Freud saw the dream as occupying a very important position in his theoretical model. If there were to be problems with his theoretical account of the dream then this would impinge upon proposed therapy and, of course, education as the right balance between the instincts and the institution of culture. Wittgenstein, whilst stating that Freud was interesting and important, raised several issues in relation to psychology/psychoanalysis, and to Freud in particular. Why would Wittgenstein have seen Freud as having some important (...) things to say, even though he was sharply critical of Freud's claims to be scientific? The major issues to be considered in this paper are, in Section 1, the scientific status of Freud's work—was it science or was it more like philosophy than science; the analysis of dreams; rationality, and dreams and madness. Section 2 considers Freud and education, including the indignity of Freud's notion of 'the talking cure.' Section 3 considers psychoanalytic explanations not as theory but as a manner of speaking: 'une façon de parler.'. (shrink)
Critical thinking, considered as a version of informallogic, must consider emotions and personal attitudesin assessing assertions and conclusions in anyanalysis of discourse. It must therefore presupposesome notion of the self. Critical theory may be seenas providing a substantive and non-neutral positionfor the exercise of critical thinking. It thereforemust presuppose some notion of the self. This paperargues for a Foucauldean position on the self toextend critical theory and provide a particularposition on the self for critical thinking. Thisposition on the self is (...) developed from moretraditional accounts of the self from Descartes toSchopenhauer, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. (shrink)
Lyotard talks of performativity or the subsumption of education to the efficient functioning of the social system. Education is no longer to be concerned with the pursuit of ideals such as that of personal autonomy or emancipation, but with the means, techniques or skills that contribute to the efficient operation of the state in the world market and contribute to maintaining the internal cohesion and legitimation of the state. But this requires individuals of a certain kind -- not Kantian autonomous (...) persons but Foucault's normalized and governable individuals. In constituting such individuals discourse is critically important. But how discourse effects this through the force of language is not fully developed by Foucault. This paper draws upon the performative account of language offered by John Austin to develop more fully comments made by Foucault on the force or effects of language in constituting normalized and governable individuals for the march of performativity. (shrink)
Recent curriculum âreformâ in western educational systems has seen a major emphasis on electronic technology, but reform literature seldom problematises the form that this new education should take in this new mode of information. From the particular case of New Zealand it is argued that knowledge has been replaced by information, knowing that (something is the case) by knowing how (acquiring skills), while electronic writing tends to be treated as a mere extension of print literacy. However, the information economy is (...) a major force restructuring not only the curriculum but, also, our social and cultural relations, established notions of knowledge, authority, and rights, and our notions of subjectivity. The purpose of this paper is to problematise this move to information in the new electronic technologies. (shrink)
Abstract In his paper ?The compatibility of punishment and moral education?, Hobson (1986) attempts to refute arguments which I had advanced (Marshall, 1984) to the effect that there were incompatibilities between claims to be morally educating children and to be punishing them. I wish to point out in Hobson's paper some questionable interpretations of the punishment literature and a serious flaw in the argument. More importantly, I wish to advance the debate by recourse to historical material and the work of (...) Michel Foucault, as opposed to abstract philosophical argument alone. Foucault argues that the practices of punishment have changed and that the legal notion of punishment (Hobson, 1986) is inappropriate for the description of what he calls disciplinary punishment. This notion best describes what we do to children. Hence claims to be punishing (legal notion) fit uneasily with claims to be developing rational autonomy. (shrink)
We describe an evaluation undertaken on contract for the New Zealand State Services Commission of a major project (the Administrative Decision-Making Skills Project) designed to produce a model of administrative decision making and an associated teaching/learning packagefor use by government officers. It describes the evaluation of a philosophical model of decision making and the associated teaching/learning package in the setting of the New Zealand Public Service, where a deliberate attempt has been initiated to improve the quality of decision making, especially (...) in relation to moral factors. (shrink)
Abstract The central argument of this paper is that it is inconsistent to both morally educate children and to punish them. This is because the aims of punishment, according to the traditional theories, are, in the case of children, incompatible with the aims of moral education. Finally it is suggested that as no obvious general justification of the punishment of children is forthcoming, therefore the onus of justification must rest with those who, in a particular case, wish to punish children.