-323.
  2. James W. Garson (2013). What Logics Mean: From Proof Theory to Model-Theoretic Semantics. Cambridge University Press.
    What do the rules of logic say about the meanings of the symbols they govern? In this book, James W. Garson examines the inferential behaviour of logical connectives, whose behaviour is defined by strict rules, and proves definitive results concerning exactly what those rules express about connective truth conditions. He explores the ways in which, depending on circumstances, a system of rules may provide no interpretation of a connective at all, or the interpretation we ordinarily expect for it, or (...)
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  3.  20
    Ernest Pore & James Garson (1983). Pronouns and Quantifier-Scope in English. Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (3):327 - 358.
    This paper is truly a joint effort and it could not have been written without the contribution of both authors. Garson, though, deserves credit (or blame) for first seeing the need for two kinds of quantifier scope, and also for devising essentials of the positive theory.
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  4. Justin Garson (2014). The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.
    For some, biology explains all there is to know about the mind. Yet many big questions remain: is the mind shaped by genes or the environment? If mental traits are the result of adaptations built up over thousands of years, as evolutionary psychologists claim, how can such claims be tested? If the mind is a machine, as biologists argue, how does it allow for something as complex as human consciousness? The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction explores these questions and more, (...)
     
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  5. Justin Garson (2014). The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.
    For some, biology explains all there is to know about the mind. Yet many big questions remain: is the mind shaped by genes or the environment? If mental traits are the result of adaptations built up over thousands of years, as evolutionary psychologists claim, how can such claims be tested? If the mind is a machine, as biologists argue, how does it allow for something as complex as human consciousness? The Biological Mind: A Philosophical Introduction explores these questions and more, (...)
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  6. G. Piccinini & J. Garson (2014). Functions Must Be Performed at Appropriate Rates in Appropriate Situations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (1):1-20.
    We sketch a novel and improved version of Boorse’s biostatistical theory of functions. Roughly, our theory maintains that (i) functions are non-negligible contributions to survival or inclusive fitness (when a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness); (ii) situations appropriate for the performance of a function are typical situations in which a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness; (iii) appropriate rates of functioning are rates that make adequate contributions to survival or inclusive fitness (in situations appropriate for the performance (...)
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  7.  16
    Justin Garson (2013). The Functional Sense of Mechanism. Philosophy of Science 80 (3):317-333.
  8.  11
    Joshua D. K. Brown & James W. Garson (forthcoming). A New Semantics for Vagueness. Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Intuitively, vagueness involves some sort of indeterminacy: if Plato is a borderline case of baldness, then there is no fact of the matter about whether or not he’s bald—he’s neither bald nor not bald. The leading formal treatments of such indeterminacy—three valued logic, supervaluationism, etc.—either fail to validate the classical theorems, or require that various classically valid inference rules be restricted. Here we show how a fully classical, yet indeterminist account of vagueness can be given within natural semantics, an alternative (...)
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  9.  21
    Justin Garson (2012). Function, Selection, and Construction in the Brain. Synthese 189 (3):451-481.
    A common misunderstanding of the selected effects theory of function is that natural selection operating over an evolutionary time scale is the only functionbestowing process in the natural world. This construal of the selected effects theory conflicts with the existence and ubiquity of neurobiological functions that are evolutionary novel, such as structures underlying reading ability. This conflict has suggested to some that, while the selected effects theory may be relevant to some areas of evolutionary biology, its relevance to neuroscience is (...)
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  10.  28
    James W. Garson (2009). Modal Logic. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  11.  31
    James W. Garson (2006). Modal Logic for Philosophers. Cambridge University Press.
    Designed for use by philosophy students, this book provides an accessible, yet technically sound treatment of modal logic and its philosophical applications. Every effort has been made to simplify the presentation by using diagrams in place of more complex mathematical apparatus. These and other innovations provide philosophers with easy access to a rich variety of topics in modal logic, including a full coverage of quantified modal logic, non-rigid designators, definite descriptions, and the de-re de-dictio distinction. Discussion of philosophical issues concerning (...)
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  12.  52
    Justin Garson (2011). Selected Effects and Causal Role Functions in the Brain: The Case for an Etiological Approach to Neuroscience. Biology and Philosophy 26 (4):547-565.
