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Profile: Frank Jackson (Australian National University, Princeton University)
  1. Frank Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford University Press.
    Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, suggests Jackson. He argues that such analysis is mistakenly clouded in mystery, preventing a whole range of important questions from being productively addressed. He anchors his argument in discussions of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, to ethics and the philosophy (...)
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  2. Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
  3. David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson (2001). Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation. Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.
    Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes . Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no.
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  4.  21
    Frank Jackson (2014). Procrastinate Revisited. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):634-647.
    How is what an agent ought to do at time t related to what they ought to do over a period of time that includes t? I revisit an example that sheds light on this question, taking account of issues to do with the agent's intentions and the distinction between subjective and objective obligation.
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  5. Frank Jackson, Graham Priest & David Lewis (2004). How Many Lives Has Schrodinger's Cat? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):3-22.
  6. Frank Jackson (1986). What Mary Didn't Know. Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):291-5.
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  7.  35
    Frank Jackson (1977). Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge University Press.
    What is the nature of, and what is the relationship between, external objects and our visual perceptual experience of them? In this book, Frank Jackson defends the answers provided by the traditional Representative theory of perception. He argues, among other things that we are never immediately aware of external objects, that they are the causes of our perceptual experiences and that they have only the primary qualities. In the course of the argument, sense data and the distinction between mediate and (...)
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  8.  46
    Frank Jackson (1987). Conditionals. Blackwell.
  9. Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1990). Program Explanation: A General Perspective. Analysis 50 (2):107-17.
    Some properties are causally relevant for a certain effect, others are not. In this paper we describe a problem for our understanding of this notion and then offer a solution in terms of the notion of a program explanation.
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  10. Elizabeth Prior, Robert Pargetter & Frank Jackson (1982). Three Theses About Dispositions. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):251-257.
    I. Causal Thesis: Dispositions have a causal basis. II. Distinctness Thesis: Dispositions are distinct from their causal basis. III. Impotence Thesis: Dispositions are not causally active.
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  11. Frank Jackson (1991). Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection. Ethics 101 (3):461-482.
  12. Frank Jackson, Graham Priest & Adam Elga (2004). Infinitesimal Chances and the Laws of Nature. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):67 – 76.
    The 'best-system' analysis of lawhood [Lewis 1994] faces the 'zero-fit problem': that many systems of laws say that the chance of history going actually as it goes--the degree to which the theory 'fits' the actual course of history--is zero. Neither an appeal to infinitesimal probabilities nor a patch using standard measure theory avoids the difficulty. But there is a way to avoid it: replace the notion of 'fit' with the notion of a world being typical with respect to a theory.
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  13.  63
    Frank Jackson (ed.) (1991). Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
    This collection introduces the reader to some of the most interesting current work on conditionals. Particular attention is paid to possible world semantics for conditionals, the role of conditional probability in helping us to understand conditionals, implicature and the material conditional, and subjunctive versus indicative conditionals. Contributors include V.H. Dudman, Dorothy Edgington, Nelson Goodman, H.P. Grice, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker.
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  14. Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter (1986). Oughts, Options, and Actualism. Philosophical Review 95 (2):233-255.
  15. Frank Jackson (1998). Reference and Description Revisited. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):201-218.
  16. Frank Jackson (2011). On Gettier Holdouts. Mind and Language 26 (4):468-481.
    How should we react to the contention that there is empirical evidence showing that many judge Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge, contrary to the verdict of most analytical philosophers about these cases? I argue that there is no single answer to this question. The discussion is set inside a view about how to view the role and significance of intuitive responses to some of philosophy's famous thought experiments. One take-home message is that experimental philosophy and conceptual analysis are (...)
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  17. Frank Jackson, Graham Priest & Rae Langton (2004). Elusive Knowledge of Things in Themselves. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):129 – 136.
    Kant argued that we have no knowledge of things in themselves, no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things, a thesis that is not idealism but epistemic humility. David Lewis agrees (in 'Ramseyan Humility'), but for Ramseyan reasons rather than Kantian. I compare the doctrines of Ramseyan and Kantian humility, and argue that Lewis's contextualist strategy for rescuing knowledge from the sceptic (proposed elsewhere) should also rescue knowledge of things in themselves. The rescue would not be complete: for knowledge of (...)
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  18. Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (2000). Ethical Particularism and Patterns. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press 79--99.
     
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  19.  94
    Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1988). Functionalism and Broad Content. Mind 97 (July):318-400.
  20. Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1995). Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):20-40.
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  21. Frank Jackson (1994). Armchair Metaphysics. In John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Michaelis Michael (eds.), Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer 23--42.
  22.  64
    Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1992). In Defense of Explanatory Ecumenicalism. Economics and Philosophy 8 (1):1--21.
    Many of the things that we try to explain, in both our common sense and our scientific engagement with the world, are capable of being explained more or less finely: that is, with greater or lesser attention to the detail of the producing mechanism. A natural assumption, pervasive if not always explicit, is that other things being equal, the more finegrained an explanation, the better. Thus, Jon Elster, who also thinks there are instrumental reasons for wanting a more fine-grained explanation, (...)
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  23.  13
    Frank Jackson (2010). Language, Names, and Information. Wiley-Blackwell.
    _Language, Names, and Information_ is an important contribution to philosophy of language by one of its foremost scholars, challenging the pervasive view that the description theory of proper names is dead in the water, and defending a version of the description theory from a perspective on language that sees words as a wonderful source of information about the nature of the world we live in. Challenges current pervasive view that the description theory of reference for proper names has been refuted (...)
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  24. David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (1997). Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Blackwell.
    The philosophy of mind and cognition has been transformed by recent advances in what is loosely called cognitive science. This book is a thoroughly up-to-date introduction to and account of that transformation, in which the many strands in contemporary cognitive science are brought together into a coherent philosophical picture of the mind. The book begins with discussions of the pre-history of contemporary philosophy of mind - dualism, behaviourism, and early versions of the identity theory of mind - and moves through (...)
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  25.  45
    Frank Jackson (1998). Mind, Method, and Conditionals: Selected Essays. Routledge.
    This collection brings together some of Frank Jackson's most influential essays on mind, action, conditionals, method in metaphysics, and ethics. These have each been revised for this edition, and are presented along with his challenge to orthodoxy on the new riddle of induction.
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  26. Frank Jackson (2004). Why We Need A-Intensions. Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):257-277.
    I think recent discussions of content and reference have not paid enough attention to the role of language as a convention-governed system of communication. With this as a background theme, I explain the role of A-intensions in elucidating one important notion of content and correlative notions of reference.
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  27. Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1998). A Problem for Expressivism. Analysis 58 (4):239–251.
    Expressivists hold that ethical sentences express attitudes. We argue that it is very hard for expressivists to give an account of the relevant sense of 'express' which has some plausibility and also delivers the kind of noncognitivist account of ethical sentences they affirm. Our argument draws on Locke's point that words are voluntary signs.
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  28. Frank Jackson (1979). On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals. Philosophical Review 88 (4):565-589.
    I defend the view that the truth conditions of the ordinary indicative conditional are those of the material conditional. This is done via a discussion of assertability and by appeal to conventional implicature rather than conversational implicature.
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  29. Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.) (2005). The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy is the definitive guide to what's going on in this lively and fascinating subject. Jackson and Smith, themselves two of the world's most eminent philosophers, have assembled more than thirty distinguished scholars to contribute incisive and up-to-date critical surveys of the principal areas of research. The coverage is broad, with sections devoted to moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, philosophy of mind and action, philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of the sciences. This (...)
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  30. David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (2006). Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An Introduction. Wiley-Blackwell.
    David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson’s popular introduction to philosophy of mind and cognition is now available in a fully revised and updated edition. Ensures that the most recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science are brought together into a coherent, accessible whole. Revisions respond to feedback from students and teachers and make the volume even more useful for courses. New material includes: a section on Descartes’ famous objection to materialism; extended treatment of connectionism; coverage of the view (...)
     
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  31. Michael Smith & Frank Jackson (2006). Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty. Journal of Philosophy 103 (6):267-283.
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  32. Frank Jackson (1973). Is There a Good Argument Against the Incorrigibility Thesis? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (May):51-62.
    "the incorrigibility thesis", The thesis that it is logically impossible to be mistaken about such things as whether I am now in pain or am seeing or seeming to see something red, Is very widely supposed to be false. I consider the arguments designed to show this, And argue that they all fail.
