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Profile: Jake Chandler (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München, University of Groningen)
  1. Jake Chandler (forthcoming). Probability, Acceptance and Aggregation. Erkenntnis.
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  2. Jake Chandler (forthcoming). Subjective Probabilities Need Not Be Sharp. Erkenntnis:1-14.
    It is well known that classical, aka ‘sharp’, Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called ‘imprecise’ models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be borne out (...)
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  3. Jake Chandler (2013). Acceptance, Aggregation and Scoring Rules. Erkenntnis 78 (1):201 - 217.
    As the ongoing literature on the paradoxes of the Lottery and the Preface reminds us, the nature of the relation between probability and rational acceptability remains far from settled. This article provides a novel perspective on the matter by exploiting a recently noted structural parallel with the problem of judgment aggregation. After offering a number of general desiderata on the relation between finite probability models and sets of accepted sentences in a Boolean sentential language, it is noted that a number (...)
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  4. Jake Chandler (2013). Contrastive Confirmation: Some Competing Accounts. Synthese 190 (1):129-138.
    I outline four competing probabilistic accounts of contrastive evidential support and consider various considerations that might help arbitrate between these. The upshot of the discussion is that the so-called 'Law of Likelihood' is to be preferred to any of the alternatives considered.
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  5. Jake Chandler (2013). Defeat Reconsidered. Analysis 73 (1):49-51.
    It appears to have gone unnoticed in the literature that Pollock's widely endorsed analysis of evidential defeat entails a remarkably strong symmetry principle, according to which, for any three propositions D, E and H, if both E and D provide a reason to believe H, then D is a defeater for E's support for H if and only if, in turn, E is a defeater for D's support for H. After illustrating the counterintuitiveness of this constraint, a simple, more suitable, (...)
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  6. Jake Chandler (2013). Transmission Failure, AGM-Style. Erkenntnis 78 (2):383-398.
    This article provides a discussion of the principle of transmission of evidential support across entailment from the perspective of belief revision theory in the AGM tradition. After outlining and briefly defending a small number of basic principles of belief change, which include a number of belief contraction analogues of the Darwiche-Pearl postulates for iterated revision, a proposal is then made concerning the connection between evidential beliefs and belief change policies in rational agents. This proposal is found to be suffcient to (...)
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  7. Jake Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.) (2012). Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. OUP Oxford.
    At a time in which probability theory is exerting an unprecedented influence on epistemology and philosophy of science, promising to deliver an exact and unified foundation for the philosophy of rational inference and decision-making, it is worth remembering that the philosophy of religion has long proven to be an extremely fertile ground for the application of probabilistic thinking to traditional epistemological debates. This volume brings together original contributions from twelve contemporary researchers, both established and emerging, to offer a representative sample (...)
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  8. Jake Chandler & Adam Rieger (2011). Self-Respect Regained. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):311-318.
    In a recent article, David Christensen casts aspersions on a restricted version of van Fraassen's Reflection principle, which he dubs ‘Self-Respect’(sr). Rejecting two possible arguments for sr, he concludes that the principle does not constitute a requirement of rationality. In this paper we argue that not only has Christensen failed to make a case against the aforementioned arguments, but that considerations pertaining to Moore's paradox indicate that sr, or at the very least a mild weakening thereof, is indeed a plausible (...)
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  9. Jake Chandler (2010). Contrastive Support: Some Competing Accounts. Synthese (1):1-10.
    I outline four competing probabilistic accounts of contrastive evidential support and consider various considerations that might help arbitrate between these. The upshot of the discussion is that the so-called ‘Law of Likelihood’ is to be preferred to any of the alternatives considered.
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  10. Jake Chandler (2010). Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Eds., Degrees of Belief Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 29 (6):422-424.
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  11. Jake Chandler (2010). The Lottery Paradox Generalized? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):667-679.
    In a recent article, Douven and Williamson offer both (i) a rebuttal of various recent suggested sufficient conditions for rational acceptability and (ii) an alleged ‘generalization’ of this rebuttal, which, they claim, tells against a much broader class of potential suggestions. However, not only is the result mentioned in (ii) not a generalization of the findings referred to in (i), but in contrast to the latter, it fails to have the probative force advertised. Their paper does however, if unwittingly, bring (...)
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  12. Jake Chandler (2010). The Transmission of Support: A Bayesian Re-Analysis. [REVIEW] Synthese 176 (3):333 - 343.
    Crispin Wright’s discussion of the notion of ‘transmission-failure’ promises to have important philosophical ramifications, both in epistemology and beyond. This paper offers a precise, formal characterisation of the concept within a Bayesian framework. The interpretation given avoids the serious shortcomings of a recent alternative proposal due to Samir Okasha.
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  13. Jake Chandler (2009). Review of Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Eds. Degrees of Belief. Philosophy in Review 296 (6):422-424.
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  14. Jake Chandler (2007). Solving the Tacking Problem with Contrast Classes. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):489 - 502.
    The traditional Bayesian qualitative account of evidential support (TB) takes assertions of the form 'E evidentially supports H' to affirm the existence of a two-place relation of evidential support between E and H. The analysans given for this relation is $C(H,E) =_{def} Pr(H\arrowvertE) \models Pr(H)$ . Now it is well known that when a hypothesis H entails evidence E, not only is it the case that C(H,E), but it is also the case that C(H&X,E) for any arbitrary X. There is (...)
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  15. Jake Chandler (2006). Discussion Note Whyte on Desire Fulfilment Conditions: A Simple Problem. Disputatio 2 (21).
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