46 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
James R. Beebe [27]James Beebe [19]James Robert Beebe [1]
See also:
Profile: James R. Beebe (State University of New York, Buffalo)
  1. James R. Beebe & Wesley Buckwalter (2010). The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect. Mind and Language 25 (4):474-498.
    Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2004b) and others have demonstrated the surprising fact that the valence of a side-effect action can affect intuitions about whether that action was performed intentionally. Here we report the results of an experiment that extends these findings by testing for an analogous effect regarding knowledge attributions. Our results suggest that subjects are less likely to find that an agent knows an action will bring about a side-effect when the effect is good than when it is bad. It (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   44 citations  
  2. James R. Beebe & Mark Jensen (2012). Surprising Connections Between Knowledge and Action: The Robustness of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):689 - 715.
    A number of researchers have begun to demonstrate that the widely discussed ?Knobe effect? (wherein participants are more likely to think that actions with bad side-effects are brought about intentionally than actions with good or neutral side-effects) can be found in theory of mind judgments that do not involve the concept of intentional action. In this article we report experimental results that show that attributions of knowledge can be influenced by the kinds of (non-epistemic) concerns that drive the Knobe effect. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  3.  76
    James Beebe (2013). A Knobe Effect for Belief Ascriptions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):235-258.
    Knobe (Analysis 63:190-193, 2003a, Philosophical Psychology 16:309-324, 2003b, Analysis 64:181-187, 2004b) found that people are more likely to attribute intentionality to agents whose actions resulted in negative side-effects that to agents whose actions resulted in positive ones. Subsequent investigation has extended this result to a variety of other folk psychological attributions. The present article reports experimental findings that demonstrate an analogous effect for belief ascriptions. Participants were found to be more likely to ascribe belief, higher degrees of belief, higher degrees (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  4. Mark Alfano, James Beebe & Brian Robinson (2012). The Centrality of Belief and Reflection in Knobe-Effect Cases. The Monist 95 (2):264-289.
    Recent work in experimental philosophy has shown that people are more likely to attribute intentionality, knowledge, and other psychological properties to someone who causes a bad side effect than to someone who causes a good one. We argue that all of these asymmetries can be explained in terms of a single underlying asymmetry involving belief attribution because the belief that one’s action would result in a certain side effect is a necessary component of each of the psychological attitudes in question. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  5.  12
    James R. Beebe & Jake Monaghan (forthcoming). Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosopohy.
    We report the results of four empirical studies designed to investigate the extent to which an epistemic closure principle for knowledge is reflected in folk epistemology. Previous work by Turri (2015a) suggested that our shared epistemic practices may only include a source-relative closure principle—one that applies to perceptual beliefs but not to inferential beliefs. We argue that the results of our studies provide reason for thinking that individuals are making a performance error when their knowledge attributions and denials conflict with (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. James Beebe (2013). Weakness of Will, Reasonability, and Compulsion. Synthese 190 (18):4077-4093.
    Experimental philosophers have recently begun to investigate the folk conception of weakness of will (e.g., Mele in Philos Stud 150:391–404, 2010; May and Holton in Philos Stud 157:341–360, 2012; Beebe forthcoming; Sousa and Mauro forthcoming). Their work has focused primarily on the ways in which akrasia (i.e., acting contrary to one’s better judgment), unreasonable violations of resolutions, and variations in the moral valence of actions modulate folk attributions of weakness of will. A key finding that has emerged from this research (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  7.  53
    James R. Beebe & Ryan J. Undercoffer (2015). Moral Valence and Semantic Intuitions. Erkenntnis 80 (2):445-466.
    Despite the swirling tide of controversy surrounding the work of Machery et al. , the cross-cultural differences they observed in semantic intuitions about the reference of proper names have proven to be robust. In the present article, we report cross-cultural and individual differences in semantic intuitions obtained using new experimental materials. In light of the pervasiveness of the Knobe effect and the fact that Machery et al.’s original materials incorporated elements of wrongdoing but did not control for their influence, we (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  8. James Beebe (ed.) (2014). Advances in Experimental Epistemology. Continuum.
  9.  61
    James Beebe (2004). The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri-Level Hypothesis. Noûs 38 (1):177 - 195.
    In this paper I critically examine the Generality Problem and argue that it does not succeed as an objection to reliabilism. Although those who urge the Generality Problem are correct in claiming that any process token can be given indefinitely many descriptions that pick out indefinitely many process types, they are mistaken in thinking that reliabilists have no principled way to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant process types.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  10.  84
    James Beebe & Joseph Shea (2013). Gettierized Knobe Effects. Episteme 10 (3):219-240.
    We report experimental results showing that participants are more likely to attribute knowledge in familiar Gettier cases when the would-be knowers are performing actions that are negative in some way (e.g. harmful, blameworthy, norm-violating) than when they are performing positive or neutral actions. Our experiments bring together important elements from the Gettier case literature in epistemology and the Knobe effect literature in experimental philosophy and reveal new insights into folk patterns of knowledge attribution.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  11.  37
    James R. Beebe (2012). Social Functions of Knowledge Attributions. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press 220--242.
    Drawing upon work in evolutionary game theory and experimental philosophy, I argue that one of the roles the concept of knowledge plays in our social cognitive ecology is that of enabling us to make adaptively important distinctions between different kinds of blameworthy and blameless behaviors. In particular, I argue that knowledge enables us to distinguish which agents are most worthy of blame for inflicting harms, violating social norms, or cheating in situations of social exchange.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  12. James Beebe (2009). The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):605 - 636.
    Abductivists claim that explanatory considerations (e. g., simplicity, parsimony, explanatory breadth, etc.) favor belief in the external world over skeptical hypotheses involving evil demons and brains in vats. After showing how most versions of abductivism succumb fairly easily to obvious and fatal objections, I explain how rationalist versions of abductivism can avoid these difficulties. I then discuss the most pressing challenges facing abductivist appeals to the a priori and offer suggestions on how to overcome them.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  13. James Beebe (2010). Moral Relativism in Context. Noûs 44 (4):691-724.
    Consider the following facts about the average, philosophically untrained moral relativist: (1.1) The average moral relativist denies the existence of “absolute moral truths.” (1.2) The average moral relativist often expresses her commitment to moral relativism with slogans like ‘What’s true (or right) for you may not be what’s true (or right) for me’ or ‘What’s true (or right) for your culture may not be what’s true (or right) for my culture.’ (1.3) The average moral relativist endorses relativistic views of morality (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14.  55
    James R. Beebe (2009). The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):605-636.
    Abductivists claim that explanatory considerations (e.g., simplicity, parsimony, explanatory breadth, etc.) favor belief in the external world over skeptical hypotheses involving evil demons and brains in vats. After showing how most versions of abductivism succumb fairly easily to obvious and fatal objections, I explain how rationalist versions of abductivism can avoid these difficulties. I then discuss the most pressing challenges facing abductivist appeals to the a priori and offer suggestions on how to overcome them.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  15.  78
    James Beebe (2010). Constraints on Sceptical Hypotheses. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):449-470.
    I examine the conditions which hypotheses must satisfy if they are to be used to raise significant sceptical challenges. I argue that sceptical hypotheses do not have to be logically, metaphysically or epistemically possible: they need only to depict scenarios subjectively indistinguishable from the actual world and to show how subjects can believe what they do while not having knowledge. I also argue that sceptical challenges can be raised against a priori beliefs, even if those beliefs are necessarily true. I (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  16.  5
    James Beebe, Runya Qiaoan, Tomasz Wysocki & Miguel A. Endara (2015). “Moral Objectivism in Cross-Cultural Perspective”. Journal of Cognition and Culture 15:386-401.