    Despite the voluminous literature on biological functions produced over the last 40 years, few philosophers have studied the concept of function as it is used in neuroscience. Recently, Craver (forthcoming; also see Craver 2001) defended the causal role theory against the selected effects theory as the most appropriate theory of function for neuroscience. The following argues that though neuroscientists do study causal role functions, the scope of that theory is not as universal as claimed. Despite the strong prima facie superiority (...)
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  13. James W. Garson (2013). Modal Logic for Philosophers. Cambridge University Press.
    This book on modal logic is especially designed for philosophy students. It provides an accessible yet technically sound treatment of modal logic and its philosophical applications. Every effort is made to simplify the presentation by using diagrams instead of more complex mathematical apparatus. These and other innovations provide philosophers with easy access to a rich variety of topics in modal logic, including a full coverage of quantified modal logic, non-rigid designators, definite descriptions, and the de-re de-dicto distinction. Discussion of philosophical (...)
     
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  14.  4
    Justin Garson (2014). What is the Value of Historical Fidelity in Restoration? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 45 (1):97-100.
    The following considers the role of historical fidelity in habitat reconstruction efforts. To what extent should habitat reconstruction be guided by the goal of recreating some past state of a damaged ecosystem? I consider Sarkar’s “replacement argument,” which holds that, in most habitat reconstruction efforts, there is little justification for appealing to historical fidelity. I argue that Sarkar does not provide adequate grounds for deprecating historical fidelity relative to other natural values such as biodiversity or wild nature.
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  15.  96
    James W. Garson (2005). Unifying Quantified Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (5/6):621-649.
    Quantified modal logic has reputation for complexity. Completeness results for the various systems appear piecemeal. Different tactics are used for different systems, and success of a given method seems sensitive to many factors, including the specific combination of choices made for the quantifiers, terms, identity, and the strength of the underlying propositional modal logic. The lack of a unified framework in which to view QMLs and their completeness properties puts pressure on those who develop, apply, and teach QML to work (...)
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  16.  26
    James W. Garson (1996). Cognition Poised at the Edge of Chaos: A Complex Alternative to a Symbolic Mind. Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):301-22.
    This paper explores a line of argument against the classical paradigm in cognitive science that is based upon properties of non-linear dynamical systems, especially in their chaotic and near-chaotic behavior. Systems of this kind are capable of generating information-rich macro behavior that could be useful to cognition. I argue that a brain operating at the edge of chaos could generate high-complexity cognition in this way. If this hypothesis is correct, then the symbolic processing methodology in cognitive science faces serious obstacles. (...)
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  17.  92
    Justin Garson (2003). The Introduction of Information Into Neurobiology. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):926-936.
    The first use of the term “information” to describe the content of nervous impulse occurs in Edgar Adrian's The Basis of Sensation (1928). What concept of information does Adrian appeal to, and how can it be situated in relation to contemporary philosophical accounts of the notion of information in biology? The answer requires an explication of Adrian's use and an evaluation of its situation in relation to contemporary accounts of semantic information. I suggest that Adrian's concept of information can be (...)
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  18.  33
    Justin Garson, Linton Wang & Sahotra Sarkar (2003). How Development May Direct Evolution. Biology and Philosophy 18 (2):353-370.
    A framework is presented in which the role ofdevelopmental rules in phenotypic evolution canbe studied for some simple situations. Usingtwo different implicit models of development,characterized by different developmental mapsfrom genotypes to phenotypes, it is shown bysimulation that developmental rules and driftcan result in directional phenotypic evolutionwithout selection. For both models thesimulations show that the critical parameterthat drives the final phenotypic distributionis the cardinality of the set of genotypes thatmap to each phenotype. Details of thedevelopmental map do not matter. If phenotypesare (...)
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  19.  33
    James W. Garson (2001). Natural Semantics: Why Natural Deduction is Intuitionistic. Theoria 67 (2):114-139.
    In this paper investigates how natural deduction rules define connective meaning by presenting a new method for reading semantical conditions from rules called natural semantics. Natural semantics explains why the natural deduction rules are profoundly intuitionistic. Rules for conjunction, implication, disjunction and equivalence all express intuitionistic rather than classical truth conditions. Furthermore, standard rules for negation violate essential conservation requirements for having a natural semantics. The standard rules simply do not assign a meaning to the negation sign. Intuitionistic negation fares (...)
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  20.  66
    James W. Garson (1994). Cognition Without Classical Architecture. Synthese 100 (2):291-306.
    Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) argue that any successful model of cognition must use classical architecture; it must depend upon rule-based processing sensitive to constituent structure. This claim is central to their defense of classical AI against the recent enthusiasm for connectionism. Connectionist nets, they contend, may serve as theories of the implementation of cognition, but never as proper theories of psychology. Connectionist models are doomed to describing the brain at the wrong level, leaving the classical view to account for the (...)
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  21.  60
    James W. Garson (1995). Chaos and Free Will. Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):365-74.
    This paper explores the possibility that chaos theory might be helpful in explaining free will. I will argue that chaos has little to offer if we construe its role as to resolve the apparent conflict between determinism and freedom. However, I contend that the fundamental problem of freedom is to find a way to preserve intuitions about rational action in a physical brain. New work on dynamic computation provides a framework for viewing free choice as a process that is sensitive (...)
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  22.  36
    Justin Garson (2003). The Introduction of Information Into Neurobiology. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):926-936.
    The first use of the term "information" to describe the content of nervous impulse occurs 20 years prior to Shannon`s (1948) work, in Edgar Adrian`s The Basis of Sensation (1928). Although, at least throughout the 1920s and early 30s, the term "information" does not appear in Adrian`s scientific writings to describe the content of nervous impulse, the notion that the structure of nervous impulse constitutes a type of message subject to certain constraints plays an important role in all of his (...)
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  23.  73
    James W. Garson (2001). (Dis)Solving the Binding Problem. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):381 – 392.
    The binding problem is to explain how information processed by different sensory systems is brought together to unify perception. The problem has two sides. First, we want to explain phenomenal binding: the fact that we experience a single world rather than separate perceptual fields for each sensory modality. Second, we must solve a functional problem: to explain how a neural net like the brain links instances to types. I argue that phenomenal binding and functional binding require very different treatments. The (...)
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  24.  6
    Justin Garson, Why Function Indeterminacy is Still a Problem for Biomedicine, and How Seeing Functional Items as Components of Mechanisms Can Solve It.
    During the 1990s, many philosophers wrestled with the problem of function indeterminacy. Although interest in the problem has waned, I argue that solving the problem is of value for biomedical research and practice. This is because a solution to the problem is required in order to specify rigorously the conditions under which a given item is “dysfunctional.” In the following I revisit a solution developed originally by Neander, which uses functional analysis to solve the problem. I situate her solution in (...)
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  25. James W. Garson (2005). Unifying Quantified Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (5-6):621-649.
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  26.  2
    Justin Garson & Armin Schulz (forthcoming). Introduction: The Biology of Psychological Altruism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences.
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  27.  72
    James W. Garson (2010). Expressive Power and Incompleteness of Propositional Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (2):159-171.
    Natural deduction systems were motivated by the desire to define the meaning of each connective by specifying how it is introduced and eliminated from inference. In one sense, this attempt fails, for it is well known that propositional logic rules underdetermine the classical truth tables. Natural deduction rules are too weak to enforce the intended readings of the connectives; they allow non-standard models. Two reactions to this phenomenon appear in the literature. One is to try to restore the standard readings, (...)
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  28.  3
    Justin Garson (forthcoming). Two Types of Psychological Hedonism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences.
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  29.  36
    Justin Garson, Broken Mechanisms: Function, Pathology, and Natural Selection.
    The following describes one distinct sense of ‘mechanism’ which is prevalent in biology and biomedicine and which has important epistemic benefits. According to this sense, mechanisms are defined by the functions they facilitate. This construal has two important implications. Firstly, mechanisms that facilitate functions are capable of breaking. Secondly, on this construal, there are rigid constraints on the sorts of phenomena ‘for which’ there can be a mechanism. In this sense, there are no ‘mechanisms for’ pathology, and natural selection is (...)
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  30.  15
    Nicholas Rescher & James Garson (1968). Topological Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (4):537-548.
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  31.  21
    James W. Garson (1994). No Representations Without Rules: The Prospects for a Compromise Between Paradigms in Cognitive Science. Mind and Language 9 (1):25-37.
  32.  6
    Justin Garson (2015). Carl F. Craver and Lindley Darden. In Search of Mechanisms: Discoveries Across the Life Sciences. [REVIEW] Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):180-83.
