27 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Jacob Ross [22]Jacob J. Ross [3]Jacob Joshua Ross [2]
See also:
  1. Jacob Ross, Acceptance and Practical Reason.
    What theory should we accept from the practical point of view, or accept as a basis for guiding our actions, if we don’t know which theory is true, and if there are too many plausible alternative theories for us to take them all into consideration? This question is the theme of the first three parts of this dissertation. I argue that the problem of theory acceptance, so understood, is a problem of practical rationality, and hence that the appropriate grounds for (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jacob Ross, Countable Additivity, Dutch Books, and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.
    Currently, it appears that the most widely accepted solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem is the one-third solution. Another widely held view is that an agent’s credences should be countably additive. In what follows, I will argue that these two views are incompatible, since the principles that underlie the one-third solution are inconsistent with the principle of Countable Additivity (hereafter, CA). I will then argue that this incompatibility is a serious problems for thirders, since it undermines one of the central (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jacob Ross, Personal and Impersonal Obligation.
    How are claims about what people ought to do related to claims about what ought to be the case? That is, how are claims about of personal obligation, of the form s ought to ?, related to claims about impersonal obligation, of the form it ought to be the case that p? Many philosophers have held that the former type of claim can be reduced to the latter. In particular, they have held a view known as the Meinong-Chisholm Thesis, which, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jacob Ross, Personal Identity and the Irrelevance of Self-Interest.
    Self-interest is widely regarded as an important, if not as the only, source of reasons for action, and hence it is widely held that one can rationally give special weight to one’s self-interest in deciding how to act. In what follows, I will argue against this view. I will do so by following the lead of Derek Parfit, and considering cases in which personal identity appears to break down. My argument will differ from Parfit’s, however, in that it will have (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jacob Ross, Rationality, Normativity, and Commitment.
    Is rationality normative, in the sense that we ought to be rational, in our actions and attitudes? Recently, the claim that rationality is normative has faced several challenges. In this paper, I will take up these challenges, and aim to vindicate the normativity of rationality in the face of them. I will begin, in part 1, by outlining these challenges, and then discussing, and criticizing, some that have been offered to them in the literature. Then, in part 2, I will (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Jacob Ross, S K B C ?
    Parfit argues that a form of rule consequentialism can be derived from the most plausible formulation of the fundamental principle of Kantian ethics. And so he concludes that Kantians should be consequentialists. I argue that we have good reason to reject two of the auxiliary premises that figure in Parfit’s derivation of rule consequentialism from Kantianism..
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Jacob Ross (forthcoming). Actualism, Possibilism, and Beyond. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
    How is what an agent ought to do related to what an agent ought to prefer that she does? More precisely, suppose we know what an agent’s preference ordering ought to be over the prospects of performing the various courses of action open to her. Can we infer from this information how she ought to act, and if so, how can we infer it? One view (which, for convenience, I will call ‘actualism’) is that an agent ought to  just (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (2014). Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
    This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a proposition is (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Shieva Kleinschmidt & Jacob Ross (2013). And Generics. In Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.), Art and Abstract Objects. Oxford University Press. 125.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Shieva Kleinschmidt & Jacob Ross (2013). Repeatable Artwork Sentences and Generics. In Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.), Art and Abstract Objects. Oxford University Press.
    We seem to talk about repeatable artworks, like symphonies, films, and novels, all the time. We say things like, "The Moonlight Sonata has three movements" and "Duck Soup makes me laugh". How are these sentences to be understood? We argue against the simple subject/predicate view, on which the subjects of the sentences refer to individuals and the sentences are true iff the referents of the subjects have the properties picked out by the predicates. We then consider two alternative responses that (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (2013). Reversibility or Disagreement. Mind 122 (485):43-84.
    The phenomenon of disagreement has recently been brought into focus by the debate between contextualists and relativist invariantists about epistemic expressions such as ‘might’, ‘probably’, indicative conditionals, and the deontic ‘ought’. Against the orthodox contextualist view, it has been argued that an invariantist account can better explain apparent disagreements across contexts by appeal to the incompatibility of the propositions expressed in those contexts. This paper introduces an important and underappreciated phenomenon associated with epistemic expressions — a phenomenon that we call (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Jacob Ross (2012). All Roads Lead to Violations of Countable Additivity. Philosophical Studies 161 (3):381-390.