    Moral psychologists have recently turned their attention to the study of folk metaethical beliefs. We report the results of a cross-cultural study using Chinese, Polish and Ecuadorian participants that seeks to advance this line of investigation. Individuals in all three demographic groups were observed to attribute objectivity to ethical statements in very similar patterns. Differences in participants’ strength of opinion about an issue, the level of societal agreement or disagreement about an issue, and participants’ age were found to significantly affect (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. James R. Beebe (2003). Logical Problem of Evil. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The existence of evil and suffering in our world seems to pose a serious challenge to belief in the existence of a perfect God. If God were all-knowing, it seems that God would know about all of the horrible things that happen in our world. If God were all-powerful, God would be able to do something about all of the evil and suffering. Furthermore, if God were morally perfect, then surely God would want to do something about it. And yet (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18.  4
    James R. Beebe (2015). The Empirical Study of Folk Metaethics. Etyka 15.
    In this paper, I review recent attempts by experimental philosophers and psychologists to study folk metaethics empirically and discuss some of the difficulties that researchers face when trying to construct the right kind of research materials and interpreting the results that they obtain. At first glance, the findings obtained so far do not look good for the thesis that people are everywhere moral realists about every moral issue. However, because of difficulties in interpreting these results, I argue that better research (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. James Beebe (2008). Can Rationalist Abductivism Solve the Problem of Induction? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):151-168.
    Abstract: According to Laurence BonJour, the problem of induction can be solved by recognizing the a priori necessity that inductive conclusions constitute the best explanations of inductive premises. I defend an interpretation of the key probability claims BonJour makes about inductive premises and show that they are not susceptible to many of the objections that have been lodged against them. I then argue that these purportedly necessary probability claims nevertheless remain deeply problematic and that, as a result, BonJour's proposal fails (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  20. James R. Beebe (2007). BonJour's Abductivist Reply to Skepticism. Philosophia 35 (2):181-196.
    The abductivist reply to skepticism is the view that commonsense explanations of the patterns and regularities that appear in our sensory experiences should be rationally preferred to skeptical explanations of those same patterns and regularities on the basis of explanatory considerations. In this article I critically examine Laurence BonJour’s rationalist version of the abductivist position. After explaining why BonJour’s account is more defensible than other versions of the view, I argue that the notion of probability he relies upon is deeply (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  21. James Beebe (2011). A Priori Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):583 - 602.
    In this article I investigate a neglected form of radical skepticism that questions whether any of our logical, mathematical and other seemingly self-evident beliefs count as knowledge. ‘A priori skepticism,’ as I will call it, challenges our ability to know any of the following sorts of propositions: (1.1) The sum of two and three is five. (1.2) Whatever is square is rectangular. (1.3) Whatever is red is colored. (1.4) No surface can be uniformly red and uniformly blue at the same (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22.  30
    James R. Beebe (2016). Do Bad People Know More? Interactions Between Attributions of Knowledge and Blame. Synthese 193:2633–2657.
    A central topic in experimental epistemology has been the ways that non-epistemic evaluations of an agent’s actions can affect whether the agent is taken to have certain kinds of knowledge. Several scholars have found that the positive or negative valence of an action can influence attributions of knowledge to the agent. These evaluative effects on knowledge attributions are commonly seen as performance errors, failing to reflect individuals’ genuine conceptual competence with knows. In the present article, I report the results of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  23
    James R. Beebe (2015). A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):315-326.
    _ Source: _Page Count 12 In a previous article, I argued against the widespread reluctance of philosophers to treat skeptical challenges to our a priori knowledge of necessary truths with the same seriousness as skeptical challenges to our a posteriori knowledge of contingent truths. Hamid Vahid has recently offered several reasons for thinking the unequal treatment of these two kinds of skepticism is justified, one of which is a priori skepticism’s seeming dependence upon the widely scorned kk thesis. In the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. James Beebe (2012). Experimental Epistemology. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum 248-269.
    An overview of the main areas of epistemological debate to which experimental philosophers have been contributing and the larger, philosophical challenges these contributions have raised.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  11
    James R. Beebe & David Sackris (2016). Moral Objectivism Across the Lifespan. Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):912-929.
