This book aims to pinpoint the connection feelings have with behaviour - a connection that, while clear, has never been fully explained. Following William James, Laird argues that feelings are not the cause of behaviour but rather its consequences; the same goes for behaviour and motives and behaviour and attitudes. He presents research into feelings across the spectrum, from anger to joy to fear to romantic love, that support this against-the-grain view. Laird discusses the problem of common (...) sense, self-perception theory, the association between feelings and higher cognitive processes, and also the literature on facial expression, posture, and gaze. (shrink)
, LI, . D., F. B. A. Regius Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen LONDON QEO IGE ALLEN AND IJNWIN LTD PREFACE JOHN LAIRD did not live to ...
We present a general cognitive architecture that tightly integrates symbolic, spatial, and visual representations. A key means to achieving this integration is allowing cognition to move freely between these modes, using mental imagery. The specific components and their integration are motivated by results from psychology, as well as the need for developing a functional and efficient implementation. We discuss functional benefits that result from the combination of multiple content-based representations and the specialized processing units associated with them. Instantiating this theory, (...) we then discuss the architectural components and processes, and illustrate the resulting functional advantages in two spatially and visually rich domains. The theory is then compared to other prominent approaches in the area. (shrink)
In this reply, we respond to the comments of Palmerino and Laird on our article, "Galileo's Refutation of the Speed Distance Law of Fall Rehabilitated," published in the same issue of Centaurus.
Wisdom, J. L. Susan Stebbing, 1885-1943, an appreciation.--Acton, H. B. Moral ends and means.--Laird, J. Reflections occasioned by ideals and illusions.--Edgell, B. The way of behaviour.--Oakeley, H. D. Is there reason in history?--Mace, C. A. The logic of elucidation.--Ewing, A. C. Philosophical analysis.--Duncan-Jones, A. The concert ticket.--Black, M. Logic and semantics.--Saw, R. L. The grounds of induction in Professor Whitehead's philosophy of nature.--Russell, L. J. Epistemology and the ego-centric predicament.--Susan Stebbing: publications (p. 155-156).
Cosmides, Wason, and Johnson-Laird, among others, have suggested evidence that reasoning abilities tend to be domain specific, insofar as humans do not appear to acquire capacities for logical reasoning that are applicable across different contexts. Unfortunately, the significance of these findings depends upon the specific variety of logical reasoning under consideration. Indeed, there seem to be at least three grounds for doubting such conclusions, since: (1) tests of reasoning involving the use of material conditionals may not be appropriate for (...) representing ordinary thinking, especially when it concerns causal processes involving the use of causal conditionals instead; (2) tests of domain specificity may fail to acknowledge the crucial role fulfilled by rules of inference, such as modus ponens and modus tollens, which appear to be completely general across different contexts; and, (3) tests that focus exclusively upon deductive reasoning may misinterpret findings involving the use of inductive reasoning, which is of primary importance for human evolution. (shrink)
This article reports on a study of children's deductive reasoning in solving novel relational problems. Detailed protocols were obtained from 264 children (aged 9- 12 years) who verbalised their thinking as they solved the problems. The study included the development of a three-phase theory based on Johnson-Laird and Byrne's mental models perspective, but with some distinct modifications. These include a focus on the relational complexity entailed in model construction and in premise integration, and the advancement of four reasoning principles (...) that are applied throughout problem solution (in contrast to Johnson-Laird's falsification processes as the hallmark of deductive reasoning). The reported case studies and the results of statistical analyses supported predictions arising from the proposed theory, including the key role of the reasoning principles. The results also showed that problem difficulty is a function of relational complexity, not of the number of models to be constructed, as argued by Johnson-Laird and Byrne. (shrink)
This paper reports three studies of temporal reasoning. A problem of the following sort, where the letters denote common everyday events: A happens before B. C happens before B. D happens while B. E happens while C. What is the relation between D and EEfficacylls for at least two alternative models to be constructed in order to give the right answer for the right reason (D happens after E). However, the (...) first premise is irrelevant to this answer, and so if reasoners were to ignore it, then they would need to construct only one model. Experiment 1 showed that one-model problems were answered faster and more accurately than multiple-model problems. When the question preceded the premises in the statement of the multiple-model problems there was a slight tendency for the latencies of response to speed up in the predicted way. Experiment 2 modified the procedure, in part by using practice problems with many irrelevant premises, so that reasoners might grasp the advantage of ignoring them. Its results showed that when the premises preceded the question, the multiple-model problems were significantly harder than one-model problems. But when the question was presented first, the difference was significantly reduced in line with the theory's prediction. Experiment 3 used only problems with valid conclusions (i.e., one-model problems and multiple-model problems), and so the construction of multiple models was never necessary. However, there was still a significant difference between one-model problems and multiple-model problems. (shrink)