    Carl F. Craver and Lindley Darden’s new book, In Search of Mechanisms: Discoveries across the Life Sciences, is a fantastic and lucid introduction to the “new mechanism” tradition in the philosophy of science. Over the last 2 decades, but particularly since the turn of the century, this has become an influential framework for thinking about core problems in the history and philosophy of science, with a strong emphasis on biology. There are at least four major aims. First, the new mechanism (...)
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  33.  14
    James W. Garson (1973). Indefinite Topological Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1):102 - 118.
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  34.  7
    James W. Garson (1973). The Completeness of an Intensional Logic: Definite Topological Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 14 (2):175-184.
  35.  37
    James W. Garson (2006). Review of Ernest Lepore, Kirk Ludwig, Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (2).
    Over the last forty years, Donald Davidson has been one of the most influential, but least accessible voices in philosophy. There are several reasons why it is hard to come to grips with his work. First, his language is dense, even by the standards of analytic philosophy; while at the same time his thought is highly organic, so that it is difficult to make sense of one idea without an understanding of his whole program. Davidson never attempted to write a (...)
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  36.  8
    James W. Garson (1998). Why Dynamical Implementation Matters. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):641-642.
    Another objection to the dynamical hypothesis is explored. To resolve it completely, one must focus more directly on an area not emphasized in van Gelder's discussion: the contributions of dynamical systems theory to understanding how cognition is neutrally implemented.
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  37.  36
    James W. Garson (2003). Simulation and Connectionism: What is the Connection? Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):499-515.
    Simulation has emerged as an increasingly popular account of folk psychological (FP) talents at mind-reading: predicting and explaining human mental states. Where its rival (the theory-theory) postulates that these abilities are explained by mastery of laws describing the connections between beliefs, desires, and action, simulation theory proposes that we mind-read by "putting ourselves in another's shoes." This paper concerns connectionist architecture and the debate between simulation theory (ST) and the theory-theory (TT). It is only natural to associate TT with classical (...)
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  38.  33
    James W. Garson (1998). Chaotic Emergence and the Language of Thought. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):303-315.
    The purpose of this paper is to explore the merits of the idea that dynamical systems theory (also known as chaos theory) provides a model of the mind that can vindicate the language of thought (LOT). I investigate the nature of emergent structure in dynamical systems to assess its compatibility with causally efficacious syntactic structure in the brain. I will argue that anyone who is committed to the idea that the brain's functioning depends on emergent features of dynamical systems should (...)
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  39.  14
    Nicholas Rescher & James W. Garson (1967). A Note on Chronological Logic. Theoria 33 (1):39-44.
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  40.  16
    James W. Garson (1969). Here and Now. The Monist 53 (3):469-477.
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  41.  2
    Carlos Giannoni, Robert Meyer, J. Michael Dunn, Peter Woodruff, James Garson, Kent Wilson, Dorothy Grover, Ruth Manor, Alasdair Urquhart & Garrel Pottinger (1990). Nuel Belnap: Doctoral Students. In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences. Kluwer
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  42.  7
    James Garson (1989). Modularity and Relevant Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 30 (2):207-223.
    A practical system of reasoning must be both correct and efficient. An efficient system which contains a large body of information can not search for the proof of a conclusion from all information available. Efficiency requires that deduction of the conclusion be carried out in a modular way using only a relatively small and quickly identified subset of the total information. One might assume that data modularity is incompatible with correctness, where a system is correct for a logic L iff (...)
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  43. James W. Garson (1978). Completeness of some quantified modal logics. Logique Et Analyse 21 (82):153.
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  44.  8
    James Garson (1988). Heuristics for Proof Finding in Formal Logic. Teaching Philosophy 11 (1):41-53.
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  45.  2
    Justin Garson (2015). The Birth of Information in the Brain: Edgar Adrian and the Vacuum Tube. Science in Context 28 (1):31-52.
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  46.  11
    James W. Garson (1978). Investigations in Modal and Tense Logics with Applications to Problems in Philosophy and Linguistics. International Studies in Philosophy 10:190-192.
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  47.  12
    James W. Garson (1974). The Substitution Interpretation in Topological Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (1/2):109 - 132.
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  48. James W. Garson (1987). Review: Stuart M. Shieber, An Introduction to Unification-Based Approaches to Grammar. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (4):1052-1054.
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  49.  9
    James W. Garson (1978). Imperatives and Their Logics. New Scholasticism 52 (4):595-598.
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  50.  17
    James W. Garson (1998). A Commentary on "Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap". Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):169-172.
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