    We report the results of two studies that examine folk metaethical judgments about the objectivity of morality. We found that participants attributed almost as much objectivity to ethical statements as they did to statements of physical fact and significantly more objectivity to ethical statements than to statements about preferences or tastes. In both studies, younger participants attributed less objectivity to ethical statements than older participants. Females were observed to attribute slightly less objectivity to ethical statements than males, and we found (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  23
    James R. Beebe (2015). A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5:315-326.
    In Beebe (2011), I argued against the widespread reluctance of philosophers to treat skeptical challenges to our a priori knowledge of necessary truths with the same seriousness as skeptical challenges to our a posteriori knowledge of contingent truths. Vahid (2013) offers several reasons for thinking the unequal treatment of these two kinds of skepticism is justified, one of which is a priori skepticism’s seeming dependence upon the widely scorned KK thesis. In the present article, I defend a priori skepticism against (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. James Beebe (2008). Bonjour's Arguments Against Skepticism About the A Priori. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):243 - 267.
    I reconstruct and critique two arguments Laurence BonJour has recently offered against skepticism about the a priori. While the arguments may provide anti-skeptical, internalist foundationalists with reason to accept the a priori, I show that neither argument provides sufficient reason for believing the more general conclusion that there is no rational alternative to accepting the a priori.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  82
    James R. Beebe (2006). Reliabilism and Deflationism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):495 – 510.
    In this article I examine several issues concerning reliabilism and deflationism. I critique Alvin Goldman's account of the key differences between correspondence and deflationary theories and his claim that reliabilism can be combined only with those truth theories that maintain a commitment to truthmakers. I then consider how reliability could be analysed from a deflationary perspective and show that deflationism is compatible with reliabilism. I close with a discussion of whether a deflationary theory of knowledge is possible.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  29.  2
    James R. Beebe (2016). Evaluative Effects on Knowledge Attributions. In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Blackwell 359-367.
    Experimental philosophers have investigated various ways in which non‐epistemic evaluations can affect knowledge attributions. For example, several teams of researchers (Beebe and Buckwalter 2010; Beebe and Jensen 2012; Schaffer and Knobe 2012; Beebe and Shea 2013; Buckwalter 2014b; Turri 2014) report that the goodness or badness of an agent’s action can affect whether the agent is taken to have certain kinds of knowledge. These findings raise important questions about how patterns of folk knowledge attributions should influence philosophical theorizing about knowledge.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. James Beebe (2007). Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth. Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.
    In order to shed light on the question of whether reliabilism entails or excludes certain kinds of truth theories, I examine two arguments that purport to establish that reliabilism cannot be combined with antirealist and epistemic theories of truth. I take antirealism about truth to be the denial of the recognition-transcendence of truth, and epistemic theories to be those that identify truth with some kind of positive epistemic status. According to one argument, reliabilism and antirealism are incompatible because the former (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31.  59
    Mikkel Gerken & James R. Beebe (2016). Knowledge in and Out of Contrast. Noûs 50 (1):133-164.
    We report and discuss the results of a series of experiments that address a contrast effect exhibited by folk judgments about knowledge ascriptions. The contrast effect, which was first reported by Schaffer and Knobe, is an important aspect of our folk epistemology. However, there are competing theoretical accounts of it. We shed light on the various accounts by providing novel empirical data and theoretical considerations. Our key findings are, firstly, that belief ascriptions exhibit a similar contrast effect and, secondly, that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  26
    James R. Beebe (2001). Interpretation and Epistemic Evaluation in Goldman's Descriptive Epistemology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (2):163-186.
    One branch of Alvin Goldman's proposed "scientific epistemology" is devoted to the scientific study of how folk epistemic evaluators acquire and deploy the concepts of knowledge and justified belief. The author argues that such a "descriptive epistemology," as Goldman calls it, requires a more sophisticated theory of interpretation than is provided by the simulation theory Goldman adopts. The author also argues that any adequate account of folk epistemic concepts must reconstruct the intersubjective conceptual roles those concepts play in discursive practices. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  33.  63
    James R. Beebe (2003). Deflationism and the Value of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:391-402.
