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Profile: Jack Ritchie (University of Cape Town)
  1. Jack Ritchie (2012). Styles for Philosophers of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (4):649-656.
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  2. Jack Ritchie (2012). Styles of Thinking: The Special Issue. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (4):595-598.
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  3. Jack Ritchie (2010). Naturalized Metaphysics. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (5):673-685.
  4. Jack Ritchie (2008). Structural Realism and Davidson. Synthese 162 (1):85 - 100.
    Structural realism is an attempt to balance the competing demands of the No Miracles Argument and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. In this paper I trace the development of the structuralist idea through the work of one of its leading advocates, John Worrall. I suggest that properly thought through what the structuralist is offering or should be offering is not an account of how to divide up a theory into two parts—structure and ontology—but (perhaps surprisingly) a certain kind of theory of meaning—semantic (...)
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  5. Jack Ritchie (2008). Understanding Naturalism. Acumen Pub..
    Many contemporary Anglo-American philosophers describe themselves as naturalists. But what do they mean by that term? Popular naturalist slogans like, "there is no first philosophy" or "philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences" are far from illuminating. "Understanding Naturalism" provides a clear and readable survey of the main strands in recent naturalist thought. The origin and development of naturalist ideas in epistemology, metaphysics and semantics is explained through the works of Quine, Goldman, Kuhn, Chalmers, Papineau, Millikan and others. The most (...)
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  6. Jack Ritchie (2005). Causal Compatibilism -- What Chance? Erkenntnis 63 (1):119-132.
    Orthodox physicalism has a problem with mental causation. If physics is complete and mental events are not identical to physical events (as multiple-realisation arguments imply) it seems as though there is no causal work for the mental to do. This paper examines some recent attempts to overcome this problem by analysing causation in terms of counterfactuals or conditional probabilities. It is argued that these solutions cannot simultaneously capture the force of the completeness of physics and make room for mental causation.
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  7. Jack Ritchie (2004). William James. The Philosophers' Magazine 28 (28):80-81.
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  8. Jack Ritchie (2001). Hilary Putnam. The Philosophers' Magazine 13:52-52.
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  9. Jack Ritchie (1999). C S Peirce & Immanuel Kant. The Philosophers' Magazine 6 (6):30-31.
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