Search results for 'Jacob Feldmanb' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  53
    Zenon W. Pylyshynb, Jacob Feldmanb & Brian J. Scholla (2001). What is a Visual Object? Evidence From Target Merging in Multiple Object Tracking. Cognition 80 (1-2):159-177.
    The notion that visual attention can operate over visual objects in addition to spatial locations has recently received much empirical support, but there has been relatively little empirical consideration of what can count as an `object' in the ®rst place. We have investi- gated this question in the context of the multiple object tracking paradigm, in which subjects must track a number of independently and unpredictably moving identical items in a ®eld of identical distractors. What types of feature clusters can (...)
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  2. E. F. Jacob (1937). Cusanus the Theologian / by E.F. Jacob. Manchester University Press.
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  3. Alexander Jacob (2000). Nobilitas: A Study of European Aristocratic Philosophy From Ancient Greece to the Early Twentieth Century. Upa.
    Nobilitas is a study of the history of aristocratic philosophy from ancient Greece to the early twentieth century that aims at providing an alternative to the liberal democratic norms, which are propagated today as the only viable socio-political system for the world community. Jacob reveals that, contrary to popular belief, the social and cultural development of European civilization has, for twenty-five centuries, been based not on democratic or communist notions but, rather on aristocratic and nationalist notions. Beginning with the (...)
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  4. Pierre Jacob (2008). What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human Social Cognition? Mind and Language 23 (2):190–223.
    According to an influential view, one function of mirror neurons (MNs), first discovered in the brain of monkeys, is to underlie third-person mindreading. This view relies on two assumptions: the activity of MNs in an observer’s brain matches (simulates or resonates with) that of MNs in an agent’s brain and this resonance process retrodictively generates a representation of the agent’s intention from a perception of her movement. In this paper, I criticize both assumptions and I argue instead that the activity (...)
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  5. Pierre Jacob (2011). The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: A Critique. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):519-540.
    This paper assesses the so-called “direct-perception” model of empathy. This model draws much of its inspiration from the Phenomenological tradition: it is offered as an account free from the assumption that most, if not all, of another’s psychological states and experiences are unobservable and that one’s understanding of another’s psychological states and experiences are based on inferential processes. Advocates of this model also reject the simulation-based approach to empathy. I first argue that most of their criticisms miss their target because (...)
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  6. Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (2003). Ways of Seeing: The Scope and Limits of Visual Cognition. OUP Oxford.
    Ways of Seeing is a unique collaboration between an eminent philosopher and a world famous neuroscientist. It focuses on one of the most basic human functions - vision. What does it mean to 'see'. It brings together electrophysiological studies, neuropsychology, psychophysics, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of mind. The first truly interdisciplinary book devoted to the topic of vision, it will make a valuable contribution to the field of cognitive science.
     
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  7.  93
    Frédérique de Vignemont & Pierre Jacob (2012). What Is It Like to Feel Another's Pain? Philosophy of Science 79 (2):295-316.
    We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective component. According to our account, contagious pain consists in imagining the former, whereas empathetic pain consists in imagining the latter. We further (...)
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  8. C. Jacob & J. A. Treves (1997). Bibliotheca Alexandrina Towards the Encyclopedism of the 21st Century. Diogenes 45 (178):83-85.
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  9. C. Jacob (1999). Introduction. Diogenes 47 (186):3-3.
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  10.  52
    Pierre Jacob (2009). The Tuning-Fork Model of Human Social Cognition: A Critique☆. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):229-243.
    The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of monkeys, involves the four following assumptions: (1) mirroring processes are processes of resonance or simulation. (2) They can be motor or non-motor. (3) Processes of motor mirroring (or action-mirroring), exemplified by the activity of MNs, constitute instances of third-person mindreading, whereby an observer represents the agent's intention. (4) Non-motor mirroring processes enable humans to represent others' emotions. After questioning all (...)
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  11. Pierre Jacob (2006). Why Visual Experience is Likely to Resist Being Enacted. Psyche 12 (1).
    Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in _Action in Perception_ is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and (...)
     
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  12. Florian Cova, Emmanuel Dupoux & Pierre Jacob (2012). On Doing Things Intentionally. Mind and Language 27 (4):378-409.
    Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an influence on the way we use the adverb ‘intentionally’. Here we propose our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that the adverb ‘intentionally’ has three different meanings that are differently selected by contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can account for most available data and present some new results that support this. We end by discussing the implications (...)
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  13.  31
    Pierre Jacob (1997). What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World. Cambridge University Press.
    Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behaviour. In the process, the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to (...)
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  14.  97
    Pierre Jacob (2012). Embodying the Mind by Extending It. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):33-51.
    To subscribe to the embodied mind (or embodiment) framework is to reject the view that an individual’s mind is realized by her brain alone. As Clark ( 2008a ) has argued, there are two ways to subscribe to embodiment: bodycentrism (BC) and the extended mind (EM) thesis. According to BC, an embodied mind is a two-place relation between an individual’s brain and her non-neural bodily anatomy. According to EM, an embodied mind is a threeplace relation between an individual’s brain, her (...)
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  15. André Jacob (2011). Language as the Core of the Human Condition: In Honour of Gustave Guillaume. Diogenes 58 (4):104-108.
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  16. Florian Cova, Emmanuel Dupoux & Pierre Jacob (2010). Moral Evaluation Shapes Linguistic Reports of Others' Psychological States, Not Theory-of-Mind Judgments. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):334-335.
    We use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states to others for purposes of describing, explaining, and predicting their actions. Does the evidence reported by Knobe show, as he thinks, that moral evaluation shapes our mastery of psychological concepts? We argue that the evidence so far shows instead that moral evaluation shapes the way we report, not the way we think about, others' psychological states.
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  17. C. Jacob, J. A. Treves & J. C. Gage (1997). The Library and the Book: Forms of Alexandrian Encyclopedism. Diogenes 45 (178):63-82.
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  18. Pierre Jacob (1998). What is the Phenomenology of Thought? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):443-448.
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  19. Margaret Candee Jacob (1969). John Toland and the Newtonian Ideology. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 32:307-331.
  20.  52
    Pierre Jacob (2002). Some Problems for Reductive Physicalism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):648-654.
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  21.  53
    Pierre Jacob, Intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. The puzzles of intentionality lie at the interface between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. The word itself, which is of medieval Scholastic origin, was rehabilitated by the philosopher Franz Brentano towards the end of the nineteenth century. ‘Intentionality’ is a philosopher's word. It derives from the Latin word intentio, which in turn derives from the verb (...)
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  22.  38
    Marie-andrée Jacob (2006). Another Look at the Presumed-Versus-Informed Consent Dichotomy in Postmortem Organ Procurement. Bioethics 20 (6):293–300.
  23. Pierre Jacob (1998). Conceptual Competence and Inadequate Conceptions. Philosophical Issues 9:169-174.
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  24.  90
    C. Jacob & J. Vale (1999). From Book to Text: Towards a Comparative History of Philologies. Diogenes 47 (186):4-22.
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  25.  22
    Pierre Jacob (2012). Sharing and Ascribing Goals. Mind and Language 27 (2):200-227.
    This paper assesses the scope and limits of a widely influential model of goal-ascription by human infants: the shared-intentionality model. It derives much of its appeal from its ability to integrate behavioral evidence from developmental psychology with cognitive neuroscientific evidence about the role of mirror neuron activity in non-human primates. The central question raised by this model is whether sharing a goal with an agent is necessary and sufficient for ascribing it to that agent. I argue that advocates of the (...)
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  26. C. Jacob (2002). Gathering Memory: Thoughts on the History of Libraries. Diogenes 49 (196):41-57.
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  27.  8
    Tomas Hellström & Merle Jacob (2012). Revisiting 'Weinberg's Choice': Classic Tensions in the Concept of Scientific Merit. [REVIEW] Minerva 50 (3):381-396.
    Alvin Weinberg’s classic and much debated two articles in Minerva, “Criteria for Scientific Choice” (1963) and “Criteria for Scientific Choice II – The Two Cultures” (1964), represent two of the first and most important attempts to create a meta-discourse about priority setting in science policy, and many of the points advanced remain relevant. The goal of this paper is to elaborate on the relevance of some of Weinberg’s original arguments to priority setting today. We have singled out four issues for (...)
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  28.  5
    Adrian Guta, Marilou Gagnon & Jean Daniel Jacob (2012). Using Foucault to Recast the Telecare Debate. American Journal of Bioethics 12 (9):57-59.
    The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 9, Page 57-59, September 2012.
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  29.  68
    Pierre Jacob (2005). Grasping and Perceiving Objects. In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 241--283.
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  30.  18
    Pierre Jacob (1987). Thoughts and Belief Ascriptions. Mind and Language 2 (4):301-325.
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  31.  41
    Pierre Jacob (1993). Externalism and the Explanatory Relevance of Broad Content. Mind and Language 8 (1):131-156.
  32. Pierre Jacob (2005). First-Person and Third-Person Mindreading. In P. Gampieri-Deutsch (ed.), Psychoanalysis as an Empirical, Interdisciplinary Science. Austrian Academy of Sciences
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  33.  9
    Pierre Jacob (2002). Review: Some Problems for Reductive Physicalism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):648 - 654.
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  34.  76
    Pierre Jacob (1995). Consciousness, Intentionality, and Function: What is the Right Order of Explanation? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):195-200.
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  35.  13
    Pierre Jacob (1991). Are Mental Properties Causal Efficacious? Grazer Philosophische Studien 39:51-73.
    In respect of the question whether mental properties, i.e. contents of mental states, are causally relevant the distinction between type and token physikalism and externalism and their consequences concerning the problems of property dualism and content epiphenomenalism are sketched. Fodor's theory - a functionalist version of token physikalism - is presented and criticized. Distinguishing between naming a causally relevant property and quantifying over it a solution to the threat of epihenomenalism is suggested, and finally Davidson's Anomalous Monism is defended.
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  36.  50
    C. Jacob, J. A. Treves & J. C. Gage (1997). Introduction: At the Origins of the Encyclopedic Dream. Diogenes 45 (178):1-5.
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  37.  35
    Pierre Jacob (2002). The Scope and Limit of Mental Simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins
  38.  48
    J. Jacob (1985). Report on Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and Cessation of Treatment. Journal of Medical Ethics 11 (1):49-50.
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  39.  5
    Tomas Hellstrom & Merle Jacob (2000). Scientification of Politics or Politicization of Science? Traditionalist Science-Policy Discourse and its Quarrels with Mode 2 Epistemology. Social Epistemology 14 (1):69-77.
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  40.  60
    Pierre Jacob (1995). Can Semantic Properties Be Non-Causal? Philosophical Issues 6:44-51.
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  41.  44
    Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod (2007). Precis of Ways of Seeing. Dialogue 46 (2):335-340.
    This is a summary of the book Ways of Seing co-authord witth Marc Jeannerod and published by Oxford University Press in 2003.
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  42.  59
    Pierre Jacob (2001). Is Self-Knowledge Compatible with Externalism? Mind and Society 2 (1):59-75.
    Externalism is the view that the contents of many of a person’s propositional attitudes and perhaps sensory experiences are extrinsic properties of the person’s brain: they involve relations between the person’s brain and properties instantiated in his or her present or past environment. Privileged self-knowledge is the view that every human being is able to know directly or non-inferentially, in a way unavailable to anybody else, what he or she thinks or experiences. Now, if what I think (or experience) is (...)
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  43.  56
    Pierre Jacob (2000). Can Selection Explain Content? In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Doc Ctr 91-102.
    There are presently three broad approaches the project of naturalizing intentionality: a purely informational approach (Dretske and Fodor), a purely teleological approach (Millikan and Papineau), and a mixed informationally-based teleological approach (Dretske again). I will argue that the last teleosemantic theory offers the most promising approach. I also think, however, that the most explicit version of a pure teleosemantic theory of content, namely Millikan’s admirable theory, faces a pair of objections. My goal in this paper is to spell out Millikan’s (...)
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  44.  24
    Pierre Jacob (1992). Externalism and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (New Series):203-19.
    Argues that externalist content is not causally efficacious, but is relevant to causal explanations of behavior indirectly, via the cognitive activities of others external to the system.
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  45.  53
    Pierre Jacob (2002). Can Mental Content Explain Behavior? In Languages of the Brain.
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  46.  49
    Pierre Jacob (1990). Externalism Revisited: Is There Such a Thing as Narrow Content? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 60 (November):143-176.
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  47. Pierre Jacob, Frege's Puzzle and Belief Ascriptions.
     
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  48.  46
    Pierre Jacob (2004). Do We Know How We Know Our Own Minds Yet? In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter
  49.  42
    Pierre Jacob (1995). Can Semantic Properties Be Non-Causal? Philosophical Issues 6:44-51.
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  50. Margaret C. Jacob (1997). Scientific Culture and the Making of the Industrial West. Oxford University Press.
    As more and more historians acknowledge the central signifcance of science and technology with that of modern society, the need for a good, general history of the achievements of the Scientific Revolution has grown. Scientific Culture and The Making of the Industrial West seeks to explain this historical process by looking at how and why scientific knowledge became such an integral part of the culture of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and how this in turn lead to the (...)
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