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Profile: Jacob Berger (Idaho State University, University of Antwerp)
  1.  16
    Jacob Berger & Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Relationalism and Unconscious Perception. Analysis:anw060.
    Relationalism holds that perceptual experiences are relations between subjects and perceived objects. But much evidence suggests that perceptual states can be unconscious. We argue here that unconscious perception raises difficulties for relationalism. Relationalists would seem to have three options. First, they may deny that there is unconscious perception or question whether we have sufficient evidence to posit it. Second, they may allow for unconscious perception but deny that the relationalist analysis applies to it. Third, they may offer a relationalist explanation (...)
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  2.  41
    Jacob Berger (2014). Consciousness is Not a Property of States: A Reply to Wilberg. Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.
    According to Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT. Several critics have argued that the possibility of so-called targetless HOTs?that is, HOTs that represent one as being in a state that does not exist?undermines the theory. Recently, Wilberg (2010) has argued that HOT theory can offer a straightforward account of such cases: since consciousness is a (...)
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  3.  37
    Jacob Berger & Mark Alfano (2016). Virtue, Situationism, and the Cognitive Value of Art. The Monist 99 (2).
    Virtue-based moral cognitivism holds that at least some of the value of some art consists in conveying knowledge about the nature of virtue and vice. We explore here a challenge to this view, which extends the so-called situationist challenge to virtue ethics. Evidence from social psychology indicates that individuals’ behavior is often susceptible to trivial and normatively irrelevant situational influences. This evidence not only challenges approaches to ethics that emphasize the role of virtue but also undermines versions of moral cognitivism, (...)
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  4.  19
    Jacob Berger (2015). The Sensory Content of Perceptual Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):446-468.
    According to a traditional view, perceptual experiences are composites of distinct sensory and cognitive components. This dual-component theory has many benefits; in particular, it purports to offer a way forward in the debate over what kinds of properties perceptual experiences represent. On this kind of view, the issue reduces to the questions of what the sensory and cognitive components respectively represent. Here, I focus on the former topic. I propose a theory of the contents of the sensory aspects of perceptual (...)
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  5.  28
    Jacob Berger (2012). Do We Conceptualize Every Color We Consciously Discriminate? Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):632-635.
    Mandik (2012)understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that this evidence is consistent with our deploying a variety of (...)
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  6.  26
    Jacob Berger (2015). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, by Lynne Rudder Baker. Mind 124 (493):317-321.
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  7.  28
    Jacob Berger (2014). Mental States, Conscious and Nonconscious. Philosophy Compass 9 (6):392-401.
    I discuss here the nature of nonconscious mental states and the ways in which they may differ from their conscious counterparts. I first survey reasons to think that mental states can and often do occur without being conscious. Then, insofar as the nature of nonconscious mentality depends on how we understand the nature of consciousness, I review some of the major theories of consciousness and explore what restrictions they may place on the kinds of states that can occur nonconsciously. I (...)
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  8.  6
    Jacob Berger (2013). Perceptual Justification Outside of Consciousness. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer 137-145.
    In his paper “There It Is” and his précis “There It Was,” Benj Hellie develops a sophisticated semantics for perceptual justification according to which perceptions in good cases can be explained by intentional psychology and can justify beliefs, whereas bad cases of perception are defective and so cannot justify beliefs. Importantly, Hellie also affords consciousness a central role in rationality insofar as only those good cases of perception within consciousness can play a justificatory function. In this commentary, I reserve judgment (...)
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  9.  5
    Jacob Berger & Kyle Ferguson (2009). 'You Gotta Listen to How People Talk': Machines and Natural Language. In Richard Brown & Kevin S. Decker (eds.), Terminator and Philosophy: I'll be Back, Therefore I Am. 239-252.