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Profile: Jack Kwong (Appalachian State University)
  1. Jack M. C. Kwong (2012). Julia Langkau and Christian Nimtz, Eds. , New Perspectives on Concepts . Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 32 (1):37-39.
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  2. Jack M. C. Kwong (2011). Resisting Aliefs: Gendler on Belief-Discordant Behaviors. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):77 - 91.
    This paper challenges T. S. Gendler's notion of aliefs, a novel kind of mental state which she introduces to explain a wide variety of belief-discordant behaviors. In particular, I argue that many of the cases which she uses to motivate such a mental state can be fully explained by accounts that make use only of commonplace attitudes such as beliefs and desires.
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  3. Jack M. C. Kwong (2010). Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 30 (2):115-117.
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  4. Jack M. C. Kwong (2007). Is Conceptual Atomism a Plausible Theory of Concepts? Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):413-434.
    Conceptual atomism is the view according to which most lexical concepts lack ‘internal’ or constituent structure. To date, it has not received much attention from philosophers and psychologists. A centralreason is that it is thought to be an implausible theory of concepts, resulting in untenable implications. The main objective of this paper is to present conceptual atomism as a viable alternative, with a view toachieving two aims: the first, to characterize and to elucidate conceptual atomism; and the second, to dispel (...)
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  5. Jack M. C. Kwong (2006). Why Concepts Can't Be Theories. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):309-325.
    In this paper, I present an alternative argument for Jerry Fodor's recent conclusion that there are currently no tenable theories of concepts in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind. Briefly, my approach focuses on the 'theory-theory' of concepts. I argue that the two ways in which cognitive psychologists have formulated this theory lead to serious difficulties, and that there cannot be, in principle, a third way in which it can be reformulated. Insofar as the 'theory-theory' is supposed (...)
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