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  1. Jack Copeland, Even Turing Machines Can Compute Uncomputable Functions.
    Accelerated Turing machines are Turing machines that perform tasks commonly regarded as impossible, such as computing the halting function. The existence of these notional machines has obvious implications concerning the theoretical limits of computability.
     
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  2. Jack Copeland, Enigma Variations.
    Fifty years ago this month[[June]], in the Computing Machine Laboratory at Manchester University, the world's first electronic stored-program computer performed its first calculation. The tiny program, stored on the face of a cathode ray tube, was just 17 instructions long. Electronic engineers Freddie Williams and Tom Kilburn built the Manchester computer in accordance with fundamental ideas explained to them by Max Newman, professor of mathematics at Manchester. The computer fell sideways out of research that nobody could have guessed would have (...)
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  3. Jack Copeland, Tree Formulations of Tense Logic.
    The tense tree method extends Jeffrey’s well-known formulation of classical propositional logic to tense logic (Jeffrey 1991).1 Tense trees combine pure tense logic with features of Prior’s U-calculi (where ‘U’ is the earlier-than relation; see Prior 1967 and the Introduction to this volume). The tree method has a number of virtues: trees are well suited to computational applications; semantically, the tree systems presented here are no less illuminating than model theory; the metatheory associated with tree formulations is often more tractable (...)
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  4. Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot (2012). Our Posthuman Future. The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57):73-78.
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  5. Jack Copeland (ed.) (2004). The Essential Turing: Seminal Writings in Computing, Logic, Philosophy, Artificial Intelligence, and Artificial Life: Plus the Secrets of Enigma. Oup.
  6. Jack Copeland (2002). Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity and Property Identity. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):11--23.
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  7. Jack Copeland (2002). Narrow Versus Wide Mechanism. In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press. 5-32.
  8. Jack Copeland, Heather Dyke & Diane Proudfoot (2001). Temporal Parts and Their Individuation. Analysis 61 (4):289–293.
    Ignoring the temporal dimension, an object such as a railway tunnel or a human body is a three-dimensional whole composed of three-dimensional parts. The four-dimensionalist holds that a physical object exhibiting identity across time—Descartes, for example—is a four-dimensional whole composed of 'briefer' four-dimensional objects, its temporal parts. Peter van Inwagen (1990) has argued that four-dimensionalism cannot be sustained, or at best can be sustained only by a counterpart theorist. We argue that different schemes of individuation of temporal parts are available, (...)
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  9. Jack Copeland (1999). Beyond the Universal Turing Machine. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):46-67.
    We describe an emerging field, that of nonclassical computability and nonclassical computing machinery. According to the nonclassicist, the set of well-defined computations is not exhausted by the computations that can be carried out by a Turing machine. We provide an overview of the field and a philosophical defence of its foundations.
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  10. Jack Copeland (ed.) (1998). Philosophy Research Paper Series - Dept Philosophy, University of Canterbury.
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  11. Jack Copeland (1998). Super Turing-Machines. Complexity 4 (1):30-32.
    The tape is divided into squares, each square bearing a single symbol—'0' or '1', for example. This tape is the machine's general-purpose storage medium: the machine is set in motion with its input inscribed on the tape, output is written onto the tape by the head, and the tape serves as a short-term working memory for the results of intermediate steps of the computation. The program governing the particular computation that the machine is to perform is also stored on the (...)
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  12. Jack Copeland (1998). Turing's o-Machines, Searle, Penrose, and the Brain. Analysis 58 (2):128-138.
    In his PhD thesis (1938) Turing introduced what he described as 'a new kind of machine'. He called these 'O-machines'. The present paper employs Turing's concept against a number of currently fashionable positions in the philosophy of mind.
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  13. Jack Copeland (1997). The Broad Conception of Computation. American Behavioral Scientist 40 (6):690-716.
    A myth has arisen concerning Turing's paper of 1936, namely that Turing set forth a fundamental principle concerning the limits of what can be computed by machine - a myth that has passed into cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, to wide and pernicious effect. This supposed principle, sometimes incorrectly termed the 'Church-Turing thesis', is the claim that the class of functions that can be computed by machines is identical to the class of functions that can be computed by (...)
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  14. Jack Copeland (1996). On Alan Turing's Anticipation of Connectionism. Synthese 108 (3):361-377.
    It is not widely realised that Turing was probably the first person to consider building computing machines out of simple, neuron-like elements connected together into networks in a largely random manner. Turing called his networks unorganised machines. By the application of what he described as appropriate interference, mimicking education an unorganised machine can be trained to perform any task that a Turing machine can carry out, provided the number of neurons is sufficient. Turing proposed simulating both the behaviour of the (...)
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  15. Jack Copeland (1994). Turing, Wittgenstein, and the Science of the Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):497-519.
  16. Jack Copeland (1993). Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction. Wiley-Blackwell.
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