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James F. Sennett [16]James Fulton Sennett [1]
  1. James F. Sennett, The Ice Man Cometh: Lt. Comander Data and the Turing Test.
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  2. James F. Sennett, Brandt's Search for Rational Desires.
  3. James F. Sennett (2005). Review of Denys Turner, Faith, Reason, and the Existence of God. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (7).
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  4. James F. Sennett (1999). Is There Freedom In Heaven? Faith and Philosophy 16 (1):69-82.
    This paper examines the dilemma of heavenly freedom. If there is freedom in heaven, then it seems that there is the possibility of evil in heaven, which violates standard intuitions. If there is not, then heaven is lacking a good significant enough that it would justify God in creating free beings, despite the evil they might cause. But then how can God be justified in omitting such a good from heaven? To resolve this dilemma, I present the Proximate Conception of (...)
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  5. Alvin Plantinga & James F. Sennett (1998). The Analytic Theist a Collection of Alvin Plantinga's Work in Philosophy of Religion. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  6. James F. Sennett (1998). Direct Justification and Universal Sanction. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:257-287.
    In this paper I demonstrate the need for a plausible theory of direct justification (epistemic justification without propositional evidence) by discussing the pitfalls of skepticism and relativism that await theories dedicated to either of two extremes. I also survey two attempts to navigate between these extremes, and point out shortcomings that leave both of them wanting. I then present my own theory against this background---a theory grounded in a property I call universal sanction. I argue that universal sanction is necessary (...)
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  7. James F. Sennett (1995). Theism and Other Minds: On the Falsifiability of Non-Theories. Topoi 14 (2):149-160.
    In this paper I consider three necessary conditions for a proposition counting as a theory: that the proposition be posited for its explanatory power; that it derive its feasibility from the extent to which it provides such explanatory power; and that it be empirically falsifiable. I then argue that some propositions might fail as theories because they do not satisfy the first two conditions, yet still satisfy the third condition. Such propositions I label falsifiable non-theories. I offer folk psychology (the (...)
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  8. James F. Sennett (1994). Faith and Reason From Plato to Plantinga. Faith and Philosophy 11 (2):342-348.
  9. James F. Sennett (1994). Is God Essentially God? Religious Studies 30 (3):295 - 303.
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  10. James F. Sennett (1994). Is God Essentially God?: JAMES F. SENNETT. Religious Studies 30 (3):295-303.
    If theism is true, then there exists a being to which we appropriately refer with the term ‘God’. This point is analytic. Any object to which we appropriately refer with the term ‘God’ bears certain properties – e.g. omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection. While the analyticity of this point may be a matter of debate, I find no problem granting its necessary truth , at least for the purposes of this paper. There are properties essential to the appropriate wearing of (...)
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  11. James F. Sennett (1993). The Inscrutable Evil Defense Against the Inductive Argument From Evil. Faith and Philosophy 10 (2):220-229.
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  12. James F. Sennett (1992). Toward a Compatibility Theory for Internalist and Externalist Epistemologies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):641-655.
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  13. James F. Sennett (1992). Why Think There Are Any True Counterfactuals of Freedom? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 32 (2):105 - 116.
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  14. James F. Sennett (1991). The Free Will Defense and Determinism. Faith and Philosophy 8 (3):340-353.
    Edward Wierenga has argued that the free will defense (FWD) is compatible with compatibilism (IFaith and PhilosophyD, April 1988). I maintain that Wierenga is mistaken. I distinguish between the IconceptualD doctrine of compatibilism and the ImetaphysicalD doctrine of soft determinism, and offer arguments that the FWD fails if either doctrine is true. Finally, I reconstruct Wierenga's argument and argue that it fails because either it is equivocal or it contains a false premise.
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  15. James F. Sennett (1991). Universe Indexed Properties and the Fate of the Ontological Argument. Religious Studies 27 (1):65 - 79.
    If the contemporary rebirth of the ontological argument had its conception in Norman Malcolm's discovery of a second Anselmian argument it had its full-term delivery as a healthy philosophical progeny with Alvin Plantinga's sophisticated modal version presented in the tenth chapter of The Nature of Necessity . This latter argument has been the centre of a huge body of literature over the last fifteen years, and deservedly so. One is impressed that this version of Anselm's jewel is valid and sound (...)
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  16. James F. Sennett (1989). God and Possible Worlds: On What There Must Be. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):285-297.
    Charles sayward has taken alvin plantinga to task for what he sees to be an invalid modal ontological argument in chapter 10 of "the nature of necessity". I begin by examining sayward's complaint and demonstrating that plantinga has anticipated and blocked it in his argument for what he later calls "serious actualism"--The thesis that no objects bear properties in worlds in which they do not exist. I then show how plantinga could block sayward even without this thesis. Finally, I examine (...)
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