    This paper defends the claim that there is a deep tension between the principle of countable additivity and the one-third solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. The claim that such a tension exists has recently been challenged by Brian Weatherson, who has attempted to provide a countable additivity-friendly argument for the one-third solution. This attempt is shown to be unsuccessful. And it is argued that the failure of this attempt sheds light on the status of the principle of indifference that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jacob Ross (2010). Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas. Philosophical Review 119 (4):411 - 447.
    Currently, the most popular views about how to update de se or self-locating beliefs entail the one-third solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem.2 Another widely held view is that an agent‘s credences should be countably additive.3 In what follows, I will argue that there is a deep tension between these two positions. For the assumptions that underlie the one-third solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem entail a more general principle, which I call the Generalized Thirder Principle, and there are situations (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Jacob Ross (2010). The Irreducibility of Personal Obligation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):307 - 323.
    It is argued that claims about personal obligation (of the form "s ought to 0") cannot be reduced to claims about impersonal obligation (of the form "it ought to be the case that p"). The most common attempts at such a reduction are shown to have unacceptable implications in cases involving a plurality of agents. It is then argued that similar problems will face any attempt to reduce personal obligation to impersonal obligation.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Jacob Ross (2009). How to Be a Cognitivist About Practical Reason. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:243-281.
  16. Jacob Ross (2009). Parfit. In Christopher Belshaw & Gary Kemp (eds.), 12 Modern Philosophers. Wiley-Blackwell.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Jacob Ross (2009). Reflections on Cognitivism About Practical Reason. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Four. Oup Oxford.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Jacob Ross (2009). Should Kantians Be Consequentialists? Ratio 22 (1):126-135.
    Parfit argues that a form of rule consequentialism can be derived from the most plausible formulation of the fundamental principle of Kantian ethics. And so he concludes that Kantians should be consequentialists. I argue that we have good reason to reject two of the auxiliary premises that figure in Parfit's derivation of rule consequentialism from Kantianism. 1.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Jacob Ross, Elijah Delmedigo. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Michael Beaton, J. Bricklin, Louis C. Charland, JCW Edwards, Ilya B. Farber, Bill Faw, Rocco J. Gennaro, C. Kaernbach, C. M. H. Nunn, Jaak Panksepp, Jesse J. Prinz, Matthew Ratcliffe, Jacob J. Ross, S. Murray, Henry P. Stapp & Douglas F. Watt (2006). Switched-on Consciousness - Clarifying What It Means - Response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):7-12.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Jeff McMahan, Nick Bostrom, Toby Ord, Paul E. Hurley, Pekka Väyrynen & Jacob Ross (2006). 10. Joseph Raz, The Practice of Value Joseph Raz, The Practice of Value (Pp. 805-809). Ethics 116 (4).
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Jacob Ross (2006). Rejecting Ethical Deflationism. Ethics 116 (4):742-768.
    One of the perennial challenges of ethical theory has been to provide an answer to a number of views that appear to undermine the importance of ethical questions. We may refer to such views collectively as “deflationary ethical theories.” These include theories, such as nihilism, according to which no action is better than any other, as well as relativistic theories according to which no ethical theory is better than any other. In this article I present a new response to such (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Jacob Joshua Ross (1999). The Primacy of the Personalist Concept of God in Jewish Thought. Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 8 (2):171-199.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Jacob J. Ross (1990). Against Postulating Central Systems in the Mind. Philosophy of Science 57 (2):297-312.
    This paper is concerned with a recent argument of Jerry Fodor's to the effect that the frame problem in artificial intelligence is in principle insoluble. Fodor's argument is based on his contention that the mind is divided between encapsulated modular systems for information processing and 'central systems' for non-demonstrative inference. I argue that positing central systems is methodologically unsound, and in fact involves a muddle that bears a strong family resemblance to the basic error in dualism. I therefore conclude that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Jacob Joshua Ross (1974). Rationality and Commonsense. Philosophia 4 (4):569-570.
  26. Jacob J. Ross (1970). The Appeal To The Given: A Study In Epistemology. London,: Allen &Amp; Unwin.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Jacob Ross, Any Way You Slice It: On Fission, Fusion and the Weighing of Welfare.
    It is generally thought that there are certain persons to whose welfare we should give special weight. It is commonly held, for example, that we should give special weight to our own welfare. On the strongest version of this view, we should always give overriding weight to our own welfare, and so, in considering any set of alternatives, we should always prefer the one in which we fare best. Many people would reject this strong view, for two reasons. First, many (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation