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Profile: Jacob Berger (Idaho State University, University of Antwerp)
  1. Jacob Berger (forthcoming). Consciousness is Not a Property of States: A Reply to Wilberg. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    According to Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT. Several critics have argued that the possibility of so-called targetless HOTs—that is, HOTs that represent one as being in a state that does not exist—undermines the theory. Recently, Wilberg (2010) has argued that HOT theory can offer a straightforward account of such cases: since consciousness is a (...)
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  2. Jacob Berger (2014). Mental States, Conscious and Nonconscious. Philosophy Compass 9 (6):392-401.
    I discuss here the nature of nonconscious mental states and the ways in which they may differ from their conscious counterparts. I first survey reasons to think that mental states can and often do occur without being conscious. Then, insofar as the nature of nonconscious mentality depends on how we understand the nature of consciousness, I review some of the major theories of consciousness and explore what restrictions they may place on the kinds of states that can occur nonconsciously. I (...)
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  3. Jacob Berger (2013). Perceptual Justification Outside of Consciousness. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer. 137-145.
    In his (2011) paper “There It Is” and his (2014) précis “There It Was,” Benj Hellie develops a sophisticated semantics for perceptual justification according to which perceptions in good cases can be explained by intentional psychology and can justify beliefs, whereas bad cases of perception are defective and so cannot justify beliefs. Importantly, Hellie also affords consciousness a central role in rationality insofar as only those good cases of perception within consciousness can play a justificatory function. In this commentary, I (...)
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  4. Jacob Berger (2012). Do We Conceptualize Every Color We Consciously Discriminate? Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):632-635.
    Mandik (2012)understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that this evidence is consistent with our deploying a variety of (...)
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  5. Jacob Berger & Kyle Ferguson (2009). You Gotta Listen to How People Talk': Machines and Natural Language. In Richard Brown & Kevin S. Decker (eds.), Terminator and Philosophy: I'll be Back, Therefore I Am. 239-252.