    Stephen Stich (1990) has argued that our commitment to truth is parochial, arbitrary, and idiosyncratic. Truth, according to Stich, can be analyzed in terms of reference and predicate satisfaction. If our intuitions about reference can change, this means that our concept of truth can change. If there can be many distinct concepts of truth, our seemingly unreflective commitment to the one we have inherited seems unmotivated. I argue that deflationism about truth possesses sufficient resources to turn back Stich’s skeptical challenge. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  37
    James R. Beebe, The Folk Conception of Weakness of Will.
    Philosophers have long puzzled over the phenomenon of weakness of will. Some (e.g., Socrates in the Protagoras ; Hare, 1952, 1963; Watson, 1977) have questioned whether weak-willed action is genuinely possible, since it requires that agents do one thing while sincerely believing they ought to do something else. Others have been skeptical about whether weak-willed actions can be free, since agents who display weakness of will sometimes seem to be overcome or enslaved by their desires or passions (cf. Watson 1977; (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. James Beebe, Is Consciousness Embodied?
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. James R. Beebe (2003). Andrew Newman, The Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 23 (3):195-197.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  49
    James R. Beebe (2004). Prosentential Theory of Truth. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Prosentential theorists claim that sentences such as “That’s true” are prosentences that function analogously to their better known cousins–pronouns. For example, just as we might use the pronoun ‘he’ in place of ‘James’ to transform “James went to the supermarket” into “He went to the supermarket,” so we might use the prosentenceforming operator ‘is true’ to transform “Snow is white” into “‘Snow is white’ is true.” According to the prosentential theory of truth, whenever a referring expression (for example, a definite (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  29
    James R. Beebe (2003). Attributive Uses of Prosentences. Ratio 16 (1):1–15.
    Defenders of the prosentential theory of truth claim that the English language contains prosentences which function analogously to their better known cousins – pronouns. Statements such as ‘That is true’ or ‘It is true’, they claim, inherit their content from antecedent statements, just as pronouns inherit their reference from antecedent singular terms. Prosentential theorists claim that the content of these prosentences is exhausted by the content of their antecedents. They then use the notion of the inheritance of content from an (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  6
    James R. Beebe (1997). The Epistemology of Religious Experience. By Keith E. Yandell. Modern Schoolman 74 (2):163-165.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  2
    James R. Beebe (2008). Bonjour’s Arguments Against Skepticism About the A Priori. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):243-267.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  1
    James R. Beebe (2011). A Priori Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):583-602.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. James Beebe, How Does the Good Appear to Us?
    This is a rough draft of a critical notice of Sergio Tenenbaum’s book, Appearances of the Good, for Social Theory and Practice.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. James Beebe (ed.) (2014). Advances in Experimental Epistemology. Bloomsbury.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. James R. Beebe (2014). How Different Kinds of Disagreement Impact Folk Metaethical Judgments. In Jennifer Cole Wright & Hagop Sarkissian (eds.), Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology. Bloomsbury 167-187.
    Th e present article reports a series of experiments designed to extend the empirical investigation of folk metaethical intuitions by examining how different kinds of ethical disagreement can impact attributions of objectivity to ethical claims.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. James R. Beebe (2016). Individual and Cross-Cultural Differences in Semantic Intuitions: New Experimental Findings. Journal of Cognition and Culture 16:322-357.
    In 2004 Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich published what has become one of the most widely discussed papers in experimental philosophy, in which they reported that East Asian and Western participants had different intuitions about the semantic reference of proper names. A flurry of criticisms of their work has emerged, and although various replications have been performed, many critics remain unconvinced. We review the current debate over Machery et al.’s (2004) results and take note of which (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. James Beebe (1998). Walter Jost and Michael J. Hyde, Eds., Rhetoric and Hermeneutics in Our Time. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 18:271-273.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography