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James M. Joyce [17]James Michael Joyce [1]
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Profile: "Jim", "James" "James M." Joyce (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)
  1. James M. Joyce (2010). A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making1. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.
  2. James M. Joyce (1998). A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
    The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epistemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the laws of probability are invariably less accurate than they could be otherwise. (...)
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  3. James M. Joyce (2005). How Probabilities Reflect Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153–178.
  4. James M. Joyce (2012). Regret and Instability in Causal Decision Theory. Synthese 187 (1):123-145.
    Andy Egan has recently produced a set of alleged counterexamples to causal decision theory in which agents are forced to decide among causally unratifiable options, thereby making choices they know they will regret. I show that, far from being counterexamples, CDT gets Egan's cases exactly right. Egan thinks otherwise because he has misapplied CDT by requiring agents to make binding choices before they have processed all available information about the causal consequences of their acts. I elucidate CDT in a way (...)
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  5.  58
    James M. Joyce (2002). Levi on Causal Decision Theory and the Possibility of Predicting One's Own Actions. Philosophical Studies 110 (1):69 - 102.
    Isaac Levi has long criticized causal decisiontheory on the grounds that it requiresdeliberating agents to make predictions abouttheir own actions. A rational agent cannot, heclaims, see herself as free to choose an actwhile simultaneously making a prediction abouther likelihood of performing it. Levi is wrongon both points. First, nothing in causaldecision theory forces agents to makepredictions about their own acts. Second,Levi's arguments for the ``deliberation crowdsout prediction thesis'' rely on a flawed modelof the measurement of belief. Moreover, theability of agents (...)
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  6.  84
    James M. Joyce (2010). Causal Reasoning and Backtracking. Philosophical Studies 147 (1):139 - 154.
    I argue that one central aspect of the epistemology of causation, the use of causes as evidence for their effects, is largely independent of the metaphysics of causation. In particular, I use the formalism of Bayesian causal graphs to factor the incremental evidential impact of a cause for its effect into a direct cause-to-effect component and a backtracking component. While the “backtracking” evidence that causes provide about earlier events often obscures things, once we our restrict attention to the cause-to-effect component (...)
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  7. James M. Joyce (2007). Are Newcomb Problems Really Decisions? Synthese 156 (3):537 - 562.
    Richard Jeffrey long held that decision theory should be formulated without recourse to explicitly causal notions. Newcomb problems stand out as putative counterexamples to this ‘evidential’ decision theory. Jeffrey initially sought to defuse Newcomb problems via recourse to the doctrine of ratificationism, but later came to see this as problematic. We will see that Jeffrey’s worries about ratificationism were not compelling, but that valid ratificationist arguments implicitly presuppose causal decision theory. In later work, Jeffrey argued that Newcomb problems are not (...)
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  8.  93
    Alan Hájek & James M. Joyce (2008). Confirmation. In S. Psillos & M. Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Routledge
    Confirmation theory is intended to codify the evidential bearing of observations on hypotheses, characterizing relations of inductive “support” and “counter­support” in full generality. The central task is to understand what it means to say that datum E confirms or supports a hypothesis H when E does not logically entail H.
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  9.  22
    James M. Joyce (2015). The Value of Truth: A Reply to Howson. Analysis 75 (3):413-424.
    Colin Howson has recently argued that accuracy arguments for probabilism fail because they assume a privileged ‘coding’ in which TRUE is assigned the value 1 and FALSE is assigned the value 0. I explain why this is wrong by first showing that Howson’s objections are based on a misconception about the way in which degrees of confidence are measured, and then reformulating the accuracy argument in a way that manifestly does not depend on the coding of truth-values. Along the way, (...)
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  10.  82
    James M. Joyce (2000). Why We Still Need the Logic of Decision. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):13.
    In The Logic of Decision Richard Jeffrey defends a version of expected utility theory that advises agents to choose acts with an eye to securing evidence for thinking that desirable results will ensue. Proponents of "causal" decision theory have argued that Jeffrey's account is inadequate because it fails to properly discriminate the causal features of acts from their merely evidential properties. Jeffrey's approach has also been criticized on the grounds that it makes it impossible to extract a unique probability/utility representation (...)
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  11.  70
    James M. Joyce (2007). Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (2):187 - 206.
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  12.  28
    James M. Joyce (2004). The Development of Subjective Bayesianism. In Dov M. Gabbay, John Woods & Akihiro Kanamori (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic. Elsevier 10--415.
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  13.  17
    James M. Joyce (2007). ``Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance&Quot. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):187-206.
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  14.  18
    James M. Joyce (2003). Paul Weirich, Decision Space: Multidimensional Decision Analysis:Decision Space: Multidimensional Decision Analysis. Ethics 113 (4):914-919.
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  15.  1
    James M. Joyce (2007). Are Newcomb Problems Really Decisions? Synthese 156 (3):537-562.
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  16. James M. Joyce (2007). Meeting of the Aristotelian Society Held at Senate House, University of London, on 5 March 2007 at 4: 15 Pm. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (Part 2):187.
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  17.  39
    James M. Joyce (1999). The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge University Press.
    This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book solves (...)
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