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  33. Frank Jackson (2003). Mind and Illusion. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 421--442.
    Much of the contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind is concerned with the clash between certain strongly held intuitions and what science tells us about the mind and its relation to the world. What science tells us about the mind points strongly towards some version or other of physicalism. The intuitions, in one way or another, suggest that there is something seriously incomplete about any purely physical story about the mind.
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  34. Frank Jackson (1996). Mental Causation. Mind 105 (419):377-413.
    I survey recent work on mental causation. The discussion is conducted under the twin presumptions that mental states, including especially what subjects believe and desire, causally explain what subjects do, and that the physical sciences can in principle give a complete explanation for each and every bodily movement. I start with sceptical discussions of various views that hold that, in some strong sense, the causal explanations offered by psychology are autonomous with respect to those offered by the physical sciences. I (...)
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  35. Frank Jackson (2009). Thought Experiments and Possibilities. Analysis 69 (1):100-109.
    1. Reflecting on possible cases can be very valuable in differing ways. Sometimes it makes clear a consequence of a theory, a consequence that then plays an important role in debates about the theory. Utilitarians who favour maximising average happiness confront utilitarians who favour maximising total happiness with possible cases where there are enormously many sentient beings whose lives are barely worth living. Sometimes reflecting on possible cases serves to clarify a doctrine. Classical versions of consequentialism value equity for its (...)
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  36.  75
    Frank Jackson (1985). On the Semantics and Logic of Obligation. Mind 94 (374):177-195.
    This paper develops an informal semantics for 'ought to be' and 'ought to be given...' and argues for its plausibility. A feature of the semantics is that it invalidates 'if a entails b, And o(a), Then o(b)' and 'if o(a) & o(b), Then o(a&b)', While validating detachment for conditional obligation.
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  37.  77
    Frank Jackson (1996). The Primary Quality View of Color. Philosophical Perspectives 10:199-219.
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  38. Frank Jackson (2008). The Argument From the Persistence of Moral Disagreement. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. OUP Oxford
  39. Frank Jackson (1977). A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):3 – 21.
  40. Frank Jackson (2007). Colour for Representationalists. Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):169--85.
    Redness is the property that makes things look red in normal circumstances. That seems obvious enough. But then colour is whatever property does that job: a certain reflectance profile as it might be. Redness is the property something is represented to have when it looks red. That seems obvious enough. But looking red does not represent that which looks red as having a certain reflectance profile. What should we say about this antinomy and how does our answer impact on the (...)
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  41. Frank Jackson (2010). The Autonomy of Mind. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):170-184.
  42.  88
    Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1990). Causation and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:195-214.
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  43. Frank Jackson (2006). The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press 52--64.
  44. Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1990). In Defense of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Studies 59 (1):31-54.
    It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes} We say no. In part one we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires.
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  45.  13
    Frank Jackson, Jesse J. Prinz, Ernest Sosa & Kim Sterelny (2009). Viii Notes on Contributors Alvin Goldman is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. His Principal Research Areas Are Episte-Mology, Philosophy of Mind, and Cognitive Science. His Most Recent Book is Simulating Minds (2006). [REVIEW] In Michael Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Blackwell
  46. Frank Jackson (1975). Grue. Journal of Philosophy 72 (5):113-131.
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  47. Frank Jackson (2003). Narrow Content and Representation--Or Twin Earth Revisited. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (2):55-70.
    Intentional states represent. Belief represents how we take things to be; desire represents how we would like things to be; and so on. To represent is to make a division among possibilities; it is to divide the possibilities into those that are consistent with how things are being represented to be and those that are not. I will call the possibilities consistent with how some intentional state represents things to be, its content. There is no suggestion that this is the (...)
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  48. Michael Smith, Frank Jackson & Graham Oppy (1994). Minimalism and Truth Aptness. Mind 103 (411):287 - 302.
    This paper, while neutral on questions about the minimality of truth, argues for the non-minimality of truth-aptness.
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  49.  88
    Frank Jackson (2014). Mind, Meaning and Knowledge. [REVIEW] Analysis 74 (4):714-721.
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  50. David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (1997). The Teleological Theory of Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4):474-89.
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