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Profile: Jacob Busch
  1. Jacob Busch (forthcoming). Aarhus University, Arts, Department of Culture and Society, Department of Culture and Society-Philosophy and History of Ideas. Philosophical Quarterly.
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  2. Jacob Busch & Rafaele Rodogno (forthcoming). A New Perspective on Shaw’s New Perspective. Journal of Medical Ethics.
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  3. Jacob Busch (2012). The Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism and Scientific Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43 (1):3-9.
    Confirmational holism is central to a traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for mathematical realism (IA). I argue that recent strategies for defending scientific realism are incompatible with confirmational holism. Thus a traditional formulation of IA is incompatible with recent strategies for defending scientific realism. As a consequence a traditional formulation of IA will only have limited appeal.
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  4. Jacob Busch (2012). Can the New Indispensability Argument Be Saved From Euclidean Rescues? Synthese 187 (2):489-508.
    The traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical entities (IA) has been criticised due to its reliance on confirmational holism. Recently a formulation of IA that works without appeal to confirmational holism has been defended. This recent formulation is meant to be superior to the traditional formulation in virtue of it not being subject to the kind of criticism that pertains to confirmational holism. I shall argue that a proponent of the version of IA that works (...)
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  5. Jacob Busch & Andrea Sereni (2012). Indispensability Arguments and Their Quinean Heritage. Indispensability Arguments and Their Quinean Heritage 4 (32):343 - 360.
    Indispensability arguments (IA) for mathematical realism are commonly traced back to Quine. We identify two different Quinean strands in the interpretation of IA, what we label the �logical point of view� and the �theory-contribution� point of view. Focusing on each of the latter, we offer two minimal versions of IA. These both dispense with a number of theoretical assumptions commonly thought to be relevant to IA (most notably confirmational holism and naturalism). We then show that the attribution of both minimal (...)
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  6. David Shaw & Jacob Busch (2012). Rawls and Religious Paternalism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (4):373-386.
    MacDougall (2010) has argued that Rawls‘ liberal social theory suggest that parents who hold certain religious convictions can refuse blood transfusion on their children’s behalf. This paper argues that this is wrong for at least five reasons. First, MacDougall neglects the possibility that true freedom of conscience entails the right to choose one’s own religion rather than have it dictated by one’s parents. Second, he conveniently ignores the fact that children in such situations are much more likely to die than (...)
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  7. Jacob Busch (2011). Indispensability and Holism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (1):47-59.
    It is claimed that the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical entities (IA) works in a way that allows a proponent of mathematical realism to remain agnostic with regard to how we establish that mathematical entities exist. This is supposed to be possible by virtue of the appeal to confirmational holism that enters into the formulation of IA. Holism about confirmation is supposed to be motivated in analogy with holism about falsification. I present an account of how holism about (...)
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  8. Jacob Busch (2011). Is the Indispensability Argument Dispensable? Theoria 77 (2):139-158.
    When the indispensability argument for mathematical entities (IA) is spelled out, it would appear confirmational holism is needed for the argument to work. It has been argued that confirmational holism is a dispensable premise in the argument if a construal of naturalism, according to which it is denied that we can take different epistemic attitudes towards different parts of our scientific theories, is adopted. I argue that the suggested variety of naturalism will only appeal to a limited number of philosophers. (...)
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  9. Jacob Busch (2011). Scientific Realism and the Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism: A Marriage Made in Hell. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):307-325.
    An emphasis on explanatory contribution is central to a recent formulation of the indispensability argument (IA) for mathematical realism. Because scientific realism is argued for by means of inference to the best explanation (IBE), it has been further argued that being a scientific realist entails a commitment to IA and thus to mathematical realism. It has, however, gone largely unnoticed that the way that IBE is argued to be truth conducive involves citing successful applications of IBE and tracing this success (...)
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  10. Jacob Busch & Raffaele Rodogno (2011). Life Support and Euthanasia, a Perspective on Shaw’s New Perspective. Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (2):81-83.
    It has recently been suggested by Shaw (2007) that the distinction between voluntary active euthanasia, such as giving a patient a lethal overdose with the intention of ending that patient's life, and voluntary passive euthanasia, such as removing a patient from a ventilator, is much less obvious than is commonly acknowledged in the literature. This is argued by suggesting a new perspective that more accurately reflects the moral features of end-of-life situations. The argument is simply that if we consider the (...)
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  11. Jacob Busch (2010). Explanation Arguments for Scientific Realism and Theism–Faulty or Restricted in Scope? SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):161-180.
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  12. P. D. Magnus & Jacob Busch (eds.) (2010). New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan.
  13. Jacob Busch (2009). A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable – Anjan Chakravartty. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):368-371.
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  14. Jacob Busch (2009). Underdetermination and Rational Choice of Theories. Philosophia 37 (1):55-65.
    The underdetermination of theory by data argument (UD) is traditionally construed as an argument that tells us that we ought to favour an anti-realist position over a realist position. I argue that when UD is constructed as an argument saying that theory choice is to proceed between theories that are empirically equivalent and adequate to the phenomena up until now, the argument will not favour constructive empiricism over realism. A constructive empiricist cannot account for why scientists are reasonable in expecting (...)
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  15. Jacob Busch (2008). Eclectic Realism—a Cake Less Filling. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):270-272.
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  16. Jacob Busch (2008). No New Miracles, Same Old Tricks. Theoria 74 (2):102-114.
    Abstract: Laudan (1984) distinguishes between two senses of success for scientific theories: (i) that a particular theory is successful, and (ii) that the methods for picking out approximately true theories are successful. These two senses of success are reflected in two different ways that the no miracles argument for scientific realism (NMA) may be set out. First, I set out a (traditional) version of NMA that considers the success of particular theories. I then consider a more recent formulation of NMA (...)
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  17. Jacob Busch (2006). Does the Issue of Response-Dependence Have Any Consequences for Realism? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):27-39.
    Recently Michael Devitt [2006] has argued for how adopting a position he calls ‘worldmaking’ is dangerous to a realist position. He further suggests that response-dependence under the form ‘global response-dependence’ is aversion of ‘worldmaking’. The aim of this paper is to identify what this supposed danger may be if any and to suggest one possible direction argumentation may take to decide the supposed debate between realists and world makers.
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  18. Jacob Busch (2006). Entity Realism Meets the Pessimistic Meta-Induction – The World is Not Enough. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 7 (106):26.
    In the following I briefly set out Devitt's (1997) definition of entity realism and compare it to Hacking's (1983) definition. I then set out the pessimistic induction argument as suggested by Putnam (1978). I present an argument developed by Bertolet (1988) to the effect that Devitt's abductive defence of realism fails. In the light of its failure, Devitt offers the ability of his definition of scientific realism to solve the pessimistic induction argument as a tactical advantage for his definition. I (...)
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  19. Jacob Busch (2003). What Structures Could Not Be. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (3):211 – 225.
    James Ladyman has recently proposed a view according to which all that exists on the level of microphysics are structures "all the way down". By means of a comparative reading of structuralism in philosophy of mathematics as proposed by Stewart Shapiro, I shall present what I believe structures could not be. I shall argue that, if Ladyman is indeed proposing something as strong as suggested here, then he is committed to solving problems that proponents of structuralism in philosophy of mathematics (...)
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